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VEDANTA (A) ADVAITA
375 Brahman has been elaborated in thought and it therefore remains a reality for thought. It is Brahman in 'an empiric dress'--the Absolute as it appears to us, and not as it is in itself. Its internal self-discrepancy to which we have drawn attention is in fact the result of its relation to thought. It is, as it is expressed, jñeya Brahman or Brahman that can be known. In itself, it excludes all relations (asamsrsta), including that between subject and object, and is therefore unknowable. But though it cannot be known it can, as we shall point out presently, be realized.
One should therefore be careful in understanding what exactly is meant when the Upanişads describe Brahman as nirguna and therefore as indefinable and unknowable. It is not in every sense beyond the reach of words. To suppose that it is so would be to deprive the Upanişads of the whole of their purpose. Even granting that the negative definition is the only possible one, it does not follow that the nirguna Brahman is a blank. For all propositions directly or indirectly refer to reality and negation necessarily has its own positive implication. As a matter of fact, however, the Advaitins assign Upanişadic statements like neti neti-'Not this, nor that'-a secondary place while the primary place is given to those like Tattvam asi, which point to the reality in us as the ultimate. That is, the negative statement is not to be understood in isolation, but along with positive ones like Tat tvam asi. Negation is only a preliminary to affirmation. It means that the Absolute is not conceived here objectively as merely inferred from outer phenomena; but as revealing itself within us,3 This alters totally the significance of the negative description, for we are thereby constrained to admit not only its positive character but also its spiritual
Being the Absolute in the true sense of the term, it may appear as 'nothing' to the dull-witted (manda-buddhi) as Sarkara says (see com. on Ch. Up. VIII. i. 1). Compare: 'I still insist that for thought what is not relative is nothing --Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 30. 1 See Samksepa-säriraka, i. 250-6. 3 If an objective reality be negatively described and all knowable features are abstracted from it, we may conclude that there is nothing of it left behind. The observation that 'pure being is pure nothing'
