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236 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY and karma, (3) particular and universal. (4) ultimate things and visesa and (5) whole and parts or, as the same may otherwise be put, material cause and product. It will be observed that in one case, viz. the last, both the relata are dravyas and in another, viz. the third, neither may be a dravya, for guņas and karmas also, as conceived here, are particulars and reveal universals. The necessity for this category arises from the pluralistic postulate of the system, which takes distinguishable as equivalent to different.' If a dravya be altogether distinct from its attributes, the particular from the universal, the material cause from the effect and they are yet found together, they must be related; and the relation itself must be unique since one at least of these in each pair does not exist apart from the other. In order to get a clear view of this relation it is necessary to contrast it with the parallel conception of samyoga ('conjunction') which is classed under the category of guna and is an occasional or separable connection. Samyoga obtains only between dravyas while samavāya, as we have seen, may or may not. While again samavāya is only between relata that are never found separate, samyoga is between normally separate (yuta-siddha) things. Two objects now in conjunction must once have been separate and may again be separated, the nature of the objects in either case remaining unaffected by the process. For this reason, viz. that it makes no difference to the relata, saryoga should be taken as an external relation. Even samavāya, it is necessary to add, has to be explained as an external relation, although it is usual to represent it as internal in modern works on the Nyāva-Vaiseşika. To take it so would be to go against the very spirit of the doctrine which views the relata involved in the one case quite as distinct as those in the other. One of the relata here, no doubt, is never found a part from the other. That, however, is no disproof of its distinctness. The reason why while one of them can exist without the other, the other cannot do so is that it becomes related to its correlate as it comes to be. We should not think that redness, for example, comes to characterize the rose after that colour has sprung into existence. Its origination is
