Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001180
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 15 MB

Page 192

JUDGMENT
In its pure form, it is only concerned with the simple statement 'it is', that is to say, when the thing is mentioned divested of all its particular attributes or modifications.
Vyavahāra Naya :
It takes into consideration a general object as possessing specific properties. It does not deal with generality in the sense as the sangraha naya deals with it. Its subject-matter is only a part of the object of the sangraha. In other words, it classifies the subject-matter of the sangraha in a particular fashion. 'Existence is either substance or modification' is an instance of the vyavahāra naya.2 Here 'existence' is classified into two, viz., substance and modification.
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Ṛjusūtra Naya:
It does not trouble itself with the past or the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present aspect of a thing, because that alone is useful for the moment.3 The argument underlying the rjusūtra view-point is that of immediate utility which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. As for instance, 'I am happy at this moment' is a proposition dealing with the present state of my happiness. Śabda Naya:
4
It treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance 'kumbha,' 'kalasa,' 'ghața' are all expressive of one and the same object, viz., a jar. The meaning is that the sabda naya does not concern itself with the difference of synonymous words but simply deals with them as if they were pure equivalents of one another.
Samabhirūḍha Naya :
It holds that with the difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs; just as a jar and a piece of cloth are different, so also a jar (kumbha),
1. Ibid., 8.
2. Pramāṇa-naya-tattväloka, VII.23-4.
3. Ibid., VII. 28.
4. Naya-karṇikā, 14.