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248 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY sense as elsewhere in Indian philosophy, but also the manas. The last is the means of experiencing pain, pleasure, hunger, etc. Thus the manas is not only an aid in the acquisition of knowledge through the other senses; it is also a direct means of securing for the self the knowledge of certain internal states. The senses, excepting the manas which is both simple and ultimate, are explained here as derived from single elements (bhautika)—the sense of sight, from fireatoms; the sense of taste, from water-atoms; the sense of touch, from air-atoms; and the sense of smell, from earthatoms. The sense of hearing is ākāśa itself, but as delimited by the corresponding physical organ, the ear (karņa-śaskuli). The principle underlying the explanation is that like only can affect like-since without kinship between a sense and its object its distinctive capacity cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. The organ of sight alone for example apprehends colour, for it alone is made of tejas-atoms whose characteristic quality is colour. This, by the way, is how the doctrine maintains the objective character of the secondary qualities-a point to which we have already alluded.
What are the kinds of objects that can be known through pratyaksa? That some qualities and actions out of the seven categories are apprehended directly needs no special mention. But does pratyaksa apprehend any of the objects falling under the remaining categories? Here the system holds certain peculiar views which we must now consider: (1) Realists commonly believe that the existence of substances is inferred or indirectly known after their attributes are perceived. The Nyāya-Vaiseşika considers that substances also are directly cognized. But not all the senses are capable of doing this. In regard to external substances, it is only the organs of sight and touch that can do so, and in regard to the internal, viz. the self, it is the manas. In other words, while all the indriyas can sense, some can perceive also. This position is not merely assumed; attempts are made to substantiate it by a reference to experiences like the following: 'I am now touching what I saw.' Here what the two senses are able to apprehend are clearly different, but yet an identity is experienced which is explained
