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as he likes. Here, on the other hand, the first promulgator of the Veda in every cycle who is God repeats it anew, but precisely as it was in earlier cycles. That is, the Veda is selfexistent in this view also; only it is not the self-same Veda that always is, but a series of what may be described as re-issues of an eternal edition which goes back to beginningless time. This, it will be seen, is not in substance different from the Mimamsa view, excepting that it finds a place for God in the doctrine.
(ii) Samkara, following Kumārila, admits sabda to be a Pramana outside the Veda also; but he does not restrict its independent logical validity, within the Veda, to injunctive statements (p. 318). Assertive propositions found there may be equally valid, so that there is nothing in the nature of the Veda as verbal testimony to preclude it from treating directly of matters of fact (bhūta-vastu) like Brahman or the highest reality. Statements like Tat tvam asi which occur in the Upanisads thereby acquire independent logical value here; and there is no need to subordinate them in one way or another to ritualistic commands as in the Mimāmsā.
(iii) The truth revealed by the scriptures, contrary to what the Mimāmsaka thinks, is here the fundamental unity of Being. We shall see later in what sense this unity is to be understood in the Advaita, and may now consider the place in the scheme of pramāņas of perception which seems to vouch for the truth of diversity and thus to come into conflict with the teaching of revelation that all is one. The primary aim of perception, like that of the other pramāņas, is, according to Samkara, to serve empirical purposes. It gives no guarantee for metaphysical validity, so that what we commonly hold real may not be truly so. 'Common knowledge is true,' he says, 'so long only as the identity of oneself with Brahman is not realized, as dreams are until one does not awake.' In other words, the transcendental ideality of the world does not exclude its empirical reality.3 Such a view considerably modifies the notion of inherent validity (svataḥ
1 Cf. Naiskarmya-siddhi, ii. 5; iii. 44 and 83-6. 3 See Deussen: System of the Vedanta, p. 55. Cf. Samkara at the end of his com. on VS. I. i. 4.
2 VS. II. i. 14. stanzas cited by
