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VEDANTA (A) ADVAITA
371 but the solution is only apparent, for it merely shifts the difficulty to another set of things. It assumes that M and N are characterized by a x and a y respectively, and the assumption leaves us where we were, for we cannot satisfactorily explain the relation between a thing and its so-called characteristics. Now the relation between M and a x, to take only one of the entities, cannot be identity, for then the distinction between a amd x would vanish, both being identical with the same M; and with it also the relation of identity-in-difference between M and N. Nor can a and * be different from M, for then their character, whatever it may be, will cease to affect M and therefore also its relation to N. So we are driven to think of identityin-difference as the only possible relation between these. That is, in explaining the relation in question between M and N, we presuppose the same relation within each of them; and pursuing the inquiry further will only lead to an infinite process.
For such reasons the Advaitin views the relation between the saguna Brahman and its constitutive elements as unique or as tādātmya in the sense explained in the previous section not to be characterized as identity or difference or identity-in-difference. Hence the conception of saguņa Brahman involves adhyāsa, and like that of Isvara cannot be regarded as ultimate. Or to state it differently, the saguna Brahman includes not merely reality but also appearance, which is something less than the real. The element of reality in it is the ultimate of Advaita. It should be carefully noted that this reality is not the mere unity underlying the diversity of the universe, for unity and diversity are relative to each other, and it is impossible to retain the one as real while rejecting the other as an appearance. Both of them are alike appearances and the advaitic Ultimate is what is beyond
" It does not alter the matter if M and N, instead of being two objects, are two moments in the history of one and the same object, say P. The argument would still be applicable to them, the only difference being that what are described as identical features are truly so in the latter, but are only similar and remain separate in the former.