Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001180
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 15 MB

Page 116

SOUL
103
The Naiyāyika gives a further argument : If we believe that the soul is body-sized, as a consequence, it will be savayava, i.e., with parts, and therefore, a kārya (product), just like the body itself. The Jaina, however, is prepared to accept the logical consequence. More accurately he says that ātman has pradeśas, though not avayavas, in an ordinary sense. He believes that ātman is săvayava, parinămin and changes from time to time, for it is a substance having the qualities of origination, decay and permanence. He does not believe in the absolute changelessness of ātman, or for the matter of that, in absolute changelessness of anything whatsoever. He further points out that for some time after a body is cut, its parts continue to throb and retain the ātman in them. After that, they rejoin the ātman of the body from which they are cut. The particles which are cut retain their connection with the soul as the threads of a lotus-stick remain united even when the stick is cut into two.
It should be noted that Jainism is the only school of Indian philosophy which holds that ātman is body-sized. The only other school which holds an analogous, though not the same doctrine, is the school of Rāmānuja, according to which, the jñāna of ātman, though not the ātman itself, undergoes contraction and expansion. Varieties of Soul :
Jainism believes that each body possesses a different soul, and hence, there are many souls. It is also held that one body
be occupied by more than one soul but one soul cannot occupy more than one body.
Here a Vedāntin may say that many varieties of soul are unwarranted, for the soul is everywhere the same. Like the sky, it is all-pervasive. On account of illusion, we think that there are different souls in different bodies. Really speaking, it is one.
This view is refuted as follows : As regards the sky, it is all right to hold that it is only one, for the sky, even while