Book Title: Outlines of Indian Philosophy
Author(s): M Hiriyanna
Publisher: George Allen and Unwin Ltd

Previous | Next

Page 246
________________ 246 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY and upamāna--all coming under pramāņa, the first of Gautama's categories. The transformation is complete in Gangesa's Tattva-cintamani where the Nyāya becomes preeminently a pramāņa-śāstra, casting off for the most part its features as a vāda-vidyā. The epistemological standpoint adopted from the beginning in the Nyaya thus comes to be emphasized and the dialectical character of Gautama's scheme, so far as it remains, is subordinated to it. II We have seen that in India psychology never succeeded in getting itself separated from philosophy. Accordingly each system has its own psychology which is coloured by its metaphysics. The Nyāya-Vaiseșika believes in a permanent self and makes consciousness, which it describes as the basis of all life's activity, one of its possible attributes. In addition to this, five other specific attributes which the self may have, have a bearing upon psychology. They are, 'love' (rāga), 'aversion' (dveşa), pleasure' (sukha), 'pain' (duhkha) and 'volition' (yatna). Of these six attributes, jñana and vatna correspond to cognition and conation; and the remaining four may be viewed as roughly representing what would now be described as the affective side of the mind. Love and hatred are the result of pleasure and pain respectively. We like things that have given us pleasure and dislike those we associate with pain. But while in modern psychology these three phases are not regarded as in reality separate and the mind is looked upon as a unity, in the Nyāya-Vaisesika the distinction between them is taken to be fundamental. The three attributes of cognition, feeling and volition are in any specific case supposed to manifest themselves in the self in a particular order: first, knowledge; then, desire; and last, volition. We have to know a thing before we can feel the want of it, and it is to satisfy that want that we will to act. Feeling thus mediates between cognition and conation. There is not much that is psychologically important which we find stated in the system about feeling and volition. It · TS. p. 21. * Jänāti icchati yatate.

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419