________________
NYAYA-VAISESIKA
251 that a cow is white, we must, it is assumed, necessarily have perceived previously a cow by itself, the whiteness by itself, and the relation of samavāya between them also by itself. So the savikalpaka becomes a process of compounding units separately given and not one of discrimination within a mass." The fact of this preliminary cognition, however, it is admitted, is not a matter of which we become directly aware; it is only the result of logical deduction from a fundamental postulate of the system. The savikalpaka, on the other hand, is a matter of observation and is given in introspection. We become aware of it not as it arises, but Tater in a second knowledge termed anuvyavasāya (after knowledge'). We first know the object, and then, if we choose, we may become conscious of this fact, i.e. of the self as characterized by the jñāna in question. That is inner perception or self-consciousness.
III
One of the distinguishing features of the doctrine is the belief that whatever is, is knowable. It not only asserts a reality outside knowledge, but also admits that it can be known. In fact, to say that anything is unknowable is equivalent in the system to denying it. According to this view, even knowledge can be known so that jñāna is not only about objects but also about itself. But it is primarily directed to the object which is therefore known before either the subject or knowledge is. The two latter are revealed together and later in self-consciousness or reflection upon experience (anuvyavasāya). Though thus the reality of the external world stands on its own footing, knowledge is necessarily the means of reaching to it and that is how the problems of logic come to be considered in the system.
The nirvikalpaka is not here restricted to the sva-laksaņa as it is according to Buddhism. See p. 204 ante. * In current expositions of the doctrine the preliminary knowledge, it is stated, need only refer to the višeşaņa or attributive element: Visişta-jñānam višeşaņa-jñāna-janyam (TSD. p. 30. Cf. SM. p. 253). But a knowledge of the other constituents also seems once to have been thought necessary. See NM. Pp. 93 and 95.
