Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001180
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 15 MB

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
mainly directed against Absolutism.
It regards idea as an exercising force of the function of 'meaning.' Anything may be an idea, provided you mean with it; just as anything may be a weapon, provided you do injury with it. An idea is what an idea does. In this sense ideas are 'modes of conceiving' the given, a 'taking it to be this or that. It is a virtual access to an immediate experience of that which it means. By ideas, Pragmatism does not mean 'Platonic essences' but the modes of an individual's thinking. The Pragmatist conceives reality in the terms of intellectual process and circumstances. Conception of Neo-Realism :
Neo-Realism believes that the world is existent and is independent of mind. However, it does not appear exactly in the same form as the dualistic Realism of Hamilton, who makes no provision for any mediation of ideas between mind and nature. While Neo-Realism insists like other Realists that things are independent, it also asserts that when things are known, they become immediate objects of knowledge. These immediate objects of knowledge are technically called 'sensa.' So things are nothing else than 'sensa' in a certain relation. The Neo-Realist does not postulate mind as a self-conscious substance. He conceives mind as a cross-section of the physical world. Neo-Realism seems to be an ally to Naturalism and Pragmatism as it accepts like Naturalism the truth of the results of physical science and like Pragmatism the practical and empirical character of knowledge.' Let us, now, turn to a brief discussion of the conception of knowledge recognised by NeoRealism. (a) Theory of Immanence
The Neo-Realist suggests by his Theory of Immanence that things and minds are not to be regarded as two independent 1. Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 271.