Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001180/1

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY :
An Introduction
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Mohan Lal Mehta
NA VIDA
ВНА.
BHAVAN
BANGALORE
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Bangalore - 560001

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY :
An Introduction
mo a mulohan Lal Mehta
Mohan Lal Mehta M. A. (Phil. & Psy.), Ph. D. (B. H. U.),Shastracharya
(Jain Darshan), Dip. Ger. Former Professor of Jain Philosophy,
University of Poona
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Race Course Road Bangalore - 560001
(India)

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Published by : Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Race Course Road Bangalore - 560001 (India)
1998
Price : Rs. 160/
All Rights Reserved by the Author
Printed by : Yog Enterprises 428, Mangalwar Peth Pune - 411011 (India)

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In
Sacred Memory
of
Late Pandit Jodhraj Surana

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Late Pandit Jodhraj Surana
Shri. Jodhraj Surana who was born in 1912, hailed from erstwhile Mewar State (Rajasthan) and completed his education at Bikaner and Jaipur in Jain Training College. He started his career at Khachrod (M. P.) as a teacher and went to Chennai (Madras) in the year 1928. He started a number of institutions there and was also responsible for the establishment of A. M. Jain College.
After serving about 20 years in Chennai, he was brought to Bangalore with his colleague Late Pandit Devdatt Sharma by Late Seth Chhaganmal Mutha in 1948 where he developed the educational atmosphere in the society till his death on 29 - 5 - 94. He worked hard for the development of various institutions in Bangalore.
Late Pandit Jodhraj Surana believed in Gandhian Ideals and followed them in spite of several difficulties. He was pious and pure in his day to day life. He was also a freedom fighter.
The Institutions which he started in Bangalore are as follows:
1) A Boarding House and Library situated at Primrose
Road on a land measuring 75,000 Sq.ft. 2) A Primary School, Middle School and High School
at Victoria Road. A College at Indiranagar for Science, Commerce and
Arts. 4) A Girls Primary School, High School and College in
Rangaswamy Temple Street. 5) A Primary School and Middle School at Nagarathpet.
The society appreciated his services and honoured him by presenting a purse of Rs. 8,51,000/- which he donated to a Trust after adding a sum of Rs. 50,000/- for various charitable purposes. He was also honoured by the Maharana of Mewar as a distinguished personality of the State.
Shantilal V. Sheth

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Foreword
The present work is the third edition (revised and enlarged) of the author's earlier book 'Outlines of Jaina Philosophy' published in 1954 by the Jain Mission Society of Bangalore. The second edition was published in 1971 by the P. V. Research Institute of Varanasi. That edition having become exhausted and there being regular demand for the book, the present edition is the result.
The author Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta is an international scholar of Jainism. He has authored a number of books on Jaina philosophy, psychology, epistemology, culture, literature etc. He is the principal author of the 'Prakrit Proper Names', a monumental work in two volumes, published by the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad. He has been the founder Director of P. V. Research Institute, Varanasi and the founder Professor of Jain Philosophy at the University of Poona.
We thank Dr. Mehta for his labour of love in preparing this revised and enlarged edition and giving us an opportunity to publish it.
We are also thankful to Mr. Mohan Lal Khariwal,C. A., H. C. Khincha & Co., 151 Avenue Road, Bangalore -2, for taking keen interest and initiative in publishing this edition. Our thanks are also due to Dr. Siddheshwar Tagwale, Proprietor, Yog Enterprises, Pune, for the excellent printing of the book. Bangalore-1
Publishers 15th August, 1998.

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PREFACE
My aim in preparing the present treatise has been to make an humble and honest contribution to one of the most significant systems of Indian Philosophy, viz., Jainism. The system is, of course, too vast to be adequately treated in a single treatise, and consequently, I have tried to restrict myself to the broad features thereof. I have made an attempt to present the outlines of Jaina Philosophy on the basis of original Prakrit and Sanskrit texts in such a manner as to make the presentation interesting, intelligible and easy.
The treatise is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter gives a brief history of Jainism. The second chapter deals with the religious and philosophical literature of the Jainas. The third chapter has been devoted to a brief survey of the concept of reality from the stand-point of Idealism, Realism and Jainism. The general features of the six fundamental substances recognized by Jaina Philosophy have been elaborated in a simple and comprehensive manner bearing in mind the non-absolutistic implication of thought. The nature of soul has thoroughly and critically been examined in the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter has been devoted to the concept of matter. What are the different forms of matter according to Jainism; what is the nature of atom and molecule; what is the relation between matter and soul; how many kinds of bodies are there; what is the nature of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade, heat, light etc.? All these questions have been answered in this chapter. In the sixth chapter I have dealt with the theory of knowledge. The canonical as well as logical concept of knowledge has been discussed in it. The seventh chapter is on the relativity of judgment. The nature of seven-fold judgment and the theory of naya have been precisely presented in this chapter. The eighth chapter deals with the doctrine of karma which is of

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(vii)
immense importance from the ethical stand-point. The doctrine of gunastāna has been included in this chapter, since it is invariably associated with the concept of karma. A glossary of the Jaina Technical Terms has been appended in the end for the benefit of general readers as well as scholars.
Mohan Lal Mehta
B-18, Angal Park Chatuhshringi Pune - 411016
9.4 - 1998

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TRANSLITERATION
Vowels
H1, a,
#, ļ,
3, ā,
, ai,
, i, sit, 0,
&, i, sf, au,
I, J, u, ū, 31, 37: am, aḥ
e,
Consonants
a. kh
ll gh,
hige
, n,
k
bô 15
c,
ch,
j,
jh,
ñ
ļ,
th,
dh,
ņ
m trong to
n
t,
th,
dh,
n,
p,
ph,
b,
bh,
m,
:
y,
I,
I,
V,
Ś,
ş,
s,
b

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CHAPTER
I
11
III
CONTENTS
HISTORY OF JAINISM
Jainism and Buddhism 3, Pārśva and other Tirthankaras 4, Lord Mahāvīra 5, Sudharman, Jambū, Bhadrabähu and Sthūlabhadra 10, Samprati 12, Khāravela 13, Kālakācārya 13, Jaina Stūpa at Mathura 13, Kumārapāla and Hemacandra 14, Digambaras and Svetāmbaras 14.
PAGE
3
RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
Angas 18, Upangas 21, Mūlasūtras 23, Chedasūtras 24, Cūlikāsūtras 25, Prakīrņakas 25, Canonical Commentaries 26, Karmaprābhṛta and Kaṣāyaprabhṛta 27, Dhavala and Jayadhavalā 28, Kundakunda's Works 28, Mūlācāra and Kārttikeyānuprekṣā 28, Tattvärthadhigama Sutra 29, Karmaprakṛti and Pañcasangraha 29, Siddhasena's Works 29, Samantabhadra's Works 29, Mallavādin's Nayacakra 30, Akalanka's Works 30, Haribhadra's Works 30, Vidyanandin's Works 31, Nemicandra and His Works 31, Prabhācandra's Commentaries 32, Hemacandra's Works 33, Dharmāmṛta of Āśādhara 33, Yasovijaya's Works 33.

REALITY
Idealism 35, Some Misconceptions 36, Different Types of Idealism 38, Platonic Idealism 38, Idealism of Berkeley 39, Idealism of Kant 39, Absolute Idealism of Hegel 40, Bradley on Idealism 41, Idealistic Attitude of Bosanquet 42, Madhyamika School of Buddhism 44, Yogacara School of Buddhism 44, Non-dualistic Idealism of Śankara 45, Realism 47, Arguments for Physical Existence 47, Different Trends of Realism 49, Monistic Realism 50, Dualistic Realism 50, Pluralistic Realism 51, Pragmatic

17
35

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View of Realism 51, Conception of Neo-Realism 52, Theory of Critical Realism 53, Selective and Generative Realism 54, Realistic Currents of Indian Thought 55, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Schools 55, Sankhya School 55, Rāmānuja's Position 56, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika Schools 57, Cārvāka School 57, Jainism 58, Nature of Reality 58, Characteristics of Existence 60, Identity and Difference 62, Classification of Substance 63, Canonical Conception of Classification 64, Jīvāstikāya 68, Pudgalästikāya 70, Dharmāstikāya 72, Adharmāstikāya 72, Ākāśāstikāya 73, Addhāsamaya or Kāla 74, Ethical Classification of Tattva 75, Punya 76, Pāpa 76, Asrava 77, Bandha 77, Samvara 78, Nirjarā 78, Mokșa 79. SOUL
... Arguments for the Existence of Soul 80, Definition of Soul 85, Difference between Darśana and Jñāna 86, Jñāna-upayoga 88, Darśana-upayoga 89, Temporal Relation between Intuition and Knowledge 90, Simultaneity of Intuition and Knowledge 91, Successive Occurrence of Intuition and Knowledge 92, Intuition and Knowledge as Identical 93, Nature of Worldly Soul 95, Consciousness as the Essence of Soul 95, Soul as a Changing Entity 98, Soul as Agent 100, Soul as Enjoyer 100, Soul as Equal in Extent to its Body 100, Varieties of Soul 103, Soul as the Possessor of Material Karma 105, Bondage 108, Liberation 109.
IV
80
111
MATTER
Reality of Matter 111, Meaning of Pudgala U14, Definition of Matter 114, Parts of Matter 115, Difference between the Vaiseșika and the Jaina Conceptions 117, Forms of Matter 118, Aņu 118, Skandha 119, Perceptibility of Molecules 121, Union of

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VI
VII
(xi)
Matter 122, Sub-classes of Matter 124, Matter and Soul 125, Five Kinds of Bodies 126, Manifestations of Matter 127, Sound 127, Union 129, Fineness and Grossness 130, Figure 130, Divisibility 130, Darkness 131, Shade 131, Heat and Light 132.
KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge in the Jaina Canons 134, Means of Cognition in the Jaina Canons 137, Logical Conception of Knowledge 138, Validity of Knowledge 139, Classification of the Means of Valid Knowledge 140, Categories of Perception 143, Direct Perception 143, Clairvoyance 144, Telepathy 146, Clairvoyance and Telepathy 147, Omniscience 148, Arguments for the Existence of Omniscience 149, Empirical Perception 152, Senses 153, Mind 153, Categories of Empirical Perception 154, Sensation 154, Speculation 154, Determinate Perception 155, Retention 155, Non-perceptual Cognition 155, Recollection 156, Recognition 157, Inductive Reasoning 157, Inference 159, Subjective Inference 159, Probans 160, Syllogistic Inference 161, Parts of Syllogism 161, Thesis 162, Reason 162, Example 163, Application 163, Conclusion 163, Authority 164.
JUDGMENT
Traces in the Canons 166, Cause and Effect 167, Anekānta, Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda 168, Sevenfold Judgment 170, Complete Judgment 175, Incomplete Judgment 177, Definition of Naya 177, Naigama Naya 178, Sangraha Naya 178, Vyavahāra Naya 179, Rjusūtra Naya 179, Śabda Naya 179, Samabhiruḍha Naya 179, Evambhūta Naya 180, Province of Naya 180, Fallacy of Naya 182, Refutation of Some Objections 184.

133
165

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(xii)
187
VIL KARMA
Meaning of Karma 188, Four Kinds of Bondage 190, Nature 190, Knowledge-obscuring Karma 190, Intuition-obscuring Karma 191, Feeling-producing Karma 192, Deluding Karina 193, Age-determining Karma 197, Physique-making Karma 197, Hereditydetermining Karma 201, Power-hindering Karma 201, Bandha, Udaya, Udîrana and Sattā 202, Duration 203, Intensity 204, Quantity 204, Causes of Bondage 205, Causes of Knowledge, Intuitionobscuring Karmas 205, Causes of Feeling-producing Karma 205, Causes of Belief-obscuring Karma 206, Causes of Conduct -obscuring Karma 206, Causes of Physique-making Karma 207, Causes of Heredity-determining Karma 207, Causes of Powerhindering Karma 207, Prevention and Destruction of Karma 207, Stages of Spiritual Development 207, Mithyādņști 209, Sāsvādana Samyagdřsti 209, Miśradęsti 210, Avirata Samyagdřsti 210, Deśavirata 210, Pramatta Saṁyata 210, Apramatta Samyata 211, Nivștti Bādara Samparāya 211, Anivștti Bādara Samparāya 211, Sūkşma Samparāya 211, Upaśānta Kaşaya Vitaraga Chadmastha 211, Kșīņa Kaṣāya Vītarāga Chadmastha 212, Sayogi Kevalin 212, Ayogi Kevalin 212, Upaśama Śreni 213, Kșapaka Śreņi 214.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY :
An Introduction

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CHAPTER I
HISTORY OF JAINISM
Indian culture consists of two main trends : Brāhmaṇic and Áramaņic. The Vedic traditions come under the Brāhmaṇic trend. The Śramanic trend covers the Jaina , Buddhist and similar other ascetic traditions. The Brāhmaṇic schools accept the authority of the Vedas and Vedic literature. The Jainas and Buddhists have their own canons and canonical literature and accept their authority.
Jainism is one of the oldest religions of the world. It is an independent and most ancient religion of India. It is not correct to say that Jainism was founded by Lord Mahāvīra. Even Lord Pärśva cannot be regarded as the founder of this great religion. It is equally incorrect to maintain that Jainism is nothing more than a revolt against the Vedic religion. The truth is that Jainism is quite an independent religion. It has its own peculiarities. It is flourishing on this land from times immemorial.
The Jaina philosophy, no doubt, holds certain principles in common with Hinduism, but this does not disprove its independent origin and free development. If it has some similarities with the other Indian systems, it has its own peculiarities and marked differences as well. Its animism, atomic theory, karmic theory etc. are quite peculiar. Jainism and Buddhism :
Jainism and Buddhism represent Sramanic culture. If we examine the antiquity of Jainism from the Buddhist and Jaina records, it will be clear that Jainism is older than Buddhism. The Nigantha Nātaputta of the Buddhist scriptures is none else but

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Lord Mahavira, the last tirthaikaru (fordmaker) of the Jainas. The place of his death is mentioned as Pāvā. The Buddhists often refer to the Jainas as a firmly established rival sect. Buddha made several experiments in the quest of enlightenment. But such was not the case with Mahāvīra. He practised and preached the old Nirgrantha Dharma. He made no attempt to found or preach a new religion. Buddha is even said to have entered the Sramaņic (Nirgrantha or Jaina) Order of ascetics in his quest of enlightenment
The Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the Digha-nikaya refers to the four vows (caturyāma) of the Nirgrantha Dharma. It shows that the Buddhists were aware of the older traditions of the Jainas. Lord Pārsva, who preceded Lord Mahāvīra, had preached the four-fold Law (cāturyāma dharma). Mahāvīra adopted the same but added one more vow to it and preached the fivefold Law (pañcayāma dharma). This is clear from the Uttaradhyayana-sūtra of the Jainas. In this canonical text there is a nice conversation between Kesi, the follower of Pārsva, and Gautama, the follower of Mahāvīra. In this conversation the two leaders realise and recognise the fundamental unity of the doctrines of their respective teachers. They discuss the view-points of the four vows (non-injury, truth, non-stealing and non-possession) and five vows (chastity added) and come to the conclusion that fundamentally they are the same. Pārśva and other Tīrthankaras :
The historicity of Lord Pārsva has been unanimously accepted. He preceded Mahāvīra by 250 years. He was son of King Aśvasena and Queen Vāmā of Varanasi. At the age of thirty he renounced the world and became an ascetic. He practised austerities for eighty-three days. On the eighty-fourth day he obtained omniscience. Lord Pārsva preached his. doctrines for seventy years. At the age of a hundred he attained liberation on the suinmit of Mount Sammeta (Parasnath Hills).

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HISTORY OF JAINISM
The four vows preached by Lord Pārsva are : not to kill, not to lic, not to steal and not to own property. The vow of chastity was, no doubt, implicitly included in the last vow, but in the two hundred and fifty years that elapsed between the death of Pārsva and the preaching of Mahāvīra, abuses become so abundant that the latter had to add the vow of chastity explicitly to the existing four vows. Thus, the number of vows preached by Lord Mahāvīra was five instead of four.
Neminātha or Arişğanemi, who preceded Lord Pārsva, was a cousin of Krsņa. If the historicity of Krşņa is accepted, there is no reason why Neminātha should not be regarded as a historical person. He was son of Samudravijaya and grandson of Andhakavşşņi of Sauryapura. Kșşņa had negotiated the wedding of Neminātha with Rājīmatī, the daughter of Ugrasena of Dvārakā. Neminātha attained emancipation on the summit of Mount Raivata (Girnar).
The Jainas believe in the occurrence of twenty-one more tīrthankaras. They preceded Neminātha. Lord Rşabha was the first among them. The Vedic tradition also refers to him. It is not an easy job to establish the historicity of these great souls. Lord Mahāvīra :
Mahāvīra was the twenty-fourth, i, e., the last tirtharkara. According to the Pali texts, he was a contemporary of Buddha but they never met. The early Prakrit texts do not mention the name of Buddha. They totally neglect him. This indicates that Mahāvīra and his followers did not attach any importance to Buddha's personality and teachings. On the other hand, in the Pali Tripitaka Mahāvīra is regarded as one of the six tirthankaras of Buddha's times. This shows that Mahāvīra was an influential personality and a leading venerable ascetic.
According to the tradition of the Svetāmbara Jainas the liberation of Mahāvīra took place 470 years before the

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6
beginning of the Vikrama Era. The tradition of the Digambara Jainas maintains that Lord Mahāvīra attained liberation 605 years before the beginning of the Saka Era. By either mode of calculation the date comes to 527 B. C. Since the Lord attained emancipation at the age of 72, his birth must have been around 599 B. C. This makes Mahāvīra a slightly elder contemporary of Buddha who probably lived about 567-487
B.C.
JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
There are many references in the Buddhist canon to Naṭaputta and the Niganthas, meaning Mahāvīra and the Jainas. The Buddhist canon refers to the death of Naṭaputta at Pāvā at a time when Buddha was still engaged in preaching. According to Hemacandra, Mahāvīra attained liberation 155 year before Candragupta's accession to the throne. This leads to a date around 549-477 B.C. for Mahāvīra and places his death slightly later than that of Buddha. Some scholars support this view.
There is no doubt that Pārśva preceded Mahāvīra by 250 years. The Jaina canon clearly mentions that the parents of Mahāvīra were followers of Pārśva whose death took place 250 years before that of Mahāvīra. Since Pārśva lived for a hundred years, his date comes to 877-777 B.C.
Mahāvīra was not the inventor of a new doctrine but the reformer of a Law already long in existence. The Uttaradhyayana-sūtra gives a good account of this fact. The following is the essence of this account :
There was a famous preceptor in the tradition of Lord Pārsva. His name was Keśi. Surrounded by his disciples he arrived at the town of Śrāvasti. In the vicinity of that town there was a park called Tinduka. There he took up his abode in a pure place.
At that time there was a famous disciple of Lord Mahāvīra. His name was Gautama (Indrabhūti). Surrounded by his pupils he, too, arrived at Śrāvastī. In the vicinity of that

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HISTORY OF JAINISM
town there was another park called Kosthaka. There he took up his abode in a pure place.
The pupils of both, who controlled themselves, who practised austerities, who possessed virtues, made the following reflection:
'Is our Law the right one or the other ? Are our conduct and doctrines right or the other ? The Law taught by Lord Pārsva, which recognises only four vows, or the Law taught by Lord Mahāvīra (Vardhamāna), which enjoins five vows ? The Law which forbids clothes for a monk or that which allows an under and an upper garment ? Both pursuing the same end, what has caused their difference ?'
Knowing the thoughts of their pupils, both Kesi and Gautama made up their minds to meet each other. Gautama went to the Tinduka park where Kesi received him. With his permission Kesi asked Gautama: "The Law taught by Pārsva recognises only four vows, while that of Vardhamāna enjoins five. Both laws pursuing the same end, what has caused this difference? Have you no misgivings about this two-fold law?" Gautama made the following reply : "The monks under the first tirthankara are simple but slow of understanding, those under the last are prevaricating and slow of understanding and those between the two are simple and wise. Hence, there are two forms of the Law. The first can but with difficulty understand the precepts of the Law and the last can but with difficulty observe them. But those between the two can easily understand and observe them." This answer removed the doubt of Kesi. He asked another question : "The Law taught by Vardhamana forbids clothes but that of Pāráva allows an under and an upper garment. Both Laws pursuing the same end, what lias caused this difference?" Gautama gave the following reply: "The various outward marks have been introduced in view of their usefulness for religious life and their distinguishing character. The opinion of the tirthankaras is that right

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
knowledge, right faith and right conduct are the true causes of liberation" This answer, too, removed the doubt of Kesi. He, thereupon, bowed his head to Gautama and adopted the Law of five vows.
It is clear from this account of the Uttaradhyayana-sūtra that there were two main points of difference between the followers of Pārsva and those of Mahāvīra. The first point was relating to vows and the second was regarding clothes. The number of vows observed by the followers (ascetics) of Pārsva was four, to which Mahāvīra added the vow of chastity as the fifth. It seems that Pārsva had allowed his followers to wear an under and an upper garment, but Mahāvīra forbade the use of clothes. Preceptor Keśi and his disciples, . however, adopted the Law of five vows without abandoning clothes. Thus, Mahāvira's composite church had both types of monks: with clothes (sacelaka) and without clothes (acelaka).
Mahāvīra was son of Kșatriya Siddhārtha and Trišală of Kundapura (or Kundagrāma), the northern borough of Vaiśālī. He belonged to the Jñāts clan. He was born on the thirteenth day of the bright hall of the month of Caitra when the moon was in conjunction with the Hastottară constellation. As the family's treasure of gold, silver, Jewels ctc. went on increasing since the prince was placed in the womb of Trisalā, he was named Vardhamāna (the Increasing Onc). He was known by three names : Vardhamāna, śramana (the Ascetic) and Mahāvīra (the Great Hero). The name of Vardhamāna was given by his parents. He was called Sramaņa by the people, as he remained constantly engaged in austerities with spontancous happiness. Since be sustained all fears and dangers and endured all hardships and calamities, he was called Mahāvīra by the gods.
Vardhamāna lived as a householder for thirty years. When his parents died, with the permission of his clders he distributed

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HISTORY OF JAINISM
all his wealth among the poor during a whole year and renounced the world. After observing fast for two days and having put on one garment, Vardhamāna left for a park known as Jñātskhanda in a palanquin named Candraprabhā. He descended from the palanquin under an Asoka tree, took off his ornaments, plucked out his hair in five handfuls and entered the state of houselessness. He wore the garment only for a year and a month and then abandoned it and wandered about naked afterwards.
The Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra spent his second rainy season in a weaver's shed at Nālandā, a suburb of Rājagrha. Gośāla, the Ajivika, approached the Venerable Ascetic and made a request to admit him as his disciple. Mahāvīra did not entertain his request. Gośāla again approached the Venerable Ascetic when he had left the place at the end of the rainy season. This time his request was, however, accepted and both of them lived together for a considerable period. While at Siddhārthapura, Gośāla uprooted a sesamum shrub and threw it away challenging Mahāvīra's prediction that it would bear fruits. Owing to a lucky fall of rain the shrub came to life again and bore fruits. Seeing this Gośāla concluded that everything is pre-determined and that all living beings are capable of reanimation. Mahāvīra did not favour such generalisations. Gośāla, then, severed his association with Mahāvira and founded his own sect known as Ajivika.
Mahāvīra had travelled up to Lādha in West Bengal. He had to suffer all sorts of tortures in the non-Aryan territory of Vajrabhūmi and Subhrabhūmi. Many of his hardships were owing to the adverse climate, stinging plants and insects and wicked inhabitants who set dogs at him. The Venerable Ascetic had spent his ninth rainy season in the non-Aryan land of the Lādha country.
Mahāvīra passed twelve years of his ascetic life with cquanimity performing hard and long penances and enduring

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
all afflictions and calamities with undisturbed mind. During the thirteenth year on the tenth day of the bright fortnight of the month of Vaišākha the Venerable Ascetic obtained omniscience under a Sāla tree in the farm of Syāmāka on the northern bank of river Rjupālikā outside the town of Jşmbhikagrāma. He preached the Law in the Ardhamāgadhi language, taught five great vows etc., initiated Indrabhūti (Gautama) and others and established the four-fold Order (monks, nuns, male lay-votaries and female lay-votaries).
Lord Mahāvīra passed the last thirty years of his life as the omniscient tīrtharkara. He spent his last rainy season at Pāpā (Pavapuri). On the fifteenth day of the dark fortnight of the month of Kārttika the Lord attained liberation there at the age of seventy-two. The eighteen confederate kings of Kāśī and Kośala (and eighteen kings) belonging to the Mallaki and Lecchaki clans were present there at that time. Thinking that the spiritual light of knowledge has vanished with the passing away of the Lord they made a material illumination by lighting lamps.
Lord Mahāvīra was the head of an excellent community of 14000 monks, 36000 nuns, 159000 male lay-votaries and 318000 female lay-votaries. The four groups designated as monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen constitute the four-fold Order (tirtha) of Jainism. One who makes such an Order is known as tirthařkara. Tirthařkara Mahāvīra's followers coinprised three categories of persons: ascetics, lay-votaries and sympathisers or supporters. Indrabhūti (monk), Candanā (nun) etc. form the first category. Sankha (layman), Sulasā (laywoman) etc. come under the second category. Sreņika (Bimbisāra), Kūņika (Ajātasatru), Pradyota, Udāyana, Cellaņā etc. form the third category. The tirthankara's tīrtha or sangha consisted of only the first two categories. Sudharman, Jambu, Bhadrabāhu and Sthulabhadra :
Of the eleven principal disciples (ganadharas) of Lord Mahāvīra, only two, viz... Indrabhūti and Sudharian survived

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HISTORY OF JAINISM
11
him. After twenty years of the liberation of Mahāvīra Sudharman also attained emancipation. He was the last of the eleven gañadharas to die. Jambu, the last omniscient, was his pupil. He attained salvation after sixty-four years of the liberation of Mahāvīra. Bhadrabāhu, belonging to the sixth generation since Sudharman, lived in the third century B.C. He died 170 years after Mahāvīra. He was the last śrutake valin (possessed of knowledge of all the scriptures). Sthūlabhadra possessed knowledge of all the scriptures less four Pūrvas (a portion of Dșstivāda). He could learn the first ten Pūrvas with meaning and the last four without meaning from Bhadrabāhu in Nepal. Thus, knowledge of the canonical texts started diminishing gradually. There are still a good many authentic original scriptures preserved in the Svetāmbara tradition. Of course, some of the canons have, partly or wholly, undergone modifications. The Digambaras believe that all the original canonical texts have vanished.
Up to Jambu there is no difference as regards the names of pontiffs in the Digambara and Svetāmbara traditions. They are common in both the branches. The name of Bhadrabāhu is also common, though there is a lot of difference regarding the events relating to his life. There is no unanimity with regard to the name of his own successor, too. The names of intermediary pontiffs are, of course, quite different. Judging from the total picture it seems that in fact there had been two different preceptors bearing the name of Bhadrabāhu in the two traditions. Probably they were contemporary. The Svetāmbara account mentions that the death of Srutakevali Bhadrabāhu occurred 170 years after the liberation of Mahāvīra, whereas the Digambara tradition maintains that Bhadrabāhu died 162 years after Mahāvīra's emancipation.
According to the tradition of the Svetāmbaras, Preceptor Bhadrabāhu had been to Nepal and remained there engaged in

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
some specific course of meditation. Sthūlabhadra and some other monks went to Nepal to learn the Dșstivāda from Bhadrabāhu.
The Digambara tradition believes in a migration of Bhadrabāhu and other monks to South India. It holds that the Head of the Jaina Church in the time of Candragupta's reign (322-298 B.C.) was Bhadrabāhu. He was the last srutakevalin. He prophesied a twelve-year famine and led a migration of a large number of Jaina monks to South India. They settled in the vicinity of Sravana Belgolā in Karnatak. Bhadrabāhu himself died there. King Candragupta, an adherent of the Jaina faith, left his throne and went to Sravana Belgolā. He lived there for a number of years in a cave as an ascetic and finally embraced death. Samprati :
Sthūlabhadra's pupil Suhastin had won King Samprati, the grandson of and successor to Asoka, for Jainism. Samprati was very zealous in the promotion and propagation of Jainism. He showed his enthusiasm by causing Jaina temples to be erected over the whole of the country. During Suhastin's stay at Ujjain (Samprati's Capital), and under his guidance, splendid religious festivals were celebrated. The devotion manifested by the king and his subjects on such occasions was great. The example and advice of King Samprati induced his vassals to embrace and patronise Jainismi. He had sent out missionaries as far as to South India. In order to extend the sphere of their activities to non-Aryan countries, Samprati sent there Jaina monks as messengers. They acquainted the people with the kind of food and other requisites which Jaina monks may accept as alms. Having thus prepared the way for them, Samprati induced the superior to send monks to those countries. Accordingly, missionaries were sent to the countries of Andhra and Dramila in South India.

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Kharavela:
HISTORY OF JAINISM
Somewhere near Samprati's time there lived King Khāravela of Kalinga. His inscription in a cave of Khandagiri, dating around the middle of the second century B.C., tells among other things of how he constructed rock-dwellings and gave abundant gifts to Jaina devotees. There are some Jaina caves in sandstone hills known as Khandagiri, Udayagiri and Nilagiri in Orissa. The Hathīgumpha or Elephant Cave, as it is now known, was an extensive natural cave. It was improved by King Kharavela. It has a badly damaged inscription of this king. The inscription begins with a Jaina way of veneration.
Kälakācārya :

13
in the first century B.C. when Gardabhilla was the king of Ujjain, there lived a famous Jaina preceptor known as Kālakācārya. King Gardabhilla carried off Sarasvati, a Jaina nun, who was the sister of Kalakācārya. After repeated requests and threats when Kālakācārya found that the king was not prepared to set the nun free, he travelled west of the Indus and persuaded the Sakas to attack Ujjain and overthrow Gardabhilla. The Śakas attacked Ujjain and established themselves in the city. Vikramaditya, the successor to Gardabhilla, however, expelled the invaders and re-established the native dynasty. He is said to have been won for Jainism by some Jaina preceptor.
Jaina Stupa at Mathura :
An inscription of the second century A.D. has been found in the ruins of a Jaina stupa excavated in the mound called Kankālī Țīlā at Mathura. The inscription says that the stupa was built by gods. The truth underlying this type of belief is that in that age the stupa was regarded as of immemorial antiquity. The sculptures and inscriptions found at Mathura are of great importance for the history of Jainism. They corroborate many of the points current in the

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14
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Jaina traditions. For instance, the series of twenty-four tīrthankaras with their respective emblems was firmly believed in, women also had an influential place in the Church, the Order of nuns was also in existence, the division between Svetāmbaras and Digambaras had come into being, the scriptures were being recited with verbal exactitude, and the like. Kumārapāla and Hemacandra :
Coming to the medieval period, King Siddharāja Jayasimha (A.D. 1094-1143) of Gujarat, although himself a worshipper of Siva, had Hamacandra, a distinguished Jaina preceptor and writer, as a scholar-member of his court. King Kumārapāla (A.D. 1143-1173), the successor to Jayasimha, was actually converted to Jainism by Hemacandra. Kumārapāla tried to make Gujarat in some manner a Jaina model State. On the other hand, Hemacandra, taking full advantage of the opportunity, established the basis for a typical Jaina culture by his versatile scientific work. He became famous as the Kalikālasarvajña, i.e., the Omniscient of the Kali Age.
In South India the Gangas, the Rāstrakūtas, the Cälukyas, the Hoysalas etc. were Jainas. They fully supported the faith. Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras :
There were both types of monks, viz., sacelaka (with clothes) and acelaka (without clothes), in the Order of Mahāvīra. The terms sacelaka and svetămbara signify the same sense and acelaka and digambara express the same meaning. The monks belonging to the Svetāmbara group wear white garments, whereas those belonging to the Digambara group wear no garments. The literal meaning of the word digambara is sky-clad and that of svetāmbara is white-clad. It was, probably, up to Jambu's time that both these groups formed the composite church. Then they separated from each other and practised the faith under their own

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HISTORY OF JAINISM
Heads. This practice is in force even in the present time. The Śvetämbaras hold that the practice of dispensing with clothing has no longer been requisite since the time of the last omniscient Jambu.
15
The following main differences exist between the Digambaras and the Svetambaras :
1. The Digambaras believe that no original canonical text exists now. The Svetāmbaras still preserve a good number of original scriptures.
2. According to the Digambaras, the omniscient no longer takes any earthly food. The Śvetāmbaras are not prepared to accept this conception.
3. The Digambaras strictly maintain that there can be no salvation without nakedness. Since women cannot go without clothes, they are said to be incapable of salvation. The Śvetāmbaras hold that nakedness is not essential to attain liberation. Hence, women are also capable of salvation.
4. The Digambaras hold that Mahāvīra was not married. The Śvetāmbaras reject this view. According to them, Mahāvīra was married and had a daughter.
5. The images of tirthankaras are not decorated at all by the Digambaras, whereas the Śvetambaras profusely decorate
them.

The two main Jaina sects, viz., the Svetambara and the Digambara, are divided into a number of sub-sects. There are at present three important Svetambara sub-sects : Mūrtipujaka, Sthanakavāsī and Terapanthi. The number of present important Digambara sub-sects is also three : Bisapanthi, Terahapanthi and Taraṇapanthi. The Murtipujakas worship images of tirthankaras etc. The Sthanakavāsīs are non-worshippers. The Terapanthīs are also not in favour of idol-worship. Their interpretation of non-violence (ahiṁsā) is

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
slightly different from that of the other Jainas. The Bisapanthis use fruits, flowers etc, in the idolatry ceremony, whereas the Terahapanthis use only lifeless articles in it. The Tāraṇapanthis worship scriptures in place of images

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CHAPTER !!
RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
The canon forms the earliest Jaina literature. The essence of the Jaina canon lies in the teachings of Lord Mahāvīra. The Anga text forms the nucleus of the entire
canon.
The canonical texts are broadly divided into two groups: Anga-praviṣṭa and Anga-bahya. The authorship of the first group is attributed to the Ganadharas (Principal Disciples) of Mahāvīra, whereas that of the second group is ascribed to different Sthaviras (Senior Preceptors). The credit of editing the available canon goes to preceptor Devardhigaṇi Kṣamāśramana who flourished after a thousand years of the liberation of Lord Mahāvīra.
The Jaina monks held three councils to recollect, revise and redact the holy teachings of Lord Mahāvīra. The first council was held at Paṭaliputra (Patna) after 160 years of the liberation of Lord Mahāvīra when the twelve years' long famine ended. The monks who assembled there could recollect only eleven Angas. It was, however, not possible for them to recall the twelfth Anga, viz., the Dṛṣṭi- vada. It was only preceptor Bhadrabāhu who possessed knowledge of that text at that time. He could not participate in the council, as he was already engaged in some specific course of meditation in Nepal. The council deputed Sthulabhadra and some other monks to go to Nepal and learn the Drstivada from preceptor Bhadrabahu. It was, however, only Sthulabhadra who could acquire knowledge

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
of the Drștivāda. Thus, up to preceptor Sthūlabhadra all the twelve Angas could be preserved.
The second council met under the chairmanship of preceptor Skandila at Mathura after 825 years of the death of Lord Mahāvīra.' Another similar council synchronising with the second one was held at Valabhs under the presidentship of preceptor Nāgārjunasūri.
The third council also met at Valabhī under the chairmanship of preceptor Devardhigaại Kșamāśramaņa after 980 (or 993) years of Lord Mahāvīra's emancipation. At this council all the canonical texts then available were systematically written down and an attempt was made to reconcile the differences pertaining to the two councils previously held at Mathura and Valabhī.
The texts other than the Angas (the Angapravista group) belong to the group known as Angabāhya. This Angabāhya group is classified into five sub-groups. Thus, we have in all six groups of canonical texts. They are known by the following names: (1) Angas, (2) Upāngas, (3) Mülasūtras, (4) Chedasūtras, (5) Cūlikāsūtras,' and (6). Prakīrņakas. All these works are in Prakrit. Angas :
The Angas are twelve in number. They are as follows: (1) Acāra, (2) Sūtrakrta, (3) Sthāna, (4) Samavāya, (5) Vyākhyāprajñapti or Bhagavatī, (6) Jñātādharmakathā, (7) Upāsakadaśā, (8) Antakrddaśā, (9) Anuttaraupapātikadašā, (10) Praśnavyākarana, (11) Vipākaśruta, (12) Destivāda.
The Acārānga is divided into two sections. The first section has at present eight chapters but formerly it had nine. The second section has sixteen chapters. This Anga, as its very name suggests, deals with the way of life of a monk. It furnishes us with materials pertaining to the life of Lord Mahāvīra. The first section is the oldest of all the Jaina works.

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RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
19
The Sūtrakrtānga is also divided into two section. The first section has sixteen chapters and the second has seven. This Anga mainly deals with the refutation of heretical doctrines.
The Sthānānga consists of ten chapters. Each chapter deals with objects according to their number. The first chapter starts with number 1. It goes up to 10 in the tenth
chapter.
The Samavāyānga, too, deals with objects according to their number. Thus, it continues, in a way, the subjectmatter of the Sthānānga. It enumerates different objects in rising numerical groups up to 1 Koțākoți of Sāgaropamas.
The Vyākhyāprajñapti or Bhagavati is divided into fortyone sections. It discusses all types of topics - philosophical, ethical, epistemological, logical, cosmological, mathematical and the like. It throws light on the lives of Lord Mahāvīra, Gośāla, Jamāli and many others.
The Jñātādharmakathā is divided into two sections. The first section has nineteen chapters. The second section consists of ten sub-divisions which are further divided into different chapters. Various narratives having a moral purpose form its subject matter.
The Upāsakadašā consists of ten chapters giving lives of ten principal lay-votaries (Upāsakas) of Lord Mahāvīra. The vows to be observed by á lay-votary are explained in the first chapter.
The Antakrddaśā is divided into eight sections consisting of ten, eight, thirteen, ten, ten, sixteen, thirteen and ten chapters respectively. It gives lives of some liberated souls.
The Anuttaraupapātikadašā is divided into three sections consisting of ten, thirteen and ten chapters respectively. It gives lives of some persons who after death were born as gods in Anuttara celestial abodes.
The Praśnavyākaraṇa consists of ten chapters. Of them, the first five deal with Asrava (influx of karmic matter) and the

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
last five give an account of Samvara (stoppage of the influx). The available contents of this work are different from those noted in the Samavāyanga and the Nandisūtra
The Vipākaśruta is divided into two sections, each having ten narratives. The first section deals with the fruits of bad deeds, whereas the second describes those of good deeds.
Both the Jaina traditions, viz., the Svetāmbara and the Digambara, unanimously hold that the Drștivāda forms the twelfth, i. e., the last Anga of the Jaina canon. According to the Nandi-sútra, the Acārānga constitutes the first Anga and the Drștivāda the twelfth. The Dhavalā also up- holds the same view. The Drștivāda consists of five sections: Parikarma, Sūtra, Anuyoga or Prathamānuyoga, Purvagata and Cūlikā. The Pūrvagata section occupies a distinctive place in the Jaina canon. One who possesses knowledge of this section comprising fourteen Pūrvas is known as śruta-kevalin (possessor of knowledge of all the scriptures). The Drștivāda or the Pūrvagata as such is not extant now. There are some treatises in both the Jaina traditions that were composed on the basis of certain Pūrvas. Since the Dșstivāda contained most difficult philosophical discussions, and hence, its study was recommended for an ascetic of nineteen years' standing who has studied the Acārānga etc., it is not surprising if it gradually vanished. It was not an easy job to find suitable monks for imparting knowledge of this difficult text.
The treatises composed on the basis of the Pūrvagata section of the Dșstivāda are of two categories : canonical and non-canonical or karmic and non-karmic. The canonical or non-karmic trcatises include the Nisitha, the Daśāśruta skandha, the Bșhatkalpa and the Vyavahāra chedasútras, the Dasavaikālika mülasira and the Parīşaha chapter of the Uttarādhyayana mülasülm. The non-canonical or karmic works comprise the Karmaprābhịta, the Kaşayaprābhịta, the Karmaprakrti, the Satit it, the Saptatikā and the Panca

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RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
sangraha. All these treatises are in Prakrit. The Niryuktis (5th century A. D.) and other commentaries record the fact that the Niśītha, the Daśāśrutaskandha, the Bṛhatkalpa and the Vyavahāra are composed on the basis of the Pratyakhyāna Pūrva. The fourth chapter of the Daśavaikālika is based upon the Atmapravāda Pūrva, the fifth one upon the Karmapravāda Purva, the seventh upon the Satyapravāda Purva and the rest upon the Pratyakhyāna Pūrva. The Parīṣaha (second) chapter of the Uttaradhyayana is composed on the basis of the Karmapravāda Pūrva.
21
The Karmaprabhṛta is based upon the Karmaprakṛtiprābhṛta section of the Agrāyaṇīya Pūrva, whereas the Preyodveṣaprabhṛta section of the Jñānapravāda Pūrva is the basis of the Kaṣāyaprabhṛta. The Karmaprakṛti, just like the Karmaprabhṛta, is an important treatise on the Jaina doctrine of karma. The author Śivaśarmasūri probably belonged to the 4 th century A. D.The commentator. Malayagiri (12th century A. D.) mentions that the work was composed on the basis of the Karmaprakṛtiprābhṛta section of the Agrāyaṇīya Pūrva. The Śataka or Bandhaśataka by Śivaśarmasūri, the Saptatika by Candrarṣimahattara or Śivaśarmasŭri, and the Pañcasangraha by Candrarṣimahattara are also said to be related to the Purvas. Thus, a good number of works in both the Jaina traditions are still available which were composed on the basis of the Dṛṣṭivāda that was lost long ago.
Upangas:
The Upangas are subsidiary to the Angas. They are also twelve in number. Their titles are as under :
(1) Aupapātika, (2) Rājapraśnīya, (3) Jīvābhigama or Jivajīvābhigama, (4) Prajñāpanā, (5) Sūryaprajñapti, (6) Jambudvipaprajñapti, (7) Candraprajñapti, (8)Nirayāvalikā or Kalpika, (9) Kalpavataṁsikā, (10) Puṣpikā, (11) Puṣpacŭlikā, (12) Vṛṣṇidaśā.

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
The Aupapātika describes in full the city of Campā, King Kūņika, Queen Dhāriņi, Lord Mahāvīra etc. This work is of special significance from the viewpoint of these splendid descriptions, as no other canonical text contains such beautiful passages.
The Rājapraśnīya describes the life of King Pradesin and his rebirth as Sūryābhadeva. It contains a beautiful dialogue between King Pradesin and Preceptor Kesi regarding the identity of soul and body.
The Jīvābhigama or Jīvājīvābhigama deals with the animate and inanimate entities. It contains a detailed description of continents and oceans.
The Prajñāpanā consists of thirty-six chapters. Each of these chapters deals with one particular topic in its entirety. These topics are pertaining to different aspects of Jaina philosophy.
The Sūryaprajñapti is a work on astronomy. It is divided into twenty chapters. It deals not only with the sun, as its name suggests, but also with the moon etc.
The Jambūdvīpaprajñapti is a work on cosmology. It has seven chapters. It gives a detailed description of the Jambūdvīpa continent.
The available edition of the Candraprajñapti is identical with the Süryaprajñapti. There must have existed in olden days two separate works of the names of Suryaprajñapti and Candraprajñapti dealing with the sun and the moon respectively.
The Nirayāvalikā or Kalpikä gives lives of King Śreņika and his sons in ten chapters.
The Kalpāvatamsikā also consists of ten chapters. They deal with lives of ten grandsons of King Śreņika.
The Puspikā gives a description of the moon, the sun and other gods in ten chapters.

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RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
23
The Puspacūlikā also contains ten chapters. They deal with lives of goddesses Śrī, Hrī, Dhịti etc.
The Vrşạidaśā or Andhakavṛṣṇidaśā has twelve chapters describing lives of twelve princes belonging to the Vrşņi lineage. Mūlasūtras:
Two explanations are offered for the term 'Mülasūtra'. Some scholars are of the opinion that the term 'Mūlasutra' means the original text, i. e., the text containing the original words of Lord Mahāvīra as received directly from his mouth. Some are of the view that the Mūlasūtras are the fundamental texts intended for those who are at the beginning of their spiritual career. The following works are designated as Mūlasūtras:
(1) Uttarādhyayana, (2) Daśavaikālika, (3) Āvaśyaka, (4) Piņdaniryukti or Oghaniryukti.
The Uttarādhyayana consists of thirty-six chapters which deal with different topics pertaining to asceticism, discipline, death, karma, metaphysics, legends, penances, ceremonialism, sacrifice etc. It contains nice parables and similes as well as beautiful dialogues and ballads.
The Daśavaikālika gives some important rules relating to ascetic life. It contains ten chapters and two appendices. The fifth chapter has two sections and the ninth has four. Some of the verses of this work agree word for word with those of the Uttarādhyayana.
The Āvaśyaka is divided into six sections known as Sāmāyika, Caturvimśatistava, Vandana, Pratikramaņa, Kayotsarga and Pratyākhyāna. It deals with monastic jurisprudence.
The Pinďaniryukti consists of 671 verses. It gives a detailed description of the type of food a monk is expected to accept.
The Oghaniryukti consists of 881 verses. It deals with some general rules of monastic discipline,

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24
JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
Chedasūtras :
The word 'cheda' means 'cut'. Probably the treatises that prescribed cuts in seniority of monks on their violating monastic discipline, were called Chedasūtras. The existing texts belonging to this group are not exclusively devoted to this type of punishment. They deal with all sorts of topics pertaining to monastic jurisprudence. The following works are included in this group :
(1) Niśītha, (2) Mahāniśītha, (3) Vyavahāra, (4) Daśāśrutaskandha, (5) Bṛhatkalpa, (6) Jītakalpa or Pañcakalpa.
The Niśītha consists of twenty chapters. It prescribes some rules pertaining to monastic life. Punishments for various transgressions are also prescribed in it. Certain exceptions to the general rules also find place therein.
The Mahāniśītha has six chapters and two appendices. It deals with some specific topics relating to ascetic life. It contains some narratives, too.
The Vyavahara contains ten chapters. It supplies injunctions and prohibitions regarding the conduct of monks and nuns. It prescribes a number of atonements and penances, too, by way of punishment for various transgressions.
The Daśāśrutaskandha consists of ten chapters. Of them, one deals with eleven upāsakapratimās (postures and penances pertaining to a lay-votary) and the rest explain different aspects relating to monastic life.
The Bṛhatkalpa has six chapters. It supplies rules and regulations regarding the conduct of monks and nuns.
The Jitakalpa consists of 103 verses. It prescribes penances pertaining to violations of rules of monastic life. These penances are in the form of ten types of expiations (prāyaścittas).
The Pañcakalpa is extinct.

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RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
Cūlikāsūtras :
The Nandi and the Anuyogadvāra are called Cūlikāsūtras. The word 'cūlikā' means 'appendix'. The two Cūlikāsūtras may be taken as appendices to the entire Jaina canon.
The Nandi contains a detailed exposition of five kinds of knowledge. In its beginning a list of senior preceptors (sthavirāvalī) is given.
The Anuyogadvāra deals with different types of topics -- metaphysical, grammatical, logical, mathematical etc. It is a small encyclopedia of Jaina subjects. Prakīrņakas :
The term 'prakirņaka' or 'prakirņa' means 'miscellany'. Generally the following ten miscellaneous canonical works are known as Prakīrņakas :
(1) Catuḥsarana, (2) Aturapratyākhyāna, (3) Bhaktaparijñā, (4) Samstāraka, (5) Tandulavaicārika, (6) Candravedhyaka, (7) Devendrastava, (8) Gaộividyā, (9) Mahāpratyākhyāna, (10) Vīrastava.
The Catuḥsaraṇa consists of 63 verses. It deals with the four-fold refuge, viz., the refuge of the arhats, that of the siddhas, that of the sādhus and that of the dharma.
The Aturapratyākhyāna deals with various types of death and the means leading to them. It consists of 70 verses.
The Bhaktaparijñā consists of 172 verses. It also describes different types of death.
The Samstāraka deals with the importance of the pallet of straw and praises those who resort to it. It contains 123 verses.
The Tandulavaicārika mostly consists of verses, their number being 139. It deals with topics like embryology, osseous structure etc.
The Candravedhyaka or Candrakavedhya consists of 175 verses. It explains how one should behave at the time of death.

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26
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
The Devendrastava contains 307 verses. It gives information regarding different types of gods and their lords.
The Gaṇividyā is an astrological treatise. It consists of 82 verses.
The Mahāpratyākhyāna contains 142 verses. It deals with renunciation, expiation, confession etc.
The Virastava consists of 43 verses. It enumerates different names of Lord Mahāvīra by way of eulogy. Canonical Commentaries :
The canonical texts are variously explained by different authors in different times. These explanations or commentaries are mainly of four categories : Niryuktis, Bhāşyas, Cūrnis and Vịttis. The Niryuktis and the Bhāșyas are in verse, whereas the Cūrņis and the Vịttis are in prose.
The Niryukti commentaries are composed by Preceptor Bhadrabāhu (5th century A. D.) who is different from the author of the Chedasūtras. All the Niryuktis are in Prakrit. The following canonical texts have Niryuktis on them :
(1) Acārānga, (2) Sūtrakstānga, (3) Sūryaprajñapti, (4) Uttarādhyayana, (5) Daśavaikālika, (6) Avaśyaka, (7) Vyavahāra, (8) Daśāśrutaskandha, (9) Bțhatkalpa, (10) Rșibhāṣita.
The Niryuktis on the Sūryaprajñapti and the Rșibhāșita are extinct.
The Bhāșyas are also in Prakrit. They explain the text as well as the Niryukti commentary. The following canonical works have Bhāşyas on them:
(1) Uttarādhyayana, (2) Daśavaikālika, (3) Āvaśyaka, (4) Vyavahāra, (5) Bșhatkalpa, (6) Niśītha, (7) Jītakalpa, (8) Oghaniryukti, (9) Pindaniryukti, (10) Pañcakalpa.
Jinabhadra and Sanghadāsagani (6th century A. D.) are well-known for their Bhāsyas. The author of the Višeşā

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RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
27
vaśyaka-bhāsya is Jinabhadra. Sanghadāsagaņi is the author of the Bțhatkalpa-bhāșya.
The Cūrņis are in Prakrit mixed with Sanskrit. Jinadāsagani Mahattara (7th century A. D.) is the author of most of the Cūrņi commentaries. The following canonical texts have Cūrņis on them :
(1) Ācārānga, (2) Sūtrakṛtānga, (3) Vyākhyaprajñapti, (4) Bșhatkalpa, (5) Vyavahāra, (6) Niśītha, (7) Daśāśrutaskandha, (8) Jītakalpa, (9) Jivābhigama, (10) Jambūdvīpaprajñapti, (11) Uttarādhyayana, (12) Avaśyaka, (13) daśavaikālika, (14) Nandī, (15) Anuyogadvāra, (16) Mahānisītha, (17) Pañcakalpa, (18) Oghaniryukti.
The Vșttis are in Sanskrit. Haribhadrasūri, śīlānkasūri, śāntyācārya, Abhayadevasūri, Maladhārī Hemacandra, Malayagiri, Droņācārya, Kșemakīrti etc. are Sanskrit commentators (from 8th century onwards). Abhayadevasūri composed commentaries on all the Angas except the first two, viz., the Acārānga and the Sūtrakstānga, which were commented upon by Sīlānkasūri. There are canonical commentaries in some modern Indian languages, too. Karmaprābhṛta and Kaşāyaprābhịta :
The Digambaras believe that the Acārānga etc. have totally vanished. They attach canonical importance to the Karmaprābhịta and the Kaşāyaprābhịta (both in Prakrit). The Karmaprābhịta is variously known as Mahākarmaprakrtiprābhịta, Āgamasiddhānta, Șațkhaņņāgama Paramāgama, Khandasiddhānta, Satkhandasiddhānta etc. It is in prose. It was composed by Preceptors Puşpadanta and Bhūtabali on the basis of the Dșstivāda. The authors lived between 600 and 700 years after the liberation of Lord Mahāvīra.
The Karmaprābhrta is divided into six sections : 1. Jīvasthāna, 2.Kșudrakabandha, 3. Bandhasvāmitvavicaya, 4. Vedanā, 5. Vargaņā, 6. Mahābandha (Mahādhavala). It deals with the doctrine of karma.
with the doctor sam4.
.
.

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The Kaṣayaprabhṛta is also known as Preyodveṣaprabhṛta. It was composed by Preceptor Gunadhara. It is also based upon the Dṛṣṭivāda. Gunadhara seems to be a contemporary of the authors of the Karmaprābhṛta. The Kaṣāyaprabhṛta deals with attachment, aversion etc. It consists of 180 verses.
Dhavala and Jayadhavalā :
The Dhavala by Vīrasena is an exhaustive commentary on the first five sections of the Karmaprabhṛta. Just like the Curni commentary on canonical works it is also in Prakrit mixed with Sanskrit. The Jayadhavala is a similar commentary on the Kaṣayaprabhṛta. It was composed by Vīrasena and Jinasena. They lived in the 9th century A. D. Kundakunda's Works :
Kundakunda's contribution to Jaina philosophy and reli gion is in no way less important. The Digambaras attach special importance to his works. He wrote only in Prakrit. The Pravacanasara, Samayasara, Pañcāstikāyasāra, Niyamasara etc. are some of his learned works. The Pravacanasära is a valuable treatise on Jaina ethics. The Samayasara is an important work on the nature of self. The Pañcastikāyasāra deals with the following five entities : soul, matter, medium of motion, medium of rest and space. The Niyamasāra is a work on Jaina monastic discipline. Kundakunda lived in one of the early centuries of the Christian era. Mūlācāra and Kārttikeyānuprekṣā :
Vaṭṭakera and Kārttikeya, too, probably lived in the carly centuries of the Christian era. The Mülăcăra by Vaṭṭakera is a Prakrit treatise on the conduct of Jaina ascetic. It is the Acaranga of the Digambaras.
The Kärttikeyanuprekṣā is a Prakrit work composed by Preceptor Kumāra, also known as Kārttikeya. This treatise treats in twelve chapters of the twelve great reflections to which both monk and layman must devote themselves in order to attain emancipation.

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Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra :
Umāsvāmin or Umāsvāti is the author of the Tattvārthādhigama Sutra or Tattvārtha Sūtra, the first Sanskrit work on Jaina philosophy. He lived in an early century of the Christian era. The Tattvärtha Sūtra is a manual for the understanding of the true nature of things. It is recognised as an authority by both the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras. It deals with Jaina logic, epistemology, psychology, ontology, ethics, cosmography and cosmology. It has a large number of commentaries, one being by the author himself. Karmapraksti and Pancasangraha :
The Karmapraksti by Sivasarmasūri and the Pañcasangraha by Candrarși are two important Prakrit treatises on the Jaina doctrine of karma. They, too, were composed during the early centuries. Both of them have been commented upon by Malayagiri. Siddhasena's Works :
Siddhasena Divakara was a great logician. He also belonged to one of the early centuries. Like Umāsvāti, the author of the Tattvārtha Sūtra, he too, is regarded by both the sects as one of their own. His works include the Sanınatitarka, the Nyayāvatāra and thirty-two Dvātrimsikās (twenty-two are available). The Sanınatitarka is an excellent Prakrit treatise on the theory of Nayas (ways of approach and observation). It also deals with the theories of knowledge and judgment. The Nyāyāvatāra (Sanskrit) is the earliest Jaina work on pure logic. The Dvātrimśikas (Sanskrit) are on different aspects of Jaina philosophy and religion. Siddhasena Divākara has really made a valuable contribution to Jaina philosophical literature. Samantabhadra's Works :
Samantabhadra's contribution to the philosophical literature of the Jainas is equally important. He is the author

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of the Aptamimāmsā, Yuktyanuśāsana and Svayambhūstotra. The Ratnakarandaka-śrāvakācāra is also ascribed to him by some scholars. In the Aptamīmāmsā or Devāgamastotra the philosophy of non-absolutism is explained. The Yuktyanuśāsana is a hymn to Lord Mahāvīra in a philosophical theme. The Svayambhūstotra or Caturvimsatijinastuti is a hymn to the twenty-four Jaina Tīrthankaras. The Ratnakarandaka-śrāvakācāra is a manual of morals for the lay-votary. All these works are in Sanskrit. Samantabhadra was a Digambara preceptor who lived in an early century. Mallavādin's Nayacakra :
The Nayacakra or Dvādaśāranayacakra by Mallavādin is an excellent Sanskrit work on the Jaina theory of Naya. The author is one of the great Svetāmbara scholars of the early centuries. Tradition reports his decisive victory over the Buddhists. His commentary on Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmatitarka is not available. There exists a commentary on the Nayacakra, entitled Nyāyāgamānusāriņi, by Simhasūri. Akalanka's Works :
Akalanka (7th century A. D.) was a great Digambara author and commentator. He composed the following philosophical (logical) treatises in Sanskrit : (1) Laghīyastraya, (2) Nyāyaviniscaya, (3) Pramāṇasangraha and (4) Siddhiviniscaya. He commented upon the Tattvārtha Sūtra and Aptamīmāṁsā. The commentary on the Tattvārtha Sūtra is known as Tattvārtharājavārttika and that on the Aptamīmāṁsā is called Aștaśati. A treatise on expiatory rites entitled Prāyaścitta, is also ascribed to Akalanka. The authorship of this work is, however, doubtful. Haribhadra's Works :
Haribhadra (8th century), a famous Svetāmbara writer, composed a large number of works both in Sanskrit and

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Prakrit. He was an eminent author in verse as well as in prose. His Şaddarśanasamuccaya (with Gunaratna's commentary) is an important treatise on Indian philosophy. It gives a summary of the six philosophical systems of India. He wrote a commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa of Dinnāga, a Buddhist logician. His Dharmabindu is a manual of morals. The Anekāntajayapatākā, Sastravārtāsamuccaya, Anekāntavādapraveśa, Dvijavadanacapețā, Paralokasiddhi, Sarvajñasiddhi, Dharmasangrahani, Lokatattvanirnaya etc. are his philosophical treatises. He composed the following works on yoga : (1) Yogadrstisamuccaya, (2) Yogabindu, (3) Yogaśataka, (4) Yogavimśikā and (5) Șodaśaka. The Samarādityakathā, Dhürtākhyāna etc. are nice stories composed by him. He commented upon a number of canonical works and composed many miscellaneous treatises. Vidyānandin's Works:
Vidyānandin or Vidyānanda (9th century) is a distinguished Jaina philosopher belonging to the Digambara sect. His Aștasahasri commentary on the Aştaśati (Akalanka's commentary on the Aptamimāmsă of Samantabhadra) is, perhaps, the most difficult of all the Jaina philosophical treatises. It was further commented upon by Yaśovijaya. Vidyānandin's lattvärthaślokavārttika is an important commentary on the Tattvārtha Sūtra. His original philosophical works include the Aptaparīkṣā, the Pramāņaparīkņā, the Patraparikṣā, the Satyaśāsanaparikşā and the Vidyānandamahodaya (extinct). The Yuktyanuśāsanālankāra is his commentary on the Yuktyanusasana of Samantabhadra. He has also composed the hymn entitled Śrīpura-Pārsvanāthastotra. The Pañcaprakarana is also ascribed to him. All his works are in Sanskrit. Nemicandra and His Works :
:: Nemicandra, a Digambara author, lived between the 10th and 11th centuries. He was the teacher of Cāmundarāya

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who caused the colossal statue of Gommata or Bahubali to be made at Śravaņa Belgolā in Karnatak. His works include the Dravyasangaha, the Gommnațasāra, the Labdhisāra, the Kșapanāsāra and the Trilokasāra. The Dravyasangraha is a brief treatise on the Jaina theory of substance. The Commațasāra (also known as Pañcasangraha) is a bulky work on the Jaina doctrine of karma. It consists of two parts : Jivakānda and Karmakāņda. The Jīvakānda gives a detailed account of the souls and their classification. The Karınakāņda deals exhaustively with the nature and effects of karma. The Labdhisāra treats of the attainment of the things that lead to perfection. The Kșapaņāsāra deals with the annihilation of passions. The Trilokasāra is a comprehensive treatise on cosmology. It gives a detailed description of the three worlds. All these treatises are in Prakrit and consist of verses. Prabhācandra's Commentaries :
Prabhācandra, a famous Digambara writer of the 11th century, composed a number of commentaries on philosophical and other works. His Prameyakamalamārtanda and Nyāyakumudacandra arc comprehensive Sanskrit commentaries on the Parīkşāmukha (a work on Jaina logic by Māņikyanandin) and the Laghiyastraya (a work on Jaina logic hy Akalanka) respectively. They deal with all important philosophical problems. Hemacandra's Works :
Hemacandra was the most versatile and prolific Jaina writer of Sanskrit. Since he composed in the most varied domains, he was called 'the Omniscient of the Kali Age (Kalikülasarvajña). He was born in 1089 A. D. and died in 1172 A. D. He belonged to the Svetambara scet. His patrons were the Caulukya kinys Jayasimha (Siddharāja) and Kumarapāla of Gujarat.
Hemacandra's Vilarāgastvira is a poem in praise of the passionless Lord Mahāvīra. It is at the same time a

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poetical manual of Jainism. It consists of twenty small sections. The Ayogavyavacchedadvātriiśikā of the author forms the first part of his hymn called Dvätrimsikā. The second part is called Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā. The first part contains an easy exposition of the doctrines of Jainism. The second part refutes the doctrines of the non-Jaina systems. It has a commentary called Syādvādamañjarī by Mallișeņa. This commentary serves as an excellent treatise on Jaina philosophy,
The Pramāṇamīmāṁsā by Hemacandra is a valuable work on Jaina logic. Its commentary by the author himself enhances the value of the work.
Hemacandra's Yogaśāstra is an important work on Jaina yoga. It is in verse and has twelve chapters. The author himself has commented upon it. The work contains a complete doctrine of duties. It treats of the effort one must make to attain emancipation. Dharmāmộta of Āsādhara :
Āśādhara was a great Digambara scholar and poet of the 13th century. He composed a number of learned works and commentaries in Sanskrit. The Dharmāmộta is his principal work. It is in two parts: Sāgāra-Dharınāmsta and Anagāra-Dharmāmộta. The Sāgāra-Dharmāmộta deals with the duties of the lay-votary, whereas the AnagāraDharmāmsta treats of the conduct of the ascetic. The author himself composed a commentary on this work in 1243 A. D. The original work is in verse. Yaśovijaya's Works :
Yaśovijaya was a prominent Śvetambara writer of the 17th century. He composed several excellent treatises and various valuable commentaries in Sanskrit. His works on philosophy include the Anekānta-vyavasthā, the Jñanabindu, the Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā, the Naya-pradīpa, the

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Nayopadeśa, the Naya-rahasya, the Nyāya-khanda-khādya, the Nyāyāloka, the Bhāṣā-rahasya, the Pramāņa-rahasya, the Adhyātma-mata-parīkṣā, the Adhyātmopanişad, the Adhyātmika-mata-khandana, the Upadeśa-rahasya, the Jñanasāra, the Devadharma-parīkṣā, the Gurutattvavinirņaya etc. Some of his valuable commentaries are on the Aștasahasrī, Šāstravārtāsamuccaya, Syādvādamañjarī, Yogavimśikā, Yogasūtra and Karmapraksti.

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CHAPTER III
REALITY
It will not be improper to maintain that the entire metaphysical world is divided into Idealism and Realism. If we want to study the essential features of philosophy, we will have to establish a close contact with the main trends of Idealism and Realism. Without a comprehensive and systematic study of these two isms, we cannot grasp the essence of philosophy. Although it seems that Idealism and Realism represent two apparently different lines of approach to the philosophy of life and the universe, yet, a tendency to reconcile them is not absent. It has begun in recent years to be thought that the difference between these two currents is not so much in their goal as in their presuppositions and methods of approach. Idealism :
Some thinkers maintain that a theory is often called Idealistic in so far as it underestimates the temporal and spatial aspects of the real universe. Some philosophers are convinced that the term Idealism has been used to cover all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe.' Others hold that according to Idealism, spirit is the terminus ad quem of nature.?
Idealism is the belief or doctrine according to which thought is the medium of the self-expression of reality. In other
1. Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, p. 1. 2. Idea of God, p. 200.

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words, reality is such as must necessarily express itself through the ideal or ideals that are organic to the knower's intellectual equipment which may be called thought or
reason.
1
The mind of man is the organ through which reality expresses itself; and if it is certain that man alone has the capacity to interpret experience through intellectual ideals, then it follows that it is man alone who can be the organ to reality. He possesses a unique position in the determination of the universe.
Some Misconceptions:
Some laymen as well as philosophers define Idealism as a doctrine which openly or secretly seeks to establish that the whole choir of heaven and earth is unreal. Now, the first thing which we should bear in mind is that Idealism does not take away the reality of anything which is considered as real by commonsense or science. Far from subtracting anything which is considered to be real by commonsense or science Idealism adds to the reality of things in so far as it alone makes it clear that things have still many other significant aspects of their life than those which are revealed to commonsense or science. To put it in the words of Bosanquet : 'Certainly for myself, if an Idealist were to tell me that a chair is really not what we commonly take it to be, but something altogether different, I should be tempted to reply in language below the dignity of controversy'.2 In the same way, a philosophy must stand selfcondemned if it thinks that the electronic constitution of matter or the inner structure of the material particles is a mere figment. The philosophers like Berkeley (who says that 'esse est percipi' i.e., to exist is to be perceived) etc. are not Idealists in the strict sense of the term Idealism. They may be called Subjective Idealists who think that perception is the real cause of external
1. Self, Thought and Reality, p. 45.
2. Contemporary Philosophy, p. 5.

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objects. They reduce existence or reality to mere perception which position is wrong according to the real definition of Idealism in which the mind only determines the objects and does not create them. Determination and creation are two different things. What needs emphasis at this place is that true Idealism has never disputed the existence of the external world. Green remarks: 'The fact that there is a real external world of which through feeling we have a determinate experience and that in this experience all our knowledge of nature is implicit, is one which no philosophy disputes. What Mr. Spencer understands by Idealism is what a raw undergraduate understands by it. It means to him a doctrine that 'there is no such thing as matter' or that 'the external world is merely the creation of our own minds', a doctrine expressly rejected by Kant, and which has had no place since his time in any Idealism that knows what it is about."
37
Now, the point is quite clear. There is no difference between the Idealistic and Realistic creeds in so far as the reality of the material world is concerned, for both there is an external world which is not the creation of our own minds. The defect, as the Idealist holds, of Realism lies in the fact that it does not realize the universe in its completeness.

The conclusion of what we have discussed so far is as follows: Though the things we know do not depend for their existence on the fact that somebody knows them, and so in this sense they are independent of the knowing mind, yet, all the determinations of the things are discovered only in the knowledge-relation, so that the things which are referred to in our explanations of facts are necessarily determined in certain specific ways. Hence, to insist that we can know only phenomena is not to degrade the things into mind-dependent appearances; it is merely to indicate that things are what we know them to be. And we know only by bringing them into
1. Works, I, p. 386.

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relation to things other than themselves, and it follows consequently that to refer a fact to a thing-in-itself that cannot be determined in any way is to adınit that the fact cannot be explained at all.' It is only through consciousness that the world exists for us at all, though, of course, it is not created by our own consciousness. Different Types of Idealism :
There have been Idealistic views in Western philosophy, some making thoughts or ideas to be eternal reals composing the world of transcendental realities preceding but somehow determining the world of phenomena, some others making thought or idea to be the pre-condition of phenomenal existence, while others conceiving spirit as the ultimate creative reality creating the world of subject and object by its own self-differentiation. The first of these types is Platonic, the second is that of Berkeley and Kant, and the last is that of Hegel and his followers. Platonic Idealism : "
Plato conceived reality as consisting of an organized realm of ideas, each of which enjoys immutability and eternality. This organized realm of the eternal and immutable ideas is real in the sense that there are independent entities not depending upon mind, either finite or infinite. They are the real metaphysical forces, remaining at the back of and somehow determining our empirical world of thoughts and things as their imperfect imitations. Hence, our world of experience is only phenomenal and unreal. It comes into existence and passes out of it. It is somehow determined by the ideas which are universal and eternal. The Idealism of Plato is objective in the sense that the ideas enjoy an existence in a real world independent of any mind. Mind is not antecedent for the existence of ideas. The ideas are there whether a mind reveals them or not. The determination of the phenomenal 1. Self, Thought and Reality, pp, 86-7.

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world depends on them. They somehow determine the empirical existence of the world. Hence, Plato's conception of reality is nothing but a system of eternal, immutable and immaterial ideas.. Idealism of Berkeley :
Berkeley may be said to be the founder of Idealism in the modern period, although his arrow could not touch the point of destination. According to Locke (the predecessor of Berkeley), substance was regarded as a seat of qualities some of which are primary in the sense that they are objective and others are secondary in the sense that they are not in objects but in our minds, i.e., subjective. Berkeley rejected this twofold division on the basis that if secondary qualities are what they are by means of perception or idea, the primary qualities are no less dependent on the same perception. A quality whether primary or secondary must be cognized by our perception. All the things which are composed of qualities both primary and secondary must be regarded as such only when they are perceived as such. In other words, the existence of things must be determined by perception or idea : Esse est percipi. This type of Idealism may be regarded as Subjective Idealism. According to Berkeley, it is the individual mind that determines the existence of external objects. In his later writings he faced a horrible difficulty of dualism regarding his doctrine of lesse est percipi.' For the emergence of perception the existence of external objects independent of mind is necessary. Without an external and independent object no perception is possible. To overcome this difficulty Berkeley established a new doctrine in his later works which is known as 'esse est concipi.' In this new doctrine he placed the word 'conception' in place of 'perception' meaning thereby 'to exist is to be conceived.' Idealism of Kant :
Kant's Idealism is a direct result of his epistemological position adopted in his Critique of Pure Reason. He points out

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that knowledge or intelligible experience is a complex product of the elements of sensibility and understanding. Pure knowledge, i.e., a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. But our judgments are always a posteriori because they are derived from experience. Sensations originate from an unknown world of things-in-themselves but must be organized into a systematic whole by the forms of intuition, i.e., space and time and by the categories or the fundamental
cepts of understanding such as substance, causality and the like. The forms and categories are a priori, because our judgments presuppose the existence of these forms and categories. Experience is never possible without the existence of these transcendental laws of judgment. Thus, it is our understanding that makes nature, according to Kant. The Idealism of Kant, therefore, consists in this that the world of our knowledge is an ideal construction out of sense-manifold to which alone the forms and categories of understanding are confined and, therefore, is commonly known as Objective Idealism. It is subjective in the sense that knowledge does not reach out to the world of things-in-themselves : ding an sich. He argues that reality cannot be grasped by our knowledge because our judgment is conditional, relative and partial. We cannot know a thing as it is but we know it as our experience reveals. Hence, the Kantian ding an sich is unknowable by our experience. His view of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception is more important as regards the unity of knowledge. All knowledge presupposes the Synthetic Unity of Pure Apperception, because unless there is a Synthetic Unity no knowledge is possible. This idea of Synthetic Unity of Pure Apperception leads Kant quite near the conception of soul which is not accepted by him outwardly. Absolute Idealism of Hegel :
The fundamental question before Hegel was : What must be the nature and characteristic of the ultimate principle of the universe in order to explain by it the origin, growth and

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development of mind and nature, their mutual relations as well as the questions of science, philosophy, ethics, art and religion. He found the ultimate principle of his fundamental question in Absolute Spirit, Reason, Thought or Idea. This Absolute Idea of Hegel is not static but a dynamic spiritual principle as it is with Fichte who after Kant established the world-view of Absolute Idealism on his conception of Absolute Ego. But his Absolute Ego was a moral principle satisfying man's craving for moral values alone, while Hegel took it in a more pronounced and comprehensive form. In his principle of Absolute Idea thinking and being coincide, or what is thinking finds its expression in being, for thinking involves an object of thought. It cannot be in vacuo (vacuum). 'The world consists of both mind and nature, subject and object, self and not-self. Thus, the world of mind and nature is the heterisation of the Absolute Thought for its thinking, so that the laws of its thinking are also the laws of being. Hegel, thus, seems to reserve for his Absolute an immutable and inexhaustible being which always transcends its heterisation or the world of becoming." It shows that the Absolute Idealism of Hegel is Monistic Spiritualism, i.e., in the shape of one spiritual reality as the source and foundation of all external objects as well as individual thoughts. In other words, the Absolute Idealism of Hegel may be called Objective Idealism. Thought, according to Hegel, is a self-developing reality which develops through the contradiction of the subject and the object, through the clash of the opposites ---- the thesis and the anti-thesis, and ultimately overcomes this dualism not by negating it but by correcting it. Bradley on Idealism :
Following the intellectual lead of Hegel, Bradley starts his enquiry and finds that the revelation of the intellect can acquaint us with the fact that the categories of substance,
1. Principles of Philosophy, p. 107.

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attributes, causality etc., the forms of time and space --- all these limited abstractions are riddled with contradictions. He finds that the external relations are meaningless to the conception of the Unity of Reality and the internal relations. Though consistent with the intellectual conception they cannot be applied to the Absolute Reality which is non-relational. Therefore, Bradley thinks that the proper organ for grasping the Absolute Reality is not intellect but the whole of mental life which is constituted by intellect, feeling and will. He, therefore, describes his Absolute as identified with Experience. Human experience is a piece of Transcendental Experience and can approximate it when it has learnt to transcend the limitations of intellect. The Absolute of Bradley, therefore, is to be felt, experienced or realized and not to be known by our simple intellect.
The implication of Bradleian Idealism is that intellect is an important factor of consciousness and cannot ordinarily be prevented from grasping and modifying reality under its own qualifications of categories and relations. But it fails to grasp reality itself, which is a non-relational whole. Therefore, intellect which grasps reality in some conditional and partial aspects, must be transcended if we are not to remain satisfied with partial realities or 'appearances' as Bradley calls them. Reality is to be apprehended by Transcendental Experience. The ordinary world of our experience in the form of individuality and diversity is the realm of appearances. Reality is something transcendental which transcends all the empirical experiences of external objects. The objects of external world are only appearances as experienced by our ordinary intellect, not reality itself in its absolute form. Hence, the external objects and finite concepts are only appearances, not the Absolute Reality. Idealistic Attitude of Bosanquet :
Following almost the same line of thought as that of Bradley, Bosanquet has come to conceive of reality as a logical

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or rational whole which he calls 'Individual'. He laid emphasis on the faculty of intellect or reason but did not reject the objective order of things. While explaining the nature and functions of thought, Bosanquet says : 'The essence of thought is not in a mental faculty but in the objective order of things. We bring the two sides together if we say, it is the control exercised by reality over mental process."
Thought, as Bosanquet conceives it, has for its goal the 'Whole'. It is.by its very nature, compelled to construct. As he puts in his own words : 'Implicit in all the modes of experience which attracted us throughout, it is now considered in its own typical manifestations, in which the idea of system, the spirit of the concrete universal, in other words, of individuality, is the central essence. On this very fundamental basis hc defines error as simply an inadequate determination without a system, which leaves alternative possibilities open, i.e., dependent on unknown conditions. Bosanquet, therefore, thinks that it is intellect, when pursued in its fullest capacity, that comprehends or constructs the whole of reality. He not only maintains this but lays emphasis on the unity of values also. 'Totality expresses itself in value, which is... the concentration and focus of reality in its essence as real, as a positive centre which is a solution of contradictions...'+ The Idealisin of Bosanquet, thus, establishes the monism of the spirit which is at once the unity of experience and the unity of values. The ultimate spirit is the 'Real Thing.' This spirit is nothing but the totality of existence and the unity of values. Thus, the external world is
othing more than the spirit as a unity of experience and the unity of values. The Spiritual Idealism propounded by Bosanquet is monistic in character.
I. Life and Philosophy in Contemporary British Philosophy,
First Series, p. 61. 2. Ibid., p. 63. 3. Ibid., p. 67. 4. Ibid., p.73.

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After giving an introductory account of Western Idealism we, now, come to the Idealistic Schools of India. Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta are the most important schools of Indian Idealism. Mādhyamika School of Buddhism :
According to this school, reality is beyond the four categories of thought.' Human intellect cannot grasp reality. What we grasp is the prapañca, and not the paramartha. If we put this idea in the technical language of Buddhism, we can say that the human knowledge is confined to the samvştisatya, i.e., to the phenomenal reality. It is unable to grasp the paramārtha-satya, i. e. the noumenal reality. The phenomenal reality is svabhāva-śünya, i.e., devoid of self-existence. The noumenal reality is prapañca-śūnya, i. e., devoid of plurality. Some scholars are of the view that the word śūnya is synonymous with Nihilism and they draw the conclusion that the school of Mādhyamika Buddhism is Nihilistic. According to the opinion of other scholars, this view is not correct. They are of the opinion that the word śünya must be interpreted in the sense of svabhāva-śünya and prapanca-śünva. As it is remarked by an eminent exponent of the system : 'The Buddha preached reality (dharma) considering two types of truth. The first type is the Phenomenal Truth and the second one is the Noumenal Truth.'The empirical world is the phenomenal reality, while the ultimate truth is the noumenal reality. 'The ultimate truth is intuitional, peaceful, devoid of plurality, indeterminate and one. This is the nature of reality." Yogācāra School of Buddhism :
This school advocates vijñānādvaita-vāda. According to it, as is generally believed, only momentary ideas are real. It is only because of this belief that the system is regarded as
1. Catuşkotivinirmuktam tattvam mādh vamikā viduh. 2. Madhyamika-kärika, XXIV. 8. 3. Ibid., XVIII. 9.

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Subjective Idealism. But this view is not correct. The doctrine of momentary ideas is tenable only in the case of phenomenal reality. The conception of momentariness is necessary to reach the ultimate reality. If the phenomenal reality is not conceived as momentary, our approach to the highest reality is not possible.
The highest reality, according to the Lankāvatāra-sūtra, is the universal consciousness (alayavijñāna). The reality which is grasped by the four categories of thought is only phenomenal.' The highest reality is unchanging, calm and permanent. It is beyond the four categories of thought.? It is beyond the duality of subject and object.? By mere analysis we cannot grasp reality. Thus, it is indescribable and devoid of any explanation."
Although the Lankāvatāra appears to support the doctrine of crude subjectivism, yet, really it is pregnant with deeper expressions which forbid us to draw such a conclusion. The external world is the creation, not of the individual consciousness, but of the Absolute Consciousness.' All, except consciousness, is unreal. Consciousness alone is the established truth preached by the Buddha. All the three worlds are the result of discrimination or thought-relations. No external object exists in reality. All that is, is consciousness. Non-dualistic Idealism of Sankara : "
In the philosophy of Sankara the ultimate reality is Brahman or Self. He maintains that the transcendental ground of experience is Self. The Self is not momentary but permanent, not changing but changeless, not finite but infinite, not limited and conditional but unlimited and unconditional. 1. Lankāvatāra-sūtra, p. 188. 2. Catuskotivinirmukta. 3. Grähvagrāhakavinirmukta. 4. Lankā vatāra-sūtra, p. 116. 5. Indian Philosophy (C. D. Sharma), p. 145. 6. Lankávatāra-sutra, P. 186.
1

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The existence of Self is self-proved (svavamsiddha) and cannot be denied. It is always conscious.
Now, there arises a question : If the Self is changeless and permanent, what about the reality of the external world ? Sankara recognises three grades of reality.' The external objects of our ordinary experience have only a vyāvahārika sattā (empirical reality), the objects appearing in dreams and illusions enjoy only a prātibhāsika sattā (illusory appearance) and the Brahman, i. e., the Absolute has the pāramărthika sattā (ultimate reality). The vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika existences are real from a lower stand-point. The ultimate reality is the highest reality which is devoid of all differences and contradictions. This reality is further described as 'prapañcasya ekāyanam', i. e., the basis of the whole world including the things, the senses and the mind.? Or again it is described as the 'bhūma' which though the ground of every thing, does not itself stand in need of a ground or support; it is apratisthita and anāśrita.: The Self is not affected by the appearance of the duality of subject and object. It is pure consciousness running through all the appearances. It is indescribable by the categories of thought. It can only be realised by intuition where there is no dualism of the subject and the object, the knower and the known. The subject-object-dualism is ultimately reduced to pure consciousness which is nothing but bliss. Our intellect cannot grasp the ultimate reality because it is absolute and infinite, while our intellect is limited and finite. We cannot know Brahman but we can become Brahman. 'He who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman." The appearance of the external world and of the individual souls is due to lgnorance or Nescience (Avidyā). At the time of the realisation of the Self it automatically disappears.
1. Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali p. 25. 2. Sänkara-bhāṣya, I. 4; VI. 19. 3. Chandogya-upanisad, VII. 24. 1. 4. Brahmavid brahma eva bhavati.

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Realism :
The general conception of Realism is that whatever is, is real in the sense that it exists and functions independently of any mind and its interference whatsoever. The mind may or may not be present there. Its existence is quite indifferent to the real. Realism seems to represent the most primitive and natural tendency of thought to which what is outside, is first to appeal. It takes the clear and distinct view of reality as it appears. In Western philosophy, as we find, the first Greek philosophers were realists making either water or air or fire to be the ultimate principle of the world existing independently of the mind, and the world with all its complex contents was supposed to owe its origin and growth to this principle. Arguments for Physical Existence :
When the Realist says that there is an existence of physical objects independent of intellect or idea, can he give any arguments to prove his statement ? Can he give any reasons why we should believe that the external objects exist ? He presents the following arguments to prove it:
1. The existence of physical objects can be inferred from sense-data as their cause. If there is no physical object, how can sensation be possible ? Everything which exists must have a cause. The sensation exists, therefore it must have a cause and this cause is nothing but sense-datum in the shape of physical objects. The similarity of the sense-data of one person to those of another, when both are perceiving the same object, is a good reason for believing in physical objects as their common cause. As Russell writes : 'What reason, then, have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects ? Although different people may see the table slightly differently, still they all see more or less similar things when they look at the table...so that it is easy to
1. Nature of the World, p. 125.

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arrive at a permanent object underlying all the different people's sense-data."
2. It is simpler than any other hypothesis. A man of common-sense can understand the theory of the existence of external objects more easily than any other theory of the Idealists. Its details are answerable to a simple mathematical treatment.
3. We have a strong propensity to believe that there is physical reality of external objects. What the plain man believes about the table is that it is a square, brown, hard object which he sees existing now and which goes on existing, being brown and square and hard when no one is perceiving it. If you tell him that it is nothing of the sort, that the squareness, brownness and hardness disappear when he shuts his eyes and reappear when he opens them, that they are not parts of the Real Table at all, and that the Real Table has no colour, texture, shape and weight, but only some qualities which neither he nor even the greatest philosopher can even imagine, he will not understand you and certainly will have no strong propensity to believe what you say. He won't believe if you say that it is like a dream where although there are no physical objects still we see or enjoy them. Because he knows that our dream is contradicted when we get up but the valid knowledge of waking life is not contradicted afterwards. Even our dream is not quite unreal because it has impressions of our waking life which is quite real.
There are other arguments as well that prove the independent existence of physical objects. The intellect discovers but does not make concepts. In a different language, concepts are not merely functions of the intellect, they constitute a 'coordinate realm' of reality. Philosophy must then recognise many realms of reality which mutually
1. Problems of Philosophy, p. 32.

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interpenetrate. Intellect is an organ, not of 'fabrication,' but of 'discerninent', a power men have to single out the most fugitive elements of what passes before them... aspect within aspect, quality after quality, relation upon relation. The action of the mind is not creative. Its ideas are not of its own making but rather of its own choosing. It is essentially a selective agency, 'a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.' The sense-organs select from among simultaneous stimuli, attention is selective from among sensations, morality is selective from among interests. To reason is to guide the course of ideas.
Thus, the Realists do not regard only one reality as valid. They establish the theory of the reality of physical objects independent of and entirely different from any mind, intellect, experience, consciousness, individual or spirit. Consciousness is different from its object. The object of a sensation is not the sensation itself.
The nature of consciousness is quite different from the nature of material objects. Consciousness is the essence of spirit, i. e., mind, while material objects exist outside the mind. How can these two absolutely different realities be identical ? If, 'Consciousness Alone' is real, what necessity is of the existence of external objects? Why should an external object prove itself as an obstacle in the production of knowledge ? If consciousness itself is non-blue, what is the necessity of an external object? If consciousness itself is blue, what is the necessity of an external object? If 'Consciousness Alone' is real, there would be no difference between the state of dream and the state of waking life, inasmuch as it is the external and objective reality that makes a distinction between the two. Different Trends of Realism :
We, now, proceed to consider the problem whether Realism takes the existent to be numerically one, two or

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many. Realism would be Monistic, Dualistic or Pluralistic according to its view of numerical strength of the existent. If it believes in one material reality, it would be called Monistic Realism. If it takes the existent to be two, it would fall in the category of Dualistic Realism. If it admits reality to be more than two, it would be called Pluralistic Realism. Similarly, some other types of Realism would be dealt with according to their specific characteristics. Monistic Realism :
The primitive Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Heraclitus, in so far as they each thought one or other of water, air, and fire to be the one indivisible stuff of reality, were Monistic Realists. To them all things as the physical objects, the mind, the life and the rest were the products of any one of these stuffs. Thus, consciousness was considered to be merely a product of matter. Dualistic Realism :
It regards the mental and physical worlds as two distinct and independent realities. The monistic trend changed its attitude and began to believe in 'life' as a separate and distinct reality. Empedocles believed in the psychical forces over and above the four elements of earth, fire, air and water. Anaxagoras admitted 'nous' or 'mind' as the central principle of movement and change. Plato and Aristotle may be said to have indulged in Dualism in spite of their insistence on the reality of the world of Ideas or Forms. Aristotle was, perhaps, more pronounced in his Dualism than Plato.
In modern philosophy, it was Descartes who gave a distinct turn to Realisın. To him matter and mind are independent existences each having a characteristic diametrically opposed to the characteristic of the other. This Dualism appeared in Locke in a somewhat different shape in his distinction between cogitative and non-cogitative substance.

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Although Kant was an Idealist in his noumenal outlook, still, he became guilty of a Double Dualism - Epistemological Dualism between sense and understanding and Ontological Dualism between mind and noumenal world of things-inthemselves.' Pluralistic Realism :
The primitive Greek philosophers were satisfied with one indivisible matter as the basic principle of all that is in the universe. The later Greek thinkers like Democritus and others could not satisfy their impulse of curiosity in this fashion. They thought that the visible objects of the universe are many and independent of one another, and each such object can be divided further and further till we come to a point beyond which our division cannot go. Such units of material objects, which they call 'atoms', must be the ultimate physical principles of the universe. From these 'atoms' all else (including minds) have been derived. They are the only reals, self-sufficient, self-existent and indivisible, and independent of the minds which originate from them. This type of Realism can be called 'Pluralistic Material Realism' or 'Atomic Realism.' Pragmatic View of Realism :
Pragmatism means, in the broadest sense, the acceptance of the categories of life as fundamental. Perry remarks that it is the 'bio-centric' philosophy. The Pragmatist means by life, not the imaginary or ideal life of any hypothetical being, not the 'eternal' life or the 'absolute' life but the temporal, operative life of animals and men, the life of instinct and desire, of adaptation and environment, of civilization and progress. The whole 'experimentalist' tendency in English science and philosophy may be said to have anticipated the pragmatist theory that truth is achieved by the trying of hypotheses. This tendency of Pragmatic Realism is
1. Principles of Philosophy, p. 91.

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mainly directed against Absolutism.
It regards idea as an exercising force of the function of 'meaning.' Anything may be an idea, provided you mean with it; just as anything may be a weapon, provided you do injury with it. An idea is what an idea does. In this sense ideas are 'modes of conceiving' the given, a 'taking it to be this or that. It is a virtual access to an immediate experience of that which it means. By ideas, Pragmatism does not mean 'Platonic essences' but the modes of an individual's thinking. The Pragmatist conceives reality in the terms of intellectual process and circumstances. Conception of Neo-Realism :
Neo-Realism believes that the world is existent and is independent of mind. However, it does not appear exactly in the same form as the dualistic Realism of Hamilton, who makes no provision for any mediation of ideas between mind and nature. While Neo-Realism insists like other Realists that things are independent, it also asserts that when things are known, they become immediate objects of knowledge. These immediate objects of knowledge are technically called 'sensa.' So things are nothing else than 'sensa' in a certain relation. The Neo-Realist does not postulate mind as a self-conscious substance. He conceives mind as a cross-section of the physical world. Neo-Realism seems to be an ally to Naturalism and Pragmatism as it accepts like Naturalism the truth of the results of physical science and like Pragmatism the practical and empirical character of knowledge.' Let us, now, turn to a brief discussion of the conception of knowledge recognised by NeoRealism. (a) Theory of Immanence
The Neo-Realist suggests by his Theory of Immanence that things and minds are not to be regarded as two independent 1. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 271.

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realities but rather as 'relations' into which knowledge as a fact must necessarily enter. As has been observed by Perry : 'Instead of conceiving of Reality as divided absolutely between two impenetrable spheres, we may conceive it as a field of interpenetrating relationships." (b) Theory of Independence
The suggestion of the Theory of Independence is that things are directly experienced, and that in the act of direct experience the things remain as they are without being affected by experience. Experience gives us immediate knowledge of things as they are presented to it but does not determine them.
From the above statement it follows that according to the Theory of Independence, things being independent of one another, the relations which exist amongst things are also external and real, and not subjective and internal. Just as things are outside of mind, so is the relation. This view is quite similar to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika conception of the external existence of relations. Theory of Critical Realism :
If all knowledge were immediate grasp of things then there remains no provision for distinction between true and false knowledge. Such being the case no one would be allowed to deny illusions, hallucinations and differences in the degrees of accuracy in knowledge. The Critical Realist removes this difficulty. The contention of the Critical Realist is that in our perception things do not enter directly into our consciousness, but only through the mediation of certain elements partly subjective and partly objective, which make the sense-data into the actual objects of perception. These elements are partly of the nature of the subject and partly that of the object and intervene between the subject and the object, as logical entities. These entities are called 'character
1. Ibid., p. 311.

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complex' or 'essence'. The object cannot be apprehended immediately as it is, and this accounts for the distinction between true and false knowledge, between truth and error, and for illusions and hallucinations and degrees of accuracy in knowledge
The Critical Realist further maintains that things have their independent existence and are not known in their entirety but only in their partial character. Our knowledge of things is determined by our interest which selects certain qualities of things in preference to the rest. Things are not entirely unaffected by our experience, as the Neo-Realist holds. Selective and Generative Realism :
The Selective hypothesis holds that the sense-datum is not an effect which is produced or part-produced by the sense-organ. The function of the sense-organ is to 'select' which sense-datum we perceive. Thus, if I see an object as red while a colour-blind person sees it as green, the truth is that both red and green are present in the object; but my retina selects the red for me to see and shuts out the green, while the colour-blind person's retina selects the green for him to see and shuts out the red. The outside world actually has all the qualities which can ever be perceived in it by any organism.
The Generative hypothesis holds that the existence of data is physiologically conditioned. The sense-datum is the effect of two joint causes, viz., the physical object and the sense-organ. Thus, a colour is actually produced by the interaction of the physical object and the organ of sight. If this hypothesis is taken to be true, there will exist no colour when there is no eye. Similar conclusions follow as regards the data of the other senses. Hence, according to this theory, sensedata exist only when they are being perceived.
Thus, the Selective theory says that a physical object has all the qualities which we or any other existing or possible

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organism ever has or ever will perceive in it. The Generative theory says that it has none of the qualities which any actual or possible organism ever did or ever will perceive in it. Realistic Currents of Indian Thought :
Indian Realism can be classified into two broad divisions: Orthodox Realism and Heterodox Realism. That school which believes in the Vedic Testimony is called Orthodox and that which does not regard the Vedic Authority as valid is called Heterodox. In the following paragraphs we propose to give a brief account of the schools of Orthodox Realism. Pūrva-Mīmāmsä Schools :
Both the schools, viz., Bhātta and Prābhākara, believe in two independent realities. Regarding these schools we do not easily find any reference in the Sūtras that directly points out the problem of realism. But a close study of the Mīmāṁsāsūtra in which it is indicated that knowledge is produced when the sense-organ comes in contact with the object, shows quite clearly that the writer believes in the separate and independent existence of knowledge from objects. In the Bhāşya of Sabara also we find that while criticising the view of the Sūnyavādins, Sabara says that the Objective Reality is quite independent of knowledge which in its turn really depends upon the External Reality for its occurrence. Later on, the schools of Bhātta and Prābhākara discussed this problem at great length in their respective works. Thus, it is right to say that both the schools of Pūrva-Mīmāmsā are of realistic nature. Sānkhya School :
This school also falls in the category of Realism. It points out clearly that there are two ultimate entities, viz., Purusa and Prakrti both of which are eternal and different from each other. Puruşa is nothing but consciousness (cit), while Prakrti is non-conscious (jada).' Puruşa is spectator (draşır - sāksin)
1. Sānkhya-kārikā, 11.

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and enjoyer (bhoktr), while Prakrti is what is seen and enjoyed (drýva and bhogva). From this account it is evident that Purusa is consciousness or spirit, whereas Prakrti is physical existence. Prakrti is further manifested into different forms with which we are not concerned here. In short, the Sānkhya system believes in two realities which are independent of and different from each other. Rāmānuja's Position :
According to Rāmānuja, the conscious substance (cittattva) is knower and is the substratum of knowledge (jñāna). Both are eternal and inseparably connected together.? Knowledge is all pervading. It is non-material (ajada) and of selfrevealing nature. It is capable of contraction and expansion (sankoca and vikāśa). It illumines things as well as itself, but it cannot know itself. The physical substance is divided into three kinds: (1) that which possesses immutable existence (sattva) only, (2) that which has all the three qualities (guņas) and (3) that which does not possess any one of the three qualities (guņas). It is eternal. It is distinct from knowledge and is free from consciousness. It is subject to change. Both the realities, viz., consciousness and non-conscious objects are eternal and independent. Although Rāmānuja believes in the qualified monism, still, he is quite clear in his view when he says that both these substances will never become one with Brahman. The individual souls can become similar to Brahman, not same with Brahman. The physical objects will never become identical with Brahman. Hence, according to his view, the universe is of realistic nature. Position of Nyāya-Vaiseșika School :
It is needless to say that the joint system of Nyāya-Vaiseșika
1. Sänkhya-kārikā, 21. 2. Tattva-traya, p. 17. 3. Ibid., p. 35. 4. Ibid., pp. 41,45. 5. Ibid., p. 41. 6. Vikärāspadam.
i

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school holds that spirit and matter are two independent substances. It believes in seven categories of reality, Matter which is an important factor in the concept of Realism has been shown as eternal, non-momentary and cognisable through one or more means of valid cognition.
Now, we come to the schools of Heterodox Realism. Vaibhāșika and Sautrāntika Schools :
The Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhism belongs to the sect of Sarvāstivādins. The very name of this sect shows that it believes in the separate and independent existence of the objective world. Both the external and the internal existences in the shape of matter and knowledge are real.' Both of them are momentary.
According to the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, there is an external world which is as much real as knowledge itself. Although the objective world is independent of knowledge or intellect, yet, it is not cognised through direct perception. The Sautrāntikas hold that the existence of the external world (bāhyārtha) is inferred from the various forms of knowledge which forms would not have otherwise existed. In other words, they believe that knowledge assumes various forms which lead us to infer the existence of an external world corresponding to them.
According to the Vaibhāșikas, knowledge, consciousness or intellect is formless, while it has forms according to the Sautrāntikas. The former believes in the direct perceptibility of the outside world, while the latter holds it to be entirely inferential. The Vaibhāṣika system may be called 'Direct Momentary Realism'. The Sautrāntika school may be named 'Indirect Momentary Realism'. Cārvāka School :
According to the Cārvāka, consciousness is not a separate reality. He holds that reality consists of the objective world 1. History of Indian Logic. p.247. 2. Gunaratna's Commentary on Saddarsana-samuccaya, p. 47.

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only which is constituted by the four Mahābhūtas (Primary Elements), viz., earth, water, fire and air. Consciousness is merely a by-product of a peculiar amalgamation of the abovementioned Mahābhutas,' although none of them possesses it separately. This school does not believe in anything which is neither a bhūta nor a bhautika (product of the bhūtas). This system of Realism is purely materialistic. Jainism :
All the philosophical problems are based upon the concept of universe. No school of thought denies the existence of universe but each tries to prove it by its own point of view. In the Bhagavati-sūtra, a question is asked by Gautama in connection with the concept of universe. Lord Mahāvīra replied in a direct manner. The conversation is as follows :
Gautama : "O Lord ! what is this universe ?"
Mahāvīra : "O Gautama ! this universe is composed of five extensive substances. They are the Medium of Motion, the Medium of Rest, Space, Soul and Matter."2
In this conversation Time is not regarded as a separate substance but is included in both the conscious and nonconscious substances. In some chapters of the Bhagavati-sūtra, Time is mentioned as a separate entity. This two-fold classification shows that there were two schools of thought in Jainism. One believed in the existence of five extensive substances while the other conceived the universe as composed of six substances. The latter added Time as a separate and independent entity to the five extensive substances without regarding it as an extensive reality. This is a rough estimate of the concept of universe in the Jaina canons. Nature of Reality :
The Jaina thinkers have mentioned the word 'sat', 'tativa', 'artha', padārtha' and 'tatīvārtha' as synonyins for the word
1. Saddarsana-samuccaya, p. 306. 2. Bhagavati-sūtra, XUI, 4.481. 3. Ibid., XXV. 2-4.

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reality. They generally did not make any distinction among substance, reality, existence etc. The other Indian systems did not do so in the same sense. In the Vaiseşika-sūtra, all the six, viz., substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and inherent relationship are called padārthas, but the term artha is reserved only for three padārthas, viz., substance, quality and action.' The Naiyāyikas call the sixteen principles by the name of 'sat'.? The Sānkhya system regards Prakrtī and Puruşa as lattvas. In spite of being a school of Realism, Jainism did not make any difference among Reality, Existence, Substance, Object etc.
According to Umāsvāti, the definition of reality is 'sat', i.e., existence. He did not use the term 'tattva' but used the word 'dravya,'i.e., substance for reality. We have already seen that there is no difference between substance and reality. Reality is substance and substance is reality. In this way, the primary and essential criterion of reality is existence or sattā. That which exists is real. In other words, existence is reality or reality is existence. Considering from this point of view, it can be asserted that 'all is one because all exists.'4 This view is taken to be very much similar to that of the Upanişads. In the Jaina canons there are some references that indicate this view. As we find in the Sthānānga-sūtra : 'One Soul,' 'One Universe' etc. This concept of oneness is considered to be valid only from the view-point of the 'sangrahanaya'. This view-point of the Jainas reaches near the Absolute Idealism of Indian philosophy and the 'Experience' of Bradley. Our intellect cannot describe this reality in whole. It can be realised by intuition which is possessed by an omniscient self. Both the conscious and non-conscious substances are the attributes
1. Vaiseșika -sūtra, I. I. 4; VIII. 2.3. 2. Saccu Khalu șodaśuchū vpūdhamupadesyate - Nyāya-bhāşya, I. 11. 3. Sat dravyalaksanam, V. 29. (Digambara tradition) 4. Tatt vārtha-sūtra-bhāşya, I. 35. 5. Ege avá; ege loe - Sthánänga-sūtra, 1.11. 4.

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of this reality, according to Jainism. Existence is neither 'Consciousness Alone' nor 'Matter Alone'. When we analyse reality in this fashion, our stand-point comes in clash with the Absolute Idealism and the Absolute Materialism. The Jainas hold that Existence is all-inclusive. If you say that it is nothing but Pure Consciousness, you commit a blunder. If you describe it as Pure Matter, you are guilty. It is neither sheer consciousness nor mere matter. Both consciousness and matter are included in it.
Characteristics of Existence :
Umāsvāti defines sat as possessing origination, decay and permanence.' When a substance, conscious or non-conscious, originates without leaving its own nature, it is called origination. As for instance, a jar originates from clay without leaving the nature of clay. Decay is the name of leaving the former mode. As for example, clay leaves its former mode when it becomes a jar. Permanence is the essential characteristic of a substance which remains unchanged in both the conditions, viz., origination and decay. It is neither created nor destroyed. It is changeless. As for instance, the essential nature of clay remains unchanged among its various modes.2
In the Jaina canons we do not find the word 'sat' as the criterion of reality or substance. Only the word 'dravya' has been used there. As it is mentioned in the Anuyogadvara-sūtra that the universal criterion of reality is 'dravya' (substance) and the particular characteristics of reality are the jiva dravya and the ajīva dravya, i.e., the conscious substance and the non-conscious substance. Umāsvāti developed this canonical concept of 'dravya' (substance) into 'sat' (existence) and made no distinction between 'sat' and 'dravya'. His language was
1. Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat - Tattvārtha-sūtra, V. 29. 2. Sarvārtha-siddhi, V. 30.
3. Anuyogadvāra-sūtra, 123. (Avisesie davve visesie jivadavve ajivadavve ya.)

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philosophical rather than canonical. Although he mentioned 'sat' as the criterion of reality, yet, he did not define 'sat' in the same manner as it was defined by other philosophical systems. The Vedānta school and the Nyāya-Vaiseșika system define 'sattā'as absolutely permanent having no change whatsoever. Umāsvāti also defined 'sat' as permanent (dhruva) but his concept of permanence was not that of the absolute permanence. According to him, the criterion of permanence is 'not leaving self-essence'.' He explained this definition in the following manner : 'That which neither leaves its existent essence at present nor will leave it in future, is permanent."? The substance during the period of taking new forms and leaving old ones does not leave its essence. In both origination and decay it remains as it is. Its nature remains unchanged. This immutable nature is called permanence.
Now, there arises a question : How is it possible that a substance which leaves the old mode and takes the ne is permanent ? How these two contradictory qualities, viz., change and permanence can remain in the same substance ? How is it possible that a permanent existence changes ? All these questions seem to be contradictory but really speaking they are not so. Umāsvāti himself says that this concept of permanence can be understood by the term 'leaving' and 'notleaving'.? That which is left is changed and that which is not left is permanent. The modes are temporary because they are left by the substance. The essential criterion is permanent because it remains unchanged. No substance can be absolutely destroyed. No object is absolutely permanent. The nature of reality is permanent as well as momentary. Its modes (paryāyas) change but the essential characteristic (dravya)
1. Tadbhāvāvvayan nitvam - Tattvārtha-sūtra, V. 30. 2. Yat sato bhāvānnavyeti na vyesyati tannityam --- Tattvārtha
sūtra-bhāsya. V. 30. 3. Arpitānarpitasiddheh --Tattvārtha-sūtra, V. 31.

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
remains unchanged. Kundakunda also defines reality (sattā) in the same way.
Identity and Difference :
What the Jaina maintains is that the nature of reals can be understood from experience. It is wrong to admit that any attribute or element that does not belong to the real can be ascribed as belonging to it. This is the fundamental position of almost all the Realistic schools.
Our experience tells us that no object is absolutely identical. We experience this also that the differences are not absolutely scattered. Jainism takes this commonsense-view and maintains that the identity is accepted to be true in the midst of all the varying modes or differences. There is no reason to call in question the reality of the changes or of the identity, as both are perceived facts. Every entity is subject to change and maintains its identity throughout its career. Dispassionate study reveals reality to be a synthesis of opposites - identity and difference, permanence and change, describability and indescribability, oneness and maniness. The Vedantins start with the premise that reality is One Universal Existence and that is Permanent Consciousness. The Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas believe in atomic particulars and momentary ideas, each absolutely different from the rest and having nothing underlying them to bind them together. The Naiyāyikas believe in both as combined in an individual, though they maintain that the two characters, i.e., universality and particularity are different and distinct. A real, according to them, is an aggregate of the universal and the particular, i.e., identity and difference and not a real synthesis. The Jaina differs from them all and maintains that the universal and the particular are only distinguishable traits in a real, which is at once identical with and different from both. Reality is neither a particularity nor a universality in an exclusive
1. Pancastikāyasāra. 8.

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manner, but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its foid.' It is existence. It is 'sattā'. Both identity and difference live in its bosom. They are not different from existence as such. They are in the form of existence or existence is in the form of them. This existence is 'sat'. This 'sat' is called 'dravya'. This 'dravya' is known as 'tattva'. This 'tattva' is described as reality. This type of reality is 'tattvārtha' or 'padārtha'. Classification of Substance :
It has already been mentioned that if we look at substance from the view-point of sangraha (universality), we have only one substance, one reality and that reality is existence. From this stand-point, we make no distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness, between universality and particularity, between subject and object, between one and many. All these differences are covered by 'sat'. Hence, from one point of view, 'sat' is the only substance. This view-point leads to a form of Monism, inasmuch as it takes note of the thread of unity running through plurality which we find recorded in the earlier works of Jaina philosophy.
If we look at substance from the dualistic view-point, we experience it as composed of jīva and ajīva. The jīva is the enjoyer and the ajīva is the enjoyed from the empirical point of view. That which has consciousness is jīva; that which has not consciousness is ajīva. Dr. Radhakrishnan writes in his book 'Indian Philosophy' that which has not consciousness but can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt, is ajīva." This statement is not correct. The real criterion of jīva and ajīva is consciousness and non-consciousness respectively. The Jainas do not mean by ajiva that which can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt. These four characteristics belong to 'pudgala' only
1. Asta-sahasrī, pp. 147-8. 2. Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 314.

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which is rūpin.' In other words, it is matter which can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt, because matter has gross form. Ajīva is not only matter but something more. The medium of motion, the medium of rest, space and time also fall in the category of ajīva. The following table will clearly show the real position :
Substance
Conscious 1. Jīvāstikāya
Non-conscious
Ajīva
With form (Rūpin)
Formless (Arūpin) 2. Pudgalāstikāya
3. Dharmästikāya 4. Adharmāstikāya 5. Akäśāstikāya
6. Addhāsamaya (Kāla) The last four categories of ajīva are formless. Hence, they cannot be touched, tasted, seen or smelt. It is the rūpin only which can be touched etc. Such substance is 'pudgala'. Therefore, the four characteristics of form can be ascribed to 'pudgala' (matter) only and not to 'ajīva' as a whole. 'Pudgala' (matter) is a part of ajīva, and it is needless to say that the characteristics of a part cannot be attributed to the whole. The criterion of 'ajīva' is non-consciousness. Hence, from the dualistic point of view, the conscious substance is jīva, while the unconscious substance is ajīva." Canonical Conception of Classification :
In the Bhagavati-sutra substance is classified into two divisions. These two divisions are the same as we have already
1. Rūpīṇaḥ pudgalāḥ -Tattvārtha-sútra, V. 5. 2. Nityāvasthitanyarūpāni - Ibid., V.4. 3. Bhagavati-sūtra, XXV. 2; XXV. 4.

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65
discussed. There is a further classification of the ajīva substance. It is divided into 'rūpin' and 'arūpin'. The 'rūpin' substance is pudgalāstikāya alone. The 'arūpin' one is divided into 'dharmāstikāya' (medium of motion), 'adharmāstikāya' (medium of rest), 'ākāśāstikāya' (space) and 'addhasamaya' (time). The first four 'ajīva' substances, viz., 'pudgala' (matter), 'dharma' (medium of motion), 'adharma' (medium of rest) and 'ākāśa' (space) and 'jīva' are called 'astikāyas' meaning thereby 'substances having extension'. Here it should be noted that the term 'extension' is not used by the Jaina in the realistic sense of material extension. The Jaina conception of 'extension' is a unique one. It is as follows :
As these exist, they are called 'asti' by the great Jinas, and because they have many 'pradeśas', like bodies, therefore, they are called 'kāyas'. Hence, these are called astikāyas (extensive substances).'
To be more clear, let us understand what is meant by a 'pradeśa'. It has been defined to be that part of space which is covered by one indivisible atom of matter.2 Such 'pradeśas' contain not only the atoms of matter, but also the particles .of other substances. 'Jiva', 'pudgala', 'dharma', 'adharma' and 'ākāśa' have many 'pradeśas', as these consist of many indivisible parts. The particles of these are mixed up or capable of being mixed up. The last substance, viz., 'addhāsamaya' (time) consists of particles which never mix up, and consequently, each of these particles occupies a particular 'pradeśa'. Thus, time is said to have a single 'pradeśa'. Therefore, 'addhāsamaya' is not an extensive substance. The 'addhāsamaya' substance is also called 'kāla'.
1. Dravya-sangraha, 24. 2. Ibid., 27.

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Thus, we can broadly divide substance into three categories : 1. That which is conscious and has no form. Tīva'
alone is such. 2. That which is non-conscious and has some form.
'Pudgala' falls in this category. 3. That which is non-conscious and has no form.
'Dharma', 'adharma', 'ākāśa and 'addhāsamaya' are
of this category.
Another division is also possible. It consists of'astikāya' and 'anastikāya'. 1. That which has more than one 'pradeśa', whether they
are countable, innumerable or infinite, is known as 'astikāya'. 'Tīva', 'dharma', 'adharma', 'ākāśa' and
'pudgala' constitute this variety. 2. That which has only one 'pradeśa' is called
'anastikāya'. Such substance is 'addhāsamaya' or
'kāla' alone. The following tables will clearly show the scheme :
TABLE -I Substance
Conscious
Non-conscious
Jiva
Ajīva
Material
Non-material
Pudgala
Dharma Adharma
Ākāśa Kāla
.

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TABLE II
Substance
Extensive
Non-extensive
Kāla
Jīva Dharma Adharma Ākāśa Pudgala.
Almost all the Realists of Indian thought except the Naiyāyikas and Vaiseșikas divided reality into two broad categories. These categories are known as spirit and matter, soul and matter, ideas and matter, Puruşa and Prakrti or subject and object. The materialistic school of Realism is not included in this scheme, because it is not dualistic. None of the Realists tried to divide reality exactly in the same sense as Jainism did. So far as consciousness is concerned, Jainism joins hands with the other Realists, but as regards the conception of nonconscious substance, it differs from them. The Jaina conception of non-conscious substance, is not in the sense of matter. It includes some non-material substances as well.
Jainism holds that there are not only two categories of reality, viz., consciousness and matter, but there is a third category as well which is non-conscious and non-material. Neither is it necessary that what is non-conscious must be material nor is it essential that what is non-material must be conscious. There is a third category which is non-material but non-conscious. It should not be forgotten that matter is that substance which has form, i. e., which can be touched, tasted, smelt and seen. 'Dharma', 'adharma', 'ākāśa, and 'kāla' are non-conscious but not material. They cannot be touched, tasted, smelt or seen. .
To sum up : There are six substances according to the pluralistic conception of the Jainas. They are as follows :

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1. Jāvāstikāya -- Extensive, conscious, non-material
substance. 2. Pudgalāstikāya - Extensive, non-conscious, material
substance. 3. Dharmāstikāya - Extensive, non-conscious, non-material
substance in the from of the medium of motion. 4. Adharmāstikāya - Extensive, non-conscious, non-material
substance in the form of the medium of rest. 5. Ākāśāstikāya - Extensive, non-conscious, non-material
substance in the form of space. 6. Addhāsamaya (kāla)- Non-extensive, non-conscious, non
material substance (time). Now, we propose to explain each of these substances in detail. Jīvāstikāya :
The fundamental characteristic of 'jīva' is 'upayoga'.' Because of its formlessness it cannot be perceived by the senseorgans. It can be known by introspection and inference. Now, what is 'upayoga'? The criterion of'upayoga' is consciousness. In the technical language of Jainism, this consciousness is called 'bodha.' When this 'bodha' is evolved in a particular fashion, it becomes knowledge. To explain the term 'upayoga' it is further mentioned that upayoga is of two kinds : determinate and indeterminate.? Determinate upayoga is further divided into eight categories. These categories are : mati-jñāna, śruta-jñāna, avadhi-jñāna, manaḥ-paryāya- jñāna, kevalajñāna, mati-ajñāna, śruta-ajñāna and avadhi-ajñāna (vibhanga-jñāna). Indeterminate upayoga is divided into four categories. They are : Cakşurdarśana, acakşurdarśana, avadhi-darśana and kevala-darśana. According to Jainism, there are infinite jīvas in the universe and each Jiva has
1. Upavogo laksanam ----Tattvärtha-sútra, II. 8. 2. Sa dvividhostacaturbhedah - Ibid., U. 9.

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innumerable pradeśas.' It is not all pervasive. 'By contraction and expansion of its pradeśas a soul is capable of occupying varying proportions of the countless pradeśas of the universe, just like the flame of a lamp whose light can fill a small room as well as a big hall.” As has been observed by Umāsvāti : 'If the space is divided into innumerable parts, the size of a soul can be so small as to occupy one or more of these parts' One part should not be confined to one pradeśa but it should be taken as having innumerable pradeśas, since the innumerability of the spatial pradeśas is of innumerable kinds. In special cases the size of a single soul can fill the whole universe. 'By the contraction and expansion of pradeśas, the soul occupies space like the light from a lamp.' It can occupy the smallest possible body, viz., that of a bacterium or the biggest body of a great fish (mahāmaccha). The soul becomes equal in extent to a small or a large body by contraction and expansion.' This view about the size of the soul is bitterly criticised by the other philosophers of India. No school of Indian philosophy but Jainism regards the soul as equal in extent to the body it occupies.
Such souls are infinite in number, but there are two broad divisions, viz., worldly souls and liberated souls. The worldly souls are further divided onto two classes : mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara). The mobile souls are again divided into five-sensed, four-sensed, three-sensed and two-sensed jīvas. The immobile souls are divided into five categories: those living in the bodies of earth, water, fire, air and vegetable. The following table will show the classification:
1. Ibid., V. 7-8. 2. Tattvārtha-sūtra, II. 14. 3. Asankhveyabhāgādine jīvanām --Tattvārtha-sútra, V.15. 4. Pradeśasaṁhāruusuir gübhyāṁ pradīpavat---Tattvärtha-sūtra, V. 16. 5. Dravya-sangraha. 10. 6. Sarisărino miktāśca - Tattvärtha-sútra, II. 10. 7. Ibid., II. 12.

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SOUL (Jīva)
Worldly (Saṁsārin)
Liberated (Mukta)
Mobile (Trasa)
Immobile (Sthāvara)
Living in the bodies of earth
water
Five-sensed (man etc.) Four-sensed (bee etc.) Three-sensed (ant etc.) Two-sensed (worm etc.)
fire air
"
vegetable
Those jāvas that possess five sense-organs, viz., those of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing are called five-sensed jīvas. Those possessing four sense-organs, viz., those of touch, taste, smell and sight are four-sensed. Having three senseorgans, viz., those of touch, taste and smell are known as three-sensed souls. Those who possess only two sense-organs, viz., those of touch and taste are called two-sensed jīvas. The immobile jīvas possess only one sense-organ, viz., that of touch. They are known as prthvīkāya, apkāya, tejaskāya, vāyukāya and vanaspatikāya. They possess the forms of earth, water, fire, air and vegetable. Pudgalāstikāya :
It has already been mentioned that 'pudgala' is nothing but matter. Matter is 'rūpin'. In other words, it has touch, taste, smell and colour. It consists of numerable, innumerable and infinite parts according as we consider the different molecular combinations. The indivisible elementary particle of matter is aņu (atom). It has only one pradeśa because the criterion of pradeśa itself is based on aņu. One atom
1. Niyama-sära, 35.

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71
will necessarily occupy one pradeśa. But it is not necessary that one pradeśa would always be occupied by one atom only because of the contraction and expansion of atoms in molecules.
Matter is of two varieties : in the form of an atom (aņu) and in the form of a molecule (skandha). That substance which is the beginning, the middle and the end by itself and is indivisible should be known as atom. In other words, atom is the smallest possible part of matter. Atom as a unit is inapprehensible by the sense-organs. It is perceptible only in the form of skandha. Atoms are produced only by division.' When any molecule is dissolved into the smallest possible atoms, the atoms so obtained are called effect-atoms (kāryaparamānus). Those atoms which cause the formation of four root matters --- earth, water, fire and air are called causeatoms (kāraṇa-paramāņus). Each and every atom is potentially capable of forming earth, water, fire or air. According to the Jainas, there are no distinct and separate atoms of earth, water etc. The school of Nyāya-Vaiseșika does not agree with this view.
Skandha is formed in three different ways : (1) By bheda (division) (2) By sanghāta (union) (3) By the combined process of division and union taking
place simultaneously.”
The manifestations of pudgala are found in the forms of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade or image, sunshine and moonlight.}
1. Bhedādanu--- Tattvārtha-sūtra, V.27. 2. Bhedasanghâtebhya utpadyante --Tattvārtha-sútra, V. 26. 3. Ibid., V. 24.

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Dharmāstikāya :
This substance as the medium of motion is defined by Umāsvāti as permanent, fixed and without form. Dharmastikāya is only one. It is not capable of moving from one place to another. The whole universe (loka) is the place of dharmāstikāva.!
Now, what is the nature of this substance ? It is helpful in supporting the motion of souls and matter. What does it mean? It means that although the souls and matter have the capacity of moving, yet, they cannot move unless the medium of motion is present in the universe. The medium of motion does not create motion but only helps those who have already got the capacity of moving. It is the medium through which motion takes place. As for instance, a fish swims in water. Here, water does not create swimming but it only helps the fish that has the tendency of swimming. As water helps fish in swimming, the jivāstikāya, and pudgalāstikaya are helped by dharmastikāya when the former tend to move. The medium of motion (dharmāstikāya) is non-material substance possessing no consciousness. It is permanent as well as fixed and one. Everything can penetrate it without any obstruction. It consists of innumerable pradeśas', because the universe-space possesses countless spatial units. Adharmāstikāya :
The auxiliary cause of rest to the soul and matter is called medium of rest (adharmāstikāya). It is a single non-material substance pervading through the whole of the universe. There are countless points of adharmāstikāyu as those of dharmāstikāva. Adharmāstikāva is as helpful with respect to rest as dharmāstikāya is regarding motion. As a tree is helpful to a
1. Ibid., V.3, 5, 6, 7, 13. 2. Niyama-sára, .30.

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person who is coming from a far distance in the hot sun and wants to have some rest under it, so is the nature of adharmāstikaya to help the souls and matter when they take rest. Both these substances have the capability of rest but unless there is the medium of rest, they cannot take rest. Hence, it is called the auxiliary cause of rest. Dharma and adharma pervade all the parts of the universe as oil pervades the whole of a mustard seed. The concept of dharma and adharma as the categories of substance is a unique contribution of Jaina philosophy. Ākāśāstikāya :
Know that which is capable of allowing space to the jīvas, pudgala, dharma, adharma and kāla to be åkāśa, according to Jainism. Ākāśa is eternal, all-pervasive, all the objects of the universe exist in it and it has no form.' It is a single substance having infinite pradeśas. Ākāśāstikāya is of two divisions : lokākāśa and alokākāśa. Loka is that place in which dharma, adharma, kāla, pudgala and jīvas exist. That which is beyond this lokäkāśa is called alokākāśa.2 Jainism believes in two varieties of space. One is called lokākāśa or that space in which all other substances exist. This variety of space is called 'universe' in our ordinary language. Jainism does not believe in this universe-space only but admits space beyond the universe as well. It holds that the universe-space is only lokākāśa. There is alokākāśa as well which is pure space. In this space, no substance of the universe exists, hence, it is called alokākāśa. This division is not in äkāśa itself but it is due to its relation with the other five substances. When it is relatively divided into lokākāśa and alokākāśa, lokākāśa has innumerable pradeśas, while alokākāśa has infinite pradeśas.
1. Vardhamāna-purāņa, XVI. 31. 2. Dravya-sangraha, 19.

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Having taken innumerable pradeśas, i.e., the pradeśas of lokākāśa from ākāśa as a whole, the remaining pradeśas of alokākāśa are still infinite.' Space is self-supported, while the other substances are not so. They are accommodated in it. Addhāsamaya or Kāla :
Kāla (time) is defined by Nemicandra from two standpoints. Vyavahāra-kāla (time from ordinary point of view) is that which helps to produce changes in a substance and which is known from modifications produced in it, while Pāramärthika, i.e., real kala is understood from continuity.2 Let us explain it. According to Jainism, kāla viewed from two view-points. Really speaking, kāla is nothing but the auxiliary cause of change. This change is understood from continuity. Without continuity we cannot understand change at all. If there is no continuity, what is that which changes? Hence, continuity is the ground of change. From ordinary point of view, kāla is understood in hours, minutes, seconds etc., by which we call a thing to be new or old according to changes produced in the same. These two types of time are technically called 'kāla' and 'samaya' respectively. Kala is eternal and devoid of form. Samaya has a beginning and an end, and consists of varieties, viz., hour, minute etc. Kāla may be said to be the substantial cause of Samaya.
Kāla consists of minute particles which never mix up with one another. The universe is full of these particles of time. No space-unit of the universe is devoid of it. Every spaceunit contains time-unit. Hence, it is said that the particles of time are indivisible, innumerable and without form. As it is remarked: 'Those innumerable substances which exist one by one in each pradesa of lokākāśa, like heaps of jewels, are points of time."
1. Compare: Purnasya purṇamādāya pūrṇamevāvaṣiṣyate. 2. Dravya-sangraha, 21.
3. Ibid., 22.

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Ethical Classification of Tattva:
Now, we proceed to the ethical classification of 'tattva' which is not less important than the previous one. In the Sthānanga-sutra, tattva (padartha) is divided into nine categories. In philosophical works like the Samayasara etc., we find the same classification. These nine categories are as follows: 1. jīva (soul), 2. ajīva (non-soul), 3. punya (good karma), 4. pāpa (bad karma), 5 asrava (influx of karma), 6. bandha (bondage of karma), 7. samvara (prevention of the influx of karma), 8. nirjarā (partial annihilation of karma) and 9. mokṣa (total annihilation of karma) :

75
We have already discussed the nature of jīva and ajīva and established the fact that the whole universe is nothing but jiva and ajīva. It is but natural to ask that when the whole reality is divided into two categories, what else remains which makes the latter seven categories necessary. The Jaina thinkers answer this question from ethical point of view. They say that the whole reality is divided into jīva and ajīva, and we do not deny this. The latter seven categories are necessitated by the consideration of the problem of the concept of mokṣa (emancipation). The worldly jīvas are bound by karma from beginningless time and they tend to liberate themselves from this strong karmic chain. They do not like bondage but try to attain liberation according to the best of their present capacity. Hence, liberation (mokṣa) is our goal. When we accept this category as our life-aim, we naturally desire to know the obstacles which stand in our way. How do these obstacles originate and how might they be removed? What is the nature of these obstacles? All these questions are answered by the postulation of the latter seven categories. In other words, the latter seven categories are different conditions and forms of jiva and ajīva.

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We have described the nature of jīva and ajiva. We propose to give, now, a brief account of the nature of the remaining seven categories. Punya :
The essential characteristic of jīva is consciousness, purity and bliss but through the beginningless chain of karmas, bondage is there and the jīvas enjoy weal (punya) or woe (pāpa). Punya is produced by our auspicious bhāvas (activities). The auspicious bhāvas are said to consist of freedom from delusion, acquirement of right faith and knowledge, practice of reverence, observance of the five vows, etc. The manifestation of punya consists in sātā-vedaniya (feeling of pleasure), subha-āyus (auspicious life), śubhanäman (auspicious physique) and śubha-gotra (auspicious heredity).' Pāpa :
Pāpa is produced by inauspicious bhāvas. These bhāvas consist of delusion, wrong faith and knowledge, violence, falsity, stealing, indulgence, attachment, anger, pride, deceitfulness, greed etc. The manifestation of pāpa consists in asātā-vedanīya (feeling of pain), aśubha-āyus (inauspicious life), aśubha-nāman (inauspicious body) and aśubha-gotra (inauspicious heredity).2
Some writers like Umāsvāti and others have recognised only seven categories. They did not regard punya and pāpa as separate and distinct categories. These two categories were included in asrava and bandha. It has been observed by Umāsvāti that punya and pāpa are nothing but the auspicious and inauspicious influx of karmas.
1. Sadvedyasubhäyurnāmagotrāņi punyam---Tattvārtha-sūtra. VIII. 25. 2. Atonyat papam --Tattvārtha-sūtra, VII. 26. 3. Jīvājīvāsravabandhasunivurunirjarāmokṣāstuttvam -- Ibid., 1, 4. 4. Subhaḥ punyasyu; aśubhaḥ pāpusya --- Ibid., VI. 3-4.

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Asrava :
Asrava is divided into 'bhāvāsrava' and 'dravyasrava'. That modification of soul by which karma gets into it, is known as bhāvāsrava. Dravyasrava is the karmic matter itself which enters the soul.' In other words, bhāvāsrava is nothing but activities, while dravyāsrava is a peculiar type of matter. Umāsvāti did not make such an explicit difference between bhāvāsrava and dravyāsrava. According to his definition, asrava is nothing but the actions of body, speech and mind.2
Bandha :
That conscious state by which karma is bound with the soul is called bhava-bandha, while the interpenetration of the pradeśas of karma and the soul is called dravya-bandha. Now, how does this bandha (bondage) come into existence? That modification of consciousness consisting of kaşayas, i.e., anger, pride, deceit and greed by which karmas are tied to the soul is the cause of bandha.3 In other words, it is attachment and aversion that constitute the fundamental cause of bandha.
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First of all there is influx of karmic particles through asrava. Then there are some activities of consciousness which are responsible for a peculiar kind of bondage. It is called bhāva-bandha. After this bhāva-bandha there is union of the jīva with the actual karmas. This union which consists of the interpenetration of the soul and the karmas is known as dravya
bandha.
Bandha is of four kinds, according to its prakṛti (nature), sthiti (duration), anubhāga (intensity) and pradeśas (mass).1
1-2.
3. Ibid., VIII, 2-3.
4. Dravya-sangraha, 33.
1. Dravya-sangraha, 29.
2. Kayavānmanaḥkarma yogaḥ; sa āsravaḥ. Tattvärtha-sūtra, VI.

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The prakṛti and pradeśas of bondage result from the activities of thought, speech and body, while the sthiti and anubhāga result from the conditions of attachment and aversion.'
Samvara:
It is the antagonistic principle of asrava. It is also classified into two kinds, according to the internal and external nature of it. That modification of consciousness which is the cause of checking bhāva-asrava is known as bhava-samvara and that by which dravya-āsrava is checked is known as dravya-samvara.
It is divided into seven varieties, vrata (vow), samiti (carefulness), gupti (restraint), dharma (observance), anuprekṣā (meditation), parīṣahajaya (victory over troubles) and caritra (conduct). Each of these, again, is divided into various sub-classes.
The above-mentioned classification is from the Dravyasangraha. The Tattvärtha-sūtra does not mention 'vrata' as a variety. It mentions 'tapas' (penance) in place of 'vrata'.3 Nirjarā :
That modification of soul by which the matter of karma disappears partially is called bhāva-nirjarā. The destruction itself is known as dravya-nirjarā. Thus, nirjarā is the partial destruction of the karmas which are bound with the soul. This type of partial destruction takes place in two ways: (1) The matter of karma disappears in proper time after the fruits of such karma are enjoyed. (2) The matter of karma is destroyed through penances before the actual period of enjoyment
comes.
1. Ibid.
2. Asravanirodhaḥ samvaraḥ --- Tattvärtha-sutra. IX. 1.
3. Tapasă nirjarā ca --- Ibid., IX. 3.
4. Tattvärtha-sāra, VII. 2.

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Mokșa :
That modification of soul which is the cause of the total destruction of karmas is known as bhāva-mokṣa and the actual separation of the karmic matter is called dravya-mokşa. After attaining this stage the soul is never bound again. As Umāsvāti says : A person attains kevala-jñāna (omniscience) when first his mohanīya karma and then his jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanavaraṇīya and antarāya karmas are destroyed. After attaining kevala-jñāna, the cause producing bondage being absent and nirjarā being present, he becomes free from the remaining karmas, i.e., the vedaniya, āyus, nāman and gotra karmas in due course, and thus, being void of all kinds of karmas attains final liberation.'
1. Ibid. X. 1-3.

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CHAPTER IV
SOUL
The complicated problem of the existence of soul has troubled almost all the great minds of the world. There have been such philosophers who did not believe in an independent existence of soul like the Cārvākas in India and earlier Greek philosophers as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus and the like. In the times of Lord Mahāvīra such thoughts were not altogether absent. He attempted in a successful manner to prove the independent existence of soul. Arguments for the Existence of Soul :
Lord Mahāvīra in the opening presents the views of those opponents who do not believe in an independent existence of soul. "O Indrabhūti ! you have a doubt about the existence of soul (jīva), since it is not directly perceived by the senses as is the case with a jar (ghața). And so you argue that whatever is imperceptible does not exist in the world, e.g., a flower in the sky."
Some one may here argue that though aņus (atoms) are not within the range of perception, yet, they do exist. So what about them? The answer is that no doubt they are imperceptible to us as aņus, but when they are so transformed as to perform the function of a jar etc., they no longer remain so. Such is not, however, the case with the soul. It never attains a stage when it can be directly perceived.
"The soul is not an object of inference, because inference, too, is preceded by perception and is the outcome of the
1. Višeșåvaśyaka-bhāșya, 1549.

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recollection of the universal concomitance. There has not been previously seen any connection between soul (major term) and its linga (middle term), the recollection of which, along with the sight of its linga, can lead us to a conviction about the existence of soul."
"The soul is not even within the range of scriptural authority, because scripture is not quite distinct from inference. Moreover, the soul is not directly perceptible to any one whose words make up scripture."?
There is none to whom the soul is an object of direct perception. Had there been any one of that type, his word would have been looked upon as scriptural authority and on the basis of that scripture the existence of soul would have been admitted.
"Furthermore, the scriptural authorities are mutually contradictory. Consequently, on that account, too, the doubt is justifiable. You, therefore, believe that the existence of soul cannot be established by any of the means of valid cognition."}
The existence of soul cannot be established even by the means of analogy, because in the entire universe there is no object whatsoever that resembles the soul.
Even implication does not help in proving the existence of soul. There does not exist any such object seen or heard whose postulation can prove the independent existence of soul.
Thus, when the existence of soul cannot be proved by any of the five means of valid cognition, each of which establishes the existence of an object, it automatically follows that it comes within the range of negation (abhāva), the sixth means of valid cognition whose function is to establish nonexistence.
1. Ibid., 1550-1. 2. Ibid., 1552. 3. Ibid., 1553.

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Thus, it is proved that soul does not exist. This is, in brief, the view of the opponent - the thesis (pūrva pakşa).
Now, Lord Mahāvīra refutes the arguments of the opponent in the following manner :
"O Gautama ! the soul is indeed directly cognizable to you as well. Your knowledge about it which consists of doubt etc., is itself the soul. What is proved by your own experience need not be proved by other means of cognition. No proof is required to establish the existence of happiness, misery etc.
Or, the soul is directly experienced owing to the 'ahampratyaya' (realisation as 'I') in 'I did, I do, and I shall do' the realisation which is associated with the functions pertaining to all the three tenses.
If there is no soul, how do you realise 'aham'? How can there be a doubt whether soul is or not? Or, if there is a doubt, in whose case is this 'ahampratyaya' justifiable?"}
This argument for the existence of soul is advanced from the psychological point of view. The various aspects of cognition, viz., memory, recognition, doubt, judgment etc., are never possible, if there is no soul. All these psychological functions are centred in a conscious and sentient entity which is not material but spiritual. Cognition, feeling and conation are not possible unless we regard the existence of a spiritual entity or substance as the source of all these phenomena. All the three aspects of our mental life, viz., knowing, feeling and willing, are not scattered phenomena. The process of memory certainly proves the existence of soul. The four stages of memory, viz., retention, recall, recognition and localisation, are systematically connected with one another and the source of this systematic connection is the soul. A purely material brain cannot work in such a systematic and well adjusted manner.
1. Višeşāvasyaka-bhāṣya, 1554-6.

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The problem of doubt and doubter is rather ontological. Just like the Sānkhya system that proves the separate existence of Puruşa on the ground of 'adhisthāna', Lord Mahāvīra proved the existence of soul on the ground of doubt. He argued that without a doubter who is beyond all kinds of doubt but still remains in all doubts, no doubt is possible. Doubt presupposes the existence of a doubter as its ground. That ground is a soul, a self, a sentient being, a conscious principle. "If the object about which one has doubt is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to whether I do exist or I do not exist ? Or, Gautama ! when you yourself are doubtful about yourself, what can be free from doubt ?"!
He further says : "The soul which is the substratum (guņin) of attributes is self-evident owing to its attributes (gunas) being self-evident, as is the case with a pitcher. For on realising the attributes (guņas) the substratum (guņin), too, is realised."2
Substance cannot exist without qualities and qualities have no place absolutely independent of substance. If the qualities are experienced, the experience of the substance is apparent. The qualities of soul such as perception, intuition etc. are quite evident. These qualities cannot have an absolutely independent existence. Hence, the existence of the soul to which all these qualities belong, is quite obvious. • The opponent may admit that there is a 'guņin' (substance) which is the substratum of the qualities like knowledge etc., but he may refuse to believe that this substance is something else than a body. That is to say, he looks upon the body itself as the substance in question, because the qualities are found only in the body. The argument is like this: Knowledge etc. are the qualities of a body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, fatness, thinness etc.
1. Ibid., 1557. 2. Ibid., 1558.

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The answer is : The qualities like knowledge etc. cannot belong to the material body, for the body is 'rūpin' (with form), as is the case with a pitcher. The qualities of a substance having form must be with form (rūpin). Knowledge etc. are formless. Therefore, the substance possessing these qualities, too, must be formless, and hence, it cannot be the body which is with form. Thus, that substance which is formless is nothing but the soul.
Secondly, sometimes it is seen that the qualities like perception, memory etc. are absent even when the body is present as in sound sleep, death etc.' It indicates that knowledge etc. are not the qualities of body but they belong to a separate substance, i.e., soul.
Thirdly, the body cannot be the cause of knowledge, because it is composed of material elements (bhūtas) which do not possess consciousness. The effect must exist in the cause implicitly. If the material elements do not possess consciousness as one of their qualities, how is it possible that the body becomes conscious ? If consciousness is absent in each of the material elements, it will necessarily be absent in the combination as well. As oil is absent in each particle of sand, it cannot be produced from the combination also. Hence, it is illogical to maintain that consciousness is merely a by-product of some peculiar amalgamation of the four mahābhūtas (primary elements), although none of them possesses it separately. The intoxicating nature of wine is not absent in those objects by which it is produced. Intoxication is not a mere by-product. It is systematically produced by those objects in which it exists implicitly. The patent nature of intoxication is merely a manifestation of its latent nature. It is not a product which is quite strange. Hence, consciousness cannot be ascribed to the body. All the spiritual qualities reside in a separate conscious substance. A thing which is absolutely non-existent 1. Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, p. 114. 2. Šāstra-värtä-samuccaya, 44.

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cannot come into existence like sky-flower or a horn on the head of a hare. A thing which is existent cannot be absolutely non-existent like the material elements.' If consciousness is absolutely non-existent, it can never come into existence. It exists in the soul because the soul is the principle of consciousness.
Fourthly, a person who does not accept the existence of soul, cannot make a negative judgment in the case of an absolutely non-existent object. Even the existence of skyflower is not absolutely negative, for both sky and flower exist. The conjunction (samyoga) of sky and flower is non-existent, not the objects themselves. Hence, the negation of soul itself proves the existence of soul. If there is no soul, whose negation is this?
Fifthly, the word 'jīva'is synonymous with the word 'soul.' This word 'jīva' is significant, for it has a derivation (vyutpatti) and it is a singular whole (suddha pada). Whatever is a singular whole and has a derivation is here seen to be one having a meaning. Pitcher etc. may be mentioned as instances. So is the word 'jīva'. Therefore, it, too, has a meaning. What is not significant and has no meaning, is wanting in derivation, and besides, it is not a singular whole. Dittha, sky-flower etc. are words of this type, for the former has no derivation, whereas the latter is not a singular whole. Such is not the case with the word 'jīva'. Therefore, it is significant and has a meaning.? The meaning is nothing but the concept of soul. This argument is etymological in nature. Definition of Soul :
The defining characteristic of soul is sīvatva which means cetanā. When we use the word consciousness as the criterion of soul, we only mean cetană by it. It is cetanā alone which does not exist in any substance other than the soul. Hence, the 1. Šāstra-vārtā-samuccaya, 76. 2. Višeșāvasyaka-bhāșya, 1575.

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main line of demarcation between jiva and ajīva is cetană. Existence, origination, decay, permanence etc. are the general characteristics of all the substances, therefore, when the Jainas define jīva as a substance possessing cetană or consciousness, they do not exclude all these general qualities (sādhāraṇa dharmas). These qualities are included in consciousness itself. The definition of a particular substance consists of only those special qualities which are not found in other substances.' When a substance is taken as a whole, or in other words, if we want to refer to all its characteristics, we analyse its complete nature. That analysis is not definition. It is proper to call it description. Consciousness consists of knowledge and intuition (jñāna and darśana). In the Tattvärtha-sutra, the definition of soul in the shape of upayoga is very liberal. It includes bliss and power in it. Strictly speaking, soul is that substance which possesses four infinities (ananta catuṣṭaya). These four infinities are infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, infinite bliss and infinite power. A liberated soul possesses all these infinities. The worldly jivas do not possess them in their perfection, because they are obscured by the veil of four obstructive (ghatin) karmas, viz., jñānāvaraṇīya (covering the faculty of knowledge), darśanavaraṇīya (covering the faculty of intuition), mohaniya (covering the faculty of bliss) and antarāya (covering the faculty of power). The liberated souls as well as the omniscients are absolutely free from these four kinds of karmas, hence, they possess the four infinities in all perfection. Thus, the definition of soul consists in the possession of the four infinities.
Difference between Darśana and Jñāna :
The difference between intuition (darśana) and knowledge (jñāna) consists in the fact that in the former the
1. Tattvärtha-śloka-vārtika, p. 318.
2. Mohakṣayājjñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāyakṣayācca kevalam -- Tattvärtha-sūtra, X. 1.

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details are not perceived, while in the latter the details are also known. In the technical language of Jainism, darśana is known as nirākāra-upayoga, while jñāna is called sākāra-upayoga. 'Before we know a thing in a detailed way, there is the stage where we simply see, hear, or otherwise become conscious of it in a general way, without going into its ins and outs. We simply know it as belonging to a class. This is the first stage of knowledge. It may be called detail-less knowledge or indefinite cognition. If this stage is not experienced, there can be no knowledge of the thing." This statement of Herbert Warren is correct to some extent, because 'to know a thing as belonging to a class' is the first stage of jñāna which arises after darśana. according to some Jaina thinkers. They say that the cognition of a thing as belonging to a class is avagraha jñāna (sensation).2 According to them, darsana is the primitive stage or the first stage of cognition where we are only aware of an object. This simple awareness without any reference to a particularity or generality may be called darsana. In this awareness, the knowledge contains only existence, i.e., 'sattāmātra'. This kind of knowledge originates just after the contact between the subject and the object. This state of cognition is the preceding stage of sensation proper. In other words, according to these thinkers, sensation is divided into two categories or two stages. The first stage where we have only awareness of the object is called darśana (sensation of existence). The second stage where we have sensation of the object as belonging to a class is called jñāna (sensation proper).
There are some thinkers who define darsana as the cognition of generality. Such thinkers regard avagraha (sensation) as a stage of darśana. The difference between darśana and jñāna, however, consists in the fact that in the former the details are not perceived, while in the latter the
1. Jainism, P. 29.
2. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, II. 7.
3. Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, II.21.

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details are also known. In other words, darsana is indeterminate, while jñana is determinate; darśana is nirākāra, while jñāna is sākāra.
Jñāna-upayoga :
Jñana-upayoga is of two kinds : svabhāva-jñāna (natural knowledge) and vibhāva-jñāna (non-natural knowledge).' Natural knowledge is independent of the senses. It is direct as well as immediate. It is the innate attribute of soul. It is pure and perfect. The Jainas call it kevala-jñāna.
Non-natural knowledge is of two kinds : right knowledge and wrong knowledge. Right knowledge is further divided into four kinds :
1. Sensory knowledge (mati-jñāna).
2. Scriptural knowledge (śruta-jñāna).
3. Limited direct knowledge (avadhi-jñāna).
4. Direct knowledge of mind (manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna).
Wrong knowledge is of three kinds :
1. Sensory wrong knowledge (mati-ajñāna). 2. Scriptural wrong knowledge (śruta-ajñāna).
3. Limited direct wrong knowledge (vibhanga-jñāna).2 Knowledge is the innate attribute of soul. It is pure and perfect. But, on account of the operation on the worldly soul of knowledge-obscuring karma in varying degrees, it is manifested to a greater or less extent. When knowledgeobscuring karma is altogether destroyed, the pure and perfect knowledge shines forth. This type of knowledge is called svabhāva-jñāna.
So long as the soul is in its worldly condition and is not altogether free from knowledge-obscuring karma, its knowledge is impure and imperfect, and so it is called vibhāva-jñāna.
1. Nanuvaogo duviho sahāvanāṇaṁ vibhāvanāṇaṁ tti -- Niyama-sara, 10. 2. Matiśrutavadhayo viparyayāśca - Tattvärtha-sutra. I. 32.
-

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This vibhāva-jñāna is of two kinds : right knowledge and wrong knowledge. The conditions of rightness and wrongness are dependent on our belief. External matter is not responsible for them. The knowledge combined with right belief is right knowledge and the knowledge combined with wrong belief is wrong knowledge.
Again, right knowledge has been sub-divided into four kinds : 1. Sensory knowledge - knowledge of the self and non
self by means of the senses and mind. 2. Scriptural knowledge - knowledge derived from the
reading or hearing of scriptures. 3. Limited direct knowledge - direct knowledge of
matter in varying degrees. 4. Direct knowledge of mind - direct knowledge of
another's mental activities.
The first three kinds are wrong as well as right. The fourth one is never wrong. Knowledge, thus, is divided into eight kinds :
1. Perfect or natural knowledge. 2. Right sensory knowledge. 3. Wrong sensory knowledge. 4. Right scriptural knowledge. 5. Wrong scriptural knowledge. 6. Right limited direct knowledge. 7. Wrong limited direct knowledge.
8. Direct knowledge of mind. Darśana-upayoga :
Darśana-upayoga is also of two kinds : natural intuition (svabhava-darśana) and the opposite of it - non-natural intuition (vibhāva-darśana). Natural intuition is perfect and independent of the senses.
Non-natural intuition is said to be of three kinds:

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1. Visual intuition (cakşurdarśana). 2. Non-visual intuition (acakşurdarśana). 3. Limited direct intuition (avadhi-darśana). In visual intuition, the object is undefinedly visible.
In non-visual intuition, the object is undefinedly tangible to the other senses (including the mind).
In limited direct intuition, there is direct tangibility of material objects just preceding their knowledge, without the assistance of the senses (including the mind).
Darśana, thus, is divided into four kinds : 1. Perfect or natural intuition (kevala-darśana). 2. Visual intuition (cakşurdarśana). 3. Non-visual intuition (acakṣurdarśana).
4. Limited direct intuition (avadhi-darśana). Temporal Relation between Intuition and Knowledge :
As regards the temporal relation between intuition and knowledge, there is no unanimity among Jaina philosophers. The canonical conception of the above-mentioned problem is that two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. Even two perfect conscious activities, viz., perfect intuition and perfect knowledge are not an exception. This fact is recorded in the Avasyaka-niryukti as 'the omniscient cannot have two conscious activities simultaneously'. Therefore, as regards the canonical conception, it is free from doubt that intuition and knowledge - whether sensory or extra-sensory - cannot occur simultaneously. Regarding the occurrence of intuition and knowledge in imperfect persons, all the thinkers are unanimous, inasmuch as all of them admit the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of intuition and knowledge. But with respect to the case of perfect personalities, there is a great controversy among them. The opinions of these thinkers can be classified into three varieties. Some of them hold that the
1. Savvussa kevalissa jugavam do natthi uvaogā - Avašyakaniryukti,
973.

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intuition and knowledge (both extra-sensory) of an omniscient person occur simultaneously, some stick to the canonical conception and regard them as successive and not operating at the same time, while others assert that they are mutually identical. Let us deal with all the three. Simultaneity of Intuition and knowledge :
It is observed by Umāsvāti that the conscious activities manifesting themselves as sensory cognition, scriptural cognition, limited direct cognition and direct cognition of mind (mati, śruta, avadhi and manaḥparyāya) occur successively, and not simultaneously. The conscious activities of the omniscient, possessing perfect knowledge and intuition which comprehend all objects and are independent and pure, occur simultaneously at every moment.' Umāsvāti, thus, upholds the view of simultaneous occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the case of an omniscient being. Kundakunda also holds .the same opinion. It is stated by him that the knowledge and intuition of an omniscient person operate at the same time even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.? Pūjyapāda is also of the same opinion. According to him, knowledge and intuition occur in succession in the imperfect who is under the influence of obstructive karma, while in the perfect who is completely free from the veil of obscuring karma, they occur simultaneously. Akalanka also supports the same view. He says : 'If the knowledge and intuition of the omniscient were to occur in succession, his perfection would be conditional and accidental. To the omniscient who has destroyed all the relevant karmic veils, the universal and the particular reveal themselves simultaneously." The same position is possessed by Vidyānandi who holds that the
1. Tattvārtha-bhāşya, I. 31. 2. Niyama-sára, 159. 3. Sarvārtha-siddhi, I1.9. 4. Astašati on Aptamīmāṁsā, 101.

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awareness of the generic form is intuition and the comprehension of the specific characters is knowledge. The knowledge-obscuring karma and the intuition-obscuring karma obstruct these faculties. Because of the presence of these two, people like us are not in a position to possess intuition and knowledge in all perfection. There is no reason why the universal and the particular should be revealed only in alternate. succession and not simultaneously when the two types of karma are destroyed simultaneously due to a particular kind of purification of the self.' Successive Occurrence of Intuition and Knowledge :
Now, we proceed to the problem of the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the omniscient. Jinabhadra is a great advocate of this view. He has very elaborately dealt with the problem in his Viseșāvaśyaka-bhāsya and Visesanavatī. He has mentioned all the three positions and advanced arguments for and against all of them. His own opinion is in favour of the successive occurrence, since he sincerely recognises the validity of the scriptural texts. He argues that if perfect intuition and perfect knowledge are identical and not separate, what is the sense in recognising two separate veils of karma, viz., intuition-obscuring karma and knowledgeobscuring karma ? Moreover, the scriptural conception of five types of knowledge and four types of intuition is condemned by those who are not prepared to accept the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge. The view of the simultaneous occurrence of intuition and know-ledge is also invalid, since two conscious activities cannot occur at the same instant. Now, the opponent may argue that the simultaneous occurrence of the two in the imperfect is not possible, since he is under the influence of the veil of obstructive karma and thus not completely free from it, but in the case of the perfect 1. Aștasahasri on Apta-mimāmsā, 101. 2. Višeşāvaśyaka-bhāsya, 3093. 3. Višeşāvasyaka-bhâsya, 3096.

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who is completely free from obstructive karma, it is not an impossibility. This argument, according to Jinabhadra, is also futile. The faculty of the self is qualitatively the same whether it is partially free or completely free. The cognition of the self is of the same type whether it is imperfect or perfect. The only difference between the two is that perfect cognition comprehends all the objects with all their modes, whereas imperfect knowledge does not comprehend all of them. Thus, Jinabhadra supports the alternate occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the omniscient on the basis of scripture. Intuition and Knowledge as Identical :
. Now, we come to Siddhasena who did not recognise the intuition and knowledge of an omniscient being as two separate faculties. According to his logical mind, both these faculties are identical as regards the case of the omniscient. He observes: 'We can distinguish between knowledge and intuition up to direct cognition of mind (manaḥparyāya). In omniscience, however, knowledge and intuition are identical'.? He elaborates the remark in a systematic and logical way. When perfect knowledge dawns just after the complete destruction of the relevant karma, perfect intuition also must dawn immediately after the complete destruction of the veil of the relevant karma. And as it is unanimously admitted that both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that both perfect intuition and perfect knowledge also occur at the same time. As it is maintained that there is no sensory cognition, i.e., the senses do not serve any purpose as regards the cognition of the omniscient who has completely destroyed the karmic veil that obscures cognition, so also it should be admitted that there is
1. Ibid., 314-5. 2. Manapajjavaņānamto nānassa ya darisanassa ya viseso.
Kevalaņāņaṁ puņa daṁsanan ti nanaṁ ti ya samānam.
-Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, 11.3. 3. Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, 11.5.

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no separate faculty of intuition in one who has completely destroyed the relevant karmic veil.' The contention that knowledge is determinate and distinct, whereas intuition is indeterminate and indistinct is true only in the case of an imperfect person. As regards a person who has destroyed all the relevant karmic obstructions, such distinction has no meaning. In his case, there is no distinction between determinate knowledge and indeterminate knowledge. The difference of distinct and indistinct, determinate and indeterminate is true only in the case of the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not with regard to the knowledge of perfect ones. He further argues : 'If it is admitted that the omniscient intuits the unknown and knows the unintuited, the conception of all perfection would be ridiculous." According to the view of the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the omniscient, a perfect person knows a fact that was not comprehended before, and intuits a feature which was not cognised previously, since his cognition occurs in succession. In a different language, for the omniscient some aspect of an object remains unknown for ever. If such is the case, what is the charm in admitting omniscience ? Furthermore, in the scriptures, omniscience is said to have beginning but no endd Those who have any regard for the commandments of scripture must realise the significance of this fact. If it is held that at the time of perfect intuition, knowledge is not possible, and at the moment of perfect knowledge, intuition is an impossibility, it would mean to admit the break of continuity of both of them, but this is absurd, since it goes against the scriptures that prescribe non-breadk.If the destruction of intuition-obscuring
1. Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, 11. 6. 2. Ibid., II. 11. 3. Ibid., II. 13. 4. Prajñāpanā-sutra, XVIII. 10. 5. Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, II. 7-8.

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karma and knowledge-obscuring karma takes place simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, perfect intuition and perfect knowledge, should spring forth first, the priority cannot be given to any one of them. Nor is it proper to maintain the simultaneous occurrence of both, for two conscious activities never synchronise.' If the removal of the obstruction of both intuition and knowledge takes place at one and the same moment, does the question at all arise as to which of the two arises first ? Nature of worldly Soul :
Vādideva describes the nature of the (worldly) soul in the following manner :
The soul which is proved by direct experience (pratyakşa) etc., is the knower (pramātā). It is essentially conscious, changing, agent, direct enjoyer, equal in extent to its own body, different in each body, and the possessor of material karmas.?
All these characteristics serve specific purposes. The author intends to refute all those schools that do not agree with his conception of soul.
The first characteristic of the soul that it is proved by direct experience, is meant to refute the view of the Cārvāka who does not regard soul as a separate substance. The arguments for the separate existence of soul have already been given. Consciousness as the Essence of Soul :
The second characteristic that it is essentially conscious, is meant for refuting the view of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika school which regards consciousness as an accidental quality of soul.
1. Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa, Il. 9. 2. Pramātā pratyakṣādiprasiddha ātmā.
Caitanyasvarūpaḥ pariņāmi karttā sākṣādbhoktā svadehaparimāṇaḥ pratiksetram bhinnah paudgalikādrstavaṁścāyam. ---Pramāņanayatattvāloka, VII. 55-6.

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Caitanya (consciousness) which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of ātman (soul) is treated by the Vaiseșikas and Naiyāyikas as an adventitious (aupādhika) quality' which comes temporarily into the soul as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition. Caitanya or Jñāna is, thus, something different from ātman (soul). This view is refuted in the following way :
If jñāna is supposed to be absolutely distinct from ātman, the jñāna of Mr. Caitra is in the same position with respect to his ātman as the jñāna of Mr. Maitra, that is to say, both the jñānas would be equally strangers to the ātman of Mr. Caitra, and there is no reason why his jñāna should serve him better than the jñāna of any other person in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his own jñāna, all jñānas being equally foreign to him. An explanation may be offered by the other side : Jñāna is absolutely distinct from ātman, but it is connected with ātman by samavāya-sambandha (inherent relationship), and hence, the jñāna of Mr. Caitra is not in the same position with respect to him as the jñāna of Mr. Maitra; for the former is connected with him by samavāya relation, while the latter is not so. But this explanation can be easily refuted. According to the Vaiseșika, samavāya is one, eternal and all-pervasive, and therefore, it is impossible that the jñāna should reside in Caitra and not in Maitra; and since the souls are also all-pervasive according to this school, the jñāna which takes place in one ātman takes place in all the ātmans as well and any knowledge which Caitra has acquired will belong to Maitra also.
Granted it is possible for jñāna to be connected with ätman by samavāya relation. But a question still remains to be answered : By what relation is the samavāva connected
1. Caitanyamaupādhikamātmanonyat.
- Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-dvåtrimśikā, 8. 2. Samavävasvaikatvannitvatvādvväpakatacca.

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with jñāna and ātman ? If the answer is that it is connected by another samavāya, that would mean an unending series of samavāyas leading to infinite regress. If the answer is in the form of 'itself,' why should not jñāna and ātman be connected of themselves without requiring a samvāya relation to accomplish the connection ?
The Vaiseșikas and Naiyāyikas advance another argu-ment : The distinction between ātman and jñāna is essential owing to their being related as kartr (agent) and karana (instrument). atman being the kart; and jñāna the karaņa. The Jaina thinkers hold that the position of jñāna is different from that of an ordinary karaṇa such as a scythe (dātra). Jñāna is an internal karaņa, while the scythe is an external karana.' Now, if an internal karaṇa like jñana could be shown to be absolutely distinct like scythe from karts (ātman), the argument of absolute distinction between jñāna and ātman would stand valid, but not otherwise. We say: "Devadatta sees with the eyes and a lamp."2 Here 'eye' and 'lamp' are both karanas, but on that account the two are not in the same position of absolute distinction with respect to Devadatta. Hence, jñāna is not absolutely distinct from ātman as an ordinary karaṇa. It is identical with the soul, having different types of modifications (paryāyas).
Now, the opponent asks that if jñāna and ātman are one; how is their relation of karty and karana to be accounted for?
The answer is given by the analogy of a serpent who makes a coil of his body by his own body. It may be said that the conception of karts and karaṇa in the case of the serpent is simply imaginary. How can it be said to be imaginary, when we actually see the effect, viz., the coil, which is a new state : of rest different from the former state of motion ? No amount of imagination could make us believe that a pillar was going to wind itself into a coil. 1. Syādvāda-mañjarī, p. 42. 2. Dipena cakşusā Devadattah pasyati. 3. Sarpa ātmānamätmană veştayati ---- Syādvāda-mañjarī, p. 43.

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Next, consider the word caitanya. It is the abstract noun from cetana which means ātman. Thus, caitanya means the bhāva, svarūpa or nature of ātman. Now, how can the bhāva (nature) of a thing be absolutely distinct from the thing ?
The opponent again argues that ātman is no doubt cetana but that is not without a cause but is owing to cetanā coming to reside by samavāya relation in åtman as is shown by actual experience (pratīti). The counter argument is in the following manner : If you are prepared to accept the evidence of pratiti, you must admit that ātman is by nature upayogātmaka, i.e., of the nature of consciousness. Nobody is aware of being first acetana and afterwards becoming cetana in consequence of the connection with cetanā, or of cetană coming to reside by samavāya relation in him who was at first acetana. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower (jñātā).
It may be further held that the consciousness 'jñānavānaham' (I have knowledge) would prove a distinction between jñāna (knowledge) and aham (self), for the former is that which is possessed and the latter is that who possesses. This contention is also untenable. Who possesses the consciousness 'jñānavānaham' in the theory of the opponent ? Not the self, because it is supposed to be jada, i.e., essentially devoid of jñāna in itself like a pitcher (ghata). It cannot be asserted that ātman is jada, and yet is able to become conscious. Hence, that substance which has the consciousness as 'jñānavānaham' cannot in itself be jada by nature. Therefore, ātman is not in itself jada by nature which afterwards comes to possess jñāna by samavāya relation, but it is essentially conscious. Soul as a Changing Entity :
The soul is said to be changing. This characteristic is meant for refuting the theory of the Sānkhya and other systems that regard soul as an absolutely permanent entity. They do not admit it as changing. According to the Sāńkhya system, Puruşa (soul) is devoid of form, conscious, enjoyer, permanent,

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omnipresent, static, inactive, devoid of the three guņas (sattva, rajas and tamas) and subtle. Now, if Purușa is permanent, i.e., apariṇāmin, he is above modifications of any sort; he is not liable to undergo bondage; for the same reason, he is devoid of action (kriyā) and cannot transmigrate from one life to another. Hence, there is no occasion for mokṣa (liberation) in his case. Therefore, Puruşa is neither bound nor liberated. He does not transmigrate. It is the Prakṛti (primordial matter) that is bound, liberated and reborn.' The Jaina asks: If Prakṛti is bound and liberated, what is that which binds it? If Prakṛti itself is bound and liberated, there will be no difference between bondage and liberation, because Prakṛti is always present. Hence, no question of bondage and liberation will arise in this case. If the response of Puruşa is necessary to influence Prakṛti, the response is not possible without pariṇāma (modification) in Purușa. The mere presence of Prakṛti could bring about no change in Purușa unless Puruşa was capable of action. According to the Sankhya system, it is Prakṛti which is said to be subject to pleasure and pain (sukha and duḥkha). Puruşa is reflected in buddhi (intellect) which is a factor in the evolution of Prakṛti. It is the effect of this reflection which is responsible for regarding Puruşa to be subject to pleasure and pain. This theory of the Sankhya school also proves pariņāma in Purușa. Without separating from his original character he could not be said to be subject to pleasure and pain. And the moment it is admitted that the original character is lost and a new one acquired, the operation of losing one and acquiring the other is a kriya which makes Puruşa a kartṛ (agent) which is contrary to the Sankhya tenets. When it is proved that Purușa is active, i.e., he loses one character and acquires another one, it goes without saying that Purușa is pariņāmin, i.e., active and changing, and not inactive and absolutely permanent.
1. Sankhya-kärikā, 62.
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Moreover, if pleasure and pain of which we are all undeniably conscious as belonging to ourselves, i.e., to our ātman, do not belong to ātman, they will have to hang in the air, since buddhi is incompetent to possess them, it being held to be jada (unconscious). Hence, ātman is active and changing having consciousness as its essence. Soul as Agent: . The Sānkhya school does not regard Purușa as agent, active entity. Puruşa, according to this school, is merely a silent and passive spectator. This view has been already refuted. • Pleasure and pain cannot belong to an unconscious entity. Puruşa is subject to pleasure and pain, because consciousness belongs to Purușa only. When it is proved that pleasure and pain belong to Puruşa, it is obvious that Puruşa is active, because an inactive entity cannot be subject to pleasure and pain. Moreover, consciousness itself is active, because the term consciousness implies knowledge or intelligence which is active in character. Soul as Enjoyer :
The fifth characteristic of soul is its direct enjoyment. The Sānkhyas maintain that Puruşa is enjoyer in an indirect manner, i.e., through buddhi. The Jainas say that material buddhi cannot enjoy anything. Puruşa is the karty and bhokt, (agent and enjoyer) directly and not through buddhi. Enjoyment is the function of a conscious substance. Puruşa is conscious, hence, enjoyment belongs to Puruşa and not to buddhi which is unconscious. Moreover, Puruşa cannot be reflected in buddhi, because Puruşa is immaterial, while buddhi is material, and it is evident that an immaterial substance can never be reflected in a material substance. Hence, the soul is the direct enjoyer of all its actions. Soul as Equal in Extent to its Body :
The soul is said to be equal in extent to its own body. This characteristic is meant to refute the view of the

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Naiyāyikas, the Vaiseṣikas, the Sankhyas, the Mīmāmsakas and the like who hold that the soul is omnipresent like ether. They believe in the existence of many souls but do not admit that they are equal in extent to their own bodies. They say that all the souls are all-pervasive, i.e., present everywhere. To admit a soul to be equal in extent to its own body is a unique conception of the Jaina. The doctrine which advocates the vibhutva of ätman (a soul is everywhere) is a doctrine which on the face of it, says the Jaina, is contrary to our experience. A thing must be where its quality is found, e.g., a pitcher exists where its form exists and not elsewhere.' It may be argued : Do we not smell from a distance? The answer is 'No'. The particles which possess the smell fly to our nose and then we smell. But it may be asked: Does magic not work at a distance? The reply comes: 'No'. The presiding deity of the magical formula or practice who resides elsewhere is working there. This view of soul as equal in extent to its own body may be justified by means of the following syllogism: A soul is not all-pervasive, because its qualities are not found everywhere; that thing whose qualities are not found everywhere is not all-pervasive like a pitcher; the soul also is such; therefore, it is not all-pervasive. The heterogeneous example is ether which is all-pervasive, because its qualities are found everywhere. The point is that the measure of a soul is only as much as that of the body it occupies. That is to say, there is no soul outside the body it occupies, for its attributes are found only in that body. To give an illustration, the attributes of a pitcher exist only in a pitcher and not outside it. As an alternative argument it may be said: That is nonexistent there where it cannot be realised by any one of the means of knowledge. For example, a piece of cloth does not permeate a pitcher which is separate from it. The soul is not
1. Yatraiva yo dṛṣṭaguṇaḥ sa tatra kumbhādivanniṣprati Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā, 9.

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realised outside the body. Consequently, it should be taken to be non-existent there.'
To refute this conclusion of the Jaina, the Naiyāyika urges in the course of his answer that the adrşța (karma) of our atman is supposed to act even at a distance and it cannot be there hanging in the air without an underlying substratum ; consequently, our ātman must be supposed to be existing even there. Since adrșța works everywhere, the underlying substance, viz., ātman must also exist everywhere.
The Jaina gives a counter argument. He denies that adrsta is acting there and everywhere. Things, according to him, have their own nature - a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation - and that nature is not caused by adrșța. Fire burns, because it has got the nature of burning. We cannot say that fire burns, because adrşğa is there. It burns of itself.
Secondly, to say that the nature of the things are determined by adrsta is to leave no room for God.
Thirdly, since they hold that ātmans are many, if each of them is vibhu (all-pervasive) also, as they believe, what a wonderful clash and interpenetration of ātmans would ensue? Moreover, each of them would enter the atman of God Himself, and each would thereby become a creator, for they believe that God is the creator of this universe.
It may be further urged : Unless an ātman was vibhu, how could it draw to itself the particles of the body in which it has to dwell in the next life? The Jainas reply that it is not necessary for the ātman to be vibhu for drawing the particles of the body, because if it is so, our body will be equal in extent to the whole universe, for our ātman is all-pervasive. If we accept the argument that to draw the particles of the body the soul must be all-pervasive, our body will be of a horribly vast size, because our soul will draw to itself all the particles of the universe.
1. Viseşāvasyaka-bhāsya, 1586.

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The Naiyāyika gives a further argument : If we believe that the soul is body-sized, as a consequence, it will be savayava, i.e., with parts, and therefore, a kārya (product), just like the body itself. The Jaina, however, is prepared to accept the logical consequence. More accurately he says that ātman has pradeśas, though not avayavas, in an ordinary sense. He believes that ātman is săvayava, parinămin and changes from time to time, for it is a substance having the qualities of origination, decay and permanence. He does not believe in the absolute changelessness of ātman, or for the matter of that, in absolute changelessness of anything whatsoever. He further points out that for some time after a body is cut, its parts continue to throb and retain the ātman in them. After that, they rejoin the ātman of the body from which they are cut. The particles which are cut retain their connection with the soul as the threads of a lotus-stick remain united even when the stick is cut into two.
It should be noted that Jainism is the only school of Indian philosophy which holds that ātman is body-sized. The only other school which holds an analogous, though not the same doctrine, is the school of Rāmānuja, according to which, the jñāna of ātman, though not the ātman itself, undergoes contraction and expansion. Varieties of Soul :
Jainism believes that each body possesses a different soul, and hence, there are many souls. It is also held that one body
be occupied by more than one soul but one soul cannot occupy more than one body.
Here a Vedāntin may say that many varieties of soul are unwarranted, for the soul is everywhere the same. Like the sky, it is all-pervasive. On account of illusion, we think that there are different souls in different bodies. Really speaking, it is one.
This view is refuted as follows : As regards the sky, it is all right to hold that it is only one, for the sky, even while

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permeating all the corporeal bodies, is seen to be uniformfree from any distinctions. Such is not, however, the case with the soul in question. It is not observed to be uniform, for it differs from body to body (pinda to piņda). Moreover, the difference in characteristics presupposes the difference in those having the characteristics. Hence, the soul is not one in number.'
Here is the illustration : The living beings in this world differ from one another, for there is a difference in their characteristics. As a parallel example, we may mention waterpots etc. Whatever is not different from another object does not differ in characteristics from it. As for example, the sky is everywhere the same. Moreover, if there were only one soul, then there would be nothing like happiness, misery, bondage and em
emancipation. But they do exist. Therefore, all the souls are different and they are not one but many.?
How do the characteristics differ in each body? The soul has upayoga as its characteristic. This upayoga has infinite varieties, for it differs from body to body, some having the utkarsa, i.e., the maximum upayoga, some having the apakarşa, i.e., the minimum upayoga, and some having upayoga between these two extremes. Therefore, souls are of infinite kinds owing to the unlimited varieties of upavoga.
Furthermore, if the number of soul is only one and not more, the soul cannot be an agent, an enjoyer, a thinker and a mundane being. That which is one in number, is not a doer etc. This fact is corroborated by the example of the sky.
Thus, owing to oneness there is no possibility of happiness, misery, bondage, liberation, enjoyment, thinking etc. Su it follows that there are many souls and these souls are equal in extent to the bodies they occupy.
1. Višesāvasyaka-bhāsya, 1581. 2. Visesăvasyaka-bhâsya, 1582. 3. Ibid., 1583.

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Soul as the possessor of Material Karma :
The soul is said to be the possessor of material karmas. This characteristic is meant to refute a two-fold belief. First, it attacks those philosophers who do not regard karma or adrsta as a valid existence. The Cārvākas of Indian thought fall into this category. Secondly, the adjective 'material' is directed against those thinkers who do not regard karma or adrșța as material. They are the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiseșikas etc.
Lord Mahāvīra says : "O long-lived Agnibhūti ! You entertain a doubt about the existence of karma, which is a multitude of paramāņus (atoms), for you think that its existence cannot be established by any one of the pramāņas (means of knowledge). You argue that karma is not directly perceived, because it is super-sensuous as is the case with the horn on the head of a hare. The other arguments that you advance are the same as mentioned by your brother Indrabhūti in the case of soul.
But these lines of argument are faulty. This karma is certainly pratyakşa to me. Moreover, its existence is such as can be realised by you by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramāņa can establish its existence. The karma is either good or bad. The good karma makes us experience happiness, whereas the bad karma misery."
There is a kāraña (cause) for experiencing happiness and misery, since it is a kārya (effect) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the karma is not pratyakșa to everybody, it should not exist. There is no such rule that what is pratyakşa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion is not pratyakşa to all. But on that account, it is not true to say that the lion does not exist. Therefore, the karma does exist, since it is directly perceived by an omniscient being.
1. Vịtti on Višeşāvasyaka-bhāsya, 1611.

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Moreover, the karma is pratyaksa to the doubter, too, since he realises its kärva, as is the case with material atoms, which though not directly realisable, are pratyakşa, since their kāryas (effects) like a pitcher etc. are directly perceived.
This point of cause and effect is further explained. Just as a sprout which is a kārya, has a seed for it, so happiness and misery, which are well known to every individual, have a cause, because they are käryas. And this cause is nothing but karma and so it exists. A question may be raised : A garland, sandal-paste, a woman and the like are the causes of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn etc. are those of misery. All these causes of happiness and misery are seen - are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe karma to be their cause - the karma which is not seen ? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justifiable.
This question is out of place owing to vyabhicāra (irrelevancy). It is a matter of common experience that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness do not get the same type of happiness. It is the same case with those who have the same or similar means to suffer misery. This difference in each case cannot be without a cause which is not seen. This very unseen cause is karma.
Furthermore, just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in childhood, so is the body in childhood preceded by another body. The body which is prior to that in childhood is karma.
The opponent asks : If on the ground that we can see the body etc., which are the effects, the karma is proved to be their cause, then, on the ground that the effect has a physical form, the karma also will have to be admitted as something having a physical form. The Jaina thinkers reply : Karma has indeed a physical form.
1. Višesā vasyaka-bhāsya, 1614.

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The following four illustrations are conclusive for the fact that karma has a physical form :
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1. Karma has a physical form because of the experience of pleasure, pain etc. That has a physical form in association with which pleasure etc. are experienced, just as the food one eats. There is no experience of pleasure etc. in association with that which is without a physical shape, just as in connection with the ether.
2. That in association with which a burning sensation arises is found to be something having a physical form, just as in association with fire, there is the rise of a burning sensation. So, pain occurs when one is in association with karma. Therefore, it has a form.
3. There is an addition of our strength by means of external objects. Only a physical strength can have an addition by means of the physical substance, just as a pot gets strength by means of oil etc. Such is the case with our strength which is karmic (product of karma) and on account of its being karmic, it can have an addition by means of external objects.
4. Karma has a physical form, because it undergoes change in a way different from soul. The pariṇāmitva (change) of karma is inferred from the pariņāmitva of its kāryas (effects) like body etc. If the effect is mutable, the mutability of its cause is automatically recognised, just as the mutability of milk is recognised from the pariṇāma of its kārya (curd) in the form of butter-milk (takra).

Now, if we agree that karma is murta, how could the murta karma be connected with the amūrta jīva (formless soul), by the samavaya (inherent relationship) or by the samyoga (combination)? As a murta ghata (pot) is connected with the amūrta ākāśa (ether) by means of the samyoga and an object like finger is connected with kriyā (action) like contraction by means of the samavāya, so here also karma is connected with jiva.

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How could the amūrta soul be favourably or adversely affected by the mūrta karma ? The answer is : It can be affected in the way as vijñāna etc. are affected by a drink of wine, medicine etc.
Or, the mundane soul is not absolutely amūrta, because it has assumed an alteration in the continuous chain of karma, which has no beginning. Now, since karma is mūrta and ātman is similar to karma to a certain extent, ātman is also mūrta to that extent, even though it is amūrta by its svabhāva. Consequently, the soul can be affected by the mūrta karma. Bondage :
Influx (äsrava) precedes bondage (bandha). Just as water flows into the lake through streams, so also karmic matter flows into the soul through the channel of activity. This is called influx. It is of two types: psychical and physical. That modification of consciousness by which karma gets into the soul is known as psychical influx. The karmic matter itself which enters the soul, is called physical influx. In other words, psychical influx is nothing but the mental, bodily or vocal activity, whereas physical influx is a peculiar type of matter. The influx of karma is of two kinds: virtuous (punya) and sinful (pāpa). Meritorious activities cause the influx of virtuous karmas, while wicked actions are responsible for the inflow of sinful karmas. Injury, falsehood, stealing, envy etc. are wicked activities. The opposites of these are meritorious ones. How can activity be meritorious or wicked ? That activity which is performed with good intentions is meritorious and that which is performed with evil intentions is wicked. The influx of persons with passions extends transmigration and that of persons free from passions prevents or shortens it.
Bondage is also of two types: psychical and physical That conscious state by which karma is bound with the soul is called psychical bondage. The interpenetration of the karmic particles and the soul is known as physical bondage.

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The cause of bondage is a particular modification of consciousness consisting of passions by which karmas are tied to the soul. In other words, attachment and aversion are the causes of bondage. Wrong belief, negligence etc. are also included in them. Liberation :
Stoppage (samvara) and dissociation (nirjarā) precede liberation (mokşa). The obstruction of influx, i.e., the prevention of the inflow of karmic matter, is called stoppage. It is also of two kinds: psychical and physical. The cessation of activities that lead to transmigration is psychical stoppage. It can be called 'yoga' in general terminology. When these activities are checked, the inflow of karmic matter is interrupted. This is physical stoppage.
Dissociation is also psychical as well as physical. That modification of consciousness by which karmic matter (bondage) partially disappears is called psychical dissociation. The disappearance itself is known as physical dissociation. Thus, dissociation is regarded as partial destruction of the karmas that are bound with the soul. Dissociation takes place in two ways: (1) Disappearance of karma in proper time after the enjoyment of its fruits and (2) destruction of karmic matter through penance before the arrival of the actual time of the enjoyment of its effects.
The annihilation of all karmas is liberation. That modification of the soul which is the cause of the total destruction of karmas is known as psychical liberation and
actual separation of the karmic matter is called physical liberation. In the state of liberation, i.e., self-attainment, no new karmas flow in owing to the absence of their causes. The soul exists in its pure and perfect state. It attains its natural form and possesses infinite knowledge and infinite bliss. Although the emancipated souls have no physical forms, as they are not possessed of bodies, yet, they have the psychical

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forms of their last bodies. The liberated soul does not expand to the extent of the universe, as there is no cause for it. The expansion or contraction of the soul is determined by the physique-making karma. Since there is no physique-making karma in the state of emancipation, there is neither expansion nor contraction in the case of the soul in liberation. The emancipated soul maintains the form of its last physique for
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JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
Immediately after attaining release from all karmas, including the body, the soul goes up to the end of the universe, as it is of the nature of darting upwards. If upward motion is of the nature of the liberated soul, why does it not go beyond the end of the universe, i.e., the universe-space? There is no movement in the non-universe-space, as it has no medium of motion.
Though the liberated souls maintain their own forms and individualities, still in all essential qualities there is perfect equality among them and they do not obstruct one another. Jainism does not believe in God but regards karma as the cause of this world. It accords equal status to all emancipated souls. Emancipation is the consummation of spiritual development. All liberated souls are essentially equal. None of them enjoys any privilege.

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CHAPTER V
MATTER
Does matter exist? It is a very complicated problem in the sphere of philosophy. The Idealists maintain that the universe is a spiritual reality. Matter does not enjoy any : separate existence independent of spirit or thought. The Realists do not agree with this view. They explicitly say that the material reality is absolutely independent of the spiritual reality. It is as real as thought itself. Reality of Matter :
Jainism, being a school of Realism, certainly believes in an independent and separate existence of matter. When the Idealist perceives various effects of material elements, he entertains a doubt whether material elements (bhūtas) exist or not. The Jaina thinkers maintain that the doubt about a nonexistent object is totally unjustifiable, as in the case of skyflower and hare-horn where non-existence is certain. The point is that our doubt is justifiable in the case of existent objects only. We entertain no doubt in regard to an absolutely nonexistent object. The doubt is only possible in the case of existent objects like tree and man (sthāņu and puruşa). If we raise any doubt as regards a non-existent object, we will have to raise a doubt in the case of sky-flower and hare-horn also.
To establish the existence of self, we say that 'I think therefore I am' or 'I doubt therefore I exist.' Similarly, what is the harm if we say that 'I doubt about the existence of external objects therefore they exist' or 'all things which are distinctly perceived are true'. As Descartes, the father of modern (Western) philosophy says: 'I think therefore I am' -

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'cogito ergo sum.' In the same way, 'I perceive all things clearly and distinctly therefore they are true.'
To support the belief that doubt springs up even in absolute non-existence, the opponent may advance an argument like this Just as in a dream, a poor fellow raises a doubt and questions whether there is an elephant or a mountain before his house, though in fact, nothing like them exists there; so also, at other places, doubt can be raised in spite of the absolute non-existence of objects.
This argument of the opponent is totally baseless. In dreams, doubt arises on account of various reasons. As for example, when an object is seen or experienced formerly, the remembrance of that experience gives rise to doubt. Similarly, it is some past experience which brings a dream into existence and on the basis of that experience we reject the dream. Thus, doubt arises from an existent object and not from absolute negation. If such were not the case, doubt should also have to arise from objects like the sixth element (şaṣṭha bhūta) etc. which have never been existent so far.
The causes that bring dreams into existence are as follows:'
1. Previous experience - Certain acts like bathing, taking food etc. that have once been experienced are perceived again in dreams due to some reason.
2. Observation - When objects like elephants, horses etc. are perceived in a dream, the dream is said to have been caused by the observed objects.
3. Attentive consideration A dream representing acquisition of a beloved etc. is called the dream of the object which is attentively considered.
4. Hearing When places like heaven and hell, which are only heard of and not seen, are perceived in a dream. 5. Disturbance of health Ill health caused by physical disorders is also one of the causes of dreams.

-
-
6. Deity - When one beholds a deity adverse or favourable in a dream, the dream can be called deity-caused.

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7. Watery place - This is also one of the causes when one dreams in the midst of a watery region.
8. Meritorious act - A dream is said to be good according to the auspicious actions that may be its cause.
9. Sinful act - A dream is called bad according to the inauspicious actions that may be its cause.
According to the neurological theory, a dream is a partial awakening. It is the activity of disconnected cells or neurograms that have remained in a state of relative irritability or readiness to respond. Delage, a French writer on dreams, has summed up his psychological theory of dreams in the statement that the dream is a perseveration of the unadjusted. This means that the dream is the working out of a problem which was unsolved during the working period. According to the psycho-neurological theory of Morton, a dream is an apperceptive trial and error process. This means that a dream is a series of attempts to perceive and interpret a stimulus. These attempts are unsuccessful or only partly successful. The theory advanced by Sigmund Freud may be summed up briefly in the statement that a dream is a symbolical fulfilment of repressed infantile sex-wishes. Freud distinguished between the manifest and the latent contents of dream, and pointed out that the manifest content is symbolical to the latent sexual wishes. These sexual wishes are really of a childish or undeveloped nature. Thus, according to the Freudian theory, a dream is an expression of unsatisfied needs. The theory that a dream represents a mental conflict is suggested by Rivers and others. According to Adler, present problems are responsible for dreams. Jung is of the opinion that we experience our past events in dreams. According to him, dreams are a sort of memory.
All these psychological theories as well as the views expressed by the Jaina thinkers establish firmly that dream is not non-existent. Its contents are past experiences and the like. Thus, when dream itself is existent, how can the opponent

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hold the physical world to be non-existent like dream ? Hence, the existence of material objects cannot be unreal. Therefore, matter does exist. Meaning of Pudgala :
The Jaina writers have used the term 'pudgala' exactly in the sense of matter. 'Pudgala' is one of the six substances recognised by Jainism. How does the Jaina explain the word 'pudgala'? The word 'pudgala' has two parts: 'pud' and 'gala.'
The first part 'pud' means 'to combine' and the second part 'gala' means 'to dissociate'. Hence, the etymological meaning of the word 'pudgala' is : that substance which undergoes modifications by combinations and dissociations. This definition of 'pudgala' is very significant. It is 'pudgala' alone which undergoes modifications by combinations and dissociations. This process of combination and dissociation does not occur in the other substances. The selection of the word 'pudgala' is full of deep meaning. It is worthy of note that the use of this word in the sense of matter is quite peculiar of Jainism. Definition of Matter :
Matter has four characteristics associated with it, viz., touch, taste, smell and colour. Each and every element of matter possesses these four characteristics.
Touch - Eight kinds of touch are described in the Jaina works : soft (mydu), hard (kathina), heavy (guru), light (laghu), cold (sīta), hot (uşņa), smooth (snigdha) and rough (rūkșa).? Modern psychology recognises only four principal kinds of touch : cold, hot, painful and general. · Taste - It is of five kinds : bitter (tikta), sour (kațuka), acidic (āmla), sweet (madhura) and astringent (kaşāya).
Smell - Smell is of two kinds : good smell and bad smell (surabhigandha and asurabhigandha).
1. Tattvārtha-sútra, V.23. 2. Tattvārtha-rāja vārtika, V. 23.7

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115
Colour - Five kinds of colour are described : blue (nila), yellow (pīta), white (śukla), black (krsņa) and red (lohita).'
Thus, the four characteristics are divided into twenty categories (8 kinds of touch plus 5 kinds of taste plus 2 kinds of smell plus 5 kinds of colour = 20 kinds). That is why it is mentioned that 'pudgala' is characterised by five kinds of colour, five kinds of taste, two kinds of smell and eight kinds of touch.?
It is further mentioned that the foregoing twenty are the principal divisions. Each of these may be further subdivided into numerable, innumerable and infinite kinds. Parts of Matter :
Matter consists of numerable, innumerable and infinite parts according to its different combinations. The scientific division of matter is like this : concrete matter and invisible matter. The concrete form is called Matter and the invisible form is known as Energy. Matter is further divided into solids, liquids and gases. All the three forms of matter consist of molecules and atoms. Atoms are again an assemblage of indivisible elementary particles as protons, electrons and their combinations.
The Jaina thinkers also regard matter to be of two kinds: concrete or perceptible skandhas (molecules) and imperceptible or subtle anus (atoms). When we say that atoms (aņus) are imperceptible, we only mean that they are imperceptible explicitly. The contact or relation between our sense-organs and atoms is present, but on account of the lack of capability of the sense-organs or nerves to send the message to the brain in an explicit form, we are unable to perceive them distinctly. In other words, there is a sensation
1. Ibid., V. 23.8-10. 2. Bhagavatī-sūtra, XII. 5.450. 3. Sarvārtha-siddhi, V.23. 4. Tattvārtha-sūtra, V. 10.

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of atoms but we are not aware of it, i.e., we have no perception of atoms.
Matter is said to consist of numerable (sankhyeya), innumerable (asańkhyeya) and infinite (ananta) parts (pradeśas). This statement seems to be contradictory, since the number of the units of the universe-space (lokākāśapradeśas) is only innumerable, whereas the material units may be infinite. How can an infinite number of material particles be accommodated in innumerable particles of the universespace? This question would have been quite valid if all the infinite particles of matter were in a free state. But they are not so. Even an ordinary person has the experience that a tiny piece of fuel on combustion gives rise to an enormous volume of smoke-particles. A scientist knows that a quantity of water when converted into steam occupies a volume about 1700 times greater than the original volume. Therefore, there is no possibility of contradiction between the conception of the particles of the universe-space that are innumerable (asankhyeya) and that of infinite (ananta) particles of matter.
Now, how can we justify the conception of numerability, innumerability and infiniteness of material particles ? It is said that in one pradeśa, i.e., in one unitary cell of space only one atom of matter will find place if it is in a free state, but in an aggregate form any number of atoms can occupy one or more units of space.' The same idea can be expressed in a different language: One atom occupies one unit of space, but two atoms in a state of combination may also be accommodated in the same unit. Two free atoms will occupy two units, but two atoms forming a diatomic molecule can cover one as well as two units. Three atoms can be located in a single unit if they are all in a state of condensation; they can occupy two spatial units if two atoms are in a state of condensation and one is free; they occupy three
1. Tattvärtha-sutra, V. 14.

:

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MATTER
spatial particles if they are all free. And this process is to be continued to infinity.'
Difference between the Vaiseșika and the Jaina Conceptions:
117
The Vaiseṣikas regard nine substances as the constituent elements of the universe other than qualities, actions etc. They are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind.
Of these nine substances, earth, water, fire and air are included in the Jaina category of pudgala (matter), since pudgala is defined as a substance possessing touch, taste, smell and colour as its qualities. The Vaiseṣikas hold that air is without colour, taste and smell. It has the characteristic of touch only. This conception of the Vaiseṣikas is not tenable, because even an elementary student of physics knows that air can be converted into a 'bluish liquid' by continuous cooling, just as steam can be converted into water. This is a concrete proof that air has colour. And since it has colour, it must possess both taste and smell.

They regard fire as devoid of taste and smell and possessing touch and colour only. This belief is also blind, for the scientists have clearly demonstrated that fire is a material substance. When the energy of molecular agitation in a substance becomes very acute, its temperature rises and we get the sensation of fire. It is a form of energy and we know that energy and matter are identical. Hence, all the characteristics of matter are associated with fire, because fire is composed of material particles raised to a high temperature. The exponents of the Vaiseṣika system regard smell to be existent only in earth. We agree that our nose in general cannot perceive water, fire or air, but on that ground we are not entitled to hold that odour is not associated with all these
1. Sarvärtha-siddhi, V. 14.

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forms of matter. The human nose is not sensitive enough to detect the smell of these forms. Several cases are known where our olfactory organ fails, for instance, an ant at once smells sugar or a cat smells milk, whereas we cannot perceive these smells so quickly and from such a distance.
In the light of this discussion, we can say that with regard to the conception of matter, the position of the Jainas is sound and scientific. The Jaina thinkers did not regard earth, water, fire and air as separate and independent entities but included all these forms in matter. They held that earth, water etc. are the various combinations and forms of matter. These various combinations should not be regarded as separate substances. Forms of Matter :
Matter has two chief forms : indivisible elementary particles and their combinations. In the technical terms of Jainism, the indivisible elementary particles are called anus and the combinations of these particles are known as skandhas. We translate aņu as atom and skandha as molecule for our present purpose. We will not mind some minute differences between the word atom of modern science and our technical term aņu. Skandha (molecule) is defined as an aggregate of atoms. It possesses a gross form and undergoes processes of association and dissociation. Anu:
The last particle of matter, which cannot be further divided by any means whatsoever, is called aņu or paramāņu.' In the Tattvārtha-rājavārtika, aņu is defined as the smallest material particle. There is nothing smaller than paramāņu? According to the Pañcāstikāya-sāra, the substance that has a single taste, a single colour, a single smell and two kinds of touch, which is the cause of sound while itself unsounding,
1. Sarvārtha-siddhi, V.25. 2. Tattvartha-rājavārtika, V. 11. 2.

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which is different from molecules though constituting them, is called atom.' It is imperceptible.
Since atoms are real entities, five physical attributes (1 taste plus 1 colour plus 1 smell plus 2 touches) are always associated with them. The properties of hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness are not associated with atoms. As Kundakunda remarks : 'Of the eight kinds of touch, hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness are the qualities of molecules, not of the individual atoms.' In fact, the properties of hardness and softness, heaviness and lightness can be associated only with molecules. These properties are generated by the loose or compact aggregation of atoms, and because all the atoms have the same mass, there arises no question of light and heavy or hard and smooth amongst the elementary particles of matter. The difference of light and heavy or hard and smooth in mass is found only amongst molecules.
We have already mentioned that all atoms are not found in a free state. Some of them are in various forms of molecule and some are found as separate entities, i.e., in a free state. Now, how do the atoms living in the forms of molecule become liable to pass to a free state ? The atoms are produced only by division, not by the process of union or combination. Skandha:
Skandha (molecule) has been already defined as an aggregate of atoms. It possesses a gross form and undergoes processes of association and dissociation, as we have seen. The same idea is expressed more lucidly in the following manner :
Molecules are formed in three different ways.
1. Pañcāştīkāya-sāra, 88. 2. Tattvārtha-sūtra, V.27. 3. Ibid., V. 26.

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1. By division or dissociation (bheda). 2. By union or association (sanghāta). 3. By the united process of dissociation and association
taking place simultaneously. 1. Dissociation occurs on account of two causes, viz., internal
and external.' The former cause is in the molecules themselves as the phenomenon of radio-activity and the like. The examples of the latter cause are the dissociation of molecules in solution, the breaking under high temperatures, the breaking under high pressures, the
breaking under artificial bombardment and the like. 2. Association is defined as the union of separate entities.?
The assemblage of atoms to form molecules is an
instance of association. 3. The united process of dissociation and association is defined
as follows : By simultaneous dissociation and association, molecules occupying two spatial particles etc. are produced. Just when one molecule breaks, the remaining part is associated by another molecule.
Advanced researches in physical chemistry have also revealed three processes of molecule-formation. The following lines will clarify the point :
The question to be answered is, in what ways are atoms united in the molecule ? The electronic theory of valency is able to supply a very satisfactory answer. According to this theory, there are three methods of linking atoms. The linkage may be electrovalent, co-valent or co-ordinate.
Molecules with an electrovalent linkage are ionised even in the solid state, X-ray analysis of the crystal indicating that the elementary particles making up the crystal lattice are ions and not atoms or molecules. Nearly all inorganic salts are electrovalent compounds. 1. Sarvārtha-siddhi, V.26. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.

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The second arrangement, i.e., co-valent linkage is found in organic compounds. The atoms attain stability by a process of sharing electrons. For instance, in the case of the methane gas CH, the carbon atom attains a stable arrangement by sharing four electrons with the four electrons of the four hydrogen atoms.
The third type of linkage, the co-ordinate linkage, involves the sharing of two electrons but both are supplied by the same atom. The process of the formation of a co-ordinate linkage resembles both transference and sharing. Therefore, the three modern processes are transference, sharing and combined transference and sharing.'
121
Perceptibility of Molecules :
The Jaina thinkers maintain that not only atoms are imperceptible but certain types of molecules are also imperceptible. As Pūjyapāda says: 'Out of the molecules composed even of an infinite number of elementary particles (aņus), some are visible and some invisible." The question, therefore, is: How the invisible molecules become visible, i.e., what is the process by which the imperceptible molecules are perceived? The answer is as under :
'If a molecule breaks and the broken part then attaches itself to another molecule, the resulting combination may be coarse enough to be perceived."3 The point is that the imperceptible molecule becomes perceptible by the combined process of division and union, i.e., dissociation and association. For instance, the molecules of hydrogen and chlorine gas are invisible to the eyes but when each of them breaks and then combines to form two molecules of hydrochloric acid, the product becomes visible. Regarding the other senseperceptions, the same rule can be applied.
1. Cosmology: Old and New, p. 183.
2. Sarvartha-siddhi, V. 28. 3. Ibid.

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Union of Matter:
Molecules are formed in three different ways, as we have already indicated. Of these three ways, one is purely divisional. The remaining two are not so. Association or union plays an important part in determining their nature. Now, what is this union or association? How does matter unite? It is said that 'the pudgalas unite by virtue of the properties of 'snigdha' and 'rūkṣa' associated with them." 'Snigdha' and 'rūkṣa' are two kinds of touch. The former is known as smooth and the latter as rough.
The pudgalas cannot unite in an arbitrary way. There are certain conditions which restrict the freedom of association. They are as follows:
1. The ultimate elementary particles at the lowest energy-level of smoothness or roughness do not unite at all.
2. The ultimate elementary particles with equal degrees of smoothness or roughness and of the same kind cannot unite with an atom of their own kind. In other words, an electron would not combine with another electron or a positron with a positron if both the particles are at the same energy-level, but an electron can unite with a positron or vice versa under the same conditions.? This is one opinion. According to the other opinion, the paramāņus of opposite kinds cannot unite even if the degrees of smoothness or roughness are equal. Thus, while the latter view denies the possibility of union for all combinations of particles at the same energy-level, the former view recognises such a possibility if the union is between the particles of opposite kinds.
1. Tattvärtha-sūtra, V. 32.
2. Cosmology: Old and New, p. 216.
3. Svetambara view.
4. Digambara view.

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Consequently, according to the latter view, a smooth or a rough elementary particle of a higher level combines with another of a similar or a dissimilar type if they differ in their degrees of smoothness or roughness by two units. The former view does not recognise this as a necessary condition for the union of the particles of dissimilar types, nor does it accept the conception of a higher level. According to this view, a smooth or a rough atom combines with another of a similar type if they differ in their degrees of smoothness or roughness by two or more units. With regard to dissimilar types, this difference is not necessary. They can unite in an equal condition except in the case of the lowest type. The following table will show the difference underlying these two views :
Former View Energy-level
Similar Dissimilar 1. Lowest Lowest ... No union ... No union 2. Lowest 1"more
... Union 3. Lowest 2"more ... Union 4. Lowest 3" etc.more ... " 5. Higher equally higher... No union 6. Higher "more 7. Higher 2"more ... Union 8. Higher 3"etc.more ... "
Latter View Energy-level
Similar Dissimilar 1. Lowest Lowest ... No union ... No union 2. Lowest 1"more 3. Lowest 2"more 4. Lowest 3" etc.more... 5. Higher equally higher... 6. Higher "more 7. Higher 2"more ... Union ... Union 8. Higher 3"etc.more... No union ... No union

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The latter view can be explained in a different manner also. A smooth elementary particle combines with another similar particle differing in energy-level by two units. A rough elementary particle combines with another rough elementary particle differing again in energy-level by two units. A smooth particle can also unite with a rough particle and vice versa. Particles at the lowest energy-level do not unite. The union of the various particles of different energy-levels may form an odd or an even series (as 3,5,7,9,11 etc. or 2,4,6,8,10 etc).'
The result of union is that an elementary particle or a molecule in the process of association with a higher degree of smoothness or roughness absorbs the one with a lower degree into itself. In other words, 'in the molecules of numerable, innumerable and infinite atoms, the atoms with greater degrees of smoothness or roughness when uniting, alter the atoms of lesser degree to their own kind." The union between dissimilar particles of equal degrees of smoothness and roughness produces a neutral effect.
Sub-Classes of Matter:
Broadly, matter is divided into two classes: atoms and molecules. Matter is divided into six classes also.3 These classes are not different from atoms and molecules. They are, in other words, their sub-divisions :
1. Solids
Earth, stone and the like are the solid forms of matter. This class is called sthula-sthüla.
2. Liquids-Butter, water, oil, milk and the like are the liquid forms of matter. They are known as sthūla.
3. Energy-It manifests itself in the forms of heat, light, electricity and the like. It is called sthūla-sūkṣma.
4. Gases-Air etc. are the forms of gases. This class is known as sūkṣma-sthula.
1. Gommaṭa-sāra : Jīva-kāṇḍa, 615.
2. Gommaṭa-sāra : Jīva-kāṇḍa, 619. 3. Niyama-sära, 21.

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5. Fine Matter-It is responsible for thought-activities and is
beyond sense-perception. This type of matter is called
sūksma. 6. Extra-fine Matter - The forms of single elementary particles
are composed of extra-fine matter. It is called sūkṣma
sūkşma. Matter and Soul :
Does matter influence soul (jīva)? The Jaina system admits that matter does influence the worldly soul. How does it influence ? It forms the physical basis of the body, speech, mind and respiration of the worldly soul. The same idea is expressed in the following lines :
Matter is the cause of the making of bodies. One kind of molecules called āhāra-vargaņā forms the first three types of bodies, viz., the organic body of human and animal beings, the body of the beings of heaven and hell and sometimes of human beings and animals also in an extraordinary condition, and a subtle body which is developed by advanced mystics and the respiration. Tejo-vargaņā forms the fourth type, viz., the electric body. Speech and mind are formed by two special types of molecules called bhāșă-vargaņā and mano-vargaņā respectively. The inner subtle body, i.e., kārmaņa-śarīra, which is the root cause of all mental and physical activities, is constituted by kārmaņa-vargaņā.'
Pleasure, pain, life and death are also experienced through the agency of matter. Moreover, one piece of matter is capable of producing physical and chemical changes in another piece of matter. For instance, bronze is purified by ashes, water is clarified by an organic substance 'kataka,' and so on. It is needless to say that the whole super-structure of modern science is built upon physical and chemical changes in matter. 1. Gommața-sāra : Jiva-kānda, 606-8.

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Five Kinds of Bodies:
We have stated that bodies are constituted by matter and such bodies are of five kinds :
1. Audārika - The body which is gross and physical is called audărika body. The organic body of human beings, animal beings and vegetable kingdom is of this type. It is full of blood, bones etc.
2. Vaikriya - That which is possessed by the beings of heaven and hell and by human beings as well as animals possessing an extraordinary power (labdhi) is called vaikriya body. It is invisible and is capable of transformation in different shapes and sizes.
3. Āhāraka The subtle body which is developed by an advanced yogin is called āhāraka body. It can be projected, i.e., sent to great distances on special
occasions.
4. Taijasa - It is composed of electric matter and is a necessary link between the audarika body and the kärmaṇa body. It possesses the power of digesting the food we take. 5. Kārmaņa - The inner subtle body, which is the seed of all mental and physical activities, is called kärmaṇa body. It is composed of eight kinds of karmas.
We can perceive only the first of these five kinds with our sense-organs. The remaining bodies are subtle. 'The succeeding body is subtler than the preceding one in order. The taijasa and kārmaṇa bodies are not obstructed by any material form. They are beyond any kind of check and can travel the whole universe. Both these bodies are associated with a worldly soul from beginningless time. Each and every jīva possesses at least these two bodies. At the time of transmigration, only these two bodies are possessed by the souls. The mundane soul can possess four bodies at the most at a time." The following scheme will clearly indicate the point :
1. Tattvärtha-sūtra, II. 38, 41-4.

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At least two bodies: Taijasa and kārmaṇa.
Three bodies: Taijasa, kārmaṇa and audārika
Four bodies :
MATTER

or
Taijasa, kārmaṇa and vaikriya. Taijasa, kārmaṇa, audārika and vaikriya
or
127
Taijasa, kärmaṇa, audārika and āhāraka.
From the above scheme it is evident that no soul possesses five bodies at a time. Of course, alternately, it can possess all the bodies at different times. It is also obvious that a soul cannot have both the āhāraka and vaikriya bodies at the same time, while the taijasa and kārmaṇa bodies are always present so long as the soul is in bondage.
Manifestations of Matter:
Some effects of matter in the forms of body, mind etc. have been mentioned. There remain still some important effects as the manifestations of matter. They are in the forms of sound, union, fineness, grossness, figure, divisibility, darkness, shade, heat and light.
Sound:
Some Indian systems of thought like the Vaiseṣika etc. associate sound with ether. Jainism does not accept this view and explains the creation of sound as due to the violent contact of one material object with another. A single molecule in an isolated form cannot produce sound. It is on account of this theory of sound that the system regards an individual atom as unsounding by itself. The atom is defined as having a fine form, the cause of elements like earth, fire, water and air and unsounding. The cause of sound has been pointed out to be the striking of molecules against one another.'
1. Pañcāstikāya-sāra, 85-6.

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The scientist also regards sound as a product of matter. Experiments in the sphere of science have shown that 'sound does not travel in vacuum.' If sound were generated by ether as is supposed by other schools, it should be heard in the vacuous space also, for ether is present everywhere. In the opinion of the scientist, the source of sound is in the state of vibration. For example, the prongs of a tuning-fork, a bell, the strings of a piano and the air in an organ-pipe are all in a state of vibration when they are producing sound.
Sound is classified into two chief divisions : sound incorporated in languages and sound not finding place in any language. The former is further divided into two categories : articulate utterance or speech and sounds made by creatures etc. The latter, i.e., the sound which does not find place in any language, is further classified into two sub-divisions : sounds produced by human beings with the help of musical instruments and natural sounds such as the roar of the thunder, the rippling of water, and the like. Musical sound is further classified into four categories : musical sound of a stretched instrument such as a drum, musical sound of a stringed instrument such as a violin, musical sound of a metallic instrument such as a bell, and sound produced from a wind instrument such as an organpipe. The next table will show the scheme of the classification in a lucid manner :
Sound
Language
Noise
1. Speech
Musical
3. Natural
2. Inarticulate
utterance
4. Stretched
instruments
5. Stringed instruments
6. Reed 7. Wind instruments instruments

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Expressed in the form of the above table, we have seven classes of sound :
1. Speech or articulate utterance. 2. Inarticulate utterance 3. Natural noise. 4. Noise of a stretched musical instrument. 5. Noise of a stringed musical instrument. 6. Noise produced from a metallic instrument of music.
7. Noise produced from a wind instrument of music. Union : It is classified as under :
Union :
1. Forced
2. Natural
3. Matter with matter
4. Matter with soul
12. Having 13.Beginningless
beginning
5. Karmic 6. Physical
7. Fasten-
ing
8. Paint- i ng
9. Dovetail
joint
10. Ligamen- 11. Union
of bodies
1. Forced - Union produced by the efforts of the body,
speech or mind of a person. 2. Natural - Union produced without any effort of a
person. 3. Matter with Matter - Union of one kind of matter with
another kind of matter. 4. Matter with Soul - Union of matter with spirit. 5. Karmic - Union of karmic matter with subtle bodies. 6. Physical - Physical combinations. 7. Fastening - As the fastening of a chain to a chariot.

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8. Painting - As the painting over a canvas or mural
painting. 9. Dovetail Joint - As joints in pieces of timber. 10. Ligamentary Joint - Such joints as of a living body. 11. Union of Bodies - Union of bodies more than one in
number. 12. Natural Union having Beginning - That natural union
which has a beginning as has resulted from a definite cause, such as the union of different colours in a rainbow, is called natural union having a beginning. Formation of clouds, production of lightning etc. are
included in this class. 13. Beginningless Union - Eternal union such as the union
of the different parts of substances like the medium
of motion, the medium of rest, space and the like. Fineness and Grossness :
Each of these manifestations is of two categories : extreme and relative.' The atoms furnish the example of extreme fineness and the universe itself constitutes the example of extreme grossness. There is nothing smaller than an atom and nothing bigger than the universe in the world of matter. Material objects vary relatively to each other in quantity. For instance, a coconut is bigger than an orange and so on. Figure :
Figure is nothing but the shape of a body. It may be regular, circular, triangular, rectangular and the like; or it may be an irregular body like the shape of clouds. Divisibility :
It is of six kinds : 2 1. Separation - As sawing a piece of wood. 2. Grinding - As making wheat into flour.
1. Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika, V. 24. 14-5. 2. Tattvārtha-räja-vārtika, V.24. 18.

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3. Parting - As the separate parts of a broken pitcher. 4. Chaffing - As the separation of chaff from rice or pulses. 5. Layers - As the separation of layers in a sheet of mica.
6. Smithereen - As a blacksmith smites with his hammer. Darkness :
It is opposite to light and is generally the cause of invisibility of objects. It is a positive reality existing independent of light. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiseșikas maintain that the existence of darkness should not be regarded as separate from light. They think that darkness is nothing more than the negation of light. In other words, they do not regard darkness as a positive reality. They believe that darkness is nothing but the negation of light. The Jaina thinkers do not agree with this view of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśesikas. They say that darkness has an independent existence. Modern scientists also believe in the existence of 'dark rays.' Without the presence of these 'dark rays' photography in pitch darkness would have been impossible. Shade :
It is of two kinds : virtual image produced by a plane mirror which shows the object laterally inverted and uninverted image like shadow or image of a modern cinema screen. The obstruction of light is the cause of the production of shadows.
Regarding the formation of shadows, the physicists hold that an opaque obstacle in the path of the rays of light casts a shadow, because the rays are obstructed and are unable to enter the region of the shadow. The images formed by lenses and mirrors are of two kinds called virtual and real. The example of a virtual image is the image seen in a looking glass, whereas the example of the latter is the images on a cinema screen. In the case of a virtual image the rays appear to come from the image, whereas in the case of a real image the rays actually come from it.
1. Sarvārtha-siddhi, V.24.

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Heat and Light :
Heat is the sunlight, the light of fire, that of the electric lamp and the like. Light is the moonlight, the light of jewels or the light of the glow-worm. The former predominates in heat-rays and the latter in light-rays. Science also regards heat and light as two separate manifestations of energy (matter).

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CHAPTER VI
KNOWLEDGE
The relation of knowledge with soul in Jainism is not like that in the system of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiseṣikas, as we have already seen. The Jaina writers have defined knowledge as the essence of soul. Soul has other characteristics also, as we have mentioned, but the Jaina thinkers always emphasised knowledge to be the chief characteristic possessed by soul. Kundakunda has stated that although from the empirical point of view there is difference between soul and knowledge, yet, from the transcendental point of view it is sufficient to say that soul is knower and nothing else. In this way, he apparently amalgamated all the characteristics of soul in the conception of knowledge. He went further and clearly stated that absolute bliss is absolute knowledge. Bliss and knowledge are identical! He further said that there is no difference between the knower and his knowledge." In the Jaina canons also we find such expressions to the effect that from one point of view soul is knowledge and knowledge is soul. Kundakunda further said that from the empirical point of view the omniscient perceives and knows the whole of reality and from the transcendental point of view he perceives and knows the self only! (Here the self includes all the knowledge of reality.) In this way, we conclude that knowledge plays an important part in the conception of soul, emancipation etc. We intend to give a brief account of the Jaina theory of knowledge.
1. Samaya-sāra, 6-7.
2. Pravacana-sära, I. 59-60.
3. Samaya-sāra, 10, 11, 433. 4. Niyama-sāra, 158.

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Knowledge in the Jaina Canons :
Knowledge is divided into five broad categories in the Jaina canons. The conception of five-fold knowledge is very old. We come across some descriptions in the canons which show that the conception of five-fold knowledge is precanonical. Even before Lord Mahāvīra this division existed. Keśikumāra, a preceptor following the tradition of Lord Pārsvanātha, the twenty-third tirthankara of Jainism, mentioned five kinds of knowledge as ābhinibodhika-jñāna, śruta-jñāna, avadhi-jñāna, manaḥparyaya-jñāna and kevalajñāna.' It clearly shows that Lord Mahāvīra had accepted the tradition of the conception of knowledge as it was in existence - before him.
Now, how does this conception develop in the canonical period ? What additions are made ? We find three stages of development in the canons: 2
1. At the first stage, knowledge is divided into five categories according to the above tradition as under :
Jñāna
Ābhini. bodhika
Śruta
Avadhi
Kevala
Manah. paryaya
Avagraha
Ihā
Avāya
Dhāraņā
2. The second stage presents two broad divisions of knowledge, viz., pratyakşa and parokșa. These two categories are further divided into various sub-divisions.
The scheme according to the Sthânānga-sūtra is as follows:
1. Rāja-praśniya, 165. 2. Nyāyāvatāra-vārtika-vrtti : Introduction, p.58.

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Jñāna

Pratyakşa
Parokşa
Kevala
Nokevala
Ābhinibodhika
Śruta
Avadhi
Manaḥ paryaya
Śruta niḥsıta
Aśruta nihsrta
categories, not five. This two-fold division is generally
This table shows that knowledge is divided into two main
Rjumati

Bhava- Kṣāyopa- pratya- śamika yika
Vipula- mati
Arthā- Vyañja- Arthā- Vyañja vagraha nāva- vagraha nāvagraha
graha
KNOWLEDGE
Angapravista (12 in number)
Angabāhya
Āvaśyaka
Avaśyakavyatirikta
th=13
135
Kalika
Utkālika

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accepted by the Jaina logicians who discussed the theory of knowledge on the ground of logic. In the Tattvārtha-sūtra, first of all knowledge is divided into five categories and then these categories have been included in two categories, viz., pratyakşa and parokşa' as the means of valid knowledge. This latter division clearly indicates that Umāsvāti was also influenced by the second stage of development. 3. The third stage is as follows :
Jñāna
Ābhini-
Śruta
Avadhi
Kevala
Manaḥ- paryaya
bodhika
Pratyakşa
Parokșa
Abhinibodhika
Indriya- Noindriyapratyakşa pratyaksa 1. Śrotren- 1. Avandhi driya
2. Manaḥ- 2. Cakşurin- paryaya driya
3. Kevala 3. Ghrāņendriya 4. Rasanendriya 5. Sparśanendriya
Sruta- niḥsșta
Aśrutaniḥssta
Avagraha Ihā Avāya Dhāraņā
Vyañjanāvagraha
Arthāvagraha
Autpattikī Vainayiki Karmajā Pāriņāmiki 1. Matišrutāvadhimanuhparyavakevalūni jñanam. I. 9. · Adve parokşam, 1.11. Pratvakşamunyut. I. 12.

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137
On this stage of development, sensory knowledge has been placed in both categories, viz., direct knowledge and indirect knowledge. On the second stage, sensory knowledge as well as scriptural knowledge was placed in the category of indirect knowledge which, as a matter of fact, is in the true spirit of Jainism. The third stage that has its root in the Nandisūtra, seems to be influenced by the general tendency of Indian philosophy which regards sensory knowledge as direct. The later Jaina logicians and philosophers also adopted this view in the name of laukika pratyakşa. The gist of the third stage is: 1. Avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala-jñāna are really direct. 2. Sruta-jñāna is always indirect. 3. Mati-jñāna produced by the sense-organs is really indirect.
but is regarded as direct for practical purposes. 4. Mati-jñāna produced by the mind is always indirect.
Thus, these three stages of development of the conception of knowledge in the canons show that all the classifications of the logical period as well as the schemes of division of knowledge of the earlier philosophers were rooted in the canons. We shall explain the various categories of knowledge, viz., avagraha, ihā etc. while dealing with the logical conception of knowledge Means of Cognition in the Jaina Canons :
It is wrong to say that the Jaina canons discuss the categories of knowledge only and not the means of valid knowledge. We come across many references where the means of valid knowledge are independently discussed. In the Bhagavatī-sūtra, Lord Mahāvīra says : There are four means of valid knowledge, viz., perception (pratyakșa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and authority (agama)...!
1. Bhagavati-sútra, V.43.192.

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It apparently indicates that the ancient Jaina thinkers certainly believed in the separate and independent discussion of the means of valid knowledge. Their deliberations were not confined to the categories of knowledge only. They discussed the means of valid cognition as well like other systems of philosophy. Generally, such means are four in number, but in some places we find three also. As it is mentioned in the Sthānānga-sūtra : Determination is of three kinds, viz., perception, authority and inference.' Logical Conception of Knowledge : . When we look at the Tattvārtha-sūtra, we come to know that Umāsvāti made no difference between the categories of knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In other words, he did not differentiate jñāna and pramāņa. He observes : Jñana is of five varieties, viz., mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala. All these varieties are pramāņa.” He did not inention any particular characteristic except 'rightness' regarding the concept of pramāņa. He took jñāna (right knowledge) and pramāņa as identical.
The later philosophers defined pramāņa independently and strictly. They did not conceive knowledge as the means of valid knowledge in a general form but added some specific characteristics to it. Māņikyanandin says : That jñāna is pramāņa which has the determination of itself as well as of the object not known before. It enables us to get the desirable and give up the undesirable. Hence, it can be nothing but knowledge.
Hemacandra writes in his Pramāņa-mimāṁsā : The valid judgment about an object is pramāņa. In another language, a means of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition of an object.* Vādideva says: That jñāna is pramāņa which has
1. Sthănặnga-sūtra, 185. 2. Tattvārtha-sūtra, I. 9-10. 3. Pariksā-mukha, I. 1-2. 4. Samvagarthanirnavah pramānam, I. 1.2.

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the determination of itself as well as of the object. It is able to tell us what is desirable and what is undesirable. Hence, it can be knowledge only.'
On the basis of these various definitions of pramāņa, we can understand what type of knowledge is pramāṇa and what type of knowledge is not pramāņa. The gist of all these definitions is that it is a right knowledge or a valid judgment which is pramāņa, and not a wrong one. In other words, all pramāna is jñāna but all jñāna is not pramāņa. The Buddhists regard indeterminate knowledge as the means of valid cognition. According to the Jainas, indeterminate knowledge is no knowledge at all. It is only an intuition (darśana). The determination of knowledge is essential, because if the knowledge itself is not self-conscious, it cannot determine the object. The Jainas believe in the self-illuminating nature of knowledge, therefore, no question of infinite regress arises. - Validity of Knowledge :
We have seen that knowledge must be valid, if it is to be justified in being called pramāņa. Now, the question is: How can the nature of validity be determined ? The Jaina thinkers say that 'the validity is determined either intrinsically or extrinsically.' They believe in both the types, viz., the intrinsic validity and the extrinsic validity. The determination of validity is in some cases achieved by a cognition by itself. As for instance is the habitual cognition of one's own palm induced by a repeated course of experience or the direct achievements of results such as by the acts of bathing, drinking etc., there occurs cessation of heat, thirst etc., and this alone gives final satisfaction to the subject and a person does not feel an urge for further scrutiny of his cognition. This shows that validity is self-determined, i.e., intrinsic.
On some occasions, the experience of validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point, for instance, to 1. Pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka, 1.2-3. 2. Prāmānyaniscavah svatah prato vä-Pramāna-mīmāṁsā, I. 1. 8.

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the primal perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experience. Since such cognition has not as yet been ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the object, its validity is determined (1) by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, or (2) by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or (3) by the cognition of an object invariably or universally concomitant with it. This establishes the fact that validity is determined by other means. It is called extrinsic validity. Classification of the Means of Valid Knowledge :
The means of valid knowledge are of two kinds. Is this two-fold classification to be understood in the terms of what has been propounded by the Buddhists, viz., perception and inference' or in a different way? The Jaina classification is certainly different. Their two kinds are known as direct and indirect.? From the practical point of view they are called perceptual and non-perceptual. According to the Cārvāka, there is no other means of knowledge than perception (pratyaksa or
ct knowledge). In order to refute his view, it is said that there is means of valid knowledge other than perception and it is proved by the determination of the validity and invalidity of knowledge, by the knowledge of other men's thoughts, and by negation." The realisation of the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions, of another man's thought, and the negation of what transcends sense-intuition are not possible without the help of other means of valid knowledge such as inference.
Furthermore, the validity of even perceptual cognition can be established only on the evidence of its unfailing correspondence with the fact. Why should the Cārvāka not acknowledge the validity of non-perceptual cognitions, arising
1. Pratyaksamanumānam ca --- Nyāya-bindu, 1.3. 2. Pramānam dvidha. Pratyaksam paroksaṁ ca - Pramāna
mimāmsā, I. 1. 9-10. 3. Ibid., 1. 1.11.

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KNOWLEDGE
either from verbal testimony (authority) or from a logical ground (inference) known to be necessarily concomitant with a fact, on the identical ground of unfailing correspondence with the fact? Hence, non-perceptual cognition is as valid as perceptual cognition.
The Vaiseṣikas as well as the Sankhya thinkers contend that there are three means of knowledge, viz., perception, inference and authority. The Naiyāyikas accept analogy in addition to the three. The Prabhākaras accept the four and add implication as the fifth. The followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) accept negation as an additional means and thus assert six such means in all. All these means of valid knowledge except negation are included in the perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions accepted by the Jainas. As regards negation, it is not different from perception. Since reality partakes of the nature of both being and non-being, negation cannot have an object of its own. As a matter of fact, reality is made up of both being and non-being as its constitutive elements, since it has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the nature of another. It is evident that a perceptual cognition determines, by way of affirmation and negation, its object in the following way: When we say that the jar is not on the ground, we simply mean by it the perception of a surface of the ground and not a perception of the jar. The surface of the ground itself is the negation of the jar. The experience of negation is not additional which compels us to admit an independent means of cognition in the form of negation or non-existence. The position is as follows:
141
'A positive real that is determined as 'this is exclusively of such and such a character' is not capable of being understood without the concomitant cognisance of the negation of what is different from it."
1. Śloka-vārtika: Abhāva, 15.

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The Mimāmsakas might contend: Well, let reality be accepted as partaking of the nature of both being and non being, but that does not affect our position in the least, as we, too, have proved this very truth. Our contention is that only the positive element of being with which a sense-organ comes in contact is the field of perceptual cognition and as regards the element of non-being, it cannot be so. The latter is consequently held to be cognised by a separate means, viz., negation. How can then it be maintained that negation would have no separate object? The Jaina refutes this contention as under:
If the element of non-being be not different from the element of being, why should it not be liable to apprehension by perceptual knowledge? If, again, it be different, still it has to be admitted that jar and the like are perceived when a surface of land is perceived as in the form of the non-being of jar and the like. It is a universal rule that the non-apprehension of the non-being of anything is necessarily concomitant with the apprehension of its being.
Moreover, this so-called means of valid cognition is of no use being of the nature of mere negation of the five positive means of knowledge. And thus, it is the reverse of cognition and as such how can it function as a means of valid cognition? It follows, therefore, that negation as a means has no object, since there is nothing like pure non-being separate from the double nature of the real. The conclusion, therefore, is that it cannot be an additional means of valid cognition.
'That which is direct or immediate is perceptual cognition."
The directness or immediacy is defined as: consisting in either its independence of the services of another means or in
1. Visadah Pratyakṣam - Pramāņa-mīmāṁsā, I. 1. 13. Spastam pratyakṣam-Pramāṇa-naya-tattväloka, II. 2. Visadam pratyakṣamiti-Parīkṣā-mukha, II. 3.

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143
apprehension of its content as 'this." Categories of Perception :
The most significant thing to be noted in this connection is that the Jaina philosophers divide perceptual knowledge into two categories. In the first category they put that perceptual cognition which is directly related to soul. This perception is called direct perception, immediate perception, transcendental perception, extra-sensory perception or real perception. The second category is known as empirical perception, pragmatic perception or sensory perception. Direct Perception :
'The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of a soul, emerging on the total annihilation of all obstructive veils, is called direct perception."
The self has consciousness as its essence which is luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of self, which is nothing but the self as manifested, is styled pāramārthika pratyakşa, i.e., real perception. It is the highest kind of all cognitions. It is characterised as pure and perfect in the scriptures, since it is independent of the services of external instruments such as sense-organs and mind. It emerges on the disappearance of obscuring veils which results from the total purging of all the obstructive karmas. The soul is manifested in its pure nature and perceives the whole of reality in a direct and immediate manner. Hence, it is called omniscience (kevala-jñāna).
Omniscience is not the only instance of transcendental
1. Prumāņāntarānapekşedantayā pratibhāso vā vaiếadium
Pramāna-mīmāmsā. I. 1. 14 Pratityantarávyavadhänena višeşavattayā vā pratibhasanam
vaiśadyam-Parīksa-mukha, II. 4. 2. Tad dviprakäram sāmvyāvahärikam pāramārthikam ca ---
Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka, II. 4. 3. Tatsarvathāvaranavilaye cetanasya svarūpāvirbhāvo mukhyam
kevalam-Pramana-mimämsā, 1. 1.15.

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knowledge, but there are other varieties also.
'Owing to the variation of the degrees of the destruction of obstructive veils, the transcendental knowledge admits of two varieties, viz., limited direct perception and direct perception of the modes of other minds." They are nothing but clairvoyance and telepathy.
Pure perception occurs on the complete destruction of all possible veils. But when there is variation in the degrees of the annihilation of the veils, there occur two varieties of extrasensory perception, viz., avadhi and manaḥparyaya. Avadhi means 'limit' or 'that which is confined' and so it is said: 'Avadhi is limited to the objects having form, i.e., colour, taste, smell and touch. It is of two kinds according as it is congenital or acquired by merit. Of these, the first belongs to the denizens of heaven and hell just as movement in the sky belongs to birds. The second variety is possible for man and animals.
The mind is a particular substance and its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. And the knowledge of these modes is called manaḥparyayajñāna. Clairvoyance :
The self, according to Jaina philosophy, has inherent capacity to know all things irrespective of time and space. Temporal and spatial distance is immaterial if the self were in its perfection. To put it in a different language, the self is inherently capable of cognising all things together with all their characteristics irrespective of temporal distinctions, i.e., past, present and future, and spatial differences, i.e., here, there, near, far and the like. It is only because of karmic obstructions that this capacity is obscured. Pure perception occurs on the total destruction of all karmic obstructions. But when there is
1. Tattāratamyevadhimanaḥparyāyau ca - Pramāņa-mimāmsā, I.
1.18. 2. Rūpişvavadheḥ -- Tattvārtha-sūtra, 1. 28.

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145
variation in degrees of this destruction, there occur different varieties of perception. As regards the occurrence of normal perceptions, they are derived from the senses and mind. Regarding the occurrence of super-normal perceptions, the Jaina holds that they are derived directly from the self. They are not dependent on the senses and mind. Nevertheless, there is variation in degrees of their occurrence. Perfect perception occurs on the complete annihilation of all possible veils. But when there are differences in the subsidence and annihilation of these veils, there occur two varieties of super-normal perception, viz., clairvoyance and telepathy.
Clairvoyance is confined to the objects having form. Only those things which have shape, colour etc. can be perceived through the faculty of clairvoyance. This faculty differs in scope and durability with different persons due to the difference of destruction and subsidence of karmic veils. The highest type of clairvoyance can perceive all the objects having form. With regard to space, it extends over a space that could be occupied by innumerable space-points (pradeśas) of the size of the universe. As regards time, it pierces into innumerable cycles of time, both past and future. It cannot perceive all the modes of all the things. It knows only a part of them. The lowest type of clairvoyance can cognise the object occupying a very small fraction of space. In the technical language of the Jaina, it can extend to a very small fraction of an 'angula' and know the things having form that lie therein. As regards time, it can penetrate only a small part of time which is less than a second. Regarding the modes, it can know only a part of all the modes of its object.
Clairvoyance is of six types : First, a clairvoyance which continues to exist if a person leaves a particular place and goes elsewhere. This type is called anugāmin. Second, a
1. Nandi-sūtra, 16.

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clairvoyance that does not continue to exist in the aforesaid situation. It is opposed to the former. This variety is known as ananugămin. Third, a clairvoyance that increases in its scope and durability as time passes. It is called vardhamāna. Fourth, a clairvoyance which embraces deterioration as regards its scope and durability. It is called hīyamāna. This type is opposed to the third one. Fifth, a clairvoyance that neither faces growth nor embraces deterioration. This variety is known as avasthita. Sixth, a clairvoyance that sometimes increases and sometimes decreases with respect to its scope, durability etc. It is known as anavasthita. Telepathy :
Let us turn to the nature of telepathy. Mind, according to the Jainas, is a particular material substance. Its modes are different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. Every state of our thought is a particular mode of mind. As our state of thought changes, so also the mind changes. Thus, every states of our thought is reflected in the different modes of our mind. In another language, a state of thought is nothing but a particular mode of mind itself. The direct apprehension of the modes of mind is called telepathy in Jaina philosophy. A person possessing the faculty of telepathy can directly cognise the states of our thought. This cognition of the states of thought is nothing but a direct perception of the modes of the stuff of which the mind is made up.
Telepathy is confined to the abode of human beings. Its emergence is conditioned by a particular capacity possessed by one having a particular mode of right conduct. The faculty of telepathy is not acquired by an ordinary person. It is conditioned by a strict mental and physical discipline.
1. Anugāmyananugāmivardhamanahīyamānāvasthitänavasthita
bhedāt sadvidhah ---- Tattvārtha-vārtika, I. 22.4. 2. Avasyaka-niryukti, 76.

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The person possessing the faculty of telepathy is necessarily a homeless ascetic. His character must be of a higher type. Such conditions are not set down in the case of clairvoyance. The faculty of telepathy is far more superior to that of clairvoyance. The Jaina thinkers recognise two varieties of telepathy: rjumati and vipulamati. The latter is purer and everlasting, i.e., lasts up to the dawn of omniscience, whereas the former is less pure and sometimes trembles too.' The latter perceives less number of objects than the former but apprehends them more vividly. It is only he who is at the upward stage of spiritual advancement, is possessed of the latter, whereas the former is possessed by one who is sure to descend the spiritual ladder. The latter is more lucid than the former.
1. Tattvärtha-sutra, 1. 25. 2. Ibid., I. 26.
Clairvoyance and Telepathy:
the
Both clairvoyance and telepathy have reference to material objects. Such being the case, what is the line of demarcation between the two? The difference of clairvoyance and telepathy consists in the difference of purity, scope, subject and object.2 The perception of telepathy is more lucid than the perception of clairvoyance. The person possessing power of clairvoyance also perceives mind, but the person possessing the faculty of telepathy perceives the same more lucidly. The scope of clairvoyance varies from an extremely minute part of an angula up to the whole inhabited universe. But the scope of telepathy is limited to the sphere inhabited by human beings only. With regard to the difference of subject, the acquisition of clairvoyance is possible for living beings in all the possible states. But the faculty of telepathy is possible only for a human being possessed of selfrestraint and of noble conduct occupying a certain stage of spiritual development. In other words, only those who are

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possessed of super-normal powers acquire this type of perception and not any one else, and again it is possible only for a few and not for all of them. As regards the difference in reference to objects, the jurisdiction of clairvoyance is limited to material objects and that again not covering all their modes, but that of telepathy extends to by far the minuter parts.' Omniscience :
Let us turn our attention towards the nature of omniscience. It is the highest type of perception which falls in the category of extra-sensory perception. It is the perfection of the cognising faculty of the self. It is the pure manifestation of the real nature of the conscious principle. The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of the self, arising on the complete annihilation of all obstructive veils, is called omniscience.
The self, as has already been mentioned, possesses consciousness as its essence. It is luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the conscious principle is nothing but the self as manifested in the act of knowledge. It occurs on the annihilation of the perceptionobscuring veils. The person possessing the super-normal faculty of omniscience perceives all the substances with all their modes.? His knowledge is pure and perfect due to the total destruction of all possible obstructions.
Now, there arises a question : If the self is luminous by its very nature, why should it be subject to obscuration ? And if obscuration is possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. Though luminous in nature, the moon, the sun and the like are liable to be obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud, and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these cases, when it is found to be obscured by different veils of karma. The destruction of the obscuration of
1. Commentary on Pramāņa-mīmāmsā, I. 1.19. 2. Tattvārtha-sutra, 1. 30.

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149
the self is possible by the practice of a particular course of meditation and the like in the same way as the obscuration of the sun, the moon etc. is removed by a blast of wind. Arguments for the Existence of Omniscience :
The Jaina thinkers advance the following argument to prove the existence of omniscience : 'The proof of omniscience follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of cognition." The progressive development of knowledge must reach its completion somewhere, because this is the way of all progression, as seen in the progression of magnitude. Just as heat is subject to varying degrees and consequently reaches the highest limit, so also cognition which is subject to progressive development owing to the various degrees of destruction of the obscuring veil, reaches the highest limit, i.e., omniscience, when the hindrance of the obscuring karma is totally annihilated.
The Mimāṁsakas are not prepared to accept the possibility of the occurrence of omniscience. To refute the theory of omniscience, the Mimāṁsaka asks : What does omniscience mean ? Does it mean the cognition of all the objects of the universe ? Or does it mean merely the comprehension of certain principal objects ? As regards the first alternative, does it mean the knowledge of all the objects of the universe in succession or simultaneously? In the former case, there can be no omniscience, inasmuch as the objects of the world in the shape of past, present and future can never be exhausted. This being the fact, the cognition conditioned by them also can never be complete. Because of the impossibility of the knowledge of all the objects of the world there cannot be omniscience. In the latter case also there can be no omniscience. It is an established fact that all the objects of the world are impossible to be known at one and the same time.
1. Prajiātisayavis rãntradisiddhestatsiddhih-Pramāna-mimāmsa, 1.1.16.

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How is it possible to comprehend contradictory things like heat and cold at the same time by a single cognition ? Besides, if all the objects are known at one and the same instant by an omniscient soul, in the next moment it would become unconscious having nothing to cognise. And further, the omniscient would be tainted by the attachment etc. of others in cognising them. Consequently, he would cease to be omniscient, since attachment and the like are obstructions to right cognition. Thus, it is established that omniscience does not mean the cognition of all the objects of the universe either successively or simultaneously. On the other hand, it cannot be admitted that omniscience means the cognition of certain principal objects, since only when all the objects of the universe are known, the distinction of principal objects from subordinate objects can be established. Furthermore, it is an impossibility to have the cognition of the past and future which are, really speaking, non-existent. If the omniscient cognises the past and future which are non-existent, his knowledge would be illusory and wrong. If the past and future are known as existent, they are converted into the present. If the past and future are known by the omniscient as present, his knowledge again would be illusory. Hence, logically no existence of omniscience can be established.'
All these objections advanced by the Mīmāmsaka are refuted by the Jaina as follows: Our ordinary perceptions are produced by the sense-organs, and hence, they are incapable of cognising the past, the future and the like. But such is not the case with the omniscient. The perception of an omniscient self is not produced by the sense-organs, hence, it can know supra-sensory objects. It is not produced in succession but simultaneously, and hence, it cognises all the objects of the universe at the same time. It is beyond the limitations of space
I. Prameya-kamala-mārtanda, p.254. 2. Ibid., pp. 260-1.

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and time that are the necessary conditions of the perception produced by the senses. As regards the objection that contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be cognised at the same time by a single cognition, the Jaina asks the Mimāṁsaka : Why contradictory things cannot be cognised by a single cognition ? Is it because they cannot be present at the same time, or because they by their very nature cannot be comprehended by a single cognition, though they are present at the same time? The former view is not tenable, because contradictory things like heat and cold do exist at the same time. The latter position is also not capable of being defended, because when there is a flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, there occurs a simultaneous perception of two contradictory things, viz., darkness and light. Regarding the objection that if the omniscient knows all the objects of the universe at one instant, in the next moment he would become unconscious having nothing to cognise, the Jaina thinker replies that this type of objection would be valid if both the perception of the omniscient and the whole world were annihilated in the following instant. But, really speaking, both of these are ever-lasting. Hence, it is not an absurdity to hold that the omniscient perceives all the objects of the universe by a single cognition. With respect to the objection that the omniscient would be tainted by the attachnient etc. of others in cognising them, and consequently, he would cease to be omniscient, the reply is : Mere knowledge of desires, aversions etc. is not sufficient enough to make a person tainted unless the self is transformed into that very mode. The omniscient self cannot be affected by desires etc. in the least. Hence, it cannot be tainted by the attachment etc. of others by merely knowing them. Besides, desires and aversions are produced by our impure mental states and senses and not by the self which is pure and perfect. The omniscient self is pure and perfect. Hence, it cannot be tainted by the imperfections of sensory cognition. It is

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further urged that the omniscient is not capable of perceiving the past and future, inasmuch as they are non-existent. On the other hand, if they are perceived as existent, the perception of the omniscient is illusory. The Jaina says : The past and future are perceived by the omniscient not as present but as past and future. Hence, no question of illusion arises. The past things are as much existent and real in relation to their own time as the present things are existent and real in relation to the present. The same argument can be applied to the future. The omniscient knows the past as existing in the past and the future as existing in the future. Because of the absolute destruction of the obscuring veils of karma, the cognition of an omniscient person is not produced by the senses, but it is produced directly by the self. Hence, the omniscient directly perceives all the objects of the past, present and future. In other words, the limitations of space and time are only for sensory perception. They cannot obstruct the perception of an omniscient person. To summarise, the omniscient directly and immediately perceives all the objects of the universe, past, present and future, subtle and remote, by a single everlasting cognition without the assistance of senses and mind. Empirical Perception :
Now, we come to empirical perception. 'Empirical perception is conditioned by the senses and mind and is limited." The perception which has for its condition the senses and mind is called empirical perception, i.e., sâmvyavahārika pratyakșa. The meaning of the phrase 'conditioned by the senses and mind' is to be understood in both distributive and collective senses. It is said to be conditioned by the senses when the senses play a major part and the mind exerts influence in the generation, and it is said to be conditioned by the mind
• 1. Indriyanindriyanimittam desataḥ sāšvyavahārikamiti -
Pariksämukha, II. 5.

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when it is generated by the mind alone endowed with a particular kind of purity. Senses :
The senses are touch, taste, smell, sight and ear having respectively for their characteristic the capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odour, coloured shape and sound. Each of these again is of two kinds: physical and psychical. The physical sense is of material atoms possessed of definite shape like ear, eye etc. The psychical sense is of two kinds : Attainment (labdhi) and conscious activity (upayoga). Attainment means acquisition of the capacity of manifestation of the sense-activity. Conscious activity is a particular modification of the self due to attainment." Mind :
The mind is the organ of apprehension of all the objects of all the senses. All the objects of our senses are apprehended by the mind and so it is called the organ of apprehension of all the objects.
The mind is also of two kinds : physical and psychical. The physical mind is nothing but the matter transformed into it. The psychical mind is the conscious activity.
An objection is raised here that the statement about the empirical perception 'it is conditioned by the senses and mind' is inadequate. Thus, for example, visual cognition has for its additional conditions the presence of object and light. In answer to this, it is said : 'The object and light are not the conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference (vyatireka) between the two. The meaning is that the external
1. Sparśarasagandharūpaśabdagrahanalaksanani sparśanarasana
ghrāņacakṣuḥśrotrāṇindriyāņi dravyabhāvabhedāni. Dravyendriyam niyatākäräh pudgalāh. Bhāvendriyaṁ labdhyupayogau
— Pramāna-mimaṁsā, 1. 2. 21-23. 2. Sarvārthagrahaņaṁ manaḥ --- Ibid., 1. 2. 24. 3. Narthålokau jñanasya nimittamavyatirekat - Pramana
mīmāṁsā, 1. 2. 25.

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object and light are not the direct conditions of visual cognition, though we do not deny that they are remote (vyavahita) conditions, just as time, space and the like are. Of course, it is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of removal
the knowledge-obscuring karma and also of direct service by benefiting the sense of vision. The question is : Then why should not they be held to be the direct conditions of visual cognition ? The answer is : Because there is no concomitance in difference between them which is the most essential form of universal relationship. For instance, it is observed that the perception of water takes place in mirage (maricikā) in the desert in spite of the absence of sensation of water in it and the cats and owls have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in a thick pall of darkness.' Categories of Empirical Perception :
Sensory as well as mental perception is of four kinds, viz., sensation (avagraha), speculation (īhā), determinate perception (avāya) and retention (dhāraņā).? Sensation :
Sensation is the cognition of an object, which follows in the wake of indeterminate awareness upon the contact of the sense-organ with it. Sensation is the first stage of knowledge which catches the general feature of an object after the contact of the object with the sense-organ. Speculation :
Speculation is inquisitive pursuit for the knowledge of specific details of the perceived datum. On the sensation of
1. Compare: Tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānābhāvācca, kesonduka
jñanavannaktancarajñanavacca - Pariksă-mukha, 11. 7. 2. Etaddvitayamavagrahehāvāyadhāranābhedadekaśascaturvikal
pakam ---Pramana-naya-tattvāloka, 11. 6. 3. Aksarthavoge darsananantarumarthagrahanamavagrahah --
Pramāņa mīmāṁsā, 1. 1. 26. 4. Avagrhītavisesakānksanamihů - Ibid., I. 1. 27.

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an objective datum, for instance, a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound emanates from a conch (sankha) or a horn (śrnga) and the mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference in the form of the judgment 'it is perceived as sweet and agreeable which qualities belong to the sound of a conch and not as harsh and shrill which are the qualities of the sound of a horn.' The difference between doubt (samsaya) and speculation (īhā) lies in the fact that doubt is the antecedent form of speculation, while speculation stands above doubt. In doubt there is uncertainty of a specific object, whereas in speculation there is some sort of certainty that does not fall in the category of doubt. Determinate Perception :
Determinate perception is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of speculation.' Determinate perception is the final determination of the specific characteristic regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition 'the sound must be of a conch and not of a horn.' Retention :
Retention is the condition of memory. The condition is the causal stuff capable of change into the effect as memory which consists in the recollection of a past event. It is nothing but the latent mental trace left over as a legacy by our previous experience. Now, let us turn to non-perceptual cognition Non-perceptual Cognition :
Non-perceptual cognition is what lacks immediacy and lucidity. The sub-divisions of non-perceptual knowledge are as under:
1. Ihitavisesanirnayovāyaḥ - Pramāņa-mīmāṁsā, I. 1.28. 2. Smrtiheturdhāranā - Ibid., I. 1.29. 3. Avisadah paroksam - Ibid., 1. 2.).
Aspastam parokşam - Pramāņa-naya-tattväloka, DI.I.

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'The varieties of the same are recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and authority." Recollection :
Recollection is a cognition which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression (retention) and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that."
When requisite conditions such as the elimination and subsidence of obstructive veils, observation of similar objects and the like (similarity, contiguity and contrast of modern psychology) are at work to bring it to maturation, recollection occurs. And so the clause 'which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression' has been stated. The phrase 'which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun that' is inserted for setting forth its mode of communication.
It is Jainism alone that regards recollection (smsti) as a valid and independent means of cognition among all the philosophical systems in India. As a consequence, it has to face many objections from the side of opponents. How can recollection be a means of cognition when it is not cognisant of a datum perceived at present, and thus is found to lack an objective basis ? This is an objection. The answer is : It is certainly possessed of an object that has been experienced in the past. The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of a cognition. If it be contended, on the analogy of perception, that the object must be felt as present in order that the cognition may be valid, one might with equal force contend that perceptual cognition is invalid, since it is found to lack the criterion of referring to a fact that has been experienced in the past. If the opponent thinks that the revelation of the relevant object is the criterion of validity, it is found to be
.
1. Smaranapratyabhijñānatarkānumānāgamabhedatastat pañca
prakāram - Ibid., III. 2. 2. Väsanodbodhahetu kā tadityakarā smrtih - Pramāna-mimāmsā, I. 2.3.

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equally present in the case of recollection (memory) also. Another objection is that how can a dead object be the generating condition of recollection ? The Jaina answers : It is your delusion that makes you think so. For validity of cognition, it is not necessary that the object must be the generating condition. For instance, light which comes into being on the operation of its own conditions reveals the objects jar and the like, though not generated by them, so also does a cognition reveal its object, though it is not produced by the object. Recognition :
Recognition is a synthetic judgment born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'that necessarily is it,' 'it is like that,' 'that is dissimilar to that,''this is different from that' and the like.'
Observation is perceptual cognition. Recollection is an act of memory. These two are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic judgment. 'This is necessarily that jar' and the like are the cases of judgment of identity. 'This is like that,' e.g., 'the gayal (gavaya) is like the cow' is the judgment of similarity (analogy). 'This is dissimilar to that,' e.g., 'the buffalo is different from the cow' is the judgment of dissimilarity. 'This is less than, more than, farther than, nearer than' etc. are examples of the judgment of difference. Recognition is neither perception alone nor analogy exclusively. Inductive Reasoning :
Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha).?
1. Darsanasmaranasambhava tadevedan tatsadrśam tadvi.
laksanam tatpratiyogityādisankalanaṁ pratyabhijñānam -
Pramāņa-mimāṁsā, 1.2.4. 2. Upalambhānupalambhanimittaṁ vyāptijñānamühaḥ - Ibid., I.
2.5.

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'Observation' means the knowledge of existence of the major term (sādhya) on the existence of the middle term (linga). 'Non-observation' stands for the knowledge of nonexistence of the middle term where there is no major term.
Now, it should not be maintained that such knowledge of universal concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual cognition. It is beyond the capacity of perception to derive the knowledge of universal concomitance, since our empirical perception is limited, whereas the knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. In other words, perception is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present in a limited sense.
Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible in the absence of universal concomitance. In other words, the knowledge of universal concomitance has been apprehended as an antecedent condition of inference. Such being the case, how is it possible that the knowledge of universal concomitance, i.e., inductive reasoning can be obtained by inference ? It follows, therefore, that reasoning is a separate means of knowledge which serves to give knowledge of universal concomitance which is not apprehended by any other recognised means. It is known as tarka or üha.
Now, what is universal concomitance ? Hemacandra defines it in the following terms : 'Universal concomitance consists in the 'occurrence necessarily' of the determinant concomitant (major term - vyāpaka) on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (middle term - vyāpya), or the occurrence of the determinate concomitant 'exclusively in the locus' where the major term occurs."
The uniform characteristic of both the middle and major terms has been regarded as follows : The major necessarily
1. Vyāptirvyāpakasya vyāpye sati bhäva eva, vyäpyas ya vă tatraiva
bhāvah - Pramāna-mīmāmsā, I. 2. 6.

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exists in the locus in which the middle occurs, and as for the middle, it occurs exclusively in a locus where the major exists. If this necessary restriction were reversed, the concomitance between the middle and major terms will not be necessary. Inference :
Now, we define inference which comes next in order. Inference is the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) on the strength of the probans (sādhana).'
The knowledge of the probandum, which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact, and which arises from a probans either observed or expressly stated, is called inference (anumāna).
It is of two kinds : for one's own self (subjective) and for others (syllogistic). Subjective Inference :
Subjective inference consists in the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one's own self as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum.2
Necessary concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. The knowledge of the probandum from such a probans definitely cognised by the arguer himself as having for sole and solitary characteristic of inseparable relation with the probandum is called subjective inference.
Inseparable relationship is further defined as consisting in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events.
1. Sadhanāt sādhyavijnanamanumanam - Ibid., 1. 2.7. 2. Svārthaṁ svaniscitasädhyāvinābhāvaikalaksaņāt sādhanāt
sādhyajñānam --- Pramāņa-mīmāṁsā, 1. 2.9. 3. Sahakramabhāvinoh suhakramabhāvaniyamovinābhāvah ---
Ibid., I. 2. 10.

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Synchronous events are those which are the co-products of the same set of causal conditions such as colour and taste of a fruit and the like. Successive events are those which occur in succession, as for instance, the appearance of Krttikā and Sakața; or which are related as effect and cause, e.g., smoke and fire. The necessity of the simultaneity of synchronous events and the necessity of the succession of successive events, is what is meant by inseparable relationship or universal concomitance. The triple characteristic of the Buddhists and the quintuple characteristic of the Naiyāyikas are nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance. Probans :
The probans (sādhana) is of five types : essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum and opposite. Of these, the essential identity is illustrated by the attribute of 'being a product' or 'audible' with regard to the inference of impermanence in a word. Word is impermanent, because it is a product or because it is audible.
The cause is illustrated by the attention of a particular type of cloud with regard to the inference of shower of rain.
The effect is illustrated by such instances as the appearance of a particular type of flood serving as the probans of rainfall, smoke serving as the probans of fire, life serving as the probans of consciousness.
The co-inherent in the same substratum is illustrated by colour and taste belonging to one and the same fruit, by the emergence of Sakata and Kșttikā, by the moon-rise and the sea-tide.
As regards the opposite, it is what is opposed to the negatum or to the effect etc. As for example, there is no touch of cold herein, as fire is present; the causal conditions of cold with their powers unfrustrated cannot be present here,
1. Svabhāvah karanam karyamekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti
pancadhă sādhanam - Ibid., 1. 2.12.

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as fire is present in this place.
Subjective inference has been defined. Now, we propose to give the definition of syllogistic inference. Syllogistic Inference :
'Syllogistic inference is definite cognition resulting from a statement of a probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum." The definite authentic cognition of a fact that arises from a statement of a person having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with probandum, is designated as syllogistic inference. In other words, it is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the communication made by another person.
The syllogistic statement has two different types. The first type is due to the consideration of the logical possibility on the necessary occurrence of the probandum. In other words, when the possibility of the probans is understood to be necessarily dependent on the occurrence of the probandum, the first type is there. The second type arises from the consideration of the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum. Take some concrete example : The hill is on fire, because the logical possibility of its being possessed of smoke is intelligible only on that condition; or, because the fact of its possession of smoke would become logically impossible in the absence of fire. The difference of syllogistic inference is conditioned merely by this difference of form and not a real difference. In other words, the difference between the two is not in respect of ultimate intention but is merely formal. For this very reason, the statement of both the propositions is not necessary. Parts of Syllogism :
Philosophers of different schools hold different views with regard to the constitution of syllogism. For instance, the
1. Yathoktasādhanabhidhānajah parartham -- Pramāna-mīmāṁsā,
11. 1. 1.

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Sankhyas maintain that a syllogism consists of three parts, viz., thesis, reason and example. The Mimāṁsakas assert four parts with the addition of application. The Naiyayikas assert five parts with the addition of conclusion. Such being the case, the question naturally arises: What is the proper form of a syllogism? The Jaina thinkers answer: 'The thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for a knowledgeable person." In obligation to the pledge of edification of a pupil or any layman, the syllogism may have five propositions also, viz., thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion. As has been remarked by Bhadrabahu: 'The syllogism is said to consist of five parts or of ten parts in the alternative. We denounce neither but accept both as legitimate."2
Thesis :
Now, we set forth the definition of thesis that comes first in order. 'Thesis is the statement of the theme to be proved."3 It is called pratijñā or pakṣa. 'This hill is possessed of fire' is a typical illustration.
Reason:
The definition of reason is as follows: 'Statement of a probans ending in an inflexion (vibhakti) unfolding the character of probans is called reason." A particular type of statement unfolding the character of probans is known as reason. The inflexion is either the fifth or the third caseending in Sanskrit and such words as 'because' or 'since' prefixed to it in English. As for instance, (this hill is possessed of fire) 'because it has smoke' or 'smoke is impossible in its absence.' The existence of smoke is logically justifiable
1. Etävän prekṣaprayogaḥ -
Pramāṇa-mimāṁsā, II. 1.9.
2. Katthai pañcāvayavaṁ dasahā vā savvahā na paḍikuttham ti Daśavaikālika-niryukti, 50.
3. Sadhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā -
Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā, II. 1. 11.
4. Sadhanatvābhivyañjakavibhaktyantaṁ sadhanavacanaṁ hetuḥ
Ibid., II. 1.12.

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only on the condition of its positive concomitance with fire or the existence of smoke is logically impossible unless the said concomitance be a fact. Example :
Example is the statement of an illustration. It is a statement which sets forth an illustration. It is also of two kinds on account of the difference of illustrations. The statement of an illustration based upon similarity of attribute is called 'homogeneous example' (sādharmya drstānta). 'Whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, as for example, an oven' is a typical instance. Heterogeneous example (vaidharmya drstānta) is the statement of an illustration in dissimilarity. 'Whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is possessed of the absence of smoke, as for example, a lake' may be cited as a typical case. Application :
Application is the act of bringing the probans into connection with the minor term (dharmin). The proposition 'it is possessed of smoke' is a typical example of the same. Conclusion :
Conclusion is the predication of the probandum.? The proposition 'therefore it is possessed of fire' is an illustration.
The complete form of the proposition of syllogism is like this : This hill is possessed of fire, because it has smoke, whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, as for example an oven', it is possessed of smoke, therefore it is possessed of fire.
Or This hill is possessed of fire, because smoke is impossible in its absence, whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is
1. Drstäntavacanamudāharanam --- Pramāna-mimamsă, II. 1.13. 2. Hetoh sādhyadharminyupasamharanamupanayah, yathă
dhūmaścātra pradese - Pramāņa-naya-tattväloka, Ill. 49-50. 3. Sadhyadharmasya punarnigamanam, yathā tasmadagniratra -
Ibid., III. 51-2.

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possessed of the absence of smoke, as for example, a lake, it is possessed of smoke, therefore it is possessed of fire. Authority :
We have dealt with recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning and inference. The fifth division of non-perceptual cognition, viz., authority still remains to be defined. We, now, propose to deal with it.
The knowledge produced by the word of a reliable source is called authority. It is also known as 'verbal testimony' or 'word.' The reliable source is that person who knows the object as it is and describes it as he knows it. He who possesses right knowledge and makes a right judgment is said to be reliable or āpta. Such a reliable person cannot tell a lie. His proposition is always true. Hence, he is called authority. His 'word' is also known as testimony. The authority is of two kinds : ordinary and extraordinary, i.e., laukika and alaukika. The ordinary authority is father etc. The omniscient is an example of the extraordinary authority
The agamika conception of knowledge can be covered by the logical division of cognition in the following style :
Avadhi-jñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyaya-jñāna (telepathy) and kevala-jñāna (omniscience) are styled as transcendental perception. Mati-jñāna (sensory and intellectual knowledge) is occupied by empirical perception, recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning and inference. Sruta-jñāna (scriptural knowledge) is called authority, verbal testimony, scriptural testimony or word.
1. Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka, IV.1.

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CHAPTER VII
JUDGMENT
According to Jainism, an object has three fundamental characteristics: origination, decay and permanence. Every object that seems to be permanent is liable to both origination and decay. In the same way, everything that seems to originate and perish has an aspect of permanence. All things including the flame of a lamp which is generally believed to be momentary and space that is believed to be permanent are subject to the law of origination, decay and permanence. The Jaina thinkers reject the definition of permanence (nityatva) given by other schools. They do not believe in absolute changelessness. According to the Jainas, the permanent is that which continues to exist in spite of origination and decay. They argue what would origination and dacay belong to, if nothing continues? A continuous reality must be posited for the very possibility of origination and decay. Modes, i.e., origination and decay, and essence, i.e., permanence, exist together in a substance. Neither is origination possible without decay and permanence, nor is decay possible in the absence of origination and permanence, nor is permanence tenable without origination and decay. All the three retain their respective existence on the basis of mutual co-operation. They are not heterogeneous elements, as generally supposed, but they possess the nature of homogeneous elements. Jainism differs equally from those who hold that all is absolutely permanent and those who hold that all is absolutely momentary, and also from those who hold that some things are absolutely permanent and some are absolutely momentary. According to Jaina philosophy, reality is both permanent and momentary. This criterion belongs to all things.

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Moreover, all objects are interrelated. The individual form of an object cannot be established unless the knowledge of its inter-relations is assumed. When we speak of a human being, the relative knowledge of objects other than the human being springs up of itself. Similarly, when we speak of Europeans, the idea of non-Europeans springs up naturally. When we speak of Indians, the idea of non-Indians spontaneously springs up. The idea of virtue suggests the idea of vice and so on. Thus, the knowledge of one substance or object suggests the relative knowledge of other substances or objects. Lord Mahāvīra, keeping this in view, said that a man who knows only one object with all its properties, knows all objects. He who knows all things with all their properties, knows one thing. Thus, the Jaina philosopher advocates the doctrine of non-absolutism. Every judgment of a Jaina thinker bears the impression of non-absolutism in its heart. He makes no judgment that goes against the spirit of non-absolutism. Traces in the Canons :
The theory of non-absolutism is not an innovation of the later philosophers who propounded the sacred teachings of the Great Teacher Lord Mahāvīra. The Lord himself preached this philosophical doctrine and his later followers put it into a more systematic and logical form. While describing the nature of soul (jiva), Mahāvīra addressed Gautama : "O Gautama ! from one point of view, the soul is permanent; from another point of view, the soul is not permanent. From the view-point of substance, the soul is permanent; from the view-point of modes, the soul is not permanent."2
Lord Mahāvīra emphasised the identity of soul and knowledge from one stand-point. In the Acārānga-sūtra it is
1. Je egam jāņai se savvam jānui.
Je savvaṁ jänai se egaṁ jānai -- Acārānga-sūtra, I. 3.4. 122. 2. Goyama ! jīvā siya sāsavā sira usāsarā. Govama ! davvattha
vāe sāsavā bhāvauhavăe asāsavu Bhagavati-sútra, VII. 2. 273.

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said : Soul is knowledge and knowledge is soul...' From another point of view, he emphasised the difference of various modes and according to these modes the soul was classified. We find in the Bhagavati-sūtra : "O Lord ! how many kinds of soul are there ?" "O Gautama ! the soul is said to be of eight kinds, viz., dravya-ātmā (from the point of view of substance), kaşāya-ātmā (from the point of view of passion).... ... .."2
Similarly, the medium of motion is said to be one as well as many. From the stand-point of substance (dravya), the medium of motion is one and from the view-point of units (pradeśas), it is innumerable. The same method can be applied to the medium of rest etc. Cause and Effect :
Whether the effect exists in the cause or is it a new outcome? Those philosophers who admit that the effect is not a new product but that it exists in the cause, are known as Satkāryavādins'. Those thinkers who do not believe in this doctrine but hold that the effect is entirely a new out-come and that it does not exist in the cause, are called 'Asatkāryavādins.' The schools of Indian philosophy believing in the theory of 'Satkāryavāda' are Sāňkhya, Yoga and Vedānta. The Asatkāryavādins are Cārvāka, Buddhism, NyāyaVaiseșika and Mīmāmsā (one sect). Jainism does not regard these views as valid in their absolute forms. According to its doctrine of non-absolutism, the effect is neither absolutely identical with the cause nor absolutely different from it. The cause remains in the effect as the essence and not as a mode. The effect is new in the shape of a mode and not as the essence. In other words, the essential quality remains unchanged, while the mode changes. When we say that the effect is new, we mean that the mode is new. When we admit that the effect is
1. Je āyā se vinnāyā.......... 2. Bhagavati-sūtra, XII. 10.467. 3. Prajñāpanā-sutra, Il. 56.

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not new, we mean that the essence is the same. That which exists can never be absolutely non-existent and that which does not exist at all can never come into existence. An existent object cannot be destroyed and a non-existent object cannot be originated. Hence, from one point of view, the effect does not exist in the cause. It is a new outcome. From another point of view, it can be maintained that the effect exists in the cause. Both these stand-points are right so far as they are not absolute. We cannot define the theory of causation in an exclusive manner. Unless it is accepted in the form of 'Sadasatkāryavāda', it is not possible to have a true picture of reality.
Thus, the so-called opposites such as existence and nonexistence, permanence and non-permanence, identity and difference, oneness and maniness etc. can be attributed to an object from various points of view. These opposites should not be taken to be absolutely heterogeneous. They can remain in the same object without contradicting each other. Besides, the object requires these opposites to depict its complete and real picture. In the absence of these opposites, the existence of an object is impossible. When we say that an object exists, we only mean by this statement that in a certain respect it exists. When we make the statement that an object does not exist, we only mean that from a particular point of view, it does not exist. We cannot say that it absolutely exists or it does not exist absolutely. As it is remarked : 'Everything exists in its own individuality and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, everything would be alike existent, and thus, there would possibly be no individuality at all." Anekānta, Anekāntavāda and Syädvāda :
According to Jainism, a particular object can be viewed from different points of view. It can be existent, non-existent,
1. Sarvamasti svarūpena pararūpena násti ca.
Anvatha sarvasttvam svát svarūpas yapyasambhavah.

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one, many, identical, different and the like. It possesses infinite attributes. These attributes or characteristics (dharmas) are not conceptual but they really exist in the object. The term 'anekānta' indicates the ontological nature of reality, according to which every object possesses infinite aspects. When we speak of a particular aspect, we have to use the word 'syāt', i.e., from a particular point of view or as related to this aspect, this object is such and not otherwise. As for instance, when we speak of the aspect of existence of a pot, we choose the 'existence' aspect of that pot which possesses many other aspects as well. We make a statement about the aspect of existence, i.e., in relation to the aspect of existence, the pot exists. Take another example: Mohan is a father, brother, uncle etc. according to various relations. He is the father of his son, the brother of his brother and so on. When his son calls him, he uses the word 'father.' Now, Mohan possesses many aspects like those of father, brother etc. In relation to his son, he is father. Thus, Mohan is a father as related to his son, i.e., relatively Mohan is a father. Hence, 'Syādvāda', i.e., the theory of the relativity of propositions is the theory of the relativity of judgment. When an object, which is anekäntätmaka (possessing many characteristics), is expressed in a particular form of judgment, the expression is known as Syādvāda. We can express the characteristics of an object from different points of view and these points of view are expressed by the word 'syat'. As it is said: 'The judgment about an object possessing many characteristics is called 'Syadvāda'.'
The theory of 'Syādvāda' is also called 'Anekāntavāda,' because the relativity of judgment is nothing but a relative judgment about an object that possesses infinite aspects or qualities. In other words, the relative judgment is not possible unless the object for which that judgment stands is anekāntātmaka. Hence, the judgment that stands for an object
Laghiyastraya-ṭīkā,
1. Anekāntātmakärthakathanam syādvādaḥ
62.

169

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possessing many characteristics (anekāntātmaka) is also known as Anekāntavāda. As it is maintained: 'In the term 'syādvāda', the word 'syāt' expresses many aspects of an object, hence, 'Syādvāda' is called 'Anekantavāda'.'
Thus, the object itself is anekānta, i.e., the substratum of many characteristics. The judgment about the object is 'Syādvāda', because every characteristic is expressed with the word 'syat'. This judgment is also called 'Anekāntavāda', since it expresses the object that possesses many characteristics. Seven-fold Judgment:
The object has been described as the possessor of infinite characteristics. When we select one of the characteristics with its contrary aspect and judge it, this kind of judgment has seven forms, hence, it is called seven-fold judgment.2 The following are the seven propositions with reference to the concrete illustration of pot:
1.
Relatively the pot exist.
2. Relatively the pot does not exist.
3. Relatively the pot exists and does not exist.
4. Relatively the pot is indescribable.
5.
Relatively the pot exists and is indescribable.
6. Relatively the pot does not exist and is indescribable. Relatively the pot exist, does not exist and is indescribable.
7.
In these propositions, the word 'relatively' is most significant. Every judgment bears the stamp of relativity, by which the notion of absolutism is refuted. All our judgments are relative, i.e., non-absolutistic. The proposition 'relatively the pot exists' shows that from a particular point of view the pot exists. This particular point of view is determined by four factors. These factors are the substance, place, time and mode as related to the pot. The explanation of these determining factors is as follows:
1. Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātriṁśikā, 5. 2. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, IV. 14.

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The substance of the pot is the clay of which it is made. Viewed from the point of view of this particular substance, the pot exists.
The place of the pot points to the locality where it is lying. Viewed from the point of view of a particular room, the pot exists.
The time of the existence of the pot is the present time in which it exists. Viewed from the point of view of eight o'clock, the pot exists.
The mode of the pot points to its form or shape. Viewed from the point of view of a particular form, such as its contracted neck, the pot exists. To be more clear, the proposition 'relatively the pot exists' means that the pot exists so far as its own individual form is concerned by reason of its substance, place, time and mode. Its substance points to the clay of which it is made, its place is the locality in which it stands, its time is the present time in which it exists and its mode points to its particular form such as its contracted neck.

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The proposition 'relatively the pot does not exist' means that the pot does not exist if looked at from the point of view of the absence of the characteristics of its substance, place, time and mode. To elucidate, the pot does not exist with reference to another substance, such as gold etc.; with reference to another place, such as some other room etc.; with reference to the time preceding its manufacture or succeeding its destruction, i. e., the past and future times; with reference to other modes, such as a broad neck etc. In this proposition the pot is looked at from the point of view of the absence of the four determining factors that are ascribed to the aspect of existence. But it is not a proposition contradictory to the first proposition. It does not deny the existence of the pot in so far as its specific properties are concerned but denies its existence when other properties that are not positively present in it are taken into consideration. This proposition stands

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from the point of view of the predominance of the aspect of non-existence.
The third proposition 'relatively the pot exists and does not exist' is maintained on the ground that the pot exists in reference to its own substance and does not exist with reference to the substance of other things. It exists in its own place and does not exist in other places. It exists in the present time and does not exist in the time preceding its manufacture or succeeding its destruction. i. e., the past and the future. The pot exist in reference to its own form or mode and does not exist in reference to the modes or forms of other things. According to this proposition, the first part of the judgment is true from the point of view of the existence of the individual properties of the pot and the second part is true from the point of view of the non-existence of other properties in it. It means that the pot exists from the stand-point of its individual properties and that it does not exist from the view-point of the absence of other qualities in it.
The fourth proposition 'relatively the pot is indescribable' is true if both the points of view of the previous propositions are assumed simultaneously. When both the views of existence and non-existence are taken at the same time, it becomes indescribable.
The fifth proposition 'relatively the pot exists and is indescribable' means that the pot exists in regard to its existent form but it becomes indescribable if both its existent and nonexistent forms are considered simultaneously. It is indescribable, yet, it exists.
The sixth proposition 'relatively the pot does not exist and is indescribable' means that the pot does not exist in regard to its non-existent aspects but looked at from the point of view of its existent and non-existent forms simultaneously, it becomes indescribable. Here the point of view refers to the combination of indescribability and non-existence.

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The seventh proposition 'relatively the pot exists, does not exist and is indescribable' means that the pot exists with regard to its own properties, does not exist in regard to its non-existent characteristics and is indescribable if both the points of view are assumed simultaneously. Here the point of view is dominated by the combination of indescribability, existence and non-existence.
The point is that when the truth of a particular aspect of a thing is to be ascertained, it should not be examined only from one point of view. The Jainas hold that every aspect of an object can be viewed from seven stand-points, every one of which is true but the whole truth about that aspect lies in the combination of all these seven views. This seven-fold declaration of judgment in regard to everything is a peculiar and unique method of the Jaina dialectic. Just as existence is applied to everything, so also the terms permanent and impermanent, one and many, describable and indescribable and the like can be applied to it. The propositions will be the same with the change of these words. For instance relatively the pot is eternal (in view of its substance), relatively the pot is not eternal (in view of its changing forms) and so on.
The gist of the seven-fold judgment of the Jaina dialectic is as under : 1. Thesis (positive). 2. Anti-thesis (negative). 3. Aggregate (both positive and negative successively). 4. Synthesis (both positive and negative simultaneously). 5. Thesis and synthesis (positive and both positive and
negative simultaneously). 6. Anti-thesis and synthesis (negative and both positive and
negative simultaneously). Aggregate and synthesis (both positive and negative successively and both positive and negative simultaneously).

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Or 1. Existence. 2. Non-existence. 3. Existence and non-existence. 4. Indescribability. 5. Existence and indescribability. 6. Non-existence and indescribability. 7. Existence, non-existence and indescribability.
First of all we take 'existence.' Then we come to 'nonexistence.' After it we put both 'existence' and 'non-existence' together successively. Then we put both 'existence' and 'nonexistence' together simultaneously. We cannot describe both 'existence' and 'non-existence' simultaneously, since our proposition will necessarily have either of the two first. Hence, we call it indescribable. These four propositions are fundamental. When we add the first proposition to the fourth, the fifth proposition is there. Adding the second to the fourth, we derive the sixth one. Similarly, when we add the third proposition to the fourth, we have the seventh category. The scheme is as under :
1. Existence. 2. Non-existence 3. Existence and non-existence.
4. Indescribability. 1 +4 = 5. Existence and indescribability. 2 +4 = 6. Non-existence and indescribability. 3+4 = 7. Existence, non-existence and indescribability.
This is the general view of the method of the Jaina dialectic. This dialectical method follows the theory of relativity of judgment, i. e., Syādvāda. In other words, Syādvāda can be represented only by this type of dialectical method. Syādvāda is said to be the foundation of Jaina philosophy. It is so important that the Jaina thinkers did not hesitate to put it on the equal status with omniscience (kevalajñāna). As it is said: 'Both Svadvāda and kevala-jñāna

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illuminate the whole reality. The difference between them is only this much that while the former illuminates the objects indirectly, the later illuminates them directly.'
Every proposition of the dialectical seven-fold judgment is of two kinds ; complete (sakalādeśa) and incomplete (vikalādeśa). ? Complete Judgment :
We know that an object possesses infinite characteristics but it is not possible for us to describe all of them. To overcome this difficulty, we use only one word that describes one characteristic of that object and holds the remaining characteristics to be identical with it. By this method we can describe all the characteristics of an object by the description of a particular aspect only. This type of proposition is called complete judgment. The identity of all other aspects with a single aspect is proved by the identity of time etc.
The word 'existence' in the proposition 'relatively the pot exists' includes all other aspects of the pot through the identity of time, quality, substratum, relation, contributory part, residence of substance, association and word. (1) Time (kāla)-Time indicates that at the time when the quality
of existence is predicated of the pot, the qualities of redness, hardness etc. can as well be predicated of it. In other words, the pot has many qualities or characteristics at the same time. Therefore, from the view-point of time, all the qualities of the pot are inseparable from one another. Thus, time bridges the difference existing among the various qualities and takes 'existence as
identical with all other qualities. (2) Quality (ātma-rūpa)-Just as existence is a quality of the
pot, so also redness, hardness etc. are its qualities. Hence,
1. Apta-mimāṁsā, 105. 2. Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka, IV.43. 3. Syadvāda-ratnákara, IV.44.

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with regard to qualities, existence is not different from
redness, hardness etc. in the case of the pot. (3) Substratum (artha) - In the same substratum where the
characteristic of existence resides, the other qualities also reside. Hence, with reference to substratum, all other
qualities are identical with existence. (4) Relation (sambandha) - Just as the quality of existence is
related to the pot, so also the other qualities are related to it. Hence, from the view-point of relation, all other
qualities are not different from existence. (5) Contributory Part (upkāra)- The part which the quality
of existence plays in regard to the pot, is also played by the other qualities of the pot. Thus, so far as the contributory part is concerned, there is no difference
between existence and all other qualities. (6) Residence of Substance (guņi-deśa)- In that place where
the pot exists, the quality of existence resides. In the same place the other qualities also reside. Hence, with reference to the residence of substance, the quality of
existence is identical with all other qualities. (7) Association (sarisarga)- Just as the quality of existence
is associated with the pot inseparably, so are all other qualities. Hence, from the point of view of association, there is identity in all different qualities. This is the
identity of association. (8) Word (sabda)- Just as the quality of existence is signified
by the word 'is', so are the other qualities signified by it. Just as we propose the judgment 'relatively the pot is existent', so also we propose another judgment 'relatively the pot is red, hard etc.' Here, just as the quality of 'existence' is signified by the word 'is', so are other qualities signified by it. This is the identity from the stand-point of word.

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All these eight stand-points can be applied to the other qualities also in the same manner as they are applied to the quality of existence of the pot. This kind of judgment is called complete judgment. It is also known as 'pramāņa-saptabhangi', i. e., the seven-fold judgment of pramāņa.' Incomplete Judgment :
While describing the nature of complete judgment we saw that all qualities are identical with one quality of an object. In the case of incomplete judgment the order is reversed.? Every judgment presupposes some difference in every aspect or quality. In regard to a complete judgment time, quality etc. establish identity among various qualities, whereas with regard to an incomplete judgment time, quality etc. prepare the ground for difference among various qualities. This kind of judgment is called 'naya-saptabhangi'. Definition of Naya :
Pramāņa or complete judgment describes an object with all its qualities. Naya or incomplete judgment holds any one of the qualities of that object and leaves the rest untouched. This does not mean that it rejects all other qualities except one. The point is that a particular naya (view-point) selects one of the infinite qualities for its purpose, not rejecting the other ones but leaving them for the other view-points (nayas). A judgment which accepts only one quality and rejects the remaining ones is fallacious (nayābhāsa).
If we look at an object from infinite points of view, we can say that there are infinite kinds of naya, because the object is composed of infinite characteristics and one naya knows only one characteristic. Looking at it from a specific point of view, it is maintained that naya is of two kinds : dravyāstika (dealing with generality) and paryāyāstika (dealing with particularity). Dravyāstika is the view of looking at the identity
1. Ratnākarávatārikā, IV.44. 2. Tadviparitastu vikalādesah-Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka, IV.45. 3. Sannati-tarka-prakarana. 1.3.

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of things (abheda), while paryāyāstika is the view which looks at the difference of things. Man speaks of something either from the stand-point of identity or from that of difference. Statements of things from the former point of view are put under the head of dravyāstika. Propositions of objects from the stand-point of difference fall under the category of paryāyāstika. Many minor classifications of things ranging between general (dravyāstika) and particular (paryāyāstika) view-points are also possible. But briefly speaking, there can be only two groups of statements. The view-point of identity, upon which are founded the statements of generalisation, is called dravyāstika naya, while the view-point of difference, upon which are founded the statements of particularisation, is called paryāyāstika naya. The dravyāstika naya is further divided into three categories : naigama, sangraha and vyavahära. The sub-divisions of the paryāyāstika naya are four : rjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūdha and evambhūta.' Naigama Naya :
It views an object as possessing both the general and particular properties, because no object is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some particular property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class. ? As for example, 'I am conscious' is a statement of the naigama naya. Here the property 'consciousness' is a general quality that exists in all living beings, whereas 'T' indicates my particular nature, i. e., individuality. Sangraha Naya :
It deals with the general property of an object. As for instance, 'reality is one because it exists' is a proposition of the sangraha naya. It does not look at the particular properties of reality but regards the general property as its subject-matter.
1. Pramāna-naya-tattvāloka, VII. 6; VII. 27. 2. Naya-karņikā, 5. 3. Ibid., 6.

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In its pure form, it is only concerned with the simple statement 'it is', that is to say, when the thing is mentioned divested of all its particular attributes or modifications.
Vyavahāra Naya :
It takes into consideration a general object as possessing specific properties. It does not deal with generality in the sense as the sangraha naya deals with it. Its subject-matter is only a part of the object of the sangraha. In other words, it classifies the subject-matter of the sangraha in a particular fashion. 'Existence is either substance or modification' is an instance of the vyavahāra naya.2 Here 'existence' is classified into two, viz., substance and modification.
179
Ṛjusūtra Naya:
It does not trouble itself with the past or the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present aspect of a thing, because that alone is useful for the moment.3 The argument underlying the rjusūtra view-point is that of immediate utility which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. As for instance, 'I am happy at this moment' is a proposition dealing with the present state of my happiness. Śabda Naya:
4
It treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance 'kumbha,' 'kalasa,' 'ghața' are all expressive of one and the same object, viz., a jar. The meaning is that the sabda naya does not concern itself with the difference of synonymous words but simply deals with them as if they were pure equivalents of one another.
Samabhirūḍha Naya :
It holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs; just as a jar and a piece of cloth are different, so also a jar (kumbha),
1. Ibid., 8.
2. Pramāṇa-naya-tattväloka, VII.23-4.
3. Ibid., VII. 28.
4. Naya-karṇikā, 14.

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a pitcher (kalaśa) and a pot (ghaļa) signify different things according to their meanings.' The point is that while the sabda would treat synonyms as equivalent words, the samabhirūdha would distinguish them from one another on etymological grounds. Evambhūta Naya :
It recognises an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word.2 The argument is that if a thing is not in the state of performing its function, as expressed by the term at the moment of recognition, and still it be recognised as that thing, then even a jar can be called a cloth, though it is not in the state of discharging the function of a cloth. Etymologically, evambhūta means 'true in its entirety to the word and the sense.' As for instance, 'go' (cow) means that which goes. If a cow is not going but sitting, she would not be called 'go' (cow) at that time. She is cow only when she goes. Province of Naya :
The dravyāstika naya and the paryāyāstika naya are not absolutely different. The dravyāstika includes in itself all those statements in which there is some sort of generality. In all such statements, there is an overlapping of the paryāyāstika also. Only that statement where there is no further possibility of particularisation falls under the strict purview of pure paryāyāstika. The point is that as a rule, every statement that deals with some sort of universality is the legitimate province of the dravyāstika. Except the ultimate statement where there is indivisible particularisation, all other statements gradually culminating in the statement of the highest universality fall
1. Ibid., 15. 2. Pramāņa-naya-tattväloka, VII.40. 3. 'Gacchatiti gauh'. 4. Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, 1. 8.

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under the purview of the dravyāstika. But, at the same time, all these statements, except the statement of the highest universality, become the subject-matter of the paryāyāstika as well. In other words, only one statement dealing with the highest entity without a single attribute, is covered by the dravyāstika only. Only that statement which deals with ultimate particularisation beyond which there is no possibility of further particularisation, falls under the range of the paryāyāstika only. All the intermediary statements are covered by the paryāyāstika as well as the dravyāstika, for in every such intermediary statement there is some kind of generalisation as well as some sort of particularisation. That very object which is viewed by the dravyāstika from the view-point of generalisation, is viewed by the paryāyāstika from the stand-point of particularisation. 'This being the case, it is impossible to find a dravyāstika in its pure form, that is to say, absolutely unmixed with the paryāyāstika. Similarly, it is equally impossible to find a paryāyāstika in its pure form totally unmixed with the dravyāstika. Hence, assigning a particular statement to a particular naya depends upon the volition of the speaker."
The distinction between the proper provinces of these nayas is that the dravyāstika takes its stand excluding the positive assertion of the paryāyāstika as its legitimate subject, while the paryāyāstika views the same object exclusively from the stand-point of particularisation. Here, each does not consider the assertion of its rival naya as its property. Herein lies the true distinction between them and their spheres when applied to one and the same thing. The same fact is expressed in the following words : 'From the stand-point of the paryāyāstika, all things are necessarily born and perish; the dravyāstika, on the other hand, holds that all things exist eternally without birth and decay. There cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifications of birth and decay. On the other hand, modifications cannot exist without an abiding 1. Ibid., 1. 9.

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or eternal something, i.e., a permanent substance, for birth, decay and permanence constitute the characteristic of a substance." How these nayas become wrong in their absolutely exclusive assertion, is shown in the following statement : 'These three characteristics of origination, decay and permanence must dwell together in harmony to make a real definition of a thing in its integral form. Each naya, therefore, if taken independently, isolated from the other, can never yield an adequate idea of 'sat.' Both these, therefore, divorced from each other, are wrong (fallacious). As these two nayas when taken in their exclusiveness are false nayas, all other nayas (as naigama, śabda etc.) are also wrong when taken in their isolated stand-points, for the subsequent nayas occupy themselves in viewing the different aspects of the thing which is the subject of these two principal nayas. Just as emerald and other jewels of rare quality and of excellent kind do not acquire the designation of a necklace of jewels, even though all of them be precious jewels, on account of their lying unconnected with or disunited with each other, similarly every naya in its own sphere is right, but if all of them arrogate to themselves the whole truth and disregard the views of the rival nayas, then they do not attain the status of a right view." Fallacy of Naya :
The nayas taking their own view-points in an absolute form and rejecting or disregarding the stand-points of others are called fallacious nayas (nayābhāsas). There are the following seven fallacies according to the seven nayas : 1. Fallacy of Naigama Naya - It consists in making an absolute
separation between the general and particular properties
Uppajjamtiviyamti ya bhāva niyamenu pajjavanayassa. Daratthiyassa savvam sayā aṇuppannamaviņattham. Darvan pajjavaviuyam davvaviuttā ya pajjavă natthi. Cppavatthii-bharhgā handi daviyalakkhanaṁ eyam.
-Sanmati-tarka-prakaraņa, I.11-2. 2. Ibid., I. 13; 1.22-3.

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of things. As for instance, if a proposition establishes a separation between the individual self and consciousness as if they could be separated from each other, it is the fallacy of the naigama naya.
183
2. Fallacy of Sangraha Naya - The fallacy of the sangraha occurs when we consider the general property alone as constituting a thing. This kind of fallacious proposition gives rise to confusion of thought, because the general qualities alone can never constitute an actual object. For instance, the general qualities of a tree only give us the idea of treeness, never an actual tree. The latter will have to be some particular kind of tree - an oak, a mango or the like and will, therefore, possess its own special qualities along with those of a tree in general.
3. Fallacy of Vyavahāra Naya - This type of fallacy lies in wrong selection of species, as for instance, is the case with the Materialists (Cārvākas) who select only four primary elements as real.
4. Fallacy of Rjusūtra Naya - It occurs when the permanence of things is altogether denied. In this fallacy, every object is taken to be momentary without having any kind of permanent or general feature.
5 Fallacy of Sabda Naya - This kind of fallacy occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of the sabda naya and deal with synonymous words as absolutely having the same meaning.
6. Fallacy of Samabhiruḍha Naya - This type of fallacy consists in treating the synonymous words as having absolutely different meanings.

7. Fallacy of Evambhuta Naya - It lies in making the existence of a thing absolutely dependent on the performance of the special function with reference to which a particular name has been awarded to it, e.g., to say that a teacher outside the class-room is absolutely a

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non-teacher, because he does not teach at that time, is
fallacious. Refutation of Some Objections :
The opponent who does not regard reality as the synthesis of identity and difference, and makes an absolute judgment about reality rejecting the relativity of propositions, raises the following objections : The exponents of the doctrine of the relativity of judgment or non-absolutism affirming the multiple nature of things reject the view that substance (essence) and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and think that they are identical and different both. But this position cannot be legitimate, inasmuch as it is vitiated by contradiction and other defects as under :'
1. Affirmation and negation cannot co-exist in one substratum like blue and not-blue owing to their mutual opposition. Therefore, it is contradictory to say that the same object is different as well as identical.
The answer is : There is no occasion for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another when in the presence of one the other is not perceived. But in a perceived datum, no question of contradiction arises. As regards blue and not-blue, if they were perceived in one locus, there would be no contradiction in the situation, and thus, the Buddhists do not acknowledge the contradiction between blue and not-blue in the unitary cognition of a variegated canvas. And as regards the NyāyaVaiseșika philosopher, he admits the reality of multiform colour. Further, when one single piece of linen is found to possess in harmony the apparently opposed attributes of being mobile and immobile, red and not-red, covered and notcovered, what then is the ground for doubt ?
2. If difference is affirmed in respect of one aspect and identity in respect of another, the result will be that the 1. Critique of Organ of Knowledge, p. 73.

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difference will have one locus and the identity another and thus, there will be a split in the integrity of the locus.
This kind of objection is not tenable because in conformity with the principle mentioned above, they have all been proved to be perceived in the same locus. The same cloth is mobile and immobile and the like.
3. The aspect in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits, and likewise the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicates, and this means confusion (sankara) which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum.
As regards the charge of confusion, it is easily parried by the instance of the cognition of the multiform colour and the instance of the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals.
4. The aspect which embodies difference will embody identity also and the aspect which embodies identity will embody difference too, and this, thus, gives rise to the fallacy of transfusion (the exchange of modes and attributes).
This charge is easily met by the same example of the cognition of the multiform colour and the synthesis of universal and particular.
5. A real being both identical and different will not lend itself to be determined in a definite reference, and this would create doubt.
6. The consequence will be the absence of determination.
7. This will result in the impossibility of determination of objective reality.
As regards these objections, there is no logical justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. Doubt is a kind of cognition in which the mind wavers between two conflicting alternatives. It is absolutely out of the question when the cognition is found

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to be unwavering. The establishment of knowledge proves that there is no justification for the charge of lack of knowledge, and consequently for the impossibility of such a multiform real. The conclusion follows that the conception of reality as the synthesis of mode and attribute is not incompatible with the verdict of experience and the interest of truth. Our judgment with regard to reality as the synthesis of mode and attribute has no other alternative than to be relative. Hence, the relativity of judgment and reality as the synthesis of identity and difference are co-related.

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CHAPTER VIII
KARMA
All phenomena of the universe are linked together in the universal chain of cause and effect. No event can occur without having a definite cause behind it. To find out the cause and condition under which an effect is produced has always been the aim of the various branches of science and philosophy. Almost all branches of science and philosophy in the world unanimously declare that the law of cause and effect is the most universal of all laws. It is the only law which governs all phenomena however gross or fine they may be. All the forces of nature, physical and psychical, obey this law. Every action of our body, speech or mind is the result of some force or power which is its cause. At the same time, that which is the effect of some cause becomes in turn the cause of some other effect, and thus, the chain goes on extending its sphere.
Under the sway of the all pervading law of causation, there is no room left for chance or accident. What we generally regard as an accidental event is really the product of some definite cause which is not known to us on account of our limited knowledge. In other words, accidents are not fortuitous but they have some definite cause behind them, although we are not always aware of it on account of the limitations of our knowledge. In ancient times, when the scope of knowledge of people was extremely limited, they used to explain accidental events by attributing them to some supernatural powers. Such accidental effects of unknown causes were called Providential. Really speaking, all accidents have their definite causes whether we know them or not. That which appears to be

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supernatural or Providential to an unscientific mind, is natural or causal and not supernatural or accidental to a scientific mind.
Meaning of Karma :
The Jaina thinkers do not regard this universe as the mere aggregate of the six substances set together by some supernatural authority. They hold that it is a system in itself, subject to some definite laws inherent in its own constitution. Certain phenomena occur regularly in certain circumstances and not otherwise. There is a universal law of causation operating in the universe. The phenomena of life and consciousness are not similar to the phenomena of matter or energy. In pure material activity, there is growth by addition in dead objects which is a product of chemical law only, whereas a conscious being takes to itself particles foreign to those that are already in the body and changes their nature and assimilates them with its own body. Moreover, living beings reproduce themselves in their species. These characteristics are not possessed by dead matter. Jainism regards souls to be real and infinite in number. Each soul possesses some individual characteristics different from others. The doctrine that gives us some explanation of our individual characteristics, i.e., some satisfactory answer to the factors of our individuality which we have at present and tells us how these factors were produced as the result of the forces generated in the past, is known as the doctrine of karma.
According to Jaina philosophy, every individual soul possesses infinite intuition, infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. All these attributes belong by nature to every soul in its perfection. Mundane souls are not perfect, because their knowledge, energy etc. are found to be restricted. They are not perfectly free to enjoy complete knowledge and unrestricted bliss. Why is it so ? What restricts their innate faculty of knowing etc.? The answer is: They are infected by

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something foreign which veils their natural faculties. This foreign element is known as karma. Jainism does not mean by karma 'work or deed'. According to the Jaina conception, karma is an aggregate of material particles which are very fine and are imperceptible to the senses. It enters into the soul and produces changes in it. It is a form of matter which produces certain conditions in the mundane souls that are suffering from the shackles of birth and death from beginningless time.
The entire cosmos is full of that kind of fine matter which can become karma. Through the actions of body, mind and speech, karmic matter gets into the soul and is tied to it according to the modifications of consciousness consisting of kaşāyas, i.e., anger, pride, deceit and greed. Thus, first of all there is influx of karmic particles and then there occur certain activities of mind which are responsible for the actual bondage. In the state of bondage, soul and karma are more intimate than milk and water. The bondage is of four kinds: according to its nature, duration, intensity and quantity. The activities of thought, speech and body are responsible for the nature and quantity. The duration and intensity result from attachment and aversion. Karma may remain latent in the soul for certain period without emerging into appearance. When the moment for its enjoyment arrives, it becomes apparent and releases itself.
As has already been mentioned, the soul has been eternally infected by matter, i.e., its association with karma has no beginning. Moreover, it is gathering new matter every moment. The liberation of soul from matter is possible by certain means. The soul must stop the influx of new karmas and eliminate the acquired ones. Through this twofold method, it can attain the ultimate goal, i.e., emancipation. All obstacles which impede the manifestation of its true nature are then automatically overcome, because it is released from the foreign domination of karma. This being the situation, when liberation

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is attained, the soul can undisturbedly make manifest its own innate nature, i.e., infinite knowledge etc.
Four Kinds of Bondage :
The atoms that have become karma can be contemplated from four points of view :
1. According to their nature (prakṛti).
2. According to their duration (sthiti).
3. According to their intensity (rasa or anubhāga). 4. According to their quantity (pradesas).'
Nature:
It has eight fundamental species (mūla-prakṛtis):2 1. Knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraṇīya) karma. 2. Intuition-obscuring (darśanāvaraṇīya) karma. 3. Feeling-producing (vedaniya) karma.
4. Deluding (mohaniya) karma.
5. Age-determining (ayus) karma.
6. Physique-making (nāman) karma.
7. Heredity-determining (gotra) karma. 8. Power-hindering (antarāya) karma.
Each of these eight species is divided into a number of sub-species (uttara-prakṛtis). The latter can be further classified into yet smaller sub-divisions, so that the entire number of karmas is exceedingly large. For our present purpose, only the eight chief species and the 158 sub-species are of importance. Knowledge-obscuring Karma :
That karma which obscures the knowing faculty of soul is known as knowledge-obscuring, i.e., jñānāvaraṇīya) karma. It is divided into five sub-species (uttara-prakṛtis) according to the five kinds of knowledge :3
1. Karma-grantha, I. 2.
2. Ibid., 1. 3.
3. Karma-grantha, 1.4; I. 9.

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1. Mati-jñānāvaraṇīya karma - It causes the obscuration of
the knowledge acquired through the media of senses
and mind. 2. Sruta-jñānāvaraniya karma - It produces the obscuration
of the knowledge acquired by reading or hearing
scriptures or by the words of an authority. 3. Avadhi-jñānāvaraṇīya karma - It hinders direct knowledge
of material objects. 4: Manahparyāya-jñānāvaranīya karma - It obscures direct
knowledge of the thoughts of others. 5. Kevala-jñānāvaraṇīya karma - It hinders the faculty of
omniscience inherent in soul by natural disposition. Intuition-obscuring Karma :
This kind of karma is called darśanāvaraṇīya karma. In Jaina philosophy, the word 'darśana' is used to signify two meanings. Firstly, it means belief, opinion or faith. Secondly, it has also the meaning of the awareness of an object or the cognition of a thing in its general form. It is the first stage of knowledge which is known as indistinct knowledge. In darśanāvaraniya karma, the word 'darśana' is meant to signify the second meaning. It can be translated as intuition, indeterminate perception, indistinct knowledge, undifferentiated cognition or perception in the sense of general cognition. That karma which obscures the faculty of intuition is called intuitionobscuring karma. It is of nine sub-species according to the four species of intuition and five kinds of sleep:' 1. Cakşurdarśanāvaraṇīya karma - It obscures the intuition conditional upon the eye. 2. Acakşurdarśanāvaranīya karma - This species obstructs the intuition conditional upon the four senses (other than the eye) and mind. 3. Avadhi-darśanāvaraṇīya karma - It hinders the faculty of direct intuition of material things. 1. Karma-grantha, IV. 10-12.

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4. Kevala-darśanāvaraṇīya karma - It obstructs the faculty of complete intuition. 5. Nidrā-karma - This type of karma causes a light and pleasant sleep, out of which the sleeper is aroused by the clicking of fingernails or by a slight call. 6. Nidrānidrā-karma - This type of karma produces a deep sleep, out of which the sleeper can be awakened by being shaken violently. 7. Pracalā-karma - It causes a slumber which overtakes a person while sitting or standing. 8. Pracalāpracalā-karma - This species of karma causes an intensive sleep that overcomes a person while walking. 9. Styāngrddhi-karma - It produces somnambulism. This kind of sleep is also called 'styānarddhi.' The person possessing this kind of slumber acts in the state of sleeping but forgets what he did when he wakes. Feeling-producing Karma :
The feeling of pleasure and pain is caused by this species of karma known as vedaniya karma. It has, therefore, two subspecies: 1. Sātā-vadaniya karma - It causes a feeling of pleasure, as for instance, we have the feeling of pleasure by licking something sweet like honey etc. 2. Asātā-vedaniya karma - It produces a feeling of pain, as for example, pain is produced if one is hurt by a sword.
The sātā-vedaniya is predominant with gods and human beings, although pain can be produced with the former at the time of the downfall from the heavenly world and with the latter through cold and heat, death and accident and the like. Animal beings and the beings of hell experience chiefly the asātā-vedanīya, although on some occasions, they also experience a feeling of pleasure.? 1. Ibid, I. 12. 2. Commentary on Karma-grantha, l. 13.

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Deluding Karma :
This kind of karma obstructs true faith and right conduct. It is called mohaniya karma. It has two chief division : obstruction of belief and obstruction of conduct, i.e., darśanamohaniya and cāritra-mohanīya. (a) Darśana-mohanīya karma - It obstructs the true faith. The obstruction is further divided into three sub-species : 1. Mithyātva-mohaniya - It produces complete wrong belief
or heterodoxy. The soul possessing this kind of mohaniya karma does not believe in the truths as proclaimed by a true authority but believes false prophets who enjoin false
doctrines to be truths. 2. Samyaktva-mohanīya - It induces correct belief. It is not the
right faith in its completeness but only in a preliminary degree. The true belief in its completeness is obtained only when the samyaktva-mohaniya karma is entirely destroyed, as for instance, the sun which is covered by white clouds only shines perfectly after the clouds have
been removed. 3. Miśra-mohanīya - It produces a mixed belief having some
degree of truth and some of falsity. In other words, it causes a kind of indifference between true faith and false belief. It is a mixture of both the samyaktva-mohanīya and the mithyātva-mohanīya. That is why it is also called
samyak-mithyātva-mohanīya. (b) Cãritra-mohanīya karma - This kind of mohaniya karma obscures right conduct which is the innate property of soul. It obstructs the soul from acting according to the right prescriptions of scriptures or any authoritative sources. The obstruction is produced through sixteen passions (kaşāyas) and nine quasi-passions (no-kaṣāyas). (i) Kaşāya - There are four chief kaşāyas : anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceit (māyā) and greed (lobha).

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Each of these is again classified into four sub-divisions according to the intensity of their nature. The four sub-divisions are : 1. Anantānubandhin - It completely hinders right belief and
conduct. The soul possessing the anantānubandhin anger etc. can never have right belief and conduct. It
lasts for the whole of life. 2. Apratyākhyānāvaraña - It hinders partial self-discipline but
allows the existence of true belief. It lasts for one year. 3. Pratyākhyānā varaņa - It obstructs the beginning of
complete self-discipline or renunciation but does not prevent the existence of right belief and partial self
discipline. It lasts for four months. . 4. Sañjvalana - It hinders the attainment of complete right
conduct (yathākhyāta cāritra). Its effect lasts for one
fortnight. (ii) No-kaṣāya - Quasi-passions are divided into nine
categories : 1. Hāsya - Laughing and joking fall under this category. 2. Rati - Proper or improper liking for a certain object is called
rati.
3. Arati - Proper or improper disliking for a particular thing
is named arati. 4. Soka - Sorrow for an object is known as soka. 5. Bhaya - Fear is caused by the bhaya-karma. 6. Jugupsā - It is a kind of disgust. 7. Purușa-veda - Through this, in the male the desire for union
with the female is produced.
with the 8. Stri-veda - Through this, in the female the desire for union
with the male is caused.

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9. Napumisaka-veda - The third sex is produced by this karma.
The sexual urge with this is exceedingly strong, since it is directed towards male and female both.'
The cāritra-mohanīya karma has accordingly twenty-five sub-species. Adding the three sub-species of the darśanamohaniya to it, we have in all twenty-eight sub-species of the deluding (mohanīya) karma. The following table will show these sub-species :
1. Commentary on Karma-grantha, I. 14-9; 1. 21-2.

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196
Darśana-mohanīya
Cāritra-mohanīya
Mithyātva (1)
Samyaktva (2)
Miśra
(3)
Kaşāya
No-kaṣāya

Krodha
Māna Anant...(4) Anantā..(8) Apratyā..(5) Apratyā..(9) Pratyā..(6) Pratyā..(10) Sañjvalana(7) Sañjvalana(11)
Māyā Anantā.. (12) Apratyā.. (13) Pratyā..(14) Sañjvalana(15)
Lobha Anant...(16) Apratyā..(17) Pratyā.. (18) Sañjvalana(19)
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Hāsya (20)
Rati (21)
Arati (22)
śoka (23)
Bhaya (24)
Jugupsā (25)

Purusa Stri Napumsaka veda veda veda (26) (27) (28)

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197
Age-determining Karma :
It confers on a being a certain quantum of life in any one of the four states of existence. The following are the four subspecies of the ayus karma :
1. Deva-āyus - It determines the celestial age. 2. Manusya-āyus - The human age is determined by it. 3. Tiryag-ayus - It determines the age of animal life.
4. Naraka-āyus - The age of hellish beings is determined by it. Physique-making Karma :
It causes physical diversities. It is known as nāma karma. The number of its sub-species is 103. These sub-species are mostly quoted in a fixed succession in four groups : pindaprakstis, pratyeka-prakstis, trasa-dasaka and sthāvaradaśaka.' The names of the causes of these sub-species are according to the names of the sub-species.
(a) Piņda-prakṣtis - There are seventy-five sub-species in this group : 4 States of Existence - Celestial state of existence, human state
of existence, animal state of existence and hellish state
of existence. 5 Classes of Beings - Beings with one sense, two senses, three
senses, four senses and five senses.. 5 Bodies - Gross body of animals (including vegetable
kingdom) and human beings, transformable body of fine matter, projectable body of pure matter, electric body
and karmic body. 3 Chief and Secondary Parts of Bodies - Chief and secondary
parts of gross body, of transformable body and of projectable body. Electric body and karmic body have no parts.
1.Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p. 11.

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15 Bindings : 1. Binding of gross body with previous gross body. 2. Binding of gross body with electric body. 3. Binding of gross body with karmic body. 4. Binding of gross body with electric and karmic bodies. 5. Binding of transformable body with previous
transformable body. 6. Binding of transformable body with electric body. 7. Binding of transformable body with karmic body. 8. Binding of transformable body with electric and karmic
bodies. 9. Binding of projectable body with previous projectable
body. 10. Binding of projectable body with electric body. 11. Binding of projectable body with karmic body. 12. Binding of projectable body with electric and karmic
bodies. 13. Binding of electric body with previous electric body. 14. Binding of electric body with karmic body. 15. Binding of karmic body with previous karmic body. Certain types of bodies are not bound with some particular types of bodies, as for instance, gross body has no binding with transformable body and so on. Hence, the bindings are only fifteen in number. 5 Sanghātanas - Sanghātana is a type of scraping as a rake
gathers together the grass that has scattered about. According to the five bodies there are five sanghātananāma karmas: scraping of the matter of gross body, of transformable body, of projectable body, of electric
body and of karmic body. 6 Firmnesses of Joints of Gross Body - Vajra-rṣabha-nārāca
samhanana is an excellent joining in which two bones are hooked into one another,rşabha-nārācasamhanana is not so firm, nārāca-saṁhanana is still

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weaker, ardha-nāraca-samhanana is a joining which is on one side like the preceding one, while on the other, the bones are simply pressed together and nailed, kilika-saṁhanana is a weak joining by which the bones are merely pressed together and nailed and sevārtasamhanana is quite a weak joining in which the ends
of the bones only touch one another. 6 Figures - The samsthāna-nāma karma determines the figure
of a body. Six types of figures have been discussed in the Jaina doctrine of karma : the entire body to be symmetrical, the upper part of the body to be symmetrical and not the lower one, the body below the navel to be symmetrical and above it unsymmetrical, the body to be hunch-backed, the body to be
dwarf-like and the entire body to be unsymmetrical. 5 Colours - Black, blue, red, yellow and white. Other
colours are produced by mixing only. 2 Odours - Pleasant odour and unpleasant odour or good smell
and bad smell. 5 Tastes - Bitter, sour, acidic, sweet and astringent. 8 Touches - Soft, hard, light, heavy, cold, hot, smooth and
rough. 4 Ānupūrvis - When one existence of a soul is finished and it
goes from the place of death to the place of its new birth, this state is called ānupūrvī. There are four ānupūrvīs according to the four states of existence
(gati) : celestial, human, animal and infernal. 2. Gaits - To move in a pleasant manner as oxen, elephants
etc. do and to move in an ugly manner as camels,
asses etc. do. (b) Pratyeka-prakstis - This group consists of eight sub-species: superiority over others, capability of breathing, hot body of the sun etc., cold body of the moon etc., a body that is neither

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heavy nor light, the body of a Founder of the Holy Order (tirthankara), normal formation of the body and abnormal formation of the body. (c) Trasa-daśaka - There are ten sub-species in this group : a body possessing more than one sense, gross body, developed body, individual body, firm body, beautiful and lovely parts of the body, gaining of sympathy without any obligation, sweet voice, suggestive speech and honour and glory-winning personality. (d) Sthāvara-dašaka - This group also consists of ten subspecies : a body possessing one sense only, subtle body, undeveloped body, a body in common, a body without firmness, ugly parts of the body, no gaining of sympathy, illsounding voice, unsuggestive speech and dishonour and shamegiving personality.
The scheme of the sub-species of the physique-making karma is as under :
Nāma Karma
Pinda-prakstis Pratyeka- Trasa-dasaka Sthāvaraprakệtis(8) (10)
dasaka (10) 1. States of Existence (4) 2. Classes of Beings (5) 3. Bodies (5) 4. Chief and Secondary Parts of Bodies (3) 5. Bindings (15) 6. Sanghātanas (5) 7. Firmnesses of Joints (6) 8. Figures (6) 9. Colours (5) 10. Odours (2) 11. Tastes (5) 12. Touches (8) 13. Anupūrvis (4) 14. Gaits (2)

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KARMA
Heredity-determining Karma :
It destines the hereditary characters possessed by a person. This species is called gotra karma. It is divided into two subspecies:
1. Uccairgotra karma destines superior heredity. 2. Nīcairgotra karma determines inferior heredity. Power-hindering Karma :
It hinders the power (vīrya) of the soul. It is known as antaraya karma. The power is hindered in a five-fold manner:2 1. Dāna-antarāya karma - It hinders dispensing alms etc. 2. Lābha-antarāya karma - This kind of antarāya karma hinders receiving.
3. Bhoga-antarāya karma - It hinders the enjoyment of something which can be enjoyed once, such as food etc.
4. Upabhoga-antaraya karma - It hinders the enjoyment of something that can be repeatedly enjoyed, such as clothes
etc.
5. Vīrya-antarāya karma - It hinders the freedom of willpower.
The total number of the sub-species of the eight karmas is as follows:
1. Knowledge-obscuring karma
2. Intuition-obscuring karma
3. Feeling-producing karma
4. Deluding karma
5. Age-determining karma
6. Physique-making karma 7. Heredity-determining karma
8. Power-hindering karma
1. Karma-grantha, I. 52. 2. Ibid.

201
Total

59
2
28
4
103
2
5
158

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Bandha, Udaya, Udīraņā and Sattā :
Taking into consideration the existence in potentia (sattā), all the sub-species can exist in a soul. So far as their realisation (udaya) is concerned, the entire number amounts only to 122. If the bondage (bandha) of new sub-species is taken into consideration, the total number is assumed to be 120. If the premature realisation (udīranā) is considered, the entire number amounts to 122 as in realisation. The following table will indicate the number of the sub-species existing in different states :
Bandha | Udaya Udīraņā | Sattā
Knowledge-obscuring Intuition-obscuring Feeling-producing Deluding Age-determining Physique-making Heredity-determining Power-hindering
antöan
ungan nou
Total
120
122
122
158
In sattā all the prakstis exist. In udaya the number is only 122, because the fifteen bindings and the five sanghātanas are not included as they are then thought to exist implicitly in the five bodies. The colours, odours, tastes and touches are only reckoned as four instead of twenty. In udiraņā also the same sub-species are counted. In bandha the number is 120, since the two mohanīya karmas, viz., samyaktva and miśra 1.Karma-vipāka, p. 111.

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203
cannot be bound separately, because they are purified conditions of mithyātva. Therefore, they must be subtracted from the 122 sub-species of udaya and udiraņā, so that the total number in bandha is 120. Duration:
After having considered the nature of karmas we, now, proceed to their duration. First, let us understand the scheme of the division of time as conceived by the Jainas. The lowest unit of time is a samaya. Innumerable samayas form an avalikā. 16,777,216 avalikās make a muhūrta (48 minutes of modern time.) Thirty muhurtas make an ahorātra ( a day and night). Out of ahorätras are formed fortnights, months, years etc. Years can be expressed in words up to a number containing 77 cyphers. Beyond that, it is asankhyeya (innumerable). An innumerable quantity of years makes a palyopama, 10 koțākoți (1,000,000,000,000,000) palyopamas make a sägaropama, 10 koțākoți sāgaropamas form an utsarpiņi (ascending peiod), the same number of sägaropamas forms an avasarpiņi (descending period).'
The following table will give the highest as well as the lowest duration of each chief species of karma :2
Maximum
Minimum 1. Knowledge30 kotākoți
Within one obscuring sägaropamas
muhurta 2. Intuitionobscuring 3. Feeling-producing
12 muhurtas 4. Deluding 70 " .
Within one
muhurta 5. Age-determining 33 sāgaropamas 6. Physique-making 20 koțākoți
8 muhurtas
sägaropamas 7. Heredity-determining " " 8. Power-hindering 30 " "
Within one
muhurta 1. Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p.20. 2. Tattvärtha-sútra, VIII.15-21.

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Intensity :
The intensity of the effect of karma depends upon the weakness or strength of the passions (kaṣāyas). In accordance with the four degrees of the passions, four degrees of the strength of karma have been recognised by Jainism The more sinful a person is, the duration of his bad karmas is longer. The stronger the effect of his badness, the weaker the effect of his good species. With an increased purity the duration as well as the intensity of the bad species decreases, while the intensity of the good species grows. With the bad species, the fourth degree of intensity is produced by the most violent passions, i.e., the anantānubandhi kaşāyas. The third degree is caused by the apratyākhyānāvaraṇa kaṣāyas, the second by the pratyākhyānāvaraṇa kașāyas and the first by the sañjvalana kaṣāyas. With regard to the good species, the sañjvalanas produce the fourth, pratyākhyānāvaraņas the third and the apratyākhyānāvaraņas the second. The intensity of the first degree does not exist with the good species.' Quantity :
The soul assimilates only that karmic matter which is within its own pradeśas, and not that lying outside, just as fire seizes only that inflammable material which is lying within its reach. The matter assimilated by the soul is divided into the eight species of karma. The shares which fall to the eight species differ from one another. The age-determining species (āyus) receives the smallest part, a greater portion goes to the physique-making (nāman) and heredity-determining (gotra) species which both obtain equal portions. More than that goes to the knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraṇīya), intuitionobscuring (darśanāvaraṇīya) and power-hindering (antarāya) species, each of which gets an equal portion. Still a larger part than these falls to the deluding (mohanīya) species and the greatest of all goes to the feeling-producing (vedanīya) species. 1.Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy, p.24.

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These shares are further divided among the sub-species.' Causes of Bondage :
The theory of causation explains each and every event of life in the strict form of cause and effect. No effect can be produced in the absence of its cause. This universal law is applied to the doctrine of karma also, as we have already mentioned. Each of the karma-species can only be bound so far as its cause of bondage is in existence. The following activities constitute the causes of the different species. Although all the species are bound by activities and passions in general, yet, every species has some special causes constituted by some particular activities. They are as follows:2 Causes of Knowledge, Intuition-obscuring Karmas :
1. Hostility against knowledge, knower and the means of knowledge.
2. Denial, annihilation and hindrance of these three. 3. Disregard of a true doctrine and its commandments. 4. Rebelliousness and lack of discipline towards teachers.
5. Complete destruction of books and other means of knowledge.
6. Indifferent or opposite attitude towards knower and knowledge. Causes of Feeling-producing Karma :
Pleasure : 1. Respects for parents, teachers etc. 2. To have pity on miserable beings. 3. Keeping of vows of the house-holder or monk. 4. Honourable conduct. 5. Overcoming of passions. 6. Giving of alms or some other kind of help.
7. Fidelity in belief. 1.Ibid., p. 26. 2.Karma-grantha, 1. 54-61.

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8. Interest in spiritual activities.
The contrary causes produce pain. Causes of Belief-obstructing Karma :
1. Teaching of a false faith. 2. Denial of the path of liberation. 3. Pollution of sacred objects. 4. Blasphemy of liberated souls. 5. Blasphemy of monks and saints. 6. Blasphemy of gods.
7. Disregard of the Holy Order. Causes of Conduct-obstructing Karma :
1. The actions produced by the outbreak of passions cause the binding of the kaşāya-mohanīya karma.
2. The no-kaṣāya-mohanīya karma is bound by the mind which is confused through joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear, disgust etc.
3. Slight passionate desire, conjugal fidelity, inclination for right conduct etc. cause the binding of the puruṣa-veda (male sex) karma.
4. Jealousy, deceit, great sensuality, adultery etc. cause the binding of the stri-veda (femal sex) karma.
5. Violent love of pleasure and strong passions directed towards sexual intercourse with the male and female cause the binding of the napuṁsaka-veda (third sex) karma. Causes of Age-determining Karma :
1. The hellish age is bound by the actions of one who tortures and kills other beings and strives in an extraordinary manner after passions.
2. The deceitful and fraudulent person binds the animal age.
3. The humble and sincere one, whose passions are slight, binds the human life.
4. One who possesses right belief but who only partially or not at all practises self-discipline, whose passions are slight,

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who is chaste, who endures troubles etc., binds the celestial life. Causes of Physique-making Karma :
Honesty, gentleness, absence of desire, purity etc. are the causes of the binding of the good physique-making karma, while the contrary causes produce the bad physique-making karma. Causes of Heredity-determining Karma :
The recognition of the excellence of others, modesty, reverence towards teachers and the desire to learn and to teach are some of the causes of the binding of the superior heredity, whereas the contrary causes are responsible for the binding of the inferior heredity. Causes of Power-hindering Karma :
The whithholding of food, drink, lodging, clothing and the like causes the binding of the power-hindering karma. Prevention and Destruction of Karma :
The binding of new karma can be prevented through the means of control of the activity of body, speech and mind (gupti); carefulness in walking, speaking, lifting up and laying down a thing etc. (samiti); moral virtues (dharma); reflection (anuprekşā); patient endurance of troubles (parīşahajaya) and conduct (cāritra).'
The acquired karmas can be annihilated through suitable measures of fasting, reduction of food, restriction to certain kinds of food, renunciation of delicacies, a lonely resting place, mortificaiton of the body, expiation, modesty, service, study, renunciation of egoism and meditation.? Stages of Spiritual Development :
According to Jaina philosophy, there are fourteen stages of development through which the soul gradually delivers itself
1. Tattvārtha-sūtra, IX. 2. 2. Ibid., 1X. 3; IX. 19-20.

"

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from the state of complete dependence upon karma to the state of complete dissociation from it. These stages are know as the 'states of virtue', i.e., guṇasthānas. Here the word 'virtue' does not mean an ordinary moral quality but stands for the nature of soul, i.e., knowledge, belief and conduct.'
JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
Through these fourteen stages of development, the soul gradually frees itself, firstly from the worst, then from the less bad and finally from all kinds of karma, and manifests the innate qualities of knowledge, belief and conduct in a more and more perfect form. The owners of these stages are the following:2
1. Wrong believer (mithyādṛṣṭi).
2. One who has slight taste of right belief (sāsvādana samyagdṛṣṭi).
3. One who has a mixed belief (miśradṛṣṭi).
4. One who has true belief but has not yet self-discipline (avirata samyagdṛṣṭi).
5. One who has partial self-control (deśavirata).
6. One who has complete self-discipline, although sometimes brought into wavering through negligence (pramatta samyata).
7. One who has self-control without negligence (apramatta samyata).
8. One who practises the process called 'apūrva karaṇa' and in whom, however, the passions are still occurring in a gross form (nivṛtti bādara samparāya).
9. One who practises the process called 'anivṛtti karaṇa' and in whom, however the passions are still occurring (anivṛtti bādara samparāya).
10. One in whom the passions occur in a subtle form (sūkṣma samparāya).
1. Tatra guṇaḥ jñānadarśanacāritrarūpāḥ jīvasvabhāvaviseṣāḥKarma-grantha, II. 2 (commentary).
2. Ibid.

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11. One who has suppressed every passion but does not yet possess omniscience (upaśānta kaşaya vitarāga chadmastha).
12. One who has annihilated every passion but does not yet possess omniscience (kṣīņa kaşāya vitarāga chandmastha).
13. One who possesses omniscience and engages himself in activities (sayogi kevalin).
14. One who is omniscient and does not perform any activity (ayogi kevalin).
The whole scheme of guṇasthānas is devised in a logical order according to the principle of decreasing sinfulness and increasing purity. At the first stage, all the causes of binding, viz., wrong belief, lack of self-discipline, passions and activity are operating. From the second to the fifth, only three causes are in operation, i.e., wrong belief is absent. From the sixth to the tenth, only passions and activity exercise their influence. From the eleventh to the thirteenth, only activity is present. On the last stage, there is no activity, and hence, no binding of karma. Mithyādsști :
The chief characteristic of this gunasthāna is wrong belief. The 'abhavyas' (not capable of salvation) as well as the 'bhavyas' (capable of salvation) are on this stage. The difference between their conditions is that all the 'abhavyas' are eternally in this guṇasthāna, whereas only those bhavyas who by reason of certain unfavourable conditions do not reach salvation, do so for a certain period. With the other 'bhavyas' this stage has no beginning but an end which comes sooner or later. With a being who fell from a higher stage and sank into wrong belief, it has a beginning as well as an end. Sāsvādana Samyagdsști :
It is of very short duration lasting in the minimum one 'samaya' and in the maximum six 'ävalikās. Those beings that possessed right belief produced by the suppression of wrong

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
belief during the period within a 'muhūrta' but who had lost it again on account of the breaking out of passions, are said to enjoy this guņasthāna. After the lapse of the settled period, the being necessarily sinks back into the first guṇasthāna. Miśradrști :
The fundamental characteristic of this stage is indifference which lasts only during the period within fortyeight minutes (muhurta). It is a mixed belief produced by the mingling of truth and falsity. After the lapse of the time of the stay on this stage, the being attains wrong or right belief, according to the circumstances. Avirata Samyagdşşti :
To this stage belong those beings who possess right belief and have the knowledge of truth and falsity but on account of the realisation of the apratyākhyānāvaraṇa kaşāyas are not capable of practising self-discipline. The duration of this stage is in the minimum within a muhūrta and in the maximum somewhat more than thirty-three sāgaropamas. Deśavirata :
In this state of virtue, partial self-discipline exists. The duration is in the minimum within a muhūrta and in the maximum somewhat less than a pūrvakoți. Pramatta Samyata :
The being belonging to this guṇasthāna attains complete self-discipline, although he is disturbed through negligence produced by the realisation of the sañvalana passions. This state lasts in the minimum one samaya and in the maximum within a muhürta. If the person belonging to this stage degrades after one samaya, he becomes an avirata (4th stage); if the degradation is after antarmuhurta, he becomes a deśavirata (5th stage). If the antarmuhūrta, however, has passed without any incident, he goes to the seventh stage. If he has ascended no series, he comes back to the sixth stage and the operation

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begins anew. This wavering between the sixth and seventh guņasthānas lasts in the maximum somewhat less than a pūrvakoți. If the upasama or kşapaku series is ascended, such a wavering does not take place. Apramatta Samyata :
In this state of virtue, complete self-discipline without negligence exists. It lasts one samaya till antarmuhurta. Nivștti Bādara Samparāya :
Like the following stages, this stage is accessible only to those beings who are on a śreņi (series). A special process known as apūrvakaraṇa is performed at this stage. The being who is on the upaśama śreņi remains on this stage in the minimum one samaya and in the maximum antarmuhurta; the one who is on the kşapaka śreņi altogether antarmuhūrta. Anivștti Bādara Samparāya :
One who is on the upašama or kşapaka śreņi and performs the process called anivșttikaraṇa belongs to this stage. The former remains on it in the minimum one samaya and in the maximum antarmuhūrta; the latter antarmuhūrta altogether. The passions still occur on this stage. Sūkşma Samparāya :
On this stage passions only occur in the most subtle form in order to be then totally suppressed or annihilated. It lasts with the upaśama śreņi one samaya in the minimum and antarmuhurta in the maximum; with the kşapaka śreņi altogether antarmuhūrta. Upaśānta Kaşāya Vītarāga Cha dmastha :
It is the highest stage that can be reached on the upaśama śreņi. The passions on this stage are totally suppressed. It lasts in the minimum one samaya and in the maximum antarmuhürta. After ending this stage, the being belonging to it falls from the upaśama śreņi and sinks into one of the lower states.

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Kșiņa Kaşāya Vītarāga Chadmastha :
In the last samaya of the tenth stage when the last particle of greed has been annihilated, the being who is on the kșapaka śreņi becomes a kșīņa-kaṣāya (one with annihilated passions). He remains antarinuhurta on this stage and then becomes omniscient without fail. Sayogi Kevalin :
When the karmas obscuring the knowledge, intuition, bliss and power of the soul have completely been annihilated, the person becomes a sayogi kevalin. He possesses omniscience and omnipotence. He still possesses certain activities conditional upon matter. Certain karmas are still rising, but as soon as his 'āyus' (age) is exhausted, he annihilates them also in order to be emancipated. This state of virtue lasts in the minimum antarmuhurta and in the maximum somewhat less than a pūrvakoti. Ayogi Kevalin :
This highest state of virtue is a transitory state which lasts antarmuhūrta and leads to the complete emancipation from karma. With the complete annihilation of every action, the omniscient enters the saileśī state - a state of pure meditation which only lasts as long as is necessary to pronounce the five short syllables (a,i,u, ?,I). When the remaining karmas are completely annihilated, the liberated soul goes to the end of the universe which is called siddha-silā. It dwells there without visible shape. It possesses an immaterial dimension of two-thirds of that which it had during its last existence (gati). There it enjoys infinite, incomparable, indestructible, supernatural happiness of salvation. A soul in its perfect nature is God. Every being has got the innate nature of Godliness. Through its right belief, right knowledge and right conduct, it can attain that state. It is the individual effort - the personal endeavour that constitutes the path to the state of God. There the soul prefectly shines with infinite knowledge,

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infinite intuition, infinite bliss and infinite power. The liberated soul does not lose its individuality. Its individual existence is retained in that state as well.
Upaśama Śreņi :
At the end of the seventh stage of development, the soul ascends either upasama śreņi or kṣapaka śreņi.' That śreņi (series) in which the heaped-up species of mohaniya karma are suppressed so that they cannot manifest themselves, is called upasama śreņi. The species are not totally eradicated. They exist in a latent state and can break out again occasionally. If the suppression takes place in a regular and systematic way in a cerain succession, the upasama śreņi ends in a complete suppression of all the deluding karmas. This series reaches its end in the upaśānta moha guṇusthāna (11th stage), as then the suppressed passions break out again and the jiva descends from the series. The different stages of the development of the upaśama śreņi consist in the following procedure :2
213
Firstly, the being suppresses the life-long passions. Thereupon he suppresses the three sub-species of the beliefobscuring karma and through that reaches aupaśamika samyaktva (right belief acquired through suppression). When this has happened, the being proceeds to the suppression of the still remaining mohaniya karmas. For this purpose he performs three processes: yathāpravṛttikaraṇa, apūrvakaraṇa and anivṛttikaraṇa. If a calculable part of the anivṛttikaraṇa has passed, the jiva performs an antarakarana of the twentyone remaining mohaniya karmas. Then he successively suppresses, within the fraction of a muhurta, the third sexpassion, then the female sex-passion, then joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear and disgust, then the male sex-passion, then simultaneously the apratyakhyānāvaraṇa and pratyākhyānāvaraṇa types of anger, then the sañjvalana anger. This

1. Some writers start from the fourth stage also. See Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 1291.
2 Karma-grantha, V. 98.

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
process occurs in man. The succession in woman is : third sex-pasison, male sex-passion, joking etc.; in napuṁsaka is : female sex-passion, male sex-passion, joking etc.' Thereupon follows the suppression of the second and third kinds of deceit and of the sañjvalana deceit, and then that of the second and third kinds of greed. After that the sañjvalana greed becomes divided into three parts: the first two of these, the being suppresses simultaneously, the third again is divided into a measurable number of pieces, which are suppressed gradually piece by piece. Through this long process he becomes a sükşma samparāya (10th stage). When the last piece of greed is suppressed, he is an upaśānta moha (11th stage). On this stage, the jiva remains, in the maximum for antarmuhurta and in the minimum for one samaya. No sooner has this time passed than he falls down from this stage and sinks into even the second guṇasthāna under certain circumstances. Kşapaka Śreņi :
The kşapaka śreņi leads to the destruction of karmas. The person who has ascended it, annihilates successively the different species of karma that exist in potentia, becomes in the end quite free from karma, and thereby achieves the highest goal – salvation.
A person exceeding eight years of age and possessing the best firmness of the joints is capable of ascending this series. First of all, he annihilates the four life-long passions, then the three species of belief-obscuring karma. If he has bound äyus (age) and dies before wrong belief is completely annihilated, in his new existence he can eventually bind anew the four life-long passions, since wrong belief, which is their germ, still exists. If, however, wrong belief is destroyed, this is impossible. If he has bound ayus but does not die immediately after the annihilation of the seven mohaniya karmas, he is satisfied with what he has attained, and for the moment does not undertake any endeavour to annihilate the
1. Avaśyaka-niryukti, 116; Višesăvaśyaka-bhāsya, 1288.

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other karmas. He experiences still three or four births before he attains liberation. If he reaches the series without having bound ayus, he proceeds immediately to the destruction of the still remaining conduct-obscuring karmas. For this purpose, he performs three processes of which the first falls into the seventh stage, the second into the eighth stage and the third into the ninth stage. During the second process (apūrvakaraṇa) he begins simultaneously with the annihilation of the four apratyākhyānāvaraņa and pratyākhyānāvaraņa passions. When these have half disappeared, he meanwhile destroys three intuition-obscuring karmas and thirteen physique-making karmas. Then he annihilates what still remains of the two species of passions. Thereupon follows the annihilation of the third and female sex-passions, of joking, liking, disliking, sorrow, fear, disgust, male sex-passion, and of the sañjvalana anger, pride and deceit.' After this he leaves the ninth stage and sinks into the sūkşma samparāya gunasthāna where he successively annihilates the sañjvalana greed divided into pieces. As soon as the last piece of greed disappears, all the passions are destroyed and the highest stage of the series is reached. The jīva is now a kşīņa kașāya (12th stage). Then he annihilates two kinds of sleep (nidrā and pracalā), thereupon the five veilings of knowledge, the four veilings of intuition and the five species of the power-hindering karma. Then he becomes a sayogi kevalin (13th stage)? who still wanders for some time on the earth and thereafter attains salvation.
1. This process is for man. For woman and third sex -- the same
change as in the upasama śreņi. 2. Karma-grantha, V.99..

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Page #230

JAINA WORKS:
Anuyoga-dvāra-sūtra.
Apta-mīmāmsā - Samantabhadra.
Aṣṭa-sahasri - Vidyānandi.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Avasyaka-niryukti - Bhadrabāhu.
Bhagavati-sūtra.
Cosmology: Old and New - Jain, G.R.
Critique of Organ of Knowledge (Pramāṇa-mīmāmsā) - Trans. Mookerjee and Tatia.
Daśavaikālika-sūtra-niryukti - Bhadrabāhu.
Doctrine of Karman in Jain Philosophy - Glasenapp, H.V. Dravya-sangraha - Nemicandra.
Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism - Mookerjee, S.K. Jainism Herbert Warren.
-
Jñānā-bindu-prakarana - Yasovijaya. Karmagrantha I,II,III,IV - Devendrasuri. Karma Philosophy - Gandhi, V.R. Karma Vipäka - Pt. Sukhlal. Laghiyastraya-ṭīkā - Akalanka. Nandi-sutra.

Naya-karnika - Vinayavijaya. Niyama-sara - Kundakunda.
Nyāyāvatāra - Siddhasena
Nyāyāvatāra-vārtika-vṛtti - Edit. Dalsukh Malvania.
Pancästikäya-sära - Kundakunda.
Parikṣā-mukha - Māņikyanandi. Prajñāpanā-sutra.

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Pramāṇa-mimāmsā - Hemacandra. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka - Vādideva. Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa - Prabhācandra. Pravacana-săāra - Kundakunda.
JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
Rāja-praśnīya-sūtra.
Ratnākarāvatārikā (Commentary on Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka) -
Ratnaprabhasūri.
Şad-darśana-sammuccaya (with Gunaratna's Commentary) -
Haribhadra.
Samayasara - Kundakunda.
Sanmati-tarka-prakarana - Siddhasena.
Sarvārtha-siddhi - Pūjyapāda. Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya - Haribhadra.
Sthānanga-sūtra
Studies in Jaina Philosophy - Tatia, N. M.
Syādvāda-mañjarī (on Anyayoga-vyavacoheda-dvātrimśikā)
-
Edit. Dhruva, A.B.
Syādvāda-ratnākara - Vādideva.
Tattvärtha-bhāṣya - Umāsvāti. Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika - Akalanka.
Tattvärtha-săra - Amṛtacandra.
Tattvärtha-sloka-vārtika - Vidyānandī.
Tattvärtha-sutra - Umäsvāti.
Viseṣāvasyaka-bhāṣya - Jinabhadra.
NON-JAINA WORKS:
Chandogya-upaniṣad.
Conception of Matter - Umesh Mishra. Contemporary Philosophy - Bosanquet. Critique of Pure Reason - Kant.
Doctrine of Karma - Abhedanand.

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History of Indian Logic - Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan.
History of Western Philosophy - Russell. Idea of God - Pattison, A. S. P.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Indian Philosophy - Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy - Sharma, C. D.
Lankavatara-sutra.
Life and Philosophy in Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series - Bosanquet.
Madhyamika-kārikā - Nāgārjuna. Mīmāmsā-sūtra-Šābara-bhāṣya - Śabarasvāmi.
Muktavali - Viśvanatha.
Nature of the World - Stace.
Nyāya-bindu - Dharmakirti.
Nyāya-sutra - Aksapāda.
Present Philosophical Tendencies - Perry.
Principles of Philosophy - Bhattacharya, H.M.
Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge - Smith, N. K. Sänkara-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra - Śankarācārya.
Sānkhya-kārikā - Īśvarakṛṣṇa.
Sarva-darśana-sangraha - Mādhavācārya.
Self, Thought and Reality - Mukerji, A. C.
Śloka-vārtika - Kumārila.
Structure of Molecules: Science Progress, London, April 1935.
Tarkasangraha - Annambhaṭṭa.
Tattva-traya - Lokācārya.
Trimśikā - Vasubandhu.
Vaiseṣika-sūtra - Kaṇāda.
Vedanta-siddhanta-muktāvali - Prakāśānanda.
Vimsatikā - Vasubandhu.
Works Green, T. H.
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219

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INDEX
63
50
Ajīva Abhāva 209 Ājivaka
9 Abhayadevasūri 27 Akalanka
30,91 Ābhinibodhika 134 Akāśa
73 Acakṣurdarśana 90 Ākāśāstikāya
64,73 Acaksurdarśanăvaraniya 191 Alokākāśa
73 Acārānga 18 Analogy
137, 141 Acārāńga-sūtra 166 Ananta-catustaya
86 Acelaka 8. 14 Anantānubandhin
194 Addhāsamaya 64, 74 Anavasthita
146 Adharmāstikāya 64, 72 Anaxagoras Adhyātma-mata-parīksā 34 Anaximander Adhyātma-sära
34 Anaximenes Ādhyātmika-mata-khandana Andhakavrşņi
34 Andhakavrsnidaśā Adhyātmopanişad 34 Andhra
12 Adler 113 Anekānta
168 Adrsta
102, 105: Anekāntajayapatākā Affirmation 184 Anekantavāda
168 Agama
137 Anekāntavādapraveśa 31 Age-determining Karma 197 Anekānta-vyavasthā 33 Aggregate 173 Anga
17, 18 Agnibhūti 105 Anga-bāhya
17, 18 Agrāyaṇīya Pūrva 21 Anga-pravista
17 Ahāraka 126 Anger
193 Ahāra-vargaņā
125 Animism Ahoratra
203 Anivrtti-bādara-samparāya, Air 70, 117
208, 211 Ajātaśatru
10 Anivrttikaraņa 208, 211
23
31
3

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Antakṛddaśā
Antarāya
Anti-thesis
Aņu
Anubhāga
Anugamin
Anumāna
Anuprekṣā
Anupūrvi
JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
Anuttaraupapātikadaśā
Anuyoga Anuyogadvāra
Apkāya
Application Apramatta-samyata Apratyākhyānāvaraṇa
Arati
Apta Aptamīmāmsā
Aptaparikṣā
Apurvakaraṇa
Ardhamāgadhi
70, 71, 115, 118 Astikāya
190 Aśvasena
Ariṣṭanemi
Aristotle
Artha
Arūpin
Aśādhara
Asātā-vedaniya
Ascending period
Aśoka
Asrava

19 Association
201 Aṣṭasahasri 173 Aṣṭaśati
145, 146 Atman
137, 159 Atmapravāda Pūrva 207 Atma-rupa
199 Atom
176
31
30
65
4
96
21
175
70, 71, 115, 118, 119
153
25
126
22
137, 141, 164
91, 134, 144
90
191
88
19 Attainment
20 Aturapratyakhyāna
25 Audārika
70 Aupapātika 163 Authority
208,211 Avadhi
10 Avasarpiņi
Ardha-nārāca-samhanana 199 Avasthita
5 Avaśyaka
194 Avadhi-darśana 164 Avadhi-darśanavaraṇīya 30 Avadhi-jñāna
31 Avadhi-jñānāvaraṇīya
208, 211 Avagraha 194 Avalikā
50 Avaya
58, 176 Avirata samyagdṛṣṭi 64 Ayogi kevalin
33 Ayus
192
203 Bandha
12 Bandhaśataka
75, 77, 108 Being
191
134, 154
203
203
146
23
134, 154
208, 210 209, 212
197
B
75, 77, 108, 202
21
197

Page #236

Berkeley Bhadrabāhu
Bhagavati
Bhagavati-sutra
Bhaktaparijñā
Bhāṣā-rahasya
Bhāṣā-vargaṇā
Bhāṣya
Bhaṭṭa
Bhāṭṭa
Bhavya
Bhaya
Bheda
Bhoga-antarāya
Bhuta
Bhütabali
Bimbisāra
Binding
Bisapanthi
Bradley
Brahman
Bṛhatkalpa
Buddha
INDEX
Caitanya
39 Cakṣurdarśana
10, 17, 26 Cakṣurdarśanavaraṇīya 19 Calukya
137, 167 Camuṇḍarāya

25 Candanā
34 Candragupta
125 Candrakavedhya
26 Candraprabhā
141 Candraprajñapti 55 Candrarși
209 Candravedhyaka
194 Canon
120 Căritra
Bliss
Bodha
Body
125, 126, 197
Chedasūtra
Bondage 77, 108, 190, 202, 205 Clairvoyance
42
Bosanquet
41
201 Caritra-mohaniya
84 Cārvāka 27 Catuḥśaraṇa
10
Căturyāma
198 Causation
15 Cause
86
68
45
21, 24
4, 5 3, 167
Buddhism
Buddhist 139, 140, 160, 184
C
Cellaṇā
Cetană
Colour
Complete Judgment
Conclusion
Conduct
Conscious
Consciousness
Contributory Part
96 Co-ordinate
223
57,95,105,140,167

89
191
14
31
10
6,12
25
9
22
29
25
17
207
193
25
4
187
167,205
10
85
24
144
115, 117, 199
175
163
207
64
60,68,84,85,
86, 95
176
120

Page #237

224
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
33
31 64, 72
154 28
D
201 Dnavala
31
62, 184
11, 14
31
137, 140
143
143
Deceit
Co-valent
120 Dharmabindu Cūlikā
20 Dharmāmệta Cūlikāsūtra
25 Dharmasangrahaņi Cūrņi
27 Dharmāstikāya
Dharana Dana-antarāya
Dhavala Darkness
131 Dhūtākhyāna Darśana
86,191 Difference Darśana-mohaniya 193 Digambara Darśana-upayoga
89 Dĩgha-nikāya Darśanāvaraṇīya 191 Dinnāga Daśāśrutaskandha 21, 24 Direct Daśavaikālika
21, 23 Directness Death
125 Direct Perception Decay
60, 165 Disgust
193 Disliking Delage
113 Dissociation Deluding Karma
193 Divisibility Democritus
51. Division Determination
155 Doubt Deśavirata
208, 210 Dramila Descartes
50, 111 Dravya Descending period 203 Dravyasangraha Destruction
207 Dravyāstika naya Determinate Perception 155 Dream Determination
138 Droņācārya Deva-āyus
197 Drstivāda Devadharma-parikṣā 34 Duration Devāgamastotra
30 Dvādaśāranayacakra Devardhigani 17, 18 Dvārakā Devendrastava
26 Dvātrimśikā Dharma
207 Dvijavadanacapețā
194
194 109, 120
130 120 155
12
32
178, 180
112
27 11, 17, 20 190, 203
30
29. 33
31

Page #238

INDEX
225
64
17
26
13
2
163 God
Formless Earth 117 Freud
113 Effect
167 Electron 115 Gait
• 199 Electrovalent
120 Gañadhara Elephant Cave 13 Ganga
14 Empedocles
50 Ganividyā Empirical Perception 152
Gardabhilla Energy 115,124 Gas
115, 124 Ether
117 Gautama Evambhūta naya
180 Girnar Example
102,110,212 Existence 59,60,174,197 Gommațasāra Existence in potentia 202 Gośāla Experience 59 Gotra
201 Extrinsic Validity
Greed
193
Grossness Fallacy of Evambhūta Naya 183
Gujarat Gunadhara
28 Fallacy of Naigama Naya 182 Fallacy of Naya
Gunaratna 182 Guņasthāna
208 Fallacy of Rjusūtra Naya 183
176 Fallacy of Sabda Naya
Guņi-deśa 183 Gupti
207 Fallacy of Samabhirūdha Naya
Gurutattvavinirņaya 34 Fallacy of Sangraha Naya 183 Fallacy of Vyavahāra Naya 183 Hamilton Fear
194 Haribhadra Feeling-producing Karma 192 Haribhadrasūri Figure 130, 199 Hāsya
194 Fineness 130 Hāthīgumphā
13 Fire 70. 117 Heat
132 Firmness
198 Hegel
130
F
14

Page #239

226
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
33
22
28
22
163
Heraclitus
50 Heredity-determining
Jaina Karma
Jaina-tarka-bhāsā Heterogeneous example 163 Jainism
3,58 Hemacandra 6,14,27,32,138,
Jambū
10 158
Jambūdvīpaprajñapti Hinduism
Jayadhavala Hīyamāna
146 Jinabhadra
26,92 Homogeneous example 163
Jinadāsagani
27 Hoysala
14 Jinasena
28 Jītakalpa
24 Idealism
35 Jiva
63, 68, 80, 125 Identity
62,184 Jivābhigama
22 Thā
134,154
Jivājīvābhigama Illustration
Jīvāstikāya
64,68 Immediacy
143
Jivatva Implication Incomplete Judgment
Jñāna
86,96,134,138 Indescribability
Jñānabindu
174 Indirect
137,140
Jñānapravāda Pūrva Indrabhūti
6,10
Jñana-sāra Inductive Reasoning 157 Jnāna-upayoga Indus 13 Jñānāvaraṇīya
190 Inference 137,141.159 Jñātādharmakathā Infiniteness
116 Jñāt? Influx 108 Jñātņkhanda
9 Innumerability 116 Joking
194 Intensity 190, 204 Jşmbhikagrāma
10 Intrinsic Validity 139 Judgment
165 Intuition
86, 89, 90 Jugupsā Intuition-obscuring Karma 191 Jung
113
85
141
33 21
19
194

Page #240

INDEX
227
39, 51
32
126
21 Kumārapāla
14
Knowlege 68, 86, 88, 90, Kāla 64,74,175
133, 167 Kālakācārya
Knowledge-obscuring Karma
190 Kalikālasarvajña
Košala
10 Kalinga
Koșthaka Kalpāvataṁsikā
Krodha
193 Kalpikā Krsna
5 Kankāli-Tila
Kșapaka śreņi
214 Kant
Kșapaņāsāra Karma 105, 187, 189
Kșemakirti Kārmaņa
Ksiņa kaṣāya vītarāga Kārmaņa-vargaņā
125
chadmastha 209, 212 Karmaprābhrta 21, 27
Kumāra
28 Karmapraksti 21, 29 Kumar
Kumārila
141 Karmaprakstiprābhsta Karmapravāda Pūrva
Kundagrāma Kārttikeya
Kundakunda 28, 91, 133 Kärttikeyānupreksā Kaşāya Kaşāyaprābhrta 21, 28 Käsi 10 Labdhi
153 Kesi
4,6 Labdhisāra Kesikumāra
134 Lābha-antarāya Kevala
134 Lādha Kevala-darsana
90 Laghīyastraya Kevala-darśanăvaraṇīya 192 Language
128 Kevala-jñāna 88,143 Laughing
194 Kevala-jñānāvaraṇīya 191 Lecchaki
10 Khandagiri 13 Liberation
79.109 Khāravela 13 Light
132,153 Kiliku-suinhunana 199 Liking
194
8
28 Kundapura 193 Kūnika
32 201
30

Page #241

228
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
193
M
44
27
27
Linga
158 Matter 60,65,70,111,114 Liquid
115,124 Māyā Lobha
193 Medium of Motion 65,72 Locke
50 Medium of Rest 65,72 Loka 73 Memory
155,156 Lokākāśa 73 Middle term
158 Lokatattvanirnaya 31 Mimāṁsā
55,167
Mimāṁsaka 101,142,149,162 Mādhyamika
Mind
117,125,153 Mahābhūta 84 Miśradrsti
208,2.10 Mahāniśītha
24 Miśra-mohaniya 193 Mahāpratyākhyāna 26 Mithyādrsti 208-210 Mahāvīra 3,4,5,8,134 Mithyātva-mohaniya
193 Major term
Mohaniya
193 Maladhāri
Mokşa
75,79,109 Malayagiri
Molecule
71,119 Mallaki
Morton
113 Mallavādin
30 Muhurta
Mülācāra Māna
Mūlasūtra Manaḥparyāya 91, 134, 144 Mūrtipūjaka Manah-paryāya-jñāna 88 Manaḥparyāya-jñānāvaraniya Nāgārjunasūri 191 Naigama naya
178 Māņikyanandin 32, 138 Naiyāyika 96;101,105,131, Mano-vargaņā
125
133,141,160,162 Manusya-āyus
197 Nālandā Mathurā 13, 18 Năma
197 Mati 91 Nandi
25 Mati-ajñāna 88 Napuṁsaka-veda
195 Mati-jñāna
88 Nārāca-saṁhanana 198 Mati-jñānāvaraṇīya 191 Naraka-āyus
197
Mallisena
193
N
18

Page #242

Nāṭaputta
Nature
Naturalism
Naya
Nayābhāsa
Nayacakra
Naya-pradipa
Naya-rahasya
Naya-saptabhangi Nayopadeśa
Negation
Nemicandra
Neminatha
Neo-Realism
Nepal
Nicairgotra
Nidrā
Nidrānidrā
Nigantha
Nigantha Nātaputta
Nihilism
Nilagiri
Nirākāra-upayoga
Nirayāvalikā
Nirgrantha
Nirjară
Niryukti
Niśītha
Niyamasara Noise
INDEX

6 No-kaṣāya
194
190
Non-absolutism
166, 184
52 Non-conscious
64
177 Non-existence
174
182 Non-perceptual Cognition 155 30 Numerability
116
33 Nyaya-khanda-khādya
34
34 Nyayakumudacandra
32
177 Nyāyāloka
34
33 Nyāyapraveśa
31
141, 184 Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika 56, 95, 167,
31
184
5 Nyāyāvatāra
52 Nyayaviniścaya
11, 17
201
192
192
6
3
44
13
87
Object
Odour
Oghaniryukti
Omniscience
Omniscient
Order
Origination
22
4 Padartha
26 Pakṣa
21, 24 Palyopama
Nivṛtti bädara samparāya Pañcakalpa
75, 78, 109 Pain
P
208, 211 Pañcaprakaraṇa
28 Pañcasangraha 128 Pancastikāyasăra

229
29
30
153,165
199
23
93, 143, 148
90
10
60, 165
58
125,192
162
203
24
31
21, 29
28

Page #243

230
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
25
138
31
30
20
Pañcayama
4 Pragmatism Papa
75,76,108 Prajñāpana Påpā
10 Prakirņaka Paralokasiddhi
31 Prakyti
55, 99, 190 Paramāņu
118 Pramāņa Parasnath Hills
4 Pramāṇamimāṁsā 33, 138 Parikarma
20 Pramāņaparīkņā Parīkņāmukha 32 Pramāņa-rahasya
34 Parişahajaya
207 Pramāṇasangraha Paroksa
135 Pramāņa-saptabhangi 177 Pārsva
3,4,6 Pramatta-samyata 208, 210 Pārsvanātha
134 Prameyakamalamārtanda 32 Paryāyāstika naya 178,180 Praśnavyākaraña Passion
193 Prathamānuyoga Pāķaliputra 17 Pratijña
162 Patna
17 Pratyākhyāna Pūrva 21 Patrapariksā
31 Pratyaksa 135,137,140,143 Pāvā 6 Pratyeka-praksti
199 Pāvāpuri 10 Pravacanasāra
28 Perception 137, 140, 141, 143 Prāyaścitta
30 Permanence 60,165 Premature realisation 202 Physique-making karma 197 Prevention
207 Pindaniryukti 23 Preyodveşaprabhsta
21 Pinda-prakşti
197 Pride Plato 38, 50 Probans
159, 160 Pleasure 125 192 Probandum
159 Power
86 Proton Prabhācandra
32 Prthvikaya Prābhākara 55, 141 Pudgala
63,70,114 Pracalāpracalā
192 Pudgalāstikāya 64, 70 Pradeśa 65, 190 Pūjyapāda
91 Pradyota
10 Punya
75, 76, 108
193
115 70

Page #244

INDEX
231
175
190, 204
194 Rūpin
176
Puruşa 55, 98 Relativity
184 Puruşa-veda
194 Residence of Substance 176 Purva 11, 20 Respiration
125 Purvagata 20 Retention
155 Puşpacũlikā 23 Rivers
113 Puşpadanta 27 Rjumati
147 Puspikā 22 Rjupālikā
10 Rjusūtra naya
179 Quality
Rșabha
Rşabha-nărăca-saṁhanana 198 Quantity
64 Quasi-passion
S R
Sabda Radhakrishnan
Sabda naya
179 Raivata
Sacelaka
8, 14 Rājagpha
Şaddarśanasamuccaya 31 Rājapraśnīya
Sādhana
159 Rājīmati
Sadhya
158,159 Rāmānuja
Sāgaropama
203 Rasa
Sakalādesa
175 Rāştrakūta
Śaka Rati
Sākāra-upayoga
87 Ratnakarandaka-śrāvakācāra 30
Sala Realisation
Samabhirudha naya Realism
Sāmaññaphala-sutta Reality
35, 58
Samantabhadra Reason
162 Samarādityakathā Reasoning 157 Samavāyānga :
19 Recognition
Samaya
74,203 Recollection
156 Samayasāra Reflection 207 Sambandha
176 Relation
176 Samhanuna
561
13
202
31
157
28
198

Page #245

232.
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
21
21
57
131
Samiti
207 Śataka Sammeta 4 Sātā-vedaniya
192 Samprati - 12 Satta
202 Saṁsarga
176 Satyapravāda Pūrva Samsaya
155 Satyaśāsanaparīksā Saṁstāraka
25 Sauryapura Saṁsthāna
199 Sautrāntika Samudravijaya
5 Sayogi kevalin
209, 212 Samvara
75,78,109 Scriptural Knowledge 164 Samavāya : 96 Sensation
154 Samyak-mithyātva-mohaniya Sense
153 193 Sevārta-saṁhanana
199 Samyaktva-mohanīya · 193 Seven-fold Judgment 170 Sangha
10 Shade Sanghadāsagani 26 Shadow
131 Sanghāta
120 Siddharāja Jayasimha Sanghātana
198 Siddhārtha Sangraha naya
178 Siddharthapura Sañjvalana 194 Siddhasena
29, 93 Śankara 45 Siddha-sila
212 Sankha
10 Siddhiviniscaya Sankhya 55,98,101,140, śīlānkasūri
27 162, 167 Simhasūri
30 Sanmatitarka 29 Śivasarmasūri
29 Śäntyācārya
27 Skandha
71, 115, 119 Saptatikā
21 Skandila Sarasvati
13 Sleep Sarvajñasiddhi 31 Smell
114, 117 Šāstravārtāsamuccaya 31 Smrti Sāsvādana-samyagdęsti 208, Sodasaka 209 Soka
115, 124
**************************
30
18
192
156
31
194
.
S
olid
Sat
.
58 Solid

Page #246

INDEX
233
12
44 22
20
88
Somnambulism 192 Substance
59, 63, 64 Sorrow 194 Substratum
176 Soul 69,80,95,117,125, Sudharman
10 133,167,188 Suhastin Sound
127 Sūkşma samparāya 208, 211 Space 65, 73, 117 Sulasă
10 Speculation
154 Sūnya Speech
125, 128 Sūryaprajñapti Spiritual Development 207 Sūtra Sramaņa . 8 Sūtrakstānga
19 Śravana Belgolā 12 Svabhāva-darśana
89 Śrāvasti
6 Svabhāva-jñāna Śreņika 10 Svayambhūstotra
30 Śrīpura-Pārsvanātha-stotra 31 Svetămbara
11, 14 Sruta 91, 134 Syādvāda
168 Śruta-ajñāna 88,164 Syādvādamañjari
33 Sruta-jñānāvaraṇīya 191 Syllogism
161 Śrutakevalin 11, 20 Śyāmāka
. 10 Sthānakavāsi 15 Synthesis
173 Sthānānga
19
т Shãnanga-sutra
126 Sthāvara
69 Tandulavaicārika Sthāvara-daśaka
17 Tāranapanthi Sthavira
· 158 Sthiti
114,117,199 Sthūlabhadra
58 Stri-veda 194 Tattvārtha
29,58 Stūpa
13 Tattvārthādhigama 29 Styānagrddhi
192 Tattvārtharājavārttika 30 Styānarddhi
192 Tattvārthaślokavārttika : 31 śubhrabhūmi
9 Tattvārtha-sūtra 136,138 Subjective Inference 159 Tejaskāya
138
Taijasa
25
15
200 190 10,17
Tarka Taste Tattva

Page #247

234
Tejo-vargaṇā
Telepathy Terahapanthi
Terapanthi
Thales
Thesis
Time
Tinduka
Tirtha
Tirthankara
Tiryag-ayus
Touch
JAINA PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION
Uccairgotra
Udaya
Udayagiri
Udayana
Udiraṇā
Ugrasena
Üha
Ujjain
65,74,117,175,203 Upāsakadaśā
6 Upaśama śreņi
10 Upaśānta kaṣāya vītarāga
10 chadmastha
Umāsvāmin
Umäsväti
Transcendental knowledge144 Uttaradhyayana Transcendental perception 164 Uttaradhyayana-sūtra
Trasa
69
Trasa-dasaka
Trilokasära
Triśalā

125 Universe
146 Upabhoga-antarāya 15 Upadesa-rahasya
15 Upakāra
50 Upamāna
162, 173 Upanga
U
197 Upayoga
114,111,199 Utsarpiņi
200 Vādideva 32 Vaibhāṣika
8
Vaikriya
Vaiśālī
201 Vaiśeṣika
202
5 Valabhi
158 Validity
12, 13 Vāmā
29 Vanaspatikāya Varanasi Vardhamāna
29, 91, 136, 138
Union
120, 122, 129
Universal concomitance 157, Vaṭṭakera
158 Vayukaya
58,73
201
34
176
137
21
19
213
V

13 Vajrabhūmi
10 Vajra-ṛṣabha-nārāca-saṁhanana
202
209, 211
68, 153
203
23
4,6
138
57
126
8
96,101,105,117, 127,131,133,141
9
198
18
139
4
70
4
7,8,146
28
70

Page #248

INDEX
W
Vedaniya Vedānta Vedāntin Vegetable Verbal testimony Vibhanga-jñāna Vibhāva-darśana Vibhāva-jñāna Vidyānanda Vidyānandamahodaya Vidyānandi Vidyānandin Vikalādesa Vikramaditya Vipäkaśruta Vipulamati Virasena Vīrastava Virtue Vīrya Vīrya-antarāya Višeşana-vati Višeşāvaśyaka-bhāșya
192 Vītarāgastotra 167 Vțsni 103 Vrsnidaśā
70 Vrtti 164 Vyākhyāprajñapti 88 Vyäpaka 89 Vyāpya
158 88 Vyavahāra
21, 24 31 Vyavahāra naya
179 31 91. Water
· 70, 117 31 Word
164, 176 175 13 Yaśovijaya
109, 167 147 Yogabindu 28 Yogācāra 26 Yogadrstisamuccaya 208 Yogaśāstra 201 Yogaśataka 201 Yogavimśikā 92 Yuktyanuśāsana
30 92 Yuktyanuśāsanālankāra 31
Y
.
33
20 Yoga
31

Page #249

Page #250

JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS
Dr. Mohan Lal Mehta

Page #251

Page #252

JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS
holding that the soul is not Akarmabhumi A region of active. inaction, a land of enjoyment. Akriyāvādin One who does Akarmabhūmija A person not believe in the efficacy of born in a land of inaction. action. Akarmavīrya Power coupled Akşaņa Non-injury. with wisdom.
Akşanayoga Activity involvAkalevara A liberated soul. ing no injury. Akalpasthita An ascetic hav- Akşanikura A period consisting no restrictons of scriptural ing of eighty-four lakhs of rules.
Akşanikurāngas. Akalpika Improper, forbidden. Akşaņikurānga A period conAkalpya Improper for an as- sisting of eighty-four lakhs of cetic, unacceptable.
Nalinas. Akāmamarana Involuntary Akşaraśruta A kind of scripor unwise death.
tural knowledge arising from Akāmanirjarā To destroy articulate utterance. karmas by endurance of hun- Akşīņaparibhogin One who ger etc. involuntarily.. takes food having life. Akāya A liberated soul. Akşīņamahānasika A person Akāyika An emancipated with such a spiritual attainment soul.
that thousands of people can be Akiñcana One having no fed from a small quantity of possession.
food. Aksta Not specially prepared Akhedajña Unsympathetic for ascetics.
towards the sufferings of othAkstāgama Experiencing the ers. fruits of sin etc. without com- Agamika A scripture having mitting them.
dissimilar passages. Akriyâtman A philosopher Agārin A householder.

Page #253

240
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Agītārtha Ignorant of scrip- an ascetic by praising the detures.
liciousness of food. Agupta Not free from sin Angārakarman Livelihood arising from mind, speech from charcoal. and body.
Angula A measure equal to Agurulaghu Anything nei- the twelfth part of a span. ther heavy nor light; a vari- Angulaprthaktva A measure ety of body-making karma by from two to nine Angulas. the rise of which the soul ac- Angopānga A species of quires a body which is nei- body-making karma by the ther heavy nor light. rise of which are produced Agnikāya Fire-bodied souls. limbs and sub-limbs. Agnija A disease by which Acakşurdarśana : Apprehenall the food one takes is burnt sion by the mind as well as the away without appeasing hun- sense-organs other than the ger.
eye. Agrantha An ascetic having Acakşurdarśanāvarana A no possession.
kind of apprehension-obscurAgrapinda A portion of food ing karma by the rise of which set apart for mendicants etc. one cannot have apprehension Aghātikarman A kind of derived through the mind as karma which does not ob- well as the sense-organs other struct the qualities of soul than the eye. Ankusa A fault of obeisance. Acara Immobile beings. Anga A basic canonical text. Acitta An inanimate thing. Angapravişta Canonical Acittāhāra Food without life. texts included in the Anga Acetana Lifeless, inanimate, group.
insentient. Angabāhya Canonical texts" Acela Same as Acelaka. excluding the Anga works. Acelaka one wearing no garAngavidyā A science pre- ments. dicting events from the throb- Acuurya Non-stealing, nonbing etc. of limbs.
theft. Angāra A fault incurred by Acchando Dependent on others.

Page #254

JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS
241
Acchavi An ascetic who stops Aņu Little, small; an atom. the activities of body. Anuvrata A small vow, a Ajara A liberated soul. partial vow. Ajarāmara A liberated soul Aņuvratin A lay-votary who which is free from decay and observes small vows. death.
Andaja The creature born out Ajīva An inanimate or insenti- of an egg. ent substance, a non-soul. Atathājñāna Possessed of false Ajivakāya Inanimate or knowledge. insentient extensive substance, Atara A period equal to a an extensive non-soul. Sāgaropama. Ajñātapiņda Alms from an Atikrama An inclination to unknown family.
violate a vow. Ajñātaişin An ascetic begging Aticara Transgression, alms etc. from families violation of a vow. ignorant of his scholarship etc. Atithi A guest, an ascetic Ajñāna Ignorance; wrong whose date of arrival is not knowledge.
fixed. Ajñānavādin One who does Atithipūjā Hospitality. not believe in the efficacy of Arithicam vibhāga Sharing knowledge, a philosopher establishing the superiority of with the guest or ascetic.
Atipāta Destruction, injury, ignorance. Ajñānin, Ignorant; devoid of
killing, violence. right knowledge professing Atiprasanga Unwarranted the doctrine of nescience. extension. Atata A period consisting of Atibhārāropaņa Loading eighty-four lakhs of Atatān- excessive burden.
Atiśaya A supernatural power Ațațānga A period consisting or thing. of eighty-four lakhs of Atiśeşa An extraordinary
occurrence.
gas.
Trutitas.

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Atindriya Super-sensuous. required to empty a pit which Atīrtha The time preceding is one Yojana in length, breadth the establishment or succeed- as well as depth and is filled ing the break-down of a with the finest points of hair and religious order.
from which after every hundred Atyaksara Speaking more years one point of hair is taken words than are actually out. contained in a text.
Addhāsamaya The smallest, Atyarthatva Power of uttering i.e. indivisible part of time; a words bearing profound substance which is the auxiliary meaning.
cause of change. Athākhyāta Perfect conduct, Addhāsāgaropama A period pure conduct, passionless consisting of ten Kotākoți conduct, faultless conduct. Addhāpalyopamas. Adanda Absence of sins like Adharma Medium of rest. killing etc., sinless activities of Adharmāstikāya An extensive mind, speech and body. substance in the form of Adattahara A thief, one who medium of rest. takes away without being Adhikaraṇa Quarrel, implegiven.
ments of injury, killing etc. Adattādāna Taking anything Adholoka Lower world, which is not given, stealing, infernal world.
mernal world. theft.
Adhyayana A chapter of a Adattādānaviramaņa Ab- scripture; study; a meaningful stention from taking things not word. given, non-stealing.
Adhyavapūraka A sin incurred Adrsta Karmas of the past by increasing the quantity of life.
food prepared for self in order Addha Time.
to oblige an ascetic in the Addhākāla Time marked by middle of the cooking process. the motion of the sun. Adhyavasāna Mental state, Addhäpalyopama The time thought-activity.

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Adhyavasāya Mental modifi- Ananta Infinite, unlimited, cation, thought-condition. endless. Anakşaraśruta A kind of Anantaka Endless, infinite. scriptural knowledge arising Anantakāya Vegetables from inarticulate utterance. containing infinite lives. Anagára A homeless ascetic. Anantaguņa Infinitely Anagāradharma Duties of an multiplied. ascetic.
Anantajīva Vegetables with Anagaravādin A hypocritical infinite lives. ascetic.
Anantabhāga Infinitesimal Anagarita Asceticism.
part. Anagna A wish-fulfilling tree Anantara Without intervensupplying garments.
ing space or time... Ananga Parts of the body Anantarāgama Scriptures other than the sexual organ; an directly heard by the Ganaartificial means of sexual dharas from a Tirthankara. intercourse; canonical texts Anantavarga Infinite multiother than the Angas.
plied by infinite. Anangakrīdā Unnatural Anantahita Salvation. sexual act.
Anantānanta Infinite multiAnangapravișța Canonical
plied by infinite. texts not included in the
Anantānubandhin A group of Angas.
passions which leads to endless Anangāra Free from the fault
worldly life. of Angāra.
Anapavartyāyus One whose Anadhigata Not conversant life-term cannot be reduced. with scriptures. .
Anarthadaņda Purposeless Anadhyavasāya Inattention. sin. Ananugāmin A kind of Anarthadandaviramaņa Abclairvoyance that does not stinence from purposeless sin. accompany the person when Anarpitanaya A standpoint he leaves a particular place. having generality for its

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consideration.
unfrequented by human beings. Anavadagra Endless, infinite. Anabhoga Ignorance; forgetAnavadya Sinless.
fulness. Anavama Free from fault, Anābhogapratisevanā Inperfect.
curring a sin unknowingly. Anavasthā Infinite regress. Anāyatana A place unworthy Anavasthāpya Temporary
of an ascetic to live in. expulsion.
Anārambha Giving no pain to Anavasthita Unsteady.
living beings, freedom from
sinful actions. Anaśana Fasting, giving up
Anārambhajivin An ascetic food and water for some time
who is free from all sinful or for ever.
actions. Anakäropayoga Indetermi
Anārya Barbarous, uncivinate knowledge.
lized, cruel, uncultured, sinful. Anākutți Non-injury or nonkilling.
Anāloka Ignorance or wrong
knowledge. Anācāra Discarding a vow; lack of right conduct, i.e.,
Anālocita one who has
confessed his faults. misconduct. Anācīrņa Unworthy of being
Anāvila Free from passions. practised by an ascetic.
Anāhāraka A soul living Anātmavādin One who does
does without food. not believe in the existence of Anähūta An ascetic who goes soul.
to take food uninvited. Anădinidhana Having Aniketa A homeless ascetic. neither beginning nor end, Anigraha One who has not eternal.
restrained his senses. Anādeyanāman A variety of Anitthamstha One in an body-making karma by the rise extraordinary or unusual of which a person possesses condition of existence. unsuggestive speech.
Anitya Impermanent, Anāpāta A · place transitory, transient.

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Anidāna Observing penance Anukampā Compassion, mercy, etc. without worldly desires. pity. Anidānabhūta Devoid of Anugāmin A variety of clairsinful conduct.
voyance that accompanies the Anindriya An emancipated person from place to place. soul as well as an omniscient Anutkaṣāyin One with scanty person who is free from passions. sensory perception; mind. Anuttaru The best, the highest. Aniyatacārin An ascetic with Anuttaragati Emancipation, unrestricted movements. salvation. Anirhārima Observing Anuttarajñāna Omniscience. Samlekhanā in a place where there would be no one to
Anudghātika Severe expiation, cremate the dead body. unmitigated severity of
expiation. Anivșttikaraṇa A process which leads the soul to the Anupa
Anupayukta Careless, negliverge of the dawn of the first gent, inattentive. enlightenment.
Anuparata Not free from sinful Anivrttibādarasamparaya A activity. stage of spiritual development Anupasthāna Temporary exin which gross passions can pulsion. also attack
Anupasthāpana Same as AnuAniśrita Not needing help pasthāna. from any quarter; free from Anuprekşā Reflection, conattachment etc.
templation. Aniśritopadhāna Penance Anubhāga Intensity of karmic observed without the help of fruition. others or without worldly Anubhāgabandha Bondage of desires.
the intensity of karmic fruition. Anisrşța A sin incurred by
Anubhāva Same as Anugiving food etc. to an ascetic
bhāga. without the permission of all
Anumāna Inference. the partners.

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Anumānanirākrta Refuted Antakula A low family. by inference.
Antakrta One who has attained Anumodanā Approval, liberation. support.
Antacārin An ascetic who has Anuyoga Exposition, expla- taken a vow to beg remnants of nation.
food taken by householders. Anušāsana Instruction, exhor- Antapāla One who guards the tation; punishment, admonition. boundaries of a country. Anuśāsti Exhortation, instruc- Antarātman Interior self. tion.
Antarāya An obstruction; Anuśişti Same as Anušāsti. Power-obstructing karma. Anuśreņi Following a straight Antarāla Intermediate space line in space.
etc. Anuşthāna Practice, conduct. Antardvīpa An intermediate Ansta Falsehood.
island. Anekavādin A philosopher Antardvīpaka A person living who does not recognise in an intermediate island. identity in things from any Antarmukha Introvert. point of view but maintains Antarmuhürta A measure of absolute difference among time shorter than forty-eight them.
minutes. Anekanta non-absolute, Antarvyāpti Internal concomihaving many properties,
many properties, tance. relative.
Andhakavahni Subtle fire. Anekāntavāda Non-absolutism, relativism.
Andharūpa One having a body
devoid of limbs. Aneșaņā Lack of carefulness in searching for food etc.
Annapunya A virtue acquired Aneșaṇīya Not fit to be
by giving. food out of
compassion. accepted by an ascetic.
Anyatīrthika A person belongAnaikāntikahetu Doubtful
ing to another order. probans.

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Anyatva Distinctness, differ- Aparihārika A tainted ascetic. entiation.
Aparyavasita Endless, infinite. Anyathānupapatti One's Aparyāptaka Undeveloped impossibility in the absence of living being. the other.
Aparyāptanāman A kind of Anyadrşți One holding an body-making karma by the rise alien view.
of which the living being gets Anyayūthika One belonging an undeveloped body. to a different creed.
Apavartanā Lessening the Anvaya Concomitance in duration and intensity of karma. agreement.
Apavartyāyuş One whose lifeApagataveda Having no term can be reduced. sexual desire.
Apaścimamāraṇāntikasarlekhanā Apada A liberated soul. The last penance practised at Apanayana Act of forbidding the approach of death or prohibiting.
consisting in giving up passions Aparasangraha The non
and abandoning food and
water. ultimate generic view-point. Aparādha Fault, sin, offence,
Apasiddhānta A false violation.
doctrine. Aparigrhītāgamana To enjoy
Apāya Sin arising from a woman who is not one's own
attachment etc.; perception, wife.
determinate cognition. Aparigraha Possessionless
Apārdha Half. ness, non-possessiveness,
Apunarāgama That state from non-possession.
which there is no return to the Aparicāra Free from sexual
world, liberation. intercourse.
Apunarāvartaka One who Apariņata A fault of the does not return to the world, ascetic caused by accepting
freed from the cycle of birth
and death. food not rendered perfectly free from life.
Apunarāvștti Salvation,

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emancipation.
Apratihata Unimpaired; Apunarbhava Freedom from Apratyākhyānāvaraņa A group rebirth.
of passions hindering partial Apunaścyava Absence of any renunciation. further death.
Aprathama Beginningless; Apuruşākāraparākrama Ab- second, third etc. sence of manly exploits. Apradeśa Indivisible. Apurvakaraṇa A spiritual Apramatta Careful. attainment not experienced Apramattasamyata An ascetic before, a stage of spiritual free from negligence etc. development attained for the
Apramāņa A fault incurred by first time.
an ascetic by eating beyond the Aprstalābhika An ascetic fixed limit. accepting only those alms
Apramāṇabhojin An ascetic which are not preceded by the
eating more than thirty-two question "What may I give
morsels of food.
Apramāda Carefulness, lack of Aprstavyākarana Explaining
negligence. something which is not asked. Apekşā Standpoint, view
Apralina Free from sexual
enjoyment. point, relativity.
Apraśasta Evil, wicked. Apoha Exclusion.
Aprāptakārin Same as Apkāya A water-bodied soul.
Aprāpyakārin. Aprakāśa Being blinded with
Aprāpyakārin A sense-organ pride etc. y en
cognising its object without Apratipātin Infallible, perma- coming into direct contact with nent. Apratibaddha Unobstructed; Aprārthitaprārthaka One free from attachment. desiring death. Apratisthāna Liberation, Aprāvrta Nude, not covered, salvation.
open.
you?"
it.

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Aprāsuka Containing life, knowledge. living.
Abhigraha Self-imposed Abaddhika One who believes restriction in the matter of food that karma does not bind the etc., obstinately persisting in soul but only touches it. one's own belief. Abandha Absence of karmic Abhinibodha Sensory bondage.
perception in general and Abandhaka One not incurring deduction in particular. the bondage of karmas. Abhiniveśa Perversion, Abādhā Endurance of karmas obstinacy in the wrong. without effect.
Abhinişadya A place of study. Abădhākāla Period of karmic Abhinna Whole, entire, non-fruition.
unbroken, identical, not Abuddha Devoid of right different, same, not separate. knowledge.
Abhibhūyajñānin An omniAbodhi Ignorance of the truth. scient person. Abrahmacarya Non- Abhivacana A synonym. observance of celibacy, sexual Abhisamāgama An authentic enjoyment.
cognition. Abrahman Absence of Abhihịta A fault incurred by chastity, coition.
the ascetic by accepting food Abhakta A fast.
brought to his place. Abhavastha An emancipated Abhikṣṇa Frequent, constant. soul.
Abhūta Non-existent, unreal. Abhavya Incapable of Abheda Identity, sameness. salvation.
Abhyantaratapas Internal Abhāva Wicked thought; austerity, mental penance. non-existence.
Abhyākhyāna False accusaAbhāṣā False or half-false tion. speech.
Amanaska A soul not in Abhigama Acquisition of possession of mind.

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Amama Free from attachment. Ayana A period of six months. Amara A god, a liberated Ayaśaḥkīrtināman A variety soul.
of body-making karma by Amarabhavana An abode of whose rise a person is subjected gods, heaven.
to dishonour and shame. Amarendra A king of gods. Ayuta A period consisting of Amita Unlimited, infinite. eignty
eighty-four lakhs of Ayutāngas. Amitajñānin Omniscient. Ayutānga A period consisting
of eighty-four lakhs of Amukta Not liberated from
om Akșanikuras. karmic bondage, mundane.
Ayoga Absence of the activities Amudha Free from delusion, of body, speech and mind. one who knows the truth.
Ayogikevalin An omniscient Amūdhadrsti One possessing who is free from all activities undeluded view, knowing the of mind, speech and body. real nature of things.
Ayogin Free from the activities Amūrcchita Free from of mind, speech and body. attachment.
Ayonika An emancipated soul. Amūrta Formless, i.e. devoid
Arajas An emancipated soul of touch, taste, smell and
which is free from karmic dust. colour. Amrta An emancipated soul Arata Free from attachment. which is not subject to death; Arati Disliking. nectar.
Aratimohaniya A kind of Amrşā True, not false.
deluding karma the rise of Ayaṁsandhi Punctual in the
which produces disliking. performance of duties.
Arahas The omniscient to Ayata Careless; a person
whom nothing can be a secret. having right belief but not
Arāga Free from attachment. having renunciation.
Aruha A liberated soul which Ayatana Carelessness.
is free froin birth. Ayati Non-renunciation.
Arūpakāya A formless

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extensive substance.
Alesya A soul free from Arūpin Formless, i.e., without thought-tint. touch, taste, smell and colour. Aloka Non-universe, beyond Artha Substance; object; the world. purpose; meaning; wealth. Alokākāśa Space beyond the Arthadanda Committing universe, non-cosmic space. violence for some useful Alpabahutva Relative purpose.
numerical strength. Arthanaya A viewpoint Avaktavya Inexpressible, relating to an object.
indescribable. Arthādhikāra The subject of Avagama Determination. a chapter etc.
Avagāha Occupying space: Arthāpatti Implication. providing accommodation. Arthāvagraha Object- Avagāhanā The measure of awareness.
space occupied by a body etc., Ardhacakrin A Vāsudeva. the height of a body etc. Ardhanārācasamhanana A Avagraha Sensation; shelter. joining of the body in which Avadya Sin. two bones are hooked into Avadyakara sinful. each other on one side, while
Avadyavirati Cessation of sin. on the other the bones are simply pressed together and
Avadhāraņa Determination, nailed.
decision. Arpitanaya A stand-point Avadhāriņi Decisive, having particularity for its assertive. consideration.
Avadhijñāna Limited direct Arhat One worthy of knowledge, clairvoyance. reverence, the omniscient. Avadhijñānāvaraṇīya A kind Alābha Non-acquisition of of karma obscuring food etc.
Avadhijñāna. Alūşaka One not violating Avadhidarśana Limited direct the vows of asceticism.
apprehension, apprehensive
J.
Sin

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clairvoyance.
Avigraha Uncurved, straightAvadhidarśanāvaraṇīya Aforward. kind of karma obscuring Avigrahagati Straightforward Avadhidarśana.
motion. Avabodha Recollection. Avicāra Devoid of transition; Avamaudarya Reduced diet. motionless; inconsistent. Avarņavāda Blasphemy. Avicyuti Absence of lapse,
retention. Avalambanatā Grasping. Avava A period consisting of Avitatha
Avitatha True, correct. eighty-four lakhs of Avidyā False knowledge; Avavãngas.
ignorance. Avavānga A period consist- Aviratasamyagdrșți A soul ing of eighty-four lakhs of with vowless right belief. Ațațas.
Avirati Non-abstinence from Avasa Dependent
sin, non-cessation of sinful Avasarpinī Descending aeon activity. in which happiness etc. Avirādhanā No violation, gradually decrease.
complete observance. Avasthana Steadiness: Avirādhitasamyama An ascetic retention.
fully observing the rules of right Avasthita Steady.
conduct. Avācanīya Unfit to be taught.
Avisaṁvāda Consistency. Avācya Inexpressible.
Avihiņsā Absence of different
kinds of violence. Avāya Perception, determi
Aveda “A person free from nation.
sexual desire. Avikampa Firm, steady.
Avedana A soul free from Avikalpa Absence of mis
sense-feeling, an emancipated giving
soul. Avikrșța Not practising the
Avyakta Indistinct, indefinite. austerity of more than three fasts.
Avyaya Indestructible.

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Avyavasita Indecisive, inde- Aştamabhakta Fast for three terminate.
days. Avyāghāta Absence of Asamyata Devoid of right obstruction
conduct. Avyābādha Free from Asamyama Sinful conduct. troubles.
Asanvara Influx of karma. Avyamoha Absence of Asamvibhāgin Selfish, not delusion.
sharing with others. Avyucchittinaya The stand- Asamvrta Indulged in sinful point of substance, the activity. viewpoint of identity.
Asamsakta Unattached, Asana Food.
unconnected. Asanapāna Food and water. Asaṁsāra Salvation. Asarana Helpless.
Asamsārasamäpanna A Aśaririn An emancipated liberated soul. soul.
Asamstuta Irrelevant, Aśastra Sinless conduct, inconsistent. asceticism.
Asakta Free from attachment. Asastrapariņata A sentient Asanklesa Purity of thought. thing not deprived of life by Asankhya Innumerable. fire etc.
Asankhyeya Same as Asuci Impurity, filth.
Asankhya. Aśubha Inauspicious, evil,
Asankhyeyaguņa Multiplied bad, sinful.
innumerable times. Aśubhanāman Inauspicious Asanga A soul free from body-making karma.
attachment. Aśrutaniśrita Knowledge not
Asanjñin Non-rational, nonbacked by scriptural learning
discursive. but derived from spontaneous thought.
Asatipoșaņa Maintenance of Aśloka Dishonour, ill-fame.
prostitutes etc. Asat Non-existent, non-being.
.

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Asatkriyā A sinful action. Asiddhi Non-salvation. Asattva Non-existence. Astikāya An extensive Asatya False, falsehood or lie; substance. futile.
Astivāda The doctrine Asatyamrşā Neither true nor accepting the existence of false.
· realities like soul, matter, karma Asadārambha An evil etc. activity.
Asteya Non-stealing. Asadgraha Perverseness. Asthitakalpa Flexible rules of
conduct. Asadbhāva Non-existence. Asadvedya Same as Asi
Asthiranāman A variety of Asātāvedanīya.
body-making karma by the rise
of which a living being gets an Asabhya Impolite, abusive.
unfirm body. Asamañjasa Improper, Ahimsā Non-injury, nonungraceful.
killing, non-violence, nonAsamādhi Distraction of har mind, lack of concentration. Ahorātra A day and night. Asamiti Carelessness.
Ā Asambaddha Detac disconnected. Asamyaktva Absence of right
Ākāśāstikāya An extensive
substance in the form of space. belief, wrong faith.
Ākiñcanya Non-attachment, Asātā Pain.
non-possession. Asātāvedanīya A variety of
Akīrṇa A horse of good breed; feeling-producing karma
modest. which causes pain.
Ākuti Killing, injuring, Asāvadya Sinless.
hurting. Asiddha A worldly soul.
Aksepaņi A kind of religious Asiddhahetu Non-existent
story which attracts the hearer probans.
to the truth.

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Akhyāyaka One who predicts making his caste etc. known. the consequences of omens. Ājñāpanikā Incurring karma Āgati Birth.
by ordering some evil action. Āgama Scripture, scriptural: Ādhaka One-fourth of a knowledge, authority, verbal Droņa. testimony, word.
Ātanka A fatal disease. Āgāra A house; an exception. Atapa A kind of body-making Āgāradharma The duty of a karma by the rise of which a householder.
soul gets hot body. Āgārin A householder. Ātāpana Practising austerity Āghāta Killing.
by enduring heat etc. Āghātamandala A slaughter- Ātman A soul, a self, a house.
conscious substance, a sentient Ācāmaka Water removed being. after boiling rice, pulse etc. Atmarūpa quality. Ācāmla A kind of austerity Atmavādin One who admits in which food is taken without the existence of soul as a salt etc.
substance. Acāra Conduct, behaviour, Atmașașthavādin One who practice.
admits the existence of soul in Acaravat One possessed of addition to the five elements. right conduct.
Ātmāngula A measure Acārya A preceptor; the head consisting of 108th part of the of a group of monks.
full height of a man. Acelakya Nakedness, nudity. Adānanikṣepasamiti CarefulAcchedya A sin incurred by
ness in taking up and laying snatching food from others
down things. and giving it to ascetics.
Ādikara A Tīthankara. Ājāti Birth
Āditirthařkara Rsabha, the Ājīva A fault incurred by an
first Tirthankara. ascetic by accepting food after Adirāja Rşabha, the first king.

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Ādhākarman A sin incurred Āmarsaușadhi Power to cure by an ascetic by accepting the diseases by mere touch of the food etc. specially prepared hand. for him.
Āmoşaka A thief. Ānaprāna Respiration. Āmnāya Repetition, revision. Ānayanaprayoga Asking Āyatasarsthāna Long somebody to bring something configuration. from outside the limits. Avatārtha Emancipation. Anukampika Compassionate. Āvägapata A votive slab. Anupūrvi A variety of body
Y. Āyāmaviskambha Length and making karma by the rise of
breadth. which a soul transmigrates from one state of existence to
Āyuktată Carefulness, another.
attentiveness. Antādin An ascetic eating
Āyuşkarman Longevityinferior kind of food.
determining karma, karma
which confers on a living being Aprccha Same as
a certain quantum of life. Aprcchanā.
Ārabhatā Hasty inspection of Āpta Free from passions,
clothes. omniscient, reliable.
Ārambha Sinful operation, Ābhinibodhika Sensory - cum- mental knowledge.
Ārā A spoke of wheel; an era, Ābhoga Knowledge, a div
C, a division of time. consciousness.
Ārādhaka One who devotes Ābhoganatā Reflection,
etion, himself to asceticism. thought.
Aropaņā Addition of another Ābhogabakusa An ascetic
expiation to the former one. consciously incurring sin.
Āroha The height of a body Āma Raw, unripe, uncooked.
Ārohapariņāha The length of Āmaka A thing having life.
the outstretched arms being Āmagandha A fault, a sin. equal to the height of the body.
&.

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Ārjava Straight-forwardness. Āhiņďaka A wanderer. Ārtadhyāna Mournful contemplation, sorrowful Inkhinī Censure, blame. concentration.
Inginīmaraņa Voluntary death Ārya Noble, revered, in a definite area without cultured; maternal grand- receiving any service from father; paternal grandfather. others. Āryā A nun, a female ascetic. Icchākāra Willingly carrying Āryikā A nun; maternal out the orders of a preceptor. grand-mother; paternal grand- Icchāparimāņa Limitation of mother.
desires. Ātāpaka A group of Itvaraparigrhītāgamana To connected sentences, a enjoy a woman accepted for a paragraph.
short time. Ālāpana Binding of two stvarika Temporary. things joined together.
Itvari A woman temporarily Ālumpa One engaged in evil kept. deeds.
Indra A lord of gods. Ālocana Confession: general
Indriya A sense-organ. awareness.
Indriyaja Sensuous, sensory. Alocană Same as Ālocana.
Indriyārtha The object of a Āvaraạiya Obscuring,
sense-organ. veiling, obstructing.
Ihalokabhaya Fear arising Āvarjīkaraṇa The process on
from the beings of the same the part of the omniscient to
class. force into the remnants of his
Ihalokāśaṁsāprayoga Dekarmas.
'siring being a king etc. in this Āhāraparyāpti Full development of the power of assimilating food. Ahārasañiñā Desire of taking Tryā Walking. food.
pathakarman A kind of
f world.

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karma incurred by walking Uttamapurușa An excellent etc.
man likeTirthankara, Iryāpathikabandha Karmic Cakravartin etc. bondage caused by walking Uttamasthāna Salvation. etc.
Uttamārtha Salvation. Iryāsamiti Carefulness in Uttaraguņa A secondary walking.
duty,a minor virtue. īśvarakāranika One who Uttaracara Successor, subseholds that God is the creator
quent. of the universe.
Uttarapraksti A sub-division īnā Speculation.
of karma. U
Uttānika One who has taken a Uccagotra A kind of karma vow to lie flat. by the rise of which a soul is Utthānapariyānika A biograborn in a high family. phy from birth to death. Uccavrata One observing Utpala A measure of time great vows, i.e., an ascetic. consisting of eighty-four lakhs Uccāraprasravaņa Excretion of Utpalāngas. and urine.
Utpalänga A measure of time Uccāvaca High and low. consisting of eighty-four lakhs Uccholana Careless washing of Hühukas. of hands etc.
Utpāda Origination. Ucchvāsa Inhalation.
Utpādana A fault incurred by Uñcha Begging of alms. an ascetic himself in connection Utkarşa Pride.
with his food etc. Utkālika A canonical text Utsarpiņi Ascending aeon in which can be studied at any which happiness etc. gradually proper time, that is, for the increase. study of which there is no Utsedhāngula A measure fixed time.
equal to eight barley grains. Utkrsta Maximum.
Udaya Rise, realisation,

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259
operation.
ten Koțākoțis of Polyopamas. Udāharana Illustration. Udbhinna A fault incurred by Udiranā Premature realisa- an ascetic by accepting the food tion.
etc. given after opening a door
etc. Udgama A fault incurred by an ascetic owing to a
Udvartanā Increasing the householder in connection duration and intensity of karma. with his food etc.
Unmāna A measure of weight. Udghātika Minor expiation. Unmiśra Food mixed with Udghātima Same as what possesses life. Udghātika.
Upakarana An implement. Uddişțabhakta Food Upakaraṇendriya Protecting specially prepared for an environment of a sense-organ. ascetic.
Upakāra Function; benefit, Uddeśa Same as Uddešaka. benevolence. Uddeśaka A sub-division of Upagraha Help; favour, a chapter.
kindness, benevolence. Uddyota A kind of body. Upaghāta False accusation. making karma by the rise of Upaghātanāman A variety of which a soul gets bright body. body-making karma which Uddhārapalyopama The causes abnormal formation of time required to empty a pit the body. which is one Yojana in length, Upacāra Transference of breadth and width and is filled epithet; figurativeness; formality. with the finest points of hair
Upadeśaruci Right belief and from which one hair-point
produced by a sermon. is taken out at every Samaya.
Upadhāna An austerity; a Uddhārasamaya The number
pillow. of Samayas contained in 2/2 Sāgaropamas.
Upadhāraṇatā Holding. Uddhārasāgaropama A Upadhi Implements. measure of time consisting of Upanaya Application.

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Upapatti. Reasoning, Upaśamaka An ascetic argument.
subsiding his passions. Upapāta Instantaneous birth, Upaśamaśreņi The ladder of i.e. the birth of celestial and spiritual advancement by a infernal beings.
gradual subsidence of deluding Upapāda Same as Upapāta. karmas. Upabrmhana Encouraging, Upaśāntakaşāya One whose nourishing, praising, passions have subsided. glorifying.
Upaśāntamoha One whose Upabhoga Enjoyment of delusion has subsided. consumable things.
Upasampadā Placing oneself Upabhogaparibhogaparimāna under another preceptor in order Limiting consumable and to acquire knowledge etc. non-consumable things. Upasarga Trouble, affliction. Upabhogāntarāya A variety Upasthāpana Readmission into of power-obstructing karma the order of monks or nuns. by the rise of which one Upānga A subsidiary canonical cannot enjoy consumable text. things.
Upādāna Material cause. Upamāna Analogy.
Upādeya Acceptable. Upayukta Attentive,
Upādhyāya A teacher, a cautious.
professor. Upayoga Cognition; careful
Upāśraya A place where ness, attentiveness.
ascetics stay. Uparata One who has
Upāsaka A lay-votary. desisted from sin, free from sinful activity.
Upāsakapratimā A special vow
of the lay-votary. Upalambha Comprehension, acquisition.
Upāsikā A female lay-votary. Upavāsa A fast.
Upekşā Indifference. Upaśama Forgiveness;
Upodghāta An introduction. peace; subsidence.
Uraḥparisarpa A reptile

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moving on the breast. Ekavādin One who holds that
there is only one soul in the
universe and that alone is real. Ūnodarikā Reduced diet.
Ekānta Absolute. Urdhvagati Upward motion.
Ekāntara Fasting on alternate Urdhvaloka Upper world,
days. celestial world. Ūha Inductive reasoning.
Ekāntavāda Absolutism.
Ekārthasamavāyin Coinherent R
in the substratum. Rjugati Straight motion.
Ekāvali An austerity consisting Rjumati Straight telepathy. of a number of fasts in Rjusutra Straight (present or ascending and descending momentary) view-point, order. analytic stand-point.
Ekāśana Taking only one meal Rjusūtrābhāsa Fallacy of the in a day. straight viewpoint, fallacy of Ekāśanika One who takes his the analytic standpoint. food only once a day. Rtu A measure of time Ekendriya A one-sensed being, consisting of two months. a being with one sense, viz., Rddhi An extraordinary touch. power.
Evambhūta Such-like Rşabhanārācasamhanana A viewpoint which accepts the physical constitution in which meaning of a word when the the joining of bones is not very object is engaged in the action firm.
indicated by it.
Evambhūtābhāsa Fallacy of Ekajñānin An omniscient the such-like viewpoint. person.
Eșaņā Search of food etc. Ekatva Oneness, identity; Eşaņāsamiti Carefulness in solitariness, loneliness. begging food etc. Ekabhakta Taking only one Eşaniya Acceptable, worthy of meal in a day.
being received

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
relatively. Ogha General, ordinary; Kanakāvali An austerity worldly stream.
which, when graphically Oghadrsti Commonplace represented by the units of fasts attitude.
of which it consists, assumes Oghasañjñā Instinct.
the shape of a gold necklace.
Kanda A bulb, a bulbous root, Au :
a bulbous vegetation. Aughika General, common.
Kandamūla A bulb and a root. Autpattiki Instantaneous.
Kandarpa An amorous talk. Audayika Emerging due to
Kanyālīka A lie spoken for the rise of karma.
one's daughter. Audārika Gross body etc.
Kamadhaka A dining bowl of Auddeśika A sin incurred by a an ascetic by accepting the
Kambala A blanket. food etc. specially prepared for them.
Karana . An instrument, a
an action, a Aupapātika A celestial or means;
performance; a sense-organ; an infernal being.
astrological division of day; Aupapādika Same as
mental modification, thoughtAupapātika.
activity; a secondary vow or Aupaśamika Emerging due to virtue. the subsidence of karma.
Karuņā Compassion, mercy. K
Karoţika An ascetic carrying a Katibandhana A cloth for the garland of human skulls. waist.
Karkasā Acute pain. Kațuka Bitter taste.
Karmaja Karmic body etc. Kațhina Hard touch.
Karmajā Developed by Kathaka A professional story- practical experience. teller.
Karman Fine particles of Kathañcit In some way, from matter binding the soul; action a particular point of view, or activity; occupation.

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Karmapudgala Karmic two aeons; a group of celestial matter.
regions. Karmabandha Karmic Kalpanīya Free from any fault, bondage.
acceptable. Karmabhūmi A land of Kalpavrkṣa A desire-fulfilling action, i.e., a region where tree. people earn their livelihood Kalpasthita An ascetic by any of the three
observing scriptural rules. occupations, viz., military,
Kalpātīta An ascetic who has literary and agricultural.
transcended scriptural rules; a Karmabhūmija A person heavenly being born beyond born in a land of action.
the Kalpas. Karmamāșaka A weight Kalpika proper, prescribed. equal to ten grains.
Kalpita Fit for an ascetic, Karmayoga Activity pertain
acceptable. ing to karmic body.
Kalpopaga Same as Karmavādin One who Kalpopapanna. believes in the doctrine of
Kalpopapanna A heavenly karma.
being in a Kalpa. Karmasamutthā Identical with karmajā.
Kalpya Acceptable, permitted. Karmaskandha Karmic
Kalyāņa Bliss, good,
happiness, welfare. molecule. Karmādāná A profession not
Kalyāṇaka Blissful, fit for the lay-votary, a cruel auspicious. profession by which sinful Kalyāṇabhāgin Covetous of karmas are incurred.
bliss. Kalankalībhāva Wandering Kalyoja A sum which when in the cycle of birth and death. divided by four leaves one as Kalpa Proper conduct, i.e., remainder. conduct according to Kalyoja-kalyoja A sum which prescribed rules; a cycle of when divided by four leaves

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
one as remainder and has a Käkini A weight equal to two quotient which, too, when grains. divided by four leaves one as Kanksā Desire for false tenets. remainder.
Kāpotaleśyā The third of the six Kalyoja-krtayugma A sum kinds of Leśyā, the gray which when divided by four temperament. leaves no remainder and has Kāma Objects of visual and a quotient which when
auditory senses; sexual desire. divided by four leaves one as
Kāmabhoga Objects of the five remainder.
senses; sexual enjoyment. Kalyoja-tryoja A sum which when divided by four leaves
Kaya Body. three as remainder and has a Kāyakleśa Mortification of the quotient which when divided body, physical mortification. by four leaves one as Käyagupti Control of bodily remainder.
activities. Kalyoja-dvāparayugma A Kāyadanda Sin of the body. sum which when divided by Käyaduşpranidhāna Sinful four leaves two as remainder activity of the body. and has a quotient which ka
Kāyaprayoga Bodily activity. leaves one as remainder when
Kāyapravicara One who divided by four.
experiences sexual enjoyment Kavalāhāra The intake of
through body. gross food.
Kāyasamita Careful in bodily Kaşāya A passion, i.e., anger,
er, activities. pride, deceit or greed.
Kāyika Physical, bodily. Kaşāyakuśīla An ascetic not
Kāyotsarga Stoppage of bodily free from passions.
activities, renunciation of bodily Kaşayamohaniya a kind of attachment. deluding karma causing
Kāraka A kind of right belief
a passions.
by which one performs virtuous Kaşāyarasa Astringent taste. acts and causes others to do the

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265
same.
Kutrika The three worlds, viz., Kāraṇa Cause; reason.
the upper world, the lower
world and the middle world. Kärunya Compassion.
Kutrikāpaņa A shop from Kārmaņa Karmic body etc.
which any of the articles Kārmiki Same as Karmajā.
produced in the three worlds Kārya Effect.
can be purchased. Kāla Time, the auxiliary Kudarśana Wrong belief, false cause of change; death. faith. Kālacakra Cycle of time Kudsșți One who possesses a consisting of six ascending false faith, a heretic. and six descending eras. Kudharma A heretical creed. Kalamāsa Time of death. Kupya Utensils, furniture, Kālika A canonical text which clothes etc. can be studied at the first and Kupravacana A heretical the last of the four divisions scripture. of a day as well as of a night. Kubja Hump-backed. Kālusya Sinfulness.
Kumāraśramaņa One who has Kimicchaka Accepting alms taken initiation as bachelor, an after asking such questions as unmarried ascetic. "Have you got this? Have you Kumbhi The birth-place of got that?" etc.
infernal beings. Kilvişa Deceit.
Kuruka Deceit Kilikasaṁhanana A weak Kurūpa Deluding karma. joining of the body in which
Kula A group of the disciples the bones are merely pressed
of the same preceptor. together and nailed.
Kulaka Same as Kudava. Kukși A measure equal to two
Kulakara Governor. cubits.
Kulapati The head of a group Kudava A weight equal to
of ascetics. four Setikās.
Kulinga Garments worn by Kutirthika A heretic.
heretics.

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Kulingin A heretic.
Any number which being Kuśīla Of bad character, of divided by four leaves two wicked conduct; imperfect. behind and the sum thus got by Kusamaya A false doctrine;
division when divided by four a heretical scripture.
leaves no remainder. Kūțatola False weight.
Krtikarman Obeisance to a
preceptor and the like. Kītamāna False measure.
Krtya A revered person. Kūțalekha False document.
Krsnaleśyā The first of the six Kūtasākşya False evidence. kinds of Leśyā, the black Krtayugma Any number temperament. which being divided by four Kevala Omniscience. does not leave any remainder behind.
Kevalajñāna Perfect
comprehension, comprehensive Kytayugma-kalyoja Any
omniscience. number which being divided by four leaves one behind and Kevalajñānāvaraņa A karma the sum thus got by division which obscures perfect when divided by four leaves comprehension. no remainder.
Kevaladarśana Perfect Krtayugma-kytayugma Any apprehension, apprehensive figure in which the sum omniscience. divided, as also the sum kevaladarśanāvarana A karma obtained by division, leaves which obscures perfect nothing behind when divided apprehension. by four.
2 . Kevalin Omniscient. Krtayugma-tryoja Any kevalisamudghāta The activity number which being divided performed by an omniscient by four leaves three behind being by expanding his souland the sum thus got by particles to destroy some division when divided by four karmas. leaves no remainder.
Kesarikā A small brush of Krtayugma-dvāparayugma threads.

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JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS
Keśaloca Rooting out of hair, Kṣapitakarman One who has pulling out of hair. destroyed karmas.
Keśavāņijya Dealing in furs Kṣamaṇa an ascetic of or furred animals. forbearing nature; an austerity;
a fast.
Kaivalya Omniscience.
Koṭākoți A crore multiplied by a crore.
Kotikoți Same as Koṭākoți. Kostha Firmly grasping. Kautkucika One who acts like a joker.
Kautkucya
gesticulation.
Kramabhava Successive
Occurrence.
Undesirable
Krīta A fault incurred by giving food etc. to an ascetic after purchasing it. Krodha Anger.

Krodhana Irritable, wrathful. Krośa A measure equal to four thousand Kuksis. Kṣanika Momentary. Kṣapakaśreņi Ladder of spiritual advancement by a gradual destruction of karmas. Kṣapana Destruction of
karmas; an ascetic.
267
Forgiveness,
Kṣamā forbearance.
Kṣamāpanā Begging of pardon. Kṣamāśramana An ascetic of forgiving nature.
Kṣaya Destruction annihilation of karmas.
Kriyā Activity.
Kriyāvādin Believer in moral Kṣayopaśamika Resulting
and spiritual action.
or
Kṣayopaśama Destructioncum-subsidence of karmas.
Kṣānti Forbearance, patience. Kṣāntikā A mother.
from subsidence of karmas.
Kṣiptacitta One maddened on account of sorrow.
destruction-cum
Kṣīņakaṣāya One whose passions are destroyed. Kṣinamoha One whose delusion is destroyed.

Kṣīrāsrava One possessed of sweet speech like milk. Kṣullaka A small monk. Kṣullikā A small nun. Kṣetra Place, area, space, land; country, region.

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Kh
Ganipițaka Scriptures. Khagati Gait.
Gandikā Composition of Khatvānga An instrument sentences uniform in sense. employed by ascetics. Gandīpustaka A book equal in Khandika A pupil, a disciple. length and breadth. Khalunka An immodest Gati Motion, gait; a state of disciple.
existence. Khādima Same as Khādya. Gatināman A kind of bodyKhādya All that is chewed or
making karma the rise of which
leads a soul to various states of nibbled.
existence, Khimsana Dishonour,
Gandha Smell. censure, disregard, contempt. Khedajña One who has
Gama Uniform style of knowledge of the miseries of
** composition; varieties,
distinctions; description. the world.
Gamaka Same as Gama.
Gamika A scripture having Gaccha A smaller group of
similar passages. ascetics. Gaņa bigger group of
Garbhajanma Uterine birth. ascetics.
Garhaņā Same as Garhā. Gañadhara A pontiff, a Garhā Censure. principal disciple of Gali A lazy disciple. Tirthankara; the head of a Gaveşanatā Same as Gana.
Gaveșaņā. Gaņāvacchedaka The head Gaveşaņā fathoming. of a small group of monks. Gāthāpati The head of a Ganāvacchedini The head of family; a merchant. a small group of nuns. Girinatana Death by fall fro Gaṇin The head of a Gaņa. a mountain. Gaņini The principal nun in Gitārtha Well-versed in a Gana.
scriptures.

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269
Gucchaka A kind of brush to Guru A preceptor. remove dust or insects from Gurukula A group of ascetics body etc.
under one preceptor. Guñjā A weight equal to two Gurunāman A variety of grains.
body-making karma by the rise Guņa A quality, an attribute; of which a soul gets heavy a virtue, a merit; a vow; a body. degree; a thread; multi- Gurumāsa Same as plication.
Māsaguru. Gunaratna A kind of penance Gurulaghu Heavy and light. lasting for sixteen months in
Gurusparśa Heavy touch. which one fasts for a day in the first month, for two days Grdhraprştha Death caused by in the second and so on for the piercing of the beaks of sixteen days in the sixteenth vultures etc. month.
Grhītārtha One who has Guņaviramana Identical with accepted the path of salvation. Guņavrata.
Gocara Begging of alms. Guņavrddhi Increasing of a Gocarī Alms. degree.
Gocchaka Same as Gucchaka. Guņavrata A supplementary Gotrakarman A kind of karma vow to strengthen the causing heredity, heredityfundamental vows of a lay- determining karma. votary.
Gomūtrikā A motion with Gunasthāna A stage of three curves. spiritual development, a state Grantha Knot of karmas; of virtues.
external and internal Gunahāni Decreasing of a possessions. degree.
Granthi A knot in the form of Guņideśa The residence of a attachment and aversion. substance.
Granthibheda Cutting of the Gupti Self-control.
intense Granthi.

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Graha Receiving.
Cakravartin The sovereign Grahaņa Same as Graha. king of a country. Glāna An ailing ascetic.
Cakrin Same as Cakravartin. Gh
Cakșurindriya The sense of Ghațīmātraka A small signt, the
sight, the eye, the visual organ. earthen pot.
Cakşurdarśana Visual Ghana Sound produced from
apprehension. metallic instruments.
Cakşurdarśanāvaraña A kind Ghanavāta Dense air.
of karma obscuring visual
apprehension. Ghanavātavalaya Circular
Caturanta The world. dense air.
Caturindriya A four-sensed Ghanodadhi An ocean with
being, a being with four senses, dense water.
viz., touch, taste, smell and Ghanodadhivalaya A circular
sight. ocean with dense water.
Caturthabhakta A fast. Ghāta Killing, destruction; Caturviņśatistava A hymn hell.
dedicated to the twenty-four Ghātikarman An obstructive Tirthankaras. karma, karma which obstructs
Candrakavedhya Piercing the any of the fundamental
eye of a rotating doll with an qualities of a soul.
arrow. Ghātin Obstructive,
Candrapratimā A sort of obscuring
penance in which one morsel of Ghrâna Identical with food is increased on every day Ghrāņendriya
in the bright half and decreased Ghrāņendriya The organ of similarly in the dark half of the smell, the nose, the olfactory month. sense-organ.
Cayopacayika Subject to
decrease and increase. Cakradhara Identical with Cara A mobile being. Cakravartin.
Carana Ascetic conduct,

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asceticism; conduct.
Caraṇakaraṇānuyoga An exposition of the primary and secondary rules of conduct. Caramadeha One with the last body, i.e., one who attains liberation in the same birth. Carita Conduct; life. Carya Moving about.
Calanika A waist-cloth used by a nun.
JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS
Candikya Anger.
Caturmäsa The rainy season. Caturyämadharma The law of four vows, viz., nonviolence, non-falsehood, nonstealing and non-possession. Caraṇa An ascetic possessed of an extra-ordinary power of
movement.
Cärikā A nun.
Caritra
conduct.
Conduct, right
Caritramohaniya Conductdeluding karma, a kind of karma that obstructs right
conduct.

Căriträcäritra Partial observance of right conduct. Cariträvaraṇīya Same as Caritramohaniya.
271
Căritrin An ascetic.
soul,
Citta Mind, consciousness, knowledge, life,
vitality.
Cittavat A sentient being. Cinta Thought; reasoning; induction.
Cintamani A wish-fulfilling gem.
Cilimilika A curtain.
Cilimili Same as Cilimilikā. Cūlā An appendix.
Culikā A period consisting of eighty-four lakhs of Cūlikāngas; an appendix. Culikanga A period consisting of eighty-four lakhs Prayutas.
of
Cetana Conscious.
Cetanā
Caitanya.
Cetas Same as Citta.
Cela Cloth.
Celaka Identical with Cela.
Caitanya Consciousness. Caitya A memorial on a funeral place; a temple; a garden; delightful; omniscience.
Identical with

Colapatta The waist-cloth of a monk.

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Caurika Same as Caurya. Caurya Stealing, theft. Jaga A living being. Cyavana Death of a god. Jaghanya Minimum. Ch
Jangama A mobile being. Chatrāticchatra Holding one Jarghācāraņa An ascetic who umbrella above another. can move in the sky simply by Chadman An obscuring patting the thighs. karma, a kind of karma that Jantu A living being. obscures the qualities of Jarāyuja Birth with a yolk-sac. soul.
Jalacara A five-sensed aquatic Chadmastha A non- being. omniscient.
Jalla Dirt of the body; an Chandana Inviting the acrobat. preceptor etc. to partake of a Jallausadhi The power by thing received by an ascetic. which a disease is destroyed by Channa A feast, a festivity. mere contact with dirt of the Channapada Deceit, fraud. body. Chardana Abandoning.
Jāngamika Produced from Chardita A fault connected
mobile living being, e.g. wool,
silk etc. with accepting food at the hands of one who has Jātatejas Fire. vomitted.
Jāti A Cass of living beings; Chaviccheda Mutilation of
maternal side; birth; a caste; a limbs.
kind.
Jātināman A variety of bodyChāgalika A butcher.
making karma causing birth in Chāyopaga A densely shady
different classes. tree.
Jātisthavira An ascetic of sixty Cheda Degradation, cut in or
" or more years of age. seniority.
Jātismaraņa Memory of past Chedopasthāpana Reinitiation. lives, recollection of past births.

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273
Jina A conqueror of passions, Jivakāya A group or class of a victor.
living beings. Jinakalpa The conduct of an Tīvanikāya Same as Jivakāya. ascetic like that of Jina. Jīvapradeśa An indivisible Jinakalpika Identical with particle of a soul. Jinakalpin.
Jivarāśi A collection of living Jinakalpin A solitary ascetic beings, an aggregate of whose conduct is like that of conscious beings. Jina.
Tīvaloka The world of living Jinagrha A Jina temple. beings. Jinadharma Jinism, Jainism. Tīvasthāna A state of soul, a Jinapratimā An image of a condition of living being. Jina, an idol of a Tirtharkara. Jivāstikāya An animate Jinavara A Tirtharkara. extensive substance, a sentient Jinavāni Speech or words of extenstive being, a conscious a Tīrthankara.
extensive real, an extensive Jinaśāsana Jainism.
substance in the form of soul. Jinendra A Tirthankara.
Jīvita Life. Jineśvara A Tirtharkara.
Jīvitāśaṁsā Desire to live long. Jinottama A Tirthankara.
Jugupsā Disgust. Jihvendriya The sense-organ
Jaina Relating to Jina; of taste, the gustatory sense
revealed by Jina; a follower of
Jina. organ. Jitakalpa Traditional usage or Joşaņā Destruction of karmas; convention
act of resorting Jirnakumāri A woman who Jñāta An illustration. has remained virgin till old Jñāna Comprehension, age.
determinate cognition, Jiva A soul, a living being, knowledge. an animate or a sentient Jñānāvarana Comprehension - substance.
obscuring karma.

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:
JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
Jñānāvaraņiya Same as . austerity. Jñānāvarana.
Tapasvin One who practises Jñānin A person possessed of penance; an ascetic. right knowledge.
Tamaskāya A column of Jñānopayoga Determinate darkness. cognition.
Tarka Inductive reasoning. Jyotişka A stellar god.
Taskaraprayoga Encouraging T
a thief. Tata Sound produced from Tāpasa An ascetic. leather covered musical Tikta Pungent taste.. instruments.
Tintiņika Grumbling at not Tattva Reality or truth; a real; being able to get food etc. essence; an essential thing; Tirvak Identical with substance.
Tiryanca. Tattvajñāna Knowledge of Tirvagdik The transverse the truth.
direction. Tattvaruci Predilection for Tirvagloka The middle world. the truth.
Tiryanca An animal or a subTattvärtha A real object; anh
a human being; a plant, an earthessential thing; a substance.
bodied being, a water-bodied
hodi Tathākāra Assent. .
being, a fire-bodied being and Tathāgata Free from an air-bodied being. reincarnation, emancipated. Tirtha An order of monks, Tathāgatipariņāma That nuns, laymen and laywomen; a being the natural state of ford; a holy place; a creed. motion.
Tirthańkara A founder of the Tanuvāta The atmosphere of four-fold order; a ford-maker. thin air.
Tirthařkaranāman A kind of Tanuvātavalaya The circular body-making karma by the rise atmosphere of thin air. of which a soul takes birth as a Tapas Apenance, an Tirthankara.

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275
Tivrakāmābhiniveśa Intense which a soul gets mobile body. sexual desire.
Trasareņu The sixty-fourth Tucchaușadhibhakşaņa Eat- part of the tip of a hair. ing a worthless thing from
Trindriya A three-sensed which much is to be thrown being, a being with three away.
senses, viz., touch, taste and Trņasparsa Pain inflicted by smell. blades of grass.
Truţita A period consisting of Tejaska Identical with eighty-four lakhs of Taijasa.
Truțitāngas. Tejaskāya A fire-bodied Truţitānga A period consisting being.
of eighty-four lakhs of Purvas. Tejaskāyika Same as Tryoja A number which Tejaskāya.
divided by four leaves three as Tejoleśyā The fourth of the remainder. six kinds of Leśyā, the bright Tryojakalyoja A number temperament; an effulgence which leaves a remainder of of hot atoms.
one and the quotient leaves that Taijasa Electric body etc. of three when divided by four. Taijasanāman A kind of Tryojakrtayugma A number body-making karma causing which leaves zero as remainder electric body.
and the quotient leaves three Trasa A mobile being. when divided by four. Trasakāya A mobile-bodied Tryojatryoja A number which being.
leaves a remainder of three Trasakāvika Same as Trasa. when it as well as its quotient kāya.
is divided by four. Trasanādi The space- Tryojadvāparayugma A channel occupied by mobile number which leaves a beings.
remainder of two and the Trasanāman A kind of body- quotient leaves that of three making karma by the rise of when divided by four.

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D
Daśadaśamikā A penance of a Danda Sinful activity, hundred days in which on every violence; a measure equal to day or the tenth day one Datti four cubits.
of food and water is increased Dandaka A division, a till it reaches ten Dattis. section.
Daśamabhakta Four fasts. Datti An unbroken current of Dānāntarāya A kind of powerwater or food.
obstructing karma which Dattika An ascetic observing hinders the inclination for a vow of taking a particular making gifts and charities. number of Dattis of food and Dāvägnidāna Same as water.
Davāgnidāpana. Dantavāņijya Ivory trade. Digambara Nude, naked. Dayā compassion, kindness. Digvirati Same as Digvrata. Darśana Apprehension, Digvrata A vow restraining the intuition, indeterminate limit of directions. cognition; belief, faith, Diśāparimāņa Same as conviction; introspection. Digvrata. Darśanamoha Identical with Diksā Renunciation, initiation, Darśanamohanīya.
consecration. Darśanamohaniya Belief- Diptacitta One maddened on deluding karma
account of joy. Darśanaśrāvaka The layman Dirghakālasañññā identical who holds right belief.
with Dirghakāliki. Darśanāvaraņa Apprehension Dirghakāliki A cognition -obscuring karma.
lasting for a long time. Darśanāvaraṇīya Same as Dirghakālopadeśiki Identical Darśanāvaraņa.
with Dirghakāliki. Dalika An aggregate of
Dirghaloka Vegetation. karmic particles. Davāgnidāpana Setting fire
Duḥkha Pain, distress,
suffering, misery to a forest etc.

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Duḥsvara Harsh voice. with Drşțivādopadeśiki. Durabhigandha Bad smell. Drstivādopadesiki A cognition Durgati An evil state of backed by scriptural knowexistence.
ledge. Durbhaga Unfortunate. Deva A god. Durlabhabodhika Dull.
Devakula Temple. Durvasu Incapable of Devagati The celestial state of salvation.
existence. Duścīrņa bad, wicked, evil. Devacchandaka A platform on Duşkıta A sin, an evil act.
which an idol is seated. Duspakvauşadhi Improperly
Devadūşya A divine garment. cooked food.
Devanikāya A group of gods, Duspratilekhana Improper
her a class of celestial beings. inspection.
Devādhideva A Tīrthankara. Duspramārjana Improper Devānupriya Lovable like a brushing or sweeping. god. Duşşamaduşşamā Exceed- Devendra A lord of gods. ingly miserable era.
Deśaghātin Partially obscurDuşşamā Miserable era. ing karmic particles. Dūtīpinda A fault incurred by Deśacāritra Partial observance an ascetic by obtaining food of right conduct. by conveying a message. Dešanā Sermon. Dūrālaya Salvation. Deśavirata A lay-votary, the Düsya A cloth, a garment. laity. Drstānta An example, an Deśavirati Partial renunillustration.
ciation. Drsti Sight, vision; view, Deśavrata Same as Deśavirati. tenet, doctrine; belief, faith. Deśāvakāśika A vow Drstimat Having right belief. restraining the limit of area. Drstivādasanjñā identical Daivasika Pertaining to day.

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Dravika Self-restrained. quotient leaves two when Dravya A substance; a divided by four. potency; a generality; matter, Dvāparayugmadvāparayugma a physical thing.
A figure which leaves a Dravyānuyoga An exposition remainder of two when it as relating to a substance, a well as its quotient is divided substantial exposition. by four. Dravvārthika Substantial Dvāra A topic, a chapter, a generic
section. Dravyārthikanaya Substan
Dvicarama One attaining tial standpoint, generic
liberation after being born as a viewpoint.
human being twice. Dravyāstika same as
Dvīndriya A two-sensed being, Dravyārthika.
a being with two senses, viz.,
touch and taste. Droņa A measure of four Adhakas.
Dveșa Aversion.
Dh Dvāparayugma A figure which divided by four leaves Dhanus A measure of four two as remainder.
cubits. Dvāparayugmakalyoja A Dharma Medium of motion; figure which leaves a property, attribute, characteriremainder of one and the stic; law, moral virtue, religion. quotient leaves two when Dharmacakra Wheel of law. divided by four.
Dharmatirtha A religious Dvāparayugmakştayugma A order. figure which leaves zero as Dharmadhyāna Inquisitive remainder and the quotient contemplation or meditation. leaves two when divided by Dharmācārya A religious four.
preceptor. Dvāparayugmatryoja A Dharmästikāya An extensive figure which leaves a substance in the form of remainder of three and the medium of motion.

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Dharmin Substance; subject. Dharmya Virtuous, righteous.
Nayuta A period consisting of eighty-four lakhs of Prayutas. Naraka A hell.
Dharmadhyāna.
Dharmyadhyāna Same as Narakapāla A guard of hell, a torturer of hellish beings. Narakāvāsa An infernal abode.
Nalina A period consisting of eighty-four lakhs of Nalināngas.
Dhātrīpinda A fault incurred by obtaining alms by amusing a child like a nurse.
Dharana Holding. Dharaṇā Retention. Dhūma A fault incurred by an ascetic by condemning the dryness of food.
Dhyana Meditation, concentration, contemplation.
Dhruva Constant, permanent; inevitable.
Dhrauvya Permanence.
Naya A viewpoint, a standpoint, a partial judgment. Nayavada Doctrine of viewpoint.
Nayabhasa Fallacious viewpoint, false standpoint.

279
Nalinanga A period consisting of eighty-four lakhs of Padmas. Navanavamikā A kind of penance lasting for eighty-one days.
N
Nandi Knowledge.
Närakagati The infernal state of existence.
Nandi Same as Nandi. Nandyāvarta A kind of Nārācasamhanana A weak diagram.
joining of the body in which the Napumsakaveda Androgy- bones are loosely tied together. nous desire.
Identical with
Nagnyabhava Possessionlessness, asceticism.
Namakarman Body-making karma, physique-making
karma.
Nārāyaṇa Vasudeva.
Nälikā A measure equal to four cubits; a period equal to twenty-four minutes. Nästitva Non-existence. Niḥkṣepa Same as Nikṣepa.

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Niḥśreyas Salvation.
Niḥśvāsa Exhalation. Niḥsrta Manifest.
Nīkācana Invitation. Nikācana A state of karma in which there is no possibility of any change in its nature, intensity etc.
Nikaya A collection, a group; salvation.
Nikṛti Deceit.
Nikṣipta A fault incurred by an ascetic by accepting food etc. placed on an animate thing.
Nikṣepa Positing a meaning, determination of a meaning; placing, putting. Nigamana Conclusion.
Nigoda A vegetation in the lowest form of life.
Nitya Permanent, eternal, constant, perpetual.
Nityabhakta Daily meal. Nityavāda Eternalism.
Nityavāsa Living in one place permanently.
Nidāna Desire for worldly gain as a reward for austerities. Nidrā Ordinary sleep. Nidränidrā Deep sleep.
Nidhatti Incapability of all the processes of karma other than increased realisation and decreased realisation. Nibandha Operation.
Nimittakāraṇa Instrumental

cause.
Nigraha Preventing sinful Niravadya Sinless.
activity.
Nimittapinda Accepting alms on the basis of augury. Niyati Fate, destiny, predetermination.
Niyativada Fatalism, determinism, necessitarianism. Niyativadin determinist.
A fatalist, a
Niyama A secondary vow. Niyaga Emancipation.
Niramagandha Faultless. Nirupakrama Irreducible, inevitable.
Nirodha Cessation, prevention. Nirgrantha One devoid of knot, one without possession, detached, passionless, an
Nityanitya Permanent as well ascetic, a monk.
as impermanent.
Nirgranthadharma Jainism.

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Nirgranthapravacana Jaina Nirveda Identical with Nirvega. scriptures.
Nirharana Cremation. Nirgranthi A nun.
Nivrttibādarasamparāya Same Nirjară Dissociation of as Apurvakaraṇa. karmas, destruction of karmas. Nišithikā A place for study or Nirmāņa A variety of meditation. physique-making karma Niścaya Continued cognition. which causes the formation of Niścavanaya Real viewpoint, the body with the several parts a
essential standpoint. in their proper places.
Niścalapada Salvation. Nirmitavādin One who holds that the universe is created by Nišrā Dependence. God.
Niśrita Dependent. Niryāņa Emancipation. Nişadya A seat, a sitting place. Niryukti Determination of the Nişīdana Act of sitting. relevant meaning of a word. Nișidhikā identical with Nirlāñchana Emasculation, Niśīthikā. castration,
Nişeka A praticular order of Nirvartanā Construction. karmic particles. Nirvāna Perfection, Eman- Nişedhikā Same as Naişedhiki. cipation.
Nişkarman Salvation Nirvikalpa Indeterminate. Nişkuțakşetra The region Nirvikalpaka Same as Nirvi- occupied by immobile beings kalpa.
only. Nirvrta Perfect, emancipated, Nişkramaņa Entrance into the free from the cycle of birth and ascetic order. death.
Nisarga Operation. Nirvști Same as Nirvāņa. Nisargakriyā Approval of an Nirvrtti Accomplishment. evil act. Nirvega Disgust with the Nisargaruci Intuitive belief. world.
Niha Deceitful.

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Nihā Deceit.
Nyāsa Same as Nikṣepa. Nihnava One who conceals Nyāsāpahāra Misapprothe truth and propounds a false priating a pledged property. doctrine, a schismatic.
P Nīcagotra Inferior heredity. Paksa A thesis; an abode. Nīcagotrakarman Inferior Pañcakalyāna Five auspiheredity-determining karma. cious events in the life of a Nīcairgotra Identical with Tirthankara. Nicagotra.
Pañcāstikāya Five extensive Nīti Same as Naya.
substances. Nīlaleśyā Blue thought-tint, Pañcendriya A five-sensed the second of the six kinds of being, a being with five senses, lesyā.
viz., touch, taste, smell, sight Nüma Deceit; darkness; and hearing. covering.
Paņdaka A eunuch. Naigamanaya The non- Panditamarana Wise death, distinguished standpoint. peaceful death, voluntary death. Nairayika Identical with Patangavīthikā Begging alms Nāraka.
without any order. Naiscayika Real.
Padastha Concentration upon Naisedhiki Reciting a word holy chants. suggestive of negation. Padārtha A substance, an Noindriya Mind.
object. Nokarman Quasi-karmic Padma A period consisting of matter.
eighty-four lakhs of Nokaṣāya A quasi-passion. Padmāngas. Notrasanosthāvara A libe- Padmaleśyā Pink thought-tint, rated soul.
the fifth of the six kinds of Nyagrodhaparimaņdala The
Leśyā. upper part of a body to be Padmānga A period consisting symmetrical and not the lower of eighty-four lakhs of Utpalas.

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Paratva Priority.
Parikuñcana Deceit, fraud. Paramapada Salvation. Parigopa Greed. Paramänga A way to Parigraha Possession, salvation.
possessiveness. Paramāņu An atom, an Parigrahaparimāņa Limited indivisible part of matter. possession. Paramāņupudgala Same as Parigrahaviramaņa AbstiParamāņu.
nence from possessions, nonParamātman A liberated possessiveness. soul.
Parigrahasañjnā Desire for Paramāyata Salvation possession, acquisitive instinct. Paramartha Emancipation. Paricāraņā Sexual enjoyment. Paramesthin the supreme Parijñā Abandoning after a divinity.
thorough understanding. Parampara With intervening
Pariņati Identical with space or time; succession.
Pariņāma. Paramparāgama Scriptures Pariņāma Modification, transreceived in succession.
formation, change; inherent Paralokabhaya Fear produ
nature or capacity. ced by another class of beings.
or class of beings. Pariņāminityatva Permanence Paralokāśaṁsā Other
in the midst of changes. worldly desire.
Paridevana Bewailing. Paravyapadeśa To say about Parinirvāņa Perfection, one's own possession that it salvation. belongs to someone else. Paribhoga Enjoyment of a Parasangraha The ultimate thing that can be used generic viewpoint.
repeatedly or externally. Parāghāta Superiority over Parimantha Destruction. others.
Parivarta A period consisting Parārthānumāna Syllogistic of infinite Utsarpiņis and inference.
Avasarpiņis.
Onl.

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Parivartană Revision, affliction. repetition.
Parīşahajaya Conquest of Parivartaparihāra Entering troubles, endurance of another's dead body.
afflictions. Parivartita A fault connected Parokșa Indirect knowledge, with giving of food etc. to an non-perceptual cognition, ascetic after changing or mediate knowledge. exchanging
Paryava Same as Paryāya. Parivāda Blame, accusation, Paryāpta Identical with censure.
Paryāptaka. Parişthāpana Abandoning or Paryāptaka A developed living throwing with care.
being. Parisarpa A reptile. Paryāptanāman A kind of Parisrava The cause of body-making karma by the rise destroying karmas, des- of which a living being gets a truction of bondage. developed body. Pariharaṇa Using, utilising. Paryāpti Full development, Parihāraviśuddhi Purity completion. attained by a particular Paryāya A mode, a condition, penance lasting for eighteen a form, a state. months, an expiatory catharsis. Paryāyajyestha Senior in Parita Numerable, limited; initiation. separate, independent; little, Paryāyasthavira An ascetic small.
after twenty years of Parītakāya One body with consecration. one soul.
Paryāyārthika Modal, partiParītajīva A soul with a cular, specific. separate body.
Paryāyārthikanaya Modal Paritasamsărin One who has standpoint, particular viewpoint. to wander in this world for a Paryāyāstika Same as short time.
Paryāyārthika. Parīşaha A trouble, an Paryāvasatha A monastery.

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Paryupäsanā Service, Pânaka Same as Pāna. devotion.
Pānapunya A virtue acquired Paryuşaņa Residence in a by giving water out of particular place during the compassion. rainy season.
Pānabhojana Food and drink. Paryuşaņā Identical with Papa Evil karma, sinful karma, Paryusaņa.
evil, sin. Palälaka A straw-bed. Pāpaka Sinful, wicked. Palita A wicked deed; karmic Pāpapraksti A species of sinful particles.
karma. Palya Same as Palyopama. Päraņaka Same as Pāraņā. Palyopama An innumerable Päraņā Breaking a fast. quantity of years, i.e., a Paramarthika Real, transcennumber of years crossing dental. seventy-seven cyphers.
Pārāñcika Expulsion from the Paścātkarman A sin due to
order. washing of utensils etc. with water having life after giving
Pārigrahiki A sin due to an food to an ascetic.
attachment to property. Paśyatta Apprehension: Pāriņāmika Inherent, natural. vision.
Pāriņāmiki Mature intePānimukta A motion with lligence. one curve.
Pāritāpanikā A sin incurred by Pädapopagamana Meeting troubling others. death voluntarily in a tree-like Päriharika An ascetic who motionless state.
accepts food avoiding faults; a Pädapronchana A piece of performer of a particular cloth to wipe the feet. he feet penance for a period of eighteen
months. Pädopagamana Same as Pādapopagamana.
Pārsvastha An ascetic fallen
from right conduct. Pāna A drink.
Pāśastha Same as Pārsvastha.

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Pāşanda Hcresy.
substance in the form of matter. Pāşandin A heretic. Punarbhava Rebirth. Piņdapāta Alms.
Purahkarman Same as Pindaprakrti A collective Purākarman. type of body-making karma. Purākarman A sin due to Pindalaka One who lives on washing of hands etc. before alms.
giving food to an ascetic. Pindavisuddhi Purity of food. Puruṣaveda Same as Piņdastha Concentration Pumveda. upon certain material objects. Puruşādānīya Honourable, Pindaişaņā Search for food. respectable, revered. Pihita A fault incurred by an Pulāka An ascetic whose ascetic by accepting food conduct is worthless like chaff. covered with an animate thing. Puşkariņi A lotus-pond. Pītaleśyā Yellow thought-tint. Pūtikarman Mixing of pure Pumveda Masculine desire. food with the impure. Punya Good karma, virtuous Pūrva A period equal to karma, good, virtue.
eighty-four lakhs of Punyapraksti A species of
Pūrvāngas; a scripture that was virtuous karma.
composed first. Pudgala Matter; flesh; soul.
Pürvacara Predecessor,
antecedent. Pudgalaparāvarta A period required by a soul for
Pūrvadhara One versed in the absorbing all the material
Pūrva texts. particles of the universe as Pūrvabhava Previous birth, gross body etc.
former life. Pudgalaparivarta Identical Pūrvarata Sexual enjoyments with Pudgalaparāvarta. earlier experienced. Pudgalapraksepa Throwing Pūrvavid Same as of pebbles etc.
Purvadhara. Pudgalāstikāya An extensive Pūrvānga A period equal to

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eighty-four lakhs of years. text. Purvin Identical with Prakalpa Excellent conduct. Pārvadhara.
Prakīrṇa Same as Prakīrņaka. Prochanā Enquiring. Prakirņaka Miscellaneous Pythaktva From two to nine. canonical texts. Pythaktvavitarka Meditating Prakti Nature of karma. upon the difference among the Prakrtibandha Bondage of modes of a substance karmic nature. according to scriptural
Prakṣēpāhāra Eating in knowledge.
mouthfuls. Pythvīkāya An earth-bodied
Pracankramana Moving on
Procophron soul.
the knees. Prthvīšilāpattaka An earthen
Pracalā Sleeping while sitting slab as a plank.
or standing. Paisunya Slander, back
Pracalāpracalā Sleeping biting.
while walking. Potaka A cotton cloth.
Pracchannapratisevin A Potaja One born in a bare secret sinner. state.
Pracchādani An upper Posadha Self-observation, garment. spiritual activity.
Prajñapti Identical with Poşadhopavāsa Fasting Prajñāpanā. combined with self- Prajñā Reasoning. observation.
Prajñāpanā Explanation, Paudgalika Material.
exposition. Paurusi A quarter of a day Pranidhāna Concentration. or night.
Pranidhi Same as Paușadha Same as Poşadha.
Praņidhāna. Pauşadhaśālā A place for
Delicious observing Pauşadha.
food. Prakaraņa An explanatory Pratara A layer.
TULLIANUOTOLIU
lo
CIUIUUD

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Pr
Pratāna Dreaming at length. Pratisatru Same as Pratikramana Repentance. Prativasudeva. Pratikrānta One who has Pratișthā Fixing. repented for his faults. Pratisamlinata Staying at a Pratigraha A bowl. lonely place, living alone. Pratijñā A thesis.
Pratisevanā Incurring a fault. Pratinārāyana Identical with Pratisevā Same as Pratisevanā. Prativasudeva.
Pratyakşa Perception, direct Pratipatti Continued cognition, immediate knowcognition.
ledge. Pratipātin Fallible, passing. Pratyabhijñana Recognition. Pratipürnapausadha Self- Pratyākhyāna Abandonment, observation for a day and renouncement. night.
Pratyākhyānāvarana A group Pratiprcchana Asking of passions hindering total permission again; questioning renunciation. in order to clear a doubt. Pratyāvartanată Repeated Pratiprccha Same as determination. Pratiprcchanā.
Pratyeka One body having one Pratibhā Grasp.
soul, an individual body. Pratima A particular vow or Pratyekapraksti An individual penance.
type of body-making karma. Pratimāna Weight
Pratyekabuddha One who Pratirūpakavyavahāra
attains enlightenment by means Dealing in counterfeit
of something. commodities.
Pratyekaśarira Same as Pratilekhana Inspection.
Pratyeka. Pratilekhanā Same as
Pradeśa A particle, an Pratilekhana.
indivisible part, a partless part; Prativāsudeva The enemy of
a space-point.
Pradeśabandha Bondage of a Vasudeva.
karmic particles.

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Pradveșa Aversion.
activity. Prabhāvanā Propagation of Prayogasampat The power to law.
debate. Pramattasamyata An ascetic Prarūpaņā Explanation, having some negligence. exposition, Pramāņa An organ of Pravacana Scripture, sermon, knowledge, a means of doctrine, creed. cognition, right knowledge, Pravartaka One who causes valid cognition; complete monks to observe asceticism, judgment.
the administrative head of a Pramāņāngula A measure group of monks. equal to one thousand Pravartin Identical with Utsedhāngulas.
Pravartaka. Pramāda Negligence, Pravartini A chief nun who carelessness.
causes others to observe Pramārjana Sweeping, asceticism, the female brushing, cleaning. - administrative head of a group Pramokşa Emancipation of nuns. Prayuta A period equal to Pravādin A heretic. eighty-four lakhs of Pravāduka An opponent. Prayutângas.
Pravicāra Sexual enjoyment. Prayutānga A period equal to Pravrajita An ascetic. eighty-four lakhs of Ayutas. Pravrajyā Initiation, Prayoga Activity.
consecration. Prayogakriyā Bodily Praśnápraśna Stating to both operation.
who asks and does not ask. Prayogaja Produced by an Prasthāpita Beginning of an effort.
expiation. Prayogabandha Bondage due Prasphotană A fault incurred to activity.
by an ascetic by jerking clothes. Prayogamati Intellectual Prasravaņa Urine.

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Prāņa A vitality, a life- deserves the vow of accepting principle, a vital element, life; remnants of coarse or dry food. out-breath, exhalation; a Prāntajivin One who lives on measure of time equal to coarse or dry food. breath.
Prāntāhāra Coarse or dry Prānavadha Destruction of food; remnants of food. life, severance of a vitality. Prāpyakāritā Coming in close Prāņavyaparopaņa Identical contact. with Prāņavadha.
Prābhrta A chapter; a quarrel; Prānātipāta Injury to vitality, a present. destruction of life, killing, Prābhrtaprābhịta A subviolence.
chapter. Prāņātipātaviramaņa Non
no Prābhștikā A fault incurred by violence, non-killing, non
" offering food etc. to an ascetic injury, abstinence from
as a gift. violence, refraining from killing or injuring.
"Prāmānya Validity. Prānin A sentient being a Prämitya Borrowing for an living being, an animate being.
ascetic. Prātihārika Returnable.
Prāyaścitta An expiation, an
atonement. Prātihārya A majestic occurrence, a miraculous
Prāyogya Reduction of karmic
effect. happening. Prātītyikī A sin owing to
to Prāvacanika A preceptor wellexternal things.
versed in scriptures. Prāduskarana A fault Prāśnika An ascetic who tells incurred by giving food to an the good or evil result of a ascetic by lighting a lamp. question.
adverika A sin incurred by Prāsuka Lifeless. jealousy.
Prekşā Reflection; inspection. Prāntakula A low family. Preyas Attachment. Prāntacaraka An ascetic who Preșyaparityāga A vow in

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B
which the lay-votary does not a moment for its performance. ask his servant to do any Bahuśruta One versed in work.
many scriptures, a very learned Preşyaprayoga Sending a person. servant outside the prescribed Bādara Gross. sphere.
Bādarakāya A gross-bodied Proșadha Identical with being. Poşadha.
Bādaranāman A kind of body
making karma which causes Bakuša An ascetic who cares gross body. for the adornment of his body Badarasamparāya One in and implements and whose whom passions occur in a gross mind is spotted by infatuation, form. a spotted ascetic.
Bālatapas An ignorant Baddhasprșța Closely practice of penance, childish touched.
penance. Bandha Bondage of karmas; Bālapandita A lay-votary, one binding.
with partial renunciation. Bandhana Binding, bondage. Bālamarana Foolish death, Baladeva The elder brother childish death. of a Vasudeva.
Bāhalya Thickness. Balabhadra Same as Bāhyatapas External austerity, Baladeva.
physical penance. Bahirātman Exterior self. Bāhyopadhi External Bahirmukha Extrovert. belongings. Bahirvyāpti External Bijabuddhi One having concomitance.
intellect like a seed which leads Rahubiiaka Having him to many meanings from a numerous seeds.
word having one meaning. Bahurata A doctrine which Bījaruci Right belief brought holds that an act takes many about by hearing a word.

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Bh
Buddha Omniscient, posture for two days. enlightened, learned. Bhadrottarā A particular Buddhi Intelligence, intellect; penance. vivid determination. Bhaya A deluding karma that Bodha Comprehension. causes fear. Bodhi Right belief. Bhayasañjñā The instinct of Bodhidurlabhatva Rarity of fear. right belief.
Bhavana A type of residential Brahmacarya Celibacy, con- quarters meant for gods. tinence.
Bhavanapati Identical with Brahman Celibacy; salva- Bhavanavāsin. tion; self-knowledge; self- Bhavanavāsin A residential restraint.
god.
Bhavapratyaya Owing to birth. Bhaktakathā A talk about Bhavabhramana Wandering in food.
the worldly life. Bhaktaparijñā Abandoning Bhavaviraha The end of of food for ever.
worldly existence. Bhaktapāna Food and water. Bhavasiddhika A soul fit to Bhaktapratyākhyāna Fasting. attain emancipation. Bhanga A division, a fold. Bhavāntara Another life. Bhajanā
Option, Bhavika Identical with Bhavya. contingency, indefiniteness. Bhavya Capable of salvation. Bhajaniya Optional, Bhāngika A cloth of flax. contingent, indefinite. Bhäjya Optional, contingent, Bhata An honourable one. indefinite. Bhattāraka A venerable one. Bhāțakakarman Livelihood Bhadanta Respectable, from letting beasts of burden revered.
etc. on hire. Bhadrā A penance to be Bhāva State, mode, performed in a particular modification, condition;

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293
inclination, intention; thought; moving on the arms. nature; quality; psyche, mind; Bhūta A living being. object, thing, actuality, reality. Bhutavāda Realism. Bhāvanā Contemplation, Bhūtārtha Real, true. reflection, thought, disposi-,
Bheda Division, dissociation; tion, intention, mentality,
difference, distinction. attitude. Bhāvabandha Psychical Bhedana Destruction. bondage.
Bhedābhedavāda The doctrine Bhāvaviśuddhi Purity of of identity-cum-difference. thought, mental purity. Bhoga Enjoyment of things. Bhāvaśruta Scriptural Bhogabhūmi A region of knowledge.
enjoyment, a land of inaction. Bhāvasādhu A real ascetic. Bhogāntarāya A variety of Bhävitātman A meritorious power obstructing karma by the
rise of which one cannot enjoy man, a virtuous soul.
non-consumable things. Bhāṣāpariņati Modification
Bhogopabhoga Nonof material particles in the
consumable and consumable form of speech.
things. Bhāṣāsamiti Carefulness in speaking
Bhogopabhogaparimāņa
Same as UpabhogaparibhogaBhikṣācari Same as
as parimāņa. Bhikṣācaryā.
Bhaumeya
Same as Bhiksācaryā Begging alms. Bhavanavāsin. Bhiksucarya The conduct of Bhránti Lapse of memory. an ascetic. Bhikṣuni A nun.
Mankha A wandering beggar Bhikṣupratimā A particular
earning his livelihood by penance or vow observed by
y showing pictures. the ascetic.
Mandalaka A weight equal to Bhujaparisarpa A reptile twelve Karmamāşakas.
M

:

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Mati Intelligence, intellect; Manoyoga Mental activity. determination, decision. Maraṇāśamsä To wish for
Matijñāna Sensory-cum- death. mental knowledge.
Matijñānāvarana A kind of joining of bones.
karma obscuring Matijñāna.
Madhukari Begging of alms. Madhyaloka Middle world. Madhvasrava One possessed of sweet speech like honey.
Markaṭabandha A weak
Matyajñāna Wrong sensory knowledge. Madhukaravṛtti Begging Mahattarā.
food like a bee.
Manogupti Mental control.
Manojña An ascetic of high reputation.
Manojñāna Manaḥparyayajñāna. Manoduspraṇidhāna Improper mental act.

Mahattara A chief monk. Mahattara A chief nun. Mahattarikā Same
Manaḥparyayajñāna Mahāśilākaṇṭaka A battle in which a pebble becomes a huge
Telepathy, direct knowledge of mental modes.
stone.
Manaḥparyayajñānāvaraṇa Mahāskandha The biggest Telepathy-obscuring karma. physical aggregate.
Mātṛgrāma Women.
Manaḥparyavajñāna Identical with Manaḥparyayajñāna.
Manas Mind.
Madhyasthya Indifference. Māna Pride; a means of Manuṣyagati The human measurement; a means of state of existence. knowledge; honour, respect. Māyā Deceit.
Māyāmṛṣā Falsehood together with deceit.
Same as Māraṇāntika To be done when death approaches.
Mārgaṇatā Same as Mārgaṇā. Märgaṇā Searching.
as
Maharși A Tirthankara. Mahāvrata A great vow, a complete vow.
Mahāvratin An ascetic who observes great vows.

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Mārdava Modesty, mildness. emancipation. Mālāpahrta Brought down Mukhapotikā Same as from an upper storey.
Mukhavastrikā. Māsakalpa A rule that an Mukhavastrikā A piece of ascetic should not stay at a cloth to cover the mouth. place for more than a month Mukhavāsa Anything to scent except in the rainy season. the mouth. Māsakşamaņa Fasting for a Mukhānantaka Same as month.
Mukhavastrikā. Masaguru A fast.
Mundakevalin An ordinary Māsalaghu A half fast. omniscient person. Māsikabhakta Fasting for a Mudhā Non-attachment. month.
Muni An ascetic. Mithyākāra Repentance. Musala A measure equal to Mithyātva Delusion, wrong four cubits. or false belief,
Muhurta A period equal to Mithyātvamohanīya A kind seventy-seven Lavas, i.e., of belief-deluding karma forty-eight minutes. which produces complete Mürcchã Attachment. wrong belief.
Müla Root; reordainment in Mithyādarśana Wrong or monkhood. false belief, delusion.
Mülakarman Securing food Mithyādrsti One who by causing abortion etc. possesses wrong belief.
Mülaguņa A fundamental or Miśrajāta A fault incurred by primary duty, a basic virtue. an ascetic by accepting food ML
Mülapraksti A fundamental prepared for both the ascetic
type of karma, a basic division and the householder.
of karma. Mukta
Liberated,
Mülabīja A kind of vegetation emancipated.
whose roots serve as seeds. Mukti Liberation,
Mülavrata A fundamental or

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
basic vow. Mülasūtra An original Yata Careful. canonical text, a fundamental Yatanā Carefulness. canonical text.
Yati An ascetic, a monk. Mrtādin One who eats Yatidharma The duty of an lifeless things.
ascetic. Mrşā False.
Yathākhyāta Perfect conduct. Mrşāvāda A lie, falsehood.
Yathājāta Naked. Mrşāvādaviramana Absti
the Yathāpravrttakaraṇa Soul's nence from falsehood, non- ;
ne ineradicable tendency towards falsehood.
spiritual growth. Medhā Retentiveness. .
Yathāpravsttikarana Same as Maithuna Copulation, Yathāpravsttakarana. coition.
Yathālanda Specified time. Maithunaviramaņa Absti
bsti- Yathasar vibhāga Proper nence from copulation, non
sharing with the ascetic. copulation.
Yadscchă Accident. Maithunasañjñā Sexual desire.
Yadscchāvāda Accidentalism. Moka Urine.
Yantrapidanakarman Work Mokşa Emancipation,
involving milling. liberation.
Yama A primary vow. Moha Delusion, infatuation.
Yamanikā An implement kept
by an ascetic in the right armpit. Mohanīya Deluding karma.
Yamala In juxtaposition. Maukharya Talkativeness.
Yava The eighth part of an Mauna Asceticism; silence.
Angula. Mrakṣita A fault incurred by
Yavamadhyā A penance having an ascetic by accepting food
the form of the middle part of a etc, smeared with an animate
barleycorn. thing.
Yaśaḥkirtināman A kind of Mleccha Same as Anārya

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body-making karma which Rati Liking..
causes fame and honour- Ratimohaniya A kind of
giving personality.
deluding karma which produces liking.
Yama A vow, a great vow.
Yavatkathika For life.
Ratnatraya The three jewels,
innumerable and infinite.
Yukta A variety of the viz., right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. Ratnadhika Identical with Rātnika.
Yuga A measure equal to four cubits; a period equal to five
years.
Ratnavali A penance to be
Yugala A pair of male and performed for five years, two female twins. months and twenty-eight days.
Yugalaka Identical with Ratni A cubit.
Yugala.
Rathamusala A battle in which
Yugalita Consisting of a pair a club is tied at the back of a
of male and female twins.
chariot.
Yugalin A pair of male and female twins.
Yugma An even number.
Yoga Activity.
Yojana A measure equal to four Krosas.
R Rajastrāņa A covering for vessels.
Rajoharana A broom.
Rajju 1/14 of the total height of the universe, i.e., innumerable Yojanas.

297
Rathareņu A molecule of eight Trasareņus.
Rasa Taste; intensity.
Rasana Same as Rasanā.
Rasanā
Rasanendriya.
Yoni A seat of birth, a place Rasanendriya The gustatory of birth. sense-organ, the tongue.
Bondage of
Rasaparityāga Abandonment of stimulating or delicious food. Rasabandha karmic intensity. Rasavanijya Trade in alcohol. Rahasyabheda Same as Rahasyabhyakhyāna.

Same as

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Rahasyābhyākhyāna Reveal- form, possessing form. ing a secret.
Rocaka Belief in right conduct. Rahobhyākhyāna Identical Romāhāra Taking food from with Rahasyābhyākhyāna. air etc. through hair. Rāga Attachment.
Raudradhyāna Cruel Rāgadveșa Attachment and contemplation. aversion. Rājapiņda King's food. Laghu Light. Rātnika Senior in initiation; Laghumāsa Same as superior in merit.
Masalaghu. Rātribhakta Identical with Lajjā Self-restraint. Rātribhojana.
Labdhi Attainment of capacity; Rātribhojana Taking food at attainment of super-normal night.
power Rātribhojanaviramaņa Labdhyaksara Capacity to Avoidance of night-eating, follow the meaning of the abstinence from taking food at letters and their combinations. night.
Layana A place of rest, a Rādhāvedha Shooting a doll's house. eye with an arrow. .
Lava A period equal to fortyRāśiyugma An even quantity. nine breaths; karma. Ruci Belief, faith. .
Lavālava Observance of right Rūkșa Rough touch. conduct every moment. Ripa Form.
Lākṣāvānijya Trade in lac. Rūpasthadhyāna Concentra- Langalikā A motion with two tion on the form of the Jina. curves. Rūpātītadhyāna Concen- Lābhāntarāya A kind of tration on the formless Siddha. power-obstructing karma which Rūpānupāta Making a bodily hinders gaining. gesture.
Likṣā A molecule equal to Rūpin With form, having eight tips of hair.

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Linga A sign, a mark. Vacana Speech. Luncana Same as Loca. Vacanagupti Control of speech. Luñcita One whose hair are Vacanadanda Sinful speech. plucked out
Vacanaduspraạidhāna ImproLūşaka Cruel; destroyer. per speech. Leśyā Temperament, Vacanayoga Vocal activity. thought-tint, mentality; light, Vacanasamita Careful in lustre.
speech. Loka The universe, the Vacanīya Censurable. world.
Vacas Identical with Vacana. Lokavādin A believer in the
Vajramadhyā A penance world.
having the form of the middle Lokasanjñā Worldly desire. part of the thunder-bolt. Lokākāśa The universe- Vajrarṣabhanārāca An excellspace, the space within the ent joining of the body in which universe, the cosmic space. the bones are hooked into one Lokāgra The tip of the another. universe.
Vațabha Hump-backed. Lokāloka The universe and Vadha Killing; injuring; the non-universe.
beating. Lokottara Extra-ordinary. Vanakarman Livelihood from Loca Plucking out of hair. wood. Lobha Greed.
Vanakāya Same as VanaspaLomāhāra Same as tikāya. Romāhāra.
Vanaspati Vegetation, plants. Laukika Ordinary.
Vanaspatikāya A plant-bodied
soul. Vaktavya Expressible,
Vanaspatikāyika Identical describable.
with Vanaspatikāya. Vakragati Curved motion.
Vanīpaka Accepting alms by showing misery
V

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Varagati Liberation.
soul. Varajñāna Omniscience. Vāyukāyika Identical with Vargaņā A group of material Vāyukāya. particles or atoms.
Vāsanā Impression. Varna Colour.
Vasudeva The sovereign king Varņavāda Praise.
of the half of a country. Vartanā Gradual change. Vikața Water. incessant change.
Vikatană Confession. Vardhamāna The increasing Vikațabhojin One who eats in one.
the daytime. Varşa A region, a country. Vikalādeśa Partial statement. Varşadhara A mountain Vikalendriya A living being which forms boundary of a having two, three or four senses. particular region or country. Vikāla Evening. Valanmarana Death after Vikuttanā Pain due to beating falling from self-restraint. in various ways. Vaśārtamarana Death Vikurvanā Same as Vikriyā. caused by the subjection of Vikrta An object that causes senses.
passion, e.g., milk etc. Vācaka A reader, a teacher. Vile
Vikrstabhakta Fast for more Vācană Reading, teaching than three days. Vāc Identical with Vacana. Vikriyā Transformation. Vätavalaya Circular air.
Vikṣepaņā Expanding; Vāda Debate.
expounding. Vädika A debater.
Vikșepaņi A kind of religious Vädin A disputant.
story which expounds different
doctrines. Vänavyantara Identical with Vyantara.
Vigama Destruction. Vāmana Dwarf.
Vigraha Body; curve, bend; Väyukāya An air-bodied quarrel.

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Vigrahagati Transmigratory Vidhikalpanā Positive aspect. motion.
Vinaya Veneration, reverence. Vicaya Contemplation. Vinayavāda Doctrine of nonVicāra Transition.
discrimination. Vicārabhūmi A place for Vinayavādin Same as voiding stools.
Vainayika. Vicikitsă Inconstancy; disgust. Viparyaya Wrong, false. Vicela Naked.
Vipāka Fruit, fruition. Vijñāna Determinate cogni- Vipākavicāra Contemplation tion.
of fruition of karmas. Vitata Sound produced by a Vipulamati Complex stringed instrument.
telepathy. Vitarka Scriptural know- Viprayoga Removal. ledge.
Vibhangajñāna False clairVitasti A measure equal to voyance. twelve fingers.
Vibhajyavāda Conditional Vidanda A staff as high as the expression, explanation by armpit.
making divisions. Vidāranakriyā Proclaiming Vimarśa Enquiry. others' sins.
Vimāna A heavenly abode; a Vidyācāraṇa An ascetic who celestial car. can move in the sky through Vimānavāsin Same as the power of his lore. Vaimānika. Vidyādhara A person who Vimānāvāsa A celestial abode. can fly in the sky through the Vimukta Emancipated, power of his lore.
released. Vidyāpinda Securing food by Vimukti Salvation, release, showing the application of a emancipation. lore.
Vimokṣa Same as Vimukti. Vidhāna Division, classifica- Vivasti A stick lower by four tion.
fingers than one's own body.

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Virata An ascetic.
Vihayogati Gait.
Viratasamyagdrşti An ascetic Viharabhumi A place for with right belief.
study.
Viratävirata Identical with Vicara Same as Vicara.
Deśavirata.
Vitaraga Free from attachment and aversion.
Virati Abstinence from sin, cessation of sinful activity.
Virya Power, energy.
Viramana Abstinence.
Vīryāntarāya A kind of power
Virādhanā Violation of a obstructing karma which hinders exertion or effort.
VOW.
Vivarta Mode.
Viviktaśayyasana A lonely residence.
Vivekapratima A vow of Vṛttisankṣepa Identical with renouncing external and Vrttiparisankhyāna.
Vṛṣabha Excellent, able.
internal possessions. Viśalyakaraṇa Making the Veda Sexual desire. soul faultless.
Viśvasena A Cakravartin.
Trade in
Viṣavāņijya poisonous articles.
Vişkambha Width, extension. Visamvadana Deception. Visambhogika One with whom intercourse of food etc. is broken.
Visarga Expansion.
Visarpa Expansion.
Visrasă Nature.
Vihagagati Same Vihayogati.

Vṛttiparisankhyāna Reduction of alms, restrictions for food.
Vedana Experience, feeling. Vedană Pain; experience, feeling.
Vedaniya Feeling-producing karma.
Vedya Feeling, experience. Vaikālika A text which is studied in the evening. Vaikriya Transformable body
etc.
Vaikriyalabdhi The power of making a transformable body. as Vaikriyasamudghāta Emanation of soul-particles at the time

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JAINA TECHNICAL TERMS
of making a transformable Vyavacchitti Destruction. body.
Vaikriyika Same as Vaikriya. Vaidharmya Heterogeneity, dissimilarity.
Vainayika An upholder of Vyavasaya Determination.
non-discrimination.
Vainayiki Born of faithful standpoint,
service.
viewpoint.
Vaihāyasa suicide by hanging. Vyakta Distinct, definite.
Vyañjana Sense-object
contact.
Committing
Vaimānika A heavenly god. Vyavahārābhāsa Fallacy of the practical viewpoint.
Vaiyavṛttya Service.
Vairagya Detachment.
Vaisrasika Natural.
Vyañjanākṣara Sound of the letter, the spoken letter.
Vyañjanavagraha Contact

Vyavacchinnakriyāpratipātin Same as Vyuparatakriyānivṛtti. Vyavadana Penance; destruction of karmas.
awareness.
Vyatikrama Trying to violate
a vow.
Vyatireka concomitance in disagreement.
Vyantara A peripatetic god. Vyaparopana Destruction,
severance.
Vyaya Destruction.
Vyavaharanaya Practical
empirical
303
Vyakaraṇa Answer, reply, explanation.
t
Vyaghāta An obstruction. Vyapaka Determinant concomitant.
Vyapti Necessary concomi
tance.
Vyapya Determinate conco
mitant.
Vyamoha Delusion.
Vyucchittinaya The viewpoint of mode, the standpoint of difference.
Vyutkarsa Pride, arrogance. Vyutpäta Violence.
Vyutsarga Renunciation of
attachment.

Vyutsita Bigoted.
Vyuparatakriyanivartin Same as Vyuparatakriyānivṛtti.

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Vyuparatakriyānivetti Aspiral of a conch. state of meditation where all sayana Same as Sayyā. activities are stopped and savanīya Same as Sayyā. which is infallible.
Śayyā An abode, a residence; a Vrata A vow.
bed, a bedding. Vratin One who observes curtare owner of the vows, a votary.
residence, one who offers Ś
lodging to an ascetic. Śakatakarman Livelihood śarira The body. from carts:
Śariraka Identical with Śarkā Doubt in the teachings Śarira. of the Jina.
Śaririn A worldly soul. Śańkita A fault incurred by Salaka
salākāpuruşa A great man. receiving suspicious food.
Šalya A thorn in the form of Šata Same as Sataka.
false faith, deceit etc. Śataka A chapter.
Salyoddharaņa Expiation. Śabala A gross fault, a
Sastrapariņata Lifeless. blunder. Śabda Sound.
Sastrāvapāțana Committing
suicide by cutting the body with Sabdanaya Verbal view- a weapon. point.
Šāțaka An upper garment. Śabdanupata Making a
Šāțikā An upper garment worn sound with a view to calling
by ladies. some one from outside the prescribed sphere.
śāśvåta Eternal, everlasting. Šabdābhāsa Fallacy of the
Śāsana Doctrine, command, verbal viewpoint.
scripture. Sama Calmness, peace.
Śāsqnadevatā A guardian Śambūkāvartā Begging food
deity. starting from a house in the Sikşāvrata A recurring exercise centre and going like the in self-discipline.

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305
Śiva Salvation.
Śraddhāna Same as Sraddhā. Śīrşaprahelikā A period śrama Penance, austerity. consisting of eighty-four lakhs śramaņa An ascetic, a monk. of Šīrşaprahelikāngas. Šramanatva Asceticism. Šīrsaprahelikānga A period śramanabhūta A lay-votary consisting of eighty-four lakhs who lives like a monk. of Cūlikās.
Śramanasangha An order of Śīla A supplementary vow; monks. moral conduct; continence.
śramani A nun. Śukladhyāna Pure concentration, metaphysical Sramanopāsaka A lay-votary, contemplation or meditation. a lay-man devoted to ascetics.
A laySuklapāksika A soul which Sramanopásikā
votaress, a lay-woman devoted attains liberation within half a Pudgalaparāvarta.
to ascetics. Suklaleśyā White thought- Srāddha A lay-votary. tint, pure thought.
Śrāddhi A lay-votaress. Subha Auspicious, good, Śrāmanya Asceticism. virtuous.
Śrāvaka A lay-votary. śubhanāman Auspicious Śrāvikā A lay-votaress. body-making karma.
Śruta Scripture. Śuşira Sound produced from Śrutakevalin Perfect in a wind instrument.
scriptures. Śaiksa A disciple, a student. Śrutajñāna Scriptural knowSaileśī An inert state of soul ledge, verbal knowledge. in which all activities are Śrutajñānāvaraña A kind of stopped.
karma obscuring Śrutajñāna. Soka Sorrow.
Śrutadhara Versed in Šauca Purity; absence of scriptures. greed.
Śrutaniśrita Backed by Śraddhā Belief, faith. scriptural knowledge.

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Śrutaskandha A section. Samyojanadhikarana ComŚrutasthavira Well-versed in bining destructive instruments. scriptures. Samrambha Sinful planning.
Śrutājñāna Wrong scriptural Samlekhanā
Same
knowledge.
Sallekhanā.
Śreni A row; a class; a ladder. Samvara Stoppage of the
influx of karma.
Śrotrendriya The sense-organ of hearing, the ear, the
auditory organ. Svetambara White-clad.
$
Şaṭkaya Six types of living emancipation.
beings.
Şadjivanikaya Şaṭkāya.
Şaştibhakta Fast for a month. Şaṣṭhabhakta Fast for two days
Samsaya Doubt.
Same as Samstara A bed.
S
Samyata an ascetic, a monk. Samyatāsamyata A lay
votary.
Samyati A nun. Samyama Self-restraint. Samyamasamyama Partial self-restraint.

Samvibhāga Proper sharing. Samvṛta An ascetic. Samvṛtāsamvṛta A lay-votary. Samvega Desire
for
as
Samstaraka Identical with Samstāra.
Samstobha Transformation. Samsthāna Figure.
Samsthānavicaya Contemplation of the structure of the universe.
Samsvedaja A living being
born in sweat.
Samyuktādhikaraṇa Same as Samhanana Bone-structure.
Saṁyojanādhikaraṇa. Samyojana A fault incurred by an ascetic by combining different things to create taste.
Samsvedima Water in which or with which something is boiled or washed.
Samhṛta A fault incurred by an ascetic by accepting food from a vessel besmeared with a living thing.

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307
Sakalādeśa A synthetic used for covering. statement, a complete judg- Sanghāta Union, fusion, ment.
association, combination. Sakāmamaraṇa voluntary Sanghātana Same as death, wise death.
Sanghāta. Sankara Confusion, mixture.
Sacitta Having life, living. Sankalana Synthetic Sacittaniksepa Placing a thing judgment.
on what possesses life. Sankalpa Intention.
Sacittapidhāna Covering a Sankramaņa transformation. thing by what possesses life. Sanklişta Malevolent. Sacittapratibaddha Same as Sankhadi Feast.
Sacittasambaddha. Sankhya Numerable.
Sacittasambaddha Athing Sankhyādattika An ascetic
connected with what possesses
life. who accepts food according to a number of Dattis.
Sacittasammiśra A thing Sankhyeya Same as
mixed with what possesses life. Sankhya.
Sacittāhāra Food having life. Sanga Attachment; bondage.
Sacela One wearing garments. Sangrahanaya Generic
Sacelaka Same as Sacela. viewpoint.
Sajīva Living Sangrahanayābhāsa Fallacy Sajvalana Angry. of the generic viewpoint. Sañjñā Instinct, desire; Sangha A religious order, an recognition; rationality, reason. order of monks, nuns, laymen Sañjñākṣara The script or and laywomen, church.
alphabet. Sanghatta Touch.
Sañiñin A rational being. Sangharșa Sound produced
Sañjvalana A group of by rubbing
passions preventing perfect Sanghățaka A group. conduct. Sanghāți An upper garment Sat Existent, being, real, true;

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good.
observes similar conduct. Sattā Endurance, existence. Samantānupāta Leaving Sattva A living being. excrement in places frequented Satya True, truth. by men etc. truthfulness.
Samabhāva Same as Samatā. Sadbhūta Real, true. Samabhirūąha Conventional Sadvedya identical with viewpoint, specific standpoint. Sātāvedaniya.
Samabhirūļhābhāsa Fallacy Santīrņa Liberated. of the conventional viewpoint. Sapakșa Homologous. Samaya The minimum timeSaparyavasita Having an
unit, a moment, an instant; a
doctrine, a precept, a scripture; end. Saptabhangi Sevenfold
sign, convention; self, soul. predication, sevenfold
i Samayakşetra The human judgment, sevenfold
region where time is measured
y the movements of sun etc. proposition, sevenfold statement.
Samavasarana An assembly, a Saptasaptamikā A penance conference, a gathering, a extending upto seven weeks. meeting; arriving, coming. Sapravicāra One who is Samavassta Arrived, reached. given to sexual enjoyment. Samaśreņi An even row. Saptasaptamikā A penance Samā An era. extending upto seven weeks. Samācāra Right conduct. Sapravicāra One who is Samācāri Conduct of an given to sexual enjoyment. ascetic, proper conduct. Samacaturasra The entire Samādāna Violation of vows. body to be symmetrical. Samādeśa A fault incurred by Samatā Equanimity. reserving particular food for Samanaska One possessed of ascetics. mind.
Samadhi Peace of mind, Samanojña One who easement.

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death.
Samadhimarana Peaceful Sampātima A flying insect. Samprayoga Contact. Samaya Attainment of Samprekṣā Contemplation. equanimity.
Samarambha
preparation.
Samāhita Pacified, tranquil. Samita Careful, cautious. Samiti Carefulness, cautious
ness.
Sinful
Samucchinnakriyānivṛtti interdining etc.
Same as Vyuparatakriyā- Sammūrcchana Spontaneous nivṛtti. generation.
Samutthita Ready to observe self-restraint.
Samuccheda Momentariness. Sammurcchima Identical with Samucchedavādin One who Sammurcchana. holds the doctrine of moment- Samyak Right, true. ariness.
Samyakcaritra Right conduct. Samyaktva Righteousness, right belief, right faith.
Samudāna Begging, seeking Samyaktvamohaniya A kind
alms.
of deluding karma causing right belief in a preliminary degree. Samyagjñāna knowledge.
Right
Samudghata Emanation of soul-particles from the body to destroy some karmas.
time.
Samuddeśa Teaching; food; a sub-chapter.
Samuddeśanakāla Teaching
Sambadha Pain.
Sambodhi Right knowledge, enlightenment. Sambhinnaśrotṛ One who possesses the power of hearing through any part of the body. Sambhoga Intercourse,

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Samyagdarśana Right belief, right faith.
Samuddesika Same as faith. Auddesika.
Samparāya transmigration.
Samyagdṛṣṭi One having right belief, one possessing right
Samyanmithyatvamohaniya A Passion; kind of deluding karma causing

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right and wrong, i. e., mixed meditation lasting for ten days; belief.
a kind of penance lasting for Sam yanmith yādarśana 100 days or for 245 days. Mixed, i. e., right and wrong Sarvatha Absolutely. belief.
Sarvadarsin Omniscient, one Samyanmithyādrșți One who possesses perfect having right and wrong, i.e., apprehension. mixed belief
Sarvabhadrā A penance of 392 Sayoga Same as Sayogin. fasts and 49 break-fasts. Sayogikevalin An omniscient Sarvavirati Complete having activities of mind, renunciation. speech and body.
Saleśya A soul with a thoughtSayogin Having activities of tint. mind, speech and body. Sallekhanā Voluntary death, Sayonika A worldly soul. making the body and passions Sarahśosana Drawing off the thin, passionless end. water from lakes etc.
Savicāra Having transition, Sarāga Passionate, having with shifting. passions.
Saviseșa A little more. Sarīsrpa A reptile.
Saveda A person with sexual Sarūpin a worldly soul.
desire. Sarvaga Omnipresent.
Sahacara Concomitant. Sarvagata Identical with Sahabhävin Simultaneous, coSarvaga.
existent. Sarvaghātin Completely Sahasābhyākhyāna Speaking obscuring karmic particles. thoughtlessly. Sarvajña Omniscient, one Sāmvyavahārika Empirical, who possesses perfect practical. comprehension.
Sākāramantrabheda Sarvajñatva Omniscience. Divulging someone's secret. Sarvatobhadra A kind of Sākāropayoga Determinate

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knowledge.
Sadhu A monk. Sāgara Same as Sādhya Probandum; end. Sāgaropama.
Sādhvi A nun. Sāgaropama A period equal Sānaka A flaxen cloth. to ten Koțākoți Palyopamas.
Sānta Having an end. Sāgāra A householder; with
Sāntarottara An under and an exception.
upper garment. Sāgārika Identical with
Sāmācāri Identical with Sāgārin.
Samācāri. Sāgārikā A housewife.
Sāmānya Generality. Sāgārin A householder.
Sāmāya Same as Sāmāyika. Sātā Pleasure.
Sāmāyika A vow pertaining to Sātāvedaniya A kind of the attainment of equanimity, feeling-producing karma
abandoning all sinful acts. which causes pleasure, sa
Sāmucchedika Identical with pleasure-producing karma.
Samucchedavādin. Sātireka A little more.
Sāmparāyika Due to passions; Sādi The body below the leading to transmigration. navel to be symmetrical;
Sāmbhogika Ascetics of the having a beginning.
same state of conduct wherein Sadika Same as Sãdi.
they can interdine etc. Sadhana Probans; means. Sāvadya Sinful. Sādharmika identical with
Sāsvādanasamyagdrsti One Sādharmin.
who has a slight taste of right Sādharmin Co-religionist. belief. Sādharmya Homogeneity. Simhanişkrīļita A kind of Sädhāraṇa Common body of penance in which fasting several souls.
gradually increases and Sadhāranaśarīra Same as decreases. Sādžāraṇa.
Simhavikridita Same as Sādhika A little more.
Sirhanişkrīdita.

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pated.
Siddha Liberated, emanci- Sūkşmakāya A subtle-bodied
being. Siddhagati Liberation. Sükşmakriyāpratipātin An Siddhasilõ A place where infallible state of .pure liberated souls reside.
meditation in which subtle Siddhānta A scripture; a
bodily activities occur. doctrine.
Sūkşmanāman A kind of bodySiddhāyatana A Jina temple.
making karma which causes
subtle body. Siddhi Liberation, emanci
Sükşmasamparāya One in pation.
whom passions occur in a subtle Sukệta A virtue, a good act. Sukha Pleasure, happiness, Sūtra A scripture (text); an bliss.
aphorism; a thread. Sucīrņa Rightly done.
Sürapramanabhojin One who Sucirņakarman A good eats from morning till evening. deed.
Setikā A measure equal to two Subhaga Fortunate. handfuls. Suyoga A good activity. Sendriya Having senses. Sura A god.
Sevārtasamhanana A weak Surabhigandha Good smell, joining of the body in which the fragrance.
ends of the bones merely touch Suvarna A weight of gold
one another. equal to sixteen Sopakramayuska
Sopakramāyuşka Same as Karmamāşakas.
Apavartyāyus. Suşamadușşamā Happy
Skandha A molecule. cum-miserable era.
Stambha Pride. Sușamasuşamā Exceedingly Stimita Steady; fearless. happy era.
Stena A thief. Suşamā Happy era. Steya Theft. Susvara Sweet voice. Styānagrddhi Somnambulism. Sükşma Subtle.
Styānarddhi Identical with

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Styānagrddhi.
Sthiranāman A kind of bodyStrīveda Feminine desire. making karma by the rise of Sthandila A pure place, a
which a soul gets firm parts of proper place, a fit place; anger, body. rage.
Sthula Gross. Sthavira An aged monk, a Snāta Same as Snātaka. senior monk, a learned monk. Snātaka Omniscient. Sthavirakalpa The conduct of Spandana Vibration. an ascetic who lives in a Spardhaka A group of karmic group.
particles. Sthavirakalpin An ascetic Sparśa Touch. who lives in a group.
Sparśana The tactile senseSthāna A source; a state;
organ. motionlessness.
Sparśanendriya Identical with Sthanaka A place where
Sparśana. ascetics stay. Sthāpana A fault incurred by
Sphoțakarman Livelihood
from hewing. receiving reserved food etc. Sthāpanā Representation;
Smaraña Recollection. placing.
Smrti Recollection. Sthāvara An immobile being. Syāt in some respect, from a Sthāvarakāya An immobile
certain point of view, under a bodied being
certain condition, relatively. Sthāvaranaman A kind of Syādvāda Relativism, nonbody-making karma by the absolutism. rise of which a soul gets Svadāramantrabheda Expoimmobile body.
sing the secret of one's own Sthita Steady, motionless.
wife. Sthiti Duration; rest;
Svayaṁsambuddha Same as permanence.
Svayambuddha. Sthitibandha Bondage of Svayambuddha One who karmic duration.
becomes enlightened by

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himself without the aid of Hīyamāna Decreasing. anybody, self-enlightened. Hunda The entire body to be Svarga A heaven.
unsymmetrical; odd. Svalinga One's own garb. Hühuka A period consisting of Svalingasiddha One who eighty-four lakhs of attains liberation in the garb of Hūhukāngas. a Jaina ascetic.
Huhukānga A period Svalingin A Jaina ascetic. consisting of eighty-four lakhs Svādima All that is relished. of Avavas. Svādya Identical with H
ich Hetu Reason; cause; mark. Svādima.
Hetuvādasañjñā Identical with Svādhyāya Self-study, study
Hetūpadeśiki. of scriptures.
Hetūpadeśiki A discriminating Svārthānumāna Subjective
Subiective cognition. inference, inference for Hetvābhāsa Fallacious reason. oneself.
н Harita Vegetation. Haritakāya identical with Vanaspatikāya. Hasta A cubit. Hastaka A broom, a brush. Hastakarman Masturbation. Hayamanaka Same as Hīyamāna. Häsa Same as Hāsya. Häsya Laughter. Himsā Injury, hurt, harm, violence, killing. Hinsāpradana Giving a hurtful thing

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Prof. Dr. MOHAN LAL MEHTA Born on 9th April, 1928, in a poor family of Kanod (Udaipur-Rajasthan). Received early education at Kanod and Beawar (Jain Gurukul). A student of the Parshvanath Vidyashram, Varanasi, from 1946 to 1956. Obtained Doctorate in 1955. Served the Education Department, Government of Rajasthan, for 5 years (1956-61). Worked as Deputy Director of the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for 3 years (1961-64). Served the P. V. Research Institute, Varanasi, as its Director, for 14 years (1964-78). Also worked as Honorary Professor of Jainology and Prakrit in the Banaras Hindu University and taught Post-Graduate classes and guided Research Scholars. Served as Professor of Jain Philosophy in the University of Poona for 10 years (1978-88). His books have earned him laurels from the Governments of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. Undertook world-tour in 1975 and delivered lectures on various aspects of Jainology in different Universities and Institutes. His published works include the following: English: Hindi : 1. Outlines of Jaina Philosophy 2. Outlines of Karma in Jainism 3. Jaina Psychology 4. Jaina Culture 5. Jaina Philosophy 6. Prakrit Proper Names 7. Jaina Technical Terms 8. Jaina Theory of Knowledge 9. A 10. ABER 11. HECT AT Te sfeera (PTT 2,3,4). 12. na ir gheh Hey 13. TITANIUTOT (319EURT) 14. Hafa