________________
VEDANTA (A) ADVAITA
367 religion-standing for an all-knowing almighty God, the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world; the latter, not being so, as that of advaitic philosophy-standing for the Absolute which explains the world-system as it is. When we consider the universe in reference to this supreme subject, there is only one type of reality in place of the two found in the case of the jiva; and that is of the phenomenal or prātibhāsika type. For by hypothesis whatever is, is known to Isvara and no part of it lasts longer than the time during which it is experienced. In this sense, Isvara may be described as an eternal dreamer. But we must not think that he is deluded. That would be so if he did not realize the identity of the objective world with himself, or if any aspect of the truth about it remained unrevealed to him. What is meant by describing Isvara's world as prātibhāsika is that its unity with himself being always realized, all variety as such is known to him to be a mere abstraction. It is just this distinction between the relation of the world to Isvara on the one hand and to the jiva on the other that critics overlook when they say that according to Samkara the objective world is unreal. It is no doubt an appearance to Isvara, but not to us who have not realized its unity with ourselves. Till we are able to do so and make our life a mirror of our new convictions, we must view it as real whatever its ultimate nature may be.
(4) Time.-We have so far assumed an entity like time and taken it as lying outside the remaining three. It really represents the relation between spirit and Māyā. Of these, the former alone is completely real and not Māyā also. Hence the relation between them, like that between the shell and silver, cannot be fully real. That is, time is phenomenal. In this connection it is necessary to point out the advaitic view of space. It is regarded as an offshoot of Māyā and the first object to be created, so that the Advaitin does not place time and space on the same footing. Its conception presupposes the principle of causation already at work, but not so the conception of time. While all things born, excepting * See Vana-mala on Sāmkara's com. on Tait. Up., p. 131 (Srirangam Edn.).
Tait. Up. ii. 1.
