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VIŠIŞTĀDVAITA
395 are confounded with the corresponding objects of the waking state, and this deficiency when discovered exposes their falsity. In the second place, it should comprehend the preponderating element in the object presented. The object we call shell may contain silver, but the shell part predominates in it; and it is this predominance that explains its being put to use as the one and not as the other. The silver, though certainly present, does not count practically on account of its slightness (alpatva); and this feature when discovered reveals the erroneous character of the knowledge in question. Pramā not only apprehends rightly so far as it goes, but also goes far enough to be of service in life. Bhrama also is right so far as it goes; but it does not go far enough and therefore fails to help us in the manner in which we expect it to do. So when erroneous knowledge disappears and truth comes to be known, as Rāmānuja's commentator says, the object (artha) is not negated but only activity (pravstti) is arrested. The discovery of error, as we said in connection with Prabhākara's view (p. 317), affects the reactive side of consciousness, not its receptive side.
Two important corollaries follow from such a view. The practical activities of life do not require a complete knowledge of our surroundings. It is enough if we know them approximately fully. In other words, purposive thought is selective, not exhaustive; and partial or imperfect knowledge is not necessarily a hindrance to the attainment of the common ends of life. The doctrine also recognizes a social or inter-subjective side to knowledge. So far as theoretic certainty is concerned, there is no need to appeal from the individual to common consciousness; for, as we have more than once remarked, it is in the very nature of knowledge without reference to its being peculiar to one or common to many to point to reality; but its serviceability depends upon the general though tacit testimony of society-upon the 'common sense of mankind. These observations are sure to suggest a likeness between the doctrine of sat-khyāti and what is now known as Pragmatism, Both recognize the instrumental character of knowledge and adopt practical
JHäna-phala-bhūta-pravstti-badhyatvam: SB. (com.) p. 185.
