Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

Page 66

REALITY
realities but rather as 'relations' into which knowledge as a fact must necessarily enter. As has been observed by Perry : 'Instead of conceiving of Reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships." (b) Theory of Independence
The suggestion of the Theory of Independence is that things are directly experienced, and that in the act of direct experience the things remain as they are without being affected by experience. Experience gives us immediate knowledge of things as they are presented to it but does not determine them.
From the above statement it follows that according to the Theory of Independence, things being independent of one another, the relations which exist amongst things are also external and real, and not subjective and internal. Just as things are outside of mind, so is the relation. This view is quite similar to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika conception of the external existence of relations. Theory of Critical Realism :
If all knowledge were immediate grasp of things then there remains no provision for distinction between true and false knowledge. Such being the case no one would be allowed to deny illusions, hallucinations and differences in the degrees of accuracy in knowledge. The Critical Realist removes this difficulty. The contention of the Critical Realist is that in our perception things do not enter directly into our consciousness, but only through the mediation of certain elements partly subjective and partly objective, which make the sense-data into the actual objects of perception. These elements are partly of the nature of the subject and partly that of the object and intervene between the subject and the object, as logical entities. These entities are called 'character
1. Ibid., p. 311.