________________
MATERIALISM
191 cases falling under it. But the answers vary according to the systems and it would, therefore, be preferable to deal with them under those systems themselves. We shall accordingly postpone their consideration for the present.
As a consequence of the view taken by him of knowledge, the Cārvāka cannot speak of any order or system in the world. He no doubt admits perception as a means of valid knowledge, but that gives rise only to a piecemeal knowledge of things without connecting them by means of any necessary relation. Yet he is stated to have postulated four elements (bhūtas)- each with its own character. So far he is a realist and a pluralist. The elements are to be understood as gross in form; for the Cārvāka, discarding inference as he does, cannot believe in any subtle state which can be deduced only by reason. Commonly Hindu thought recognizes five elements-earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa. While the first four of these are matters of ordinary senseexperience, the last is the result of inference. The Cārvāka, because he admits only the immediate evidence of the senses, denies the last. For the same reason he denies also the soul or ātman as a surviving entity. It comes into being, according to him, with that peculiar concatenation of the elements which we call the living body. The Cārvāka accordingly does not deny a conscious or spiritual principle; only he refuses to regard it as ultimate or independent. It is a property of the physical aggregate of the body and disappears when the latter disintegrates. It is compared to the intoxicating, quality that arises by the mingling of certain ingredients such as yeast which separately do not possess it. The entire dependence of consciousness on the physical organism, it is added, is also indicated by the fact that it is always seen associated with it and is never found apart from it. The theory may thus be taken as a rough Indian counterpart of the view that mind is a function of matter. His view, as it is sometimes set forth, borders upon
The illustration probably suggests the idea of an emergent character istic,' because the Cārvāka does not admit consciousness as character izing the factors constituting the body, taken severally. See Bhāmati, III. iii. 53.
