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206 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY known may be identical. All knowledge is thus only selfknowledge and the distinction felt between jñāna and content is a delusion, comparable to the single moon illusorily appearing double. A third support which the Yogācāra cites in favour of his view is the invariable association (sahopalambha-niyama) existing between cognition and its content. Thoughts and things always appear together; and neither without the other. There is consequently no need to assume that they are distinct, and they may well be viewed as different phases of one and the same factor. Lastly, it is argued that the so-called objects are seen to impress different persons differently and even the same person at different times--a circumstance which would be inexplicable if the objects were real, each having its own defined character. The arguments are much the same as those commonly advanced whenever subjectivism is sought to be maintained, except for the additional circumstance that everything is conceived here as momentary. But they are by no means convincing. To take the last of them as an example: It is stated that objects of experience cannot have any intrinsic nature, for no two persons agree in their perceptions of them. The argument assumes not only that there is no agreement whatever between one perceiver and another in this respect, but also that when anything is presented, it must be apprehended precisely as it is. But it is forgotten that the content apprehended may have a subjective side and may, at the same time, point to a real object outside. Individual variations in the matter of perception do not, therefore, necessarily mean the non-existence of external objects. Yet the Yogācāra reasoning has a negative force which cannot be easily thrust aside. They point to the indemonstrability of the opposite view maintained in realism.
The second school of Buddhistic idealism which we have to consider is known as the Madhyamika.. In one sense it is 1 Cf. SV. p. 286, st. 59. This argument is common to the two idealistic schools of Buddhism. 2 Strictly it is the followers of the school that are 'Madhyamikas, the doctrine itself being known as Madhyamaka. See ERE. vol. viii. 'Madhyamaka.' The term signifies an adherent of the 'middle path, which is a distinctive feature of Buddhism. See p. 132 ante.
