Book Title: Outlines of Indian Philosophy
Author(s): M Hiriyanna
Publisher: George Allen and Unwin Ltd

Previous | Next

Page 164
________________ 2 must be chararen treball 2164 . QUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Sorino - 27 waccording to Jainism, are only partially true and each becomes a dogma as soon as it is understood to represent the whole truth about reality. Equally dogmatic in the eyes of the Jains are two other views which also we come across occasionally in the Upanişads and which maintained that, because neither Being nor non-Being is the truth, reality must be characterized by both or neitheri- thus adding, with characteristic love for subtlety, two more alternatives - both is..and 'is not,' and neither 'is' nor 'is not to the well-known ones of 'is' and 'is not.' The Jains think that reality is so complex in its structure that while every one of these views is true as far as it goes, none is completely so. Its precise nature baffles all attempts to describe it directly and once for all; but it is not impossible to make it known through a series of partially true statements without committing ourselves to any one among them exclusively. Accordingly the Jains enunciate its nature in seven steps, described as the sapta-bhangi or 'the seven-fold formula. Its several steps are: (1) Maybe, is (Syät asti). A (2) Maybe, is not (Syát năsti). (3) Maybe, is and is not (Syät asti năsti). At (4) Maybe, is inexpressible (Syát avaktavyah). Rel ', (5) Maybe, is and is inexpressible (Syat asti ca avaktavyah). (6) Maybe, is not and is inexpressible (Syāt nāsti ca avaktavyah). (7) Maybe, is, is not and is inexpressible (Syät asti ca năsti ca avaktavyah). If we consider for example an object A, we may say that it is, but it is only in a sense, viz. as A and not also as B. Owing to the indefinite nature of reality, what is now or here A, may become B sometime hence or elsewhere. Thus we must remember when we posit A, that we are not stating absolutely what the nature is of the reality underlying it. So far as its material cause is concerned, a thing has always existed and will always continue to exist; but the particular + Mundaka Up., II. i. T; Svetāśvatara Up. iv. 18. See BP. P. 137 and also the passage from Samyuttaka-Nikdya, quoted in Oldenberg's Buddha, P. 249.

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419