Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001180
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 15 MB

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
many. Realism would be Monistic, Dualistic or Pluralistic according to its view of numerical strength of the existent. If it believes in one material reality, it would be called Monistic Realism. If it takes the existent to be two, it would fall in the category of Dualistic Realism. If it admits reality to be more than two, it would be called Pluralistic Realism. Similarly, some other types of Realism would be dealt with according to their specific characteristics. Monistic Realism :
The primitive Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Heraclitus, in so far as they each thought one or other of water, air, and fire to be the one indivisible stuff of reality, were Monistic Realists. To them all things as the physical objects, the mind, the life and the rest were the products of any one of these stuffs. Thus, consciousness was considered to be merely a product of matter. Dualistic Realism :
It regards the mental and physical worlds as two distinct and independent realities. The monistic trend changed its attitude and began to believe in 'life' as a separate and distinct reality. Empedocles believed in the psychical forces over and above the four elements of earth, fire, air and water. Anaxagoras admitted 'nous' or 'mind' as the central principle of movement and change. Plato and Aristotle may be said to have indulged in Dualism in spite of their insistence on the reality of the world of Ideas or Forms. Aristotle was, perhaps, more pronounced in his Dualism than Plato.
In modern philosophy, it was Descartes who gave a distinct turn to Realisın. To him matter and mind are independent existences each having a characteristic diametrically opposed to the characteristic of the other. This Dualism appeared in Locke in a somewhat different shape in his distinction between cogitative and non-cogitative substance.