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OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
them-their non-phenomenal ground (nirvisesa-vastu). It is for this reason that Samkara describes his doctrine as advaita or 'non-duality,' and not as aikya or 'unity.' By discarding the notion of bhedabheda or, more specifically, by refusing to accept a changing Brahman as ultimate, Samkara differentiates his doctrine from Brahma-pariņāmavada advocated by other Vedantins according to whom both the physical universe and the jivas actually emerge from Brahman. Brahman according to him does not evolve in this sense, but only gives rise to appearances which, though entirely depending upon it, affect it no more than the silver does the shell in which it appears. He thus enunciates a new view of causation which is different from both the pariņāma-vāda and the arambha-vāda with which we are familiar. According to it, the cause produces the effect without itself undergoing any change whatsoever. It vada or the doctrine of phenomenal development. Viewed in the light of this theory, Brahman only appears as the world. It is the original of which the world, as it has been said, may be regarded as 'a translation at the plane of space-time'; and Brahman depends as little for its being on the world as an original work does on its translation. This is what is otherwise known as the Maya doctrine. 3 Though the doctrine as it appears here naturally shows considerable development in matters of detail, it has, as we have pointed out (p. 63), a definite basis in the Upanisads. The charge that it is alien to the Vedanta is therefore really without foundation. Again, by postulating a Reality behind the self-discrepant world of experience, Samkara differentiates his doctrine from the sanya-vada of the Madhyamika. The discrepancy charac terizing the saguna Brahman or its relativity only degrades it to the level of appearance; it does not dismiss it altogether. If according to the Madhyamika it is impossible for thought
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Some like Bhaskara take the universe alone as the pariņāma of Brahman and not the jivas also.
2 IP. vol. ii. 570.
3 If the Advaitin sometimes uses terms implying belief in pariņāma, he should be understood as speaking from the empirical standpoint. See Samkara on VS. II. i. 14 and Bhamati on I. iv. 27.
