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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
non-teacher, because he does not teach at that time, is
fallacious. Refutation of Some Objections :
The opponent who does not regard reality as the synthesis of identity and difference, and makes an absolute judgment about reality rejecting the relativity of propositions, raises the following objections : The exponents of the doctrine of the relativity of judgment or non-absolutism affirming the multiple nature of things reject the view that substance (essence) and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and think that they are identical and different both. But this position cannot be legitimate, inasmuch as it is vitiated by contradiction and other defects as under :'
1. Affirmation and negation cannot co-exist in one substratum like blue and not-blue owing to their mutual opposition. Therefore, it is contradictory to say that the same object is different as well as identical.
The answer is : There is no occasion for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another when in the presence of one the other is not perceived. But in a perceived datum, no question of contradiction arises. As regards blue and not-blue, if they were perceived in one locus, there would be no contradiction in the situation, and thus, the Buddhists do not acknowledge the contradiction between blue and not-blue in the unitary cognition of a variegated canvas. And as regards the NyāyaVaiseșika philosopher, he admits the reality of multiform colour. Further, when one single piece of linen is found to possess in harmony the apparently opposed attributes of being mobile and immobile, red and not-red, covered and notcovered, what then is the ground for doubt ?
2. If difference is affirmed in respect of one aspect and identity in respect of another, the result will be that the 1. Critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 73.
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