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314 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY the term akhyāti, which is literally equivalent to 'no knowledge,' is applied to Prabhākara's theory to indicate that error, according to it, is not a unit of knowledge, but a composite of two jñānas. When shell is mistaken for silver and we say to ourselves, 'This is silver,' the 'this' is actually perceived as also certain features of the shell which it possesses in common with silver. The knowledge of those features revives in our mind the impression of a former experience and we recollect silver. The so-called error here really consists of these two jñānas-perception immediately followed by memory. Of these the first is true so far as it goes, though it may not go sufficiently far. Its object 'this is not sublated afterwards since, even when the error is discovered, we feel 'This is shell.' The same, no doubt, cannot be said of the second jñāna because its object, silver, is not found in the given context. But in this it only exhibits its normal character; for it is memory-although we at the time lose sight of that fact (smộti-pramosa)2-and does not as such signify that the object is present then. That is, the former knowledge claims to be valid and the claim is justified; the latter does not put forward any such claim at all. Indeed, Prabhākara does not admit that knowledge can ever play false to its logical nature; and there is consequently no error, according to him, in the common acceptance of the term. In what passes for error, we overlook the fact that there are two jñānas;3 and, as a natural consequence, we also fail to notice the separateness of their respective objects. This failure to know, however, cannot by itself account for the 'error'; because, if it did, errors would occur in dreamless sleep, which also is characterized by absence of knowledge. The negative factor of failure is therefore viewed as operating
Strictly this should be 'samvit. But to secure uniformity of terminology in considering this topic of truth and error in the two schools, we use 'jñana.' · Dreams, according to Prabhākara, are memory without the consciousness at the time that they are so. See NM. P. 179. 3 Recognition likewise partakes of the character of both perception and memory, but one is aware at the time of the recollective element there. It is therefore different from the instance we are considering. See SD. P. 45.
+ PP. iv. st. 5.
