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396 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY utility as the criterion of truth. But there is one important difference. Rāmānuja admits the cognitive, yalue of knowledge apart from the practical, whereas Pragmatism in its familiar form makes no such distinction. Even in error, there is some revelation of reality so that in adopting the pragmatic attitude he does not relinquish the logical. In fact, knowledge according to him has not one but two functions to perform to reveal reality and to serve the purposes of practical life. Both are equally important; and if either is to be emphasized more than the other, it would undoubtedly be the former. In other words, Rāmānuja, unlike the pragmatist, is interested in truth for its own sake and values knowledge 'more for the light it brings than for the fruits it bears.
The theory which we have so far sketched very much alters the nature of the epistemological problem. The question to be decided about knowledge is not whether it is logically valid or not-for by deficiency in this respect knowledge would lose its very title to that name—but whether it has or has not a bearing upon practical life. In other words, it is not quality that varies in knowledge but relevancy. If we take this along with what was stated above, viz. that even truth commonly reveals reality only incompletely, we see that the sat-khyāti doctrine contains the suggestion of an ideal form of knowledge which is not only valid and has practical value but is also complete or all-comprehensive. This ideal of perfect knowledge, which we may deduce from the premises of sat-khyāti, is actually recognized by Rāmānuja as characterizing the jiva in mokşa. Throughout samsāra, jñāna operates under limitations for defects of one kind or another interfere with its free activity. Consequently common knowledge, including pramā or truth, only half reveals reality. Its full revelation is possible only in mokşa when all deficiencies are overcome and all possibility of error is removed. Man's vision then becomes extended to the maximum. 'It blossoms to the full,' enabling the liberated to know everything fully and as it is. As regards pramāņas, Rāmānuja recognizes only three:
Compare the kevala-jñāna of Jainism (p. 159).
