Book Title: Outlines of Indian Philosophy
Author(s): M Hiriyanna
Publisher: George Allen and Unwin Ltd

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Page 190
________________ 190 OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY inferred truth connecting one universal with another being identical with the observed fact itself as stated in the major premise. It is in the quagmire of such a dilemma, as a wellknown stanza' has it, that a logician finds himself floundering when he tries to maintain the validity of inference. Our familiar belief in the validity of inference, the Carvaka explains as due to associations established during observation so that it is purely a psychological process with no implication whatsoever of logical certitude. Otherwise how can we account for the notorious differences even in essential matters among rationalistic philosophers themselves ? Where the belief is verified in practical life, it is due to accidental coincidence as in the case of omens, etc., which also sometimes come true. In other words, inference is nothing more than guess-work. If the Cārvāka specifically formulates his view in such a manner, it would certainly be a stultifying position for him to assume, because this negative conclusion that inference is not valid is itself the result of induction and points to a conviction that in one case at least the relation of vyāpti holds true. It would then refute itself, for what is rejected would be admitted in the very act of rejecting it. Moreover, his very attempt to convince others of the correctness of his view would imply a knowledge of their thoughts which, not being directly knowable, could only have been inferred by him. But the probability is that the Carvāka did neither state his view so formally, nor try to convince others of its rightness, but was content with merely refuting the position of the opponents.3 Usually, however, it is assumed that he did so formulate his view; and it is criticized as above by the representatives of the other systems. They vindicate inference directly also, stating why and in what circumstances a universal proposition may be taken to be valid, though it may be based on a limited examination of the * Cited for example in SD. p. 63. Višesenugamābhāvat sämānye siddha-sādhanat: Anuma-bhanga-pankesmin nimagnā vādi-dantinah. · Cf. Note 3 on p. 182. 3 Cf. NM. p. 270: Vaitandika-kathaivāsau na punah kascidägamah.

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