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CHAPTER VII
PRELIMINARY
INDIAN thought whose growth we have so far traced may be described as largely consisting of results. These results should of course have been arrived at by processes more or less definite; but we know very little about them now. The philosophy of the present period is different in this respect, and gives us not only conclusions but also the methods of reaching them. In fact, the several systems which develop now do not set about investigating their proper subjectmatter until they have given us what may be described as a critique of knowledge and considered how we come by truth. In other words, Indian philosophy becomes self-conscious at this stage; and Logic emerges as an explicit branch of it. It is not easy to discover the exact causes of this change; but it is clear that the growth and consolidation of heterodox doctrines like those of Buddhism and Jainism must have contributed much towards it, especially as some of the latter claimed to base their conclusions exclusively on reason. The increasing opposition in thought forced each party in the controversy to entrench its position properly, and to the efforts put forth in that direction should be ascribed the generally critical character of Indian philosophy in the present period.
This change of standpoint accounts for the systematic attention that now comes to be paid by all the schools without exception to what are known as pramāņas. The word pramāna signifies the essential means of arriving at valid knowledge or pramā. The object known is described as prameya, and the knower, pramātā. There is a great variety of views in regard to the nature and scope of pramānas; but it will do to refer now to only one or two general points about them. Broadly speaking, the pramānas are three-pratyakşa or perception, anumāna or inference and sabda or verbal testimony. The value of the first two of these as pramäņas is
Prama-karaṇam pramāņam.
