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MATERIALISM of the many-sidedness of philosophic activity in India in ancient times and of the prevalence of a great deal of liberty of thought as well as of freedom of expression.
Ι The most important of its doctrines is that perception (pratyaksa) is the only means of valid knowledge. Every other pramāņa including inference (anumāna) is rejected so that philosophy, which according to the common Indian view ought to be a discipline of life, ceases. bere to be even a discipline of the mind. The reason assigned for rejecting inference is that there is not sufficient warrant for believing in the truth of the inductive relation or vyāpti which forms its basis. The ascertainment of this relation, even supposing that it actually exists, depends upon observed facts; and since observation is necessarily restricted in its scope, it does not entitle us, it is urged, to universalize the conclusion reached with its help. It may be granted for the sake of argument that observation can comprehend all present instances coming under a general rule; but even then it should be admitted that there are others which are removed in time and which, therefore, lie beyond the possibility of investigation. While a general proposition may be all right so far as investigated cases are concerned, there is no guarantee that it holds good of uninvestigated cases also. Even the suspicion that it may not is enough to render the general proposition useless for purposes of exact investigation. If to avoid this difficulty we assume that it is not the examination of isolated particulars that is really the basis of induction but only the proper linking up of essential features or universals which are permanently associated with them, the Cārvāka objects that such a course would leave unrelated the particulars which alone are of practical concern. Nor can the universals themselves be taken as its subject, for in that case there would be no inference at all, the so-called 1 NM. Pp. 119-20. - This does not mean that the Cārvāka admitted universals as objectively real. They are assumed here only for the sake of argument.
