________________
182
OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY question. The appeal to reason which we come across often in the śruti-particularly in the Upanişads--is explained by the orthodox as really of this kind. In their view, reason by itself is incapable of discerning such truths. At best, it may lead to two or more conclusions equally plausibles; and, without the aid of revelation, it is impossible to avoid scepticism. The survival of the self after death is a good instance of a truth taught in the Veda which satisfies these conditions. It is not accessible to reason, but at the same time there is nothing in it to contradict reason. Despite these careful reservations, it should be admitted, śruti so defined remains an external authority; and that is the view taken of it in the orthodox schools.4
The general name for the results arrived at by means of the several pramāņas is darśana, which literally means 'sight,' and may be taken to indicate that what the Indians aspired after in philosophy was not a mediate knowledge of the ultimate truth but a direct vision of it. The word in that case would express what is a distinguishing feature of Indian philosophy in general-its insistence that one should not
In this sense they are known as yukti or anukūla-tarka, not anumāna or inference proper. * See VS. II. I. II. As regards the claim of the rationalists that such truths can be reached through reason, it is pointed out that theirs is a case of reasoning when once the revealed truth is there. They do not know because they reason; rather they reason because they know. See Sarkara on VS. I. i. 2. and on By. Up. p. 7. 3 Cf. Bharthari: Vākya-padiya (i. 34).
Yatnenānumitopyarthah kusalairanumătsbhih:
Abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapadyate. 4 It is obvious, however, that scriptural truth also should at first have been known by some human means-through direct intuition, if not reasoning. If the śruti also thus represents the intuitive experience of ancient sages and is pauruşeya, it may seem hardly different from the heterodox āgama. But we may deduce a distinction between the two from a fourth condition sometimes laid down (cf. Kusumanjali, ii. 3), that the revealed truth should have proved acceptable to the general mind of the community (mahājana-parigraha), or that it should be in harmony with what may be described as race-intuition. It is this sanction of the community in general that in the end seems to distinguish orthodox śruti from heterodox ägama.
