Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001180
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 15 MB

Page 152

KNOWLEDGE
139
the determination of itself as well as of the object. It is able to tell us what is desirable and what is undesirable. Hence, it can be knowledge only.'
On the basis of these various definitions of pramāņa, we can understand what type of knowledge is pramāṇa and what type of knowledge is not pramāņa. The gist of all these definitions is that it is a right knowledge or a valid judgment which is pramāņa, and not a wrong one. In other words, all pramāna is jñāna but all jñāna is not pramāņa. The Buddhists regard indeterminate knowledge as the means of valid cognition. According to the Jainas, indeterminate knowledge is no knowledge at all. It is only an intuition (darśana). The determination of knowledge is essential, because if the knowledge itself is not self-conscious, it cannot determine the object. The Jainas believe in the self-illuminating nature of knowledge, therefore, no question of infinite regress arises. - Validity of Knowledge :
We have seen that knowledge must be valid, if it is to be justified in being called pramāņa. Now, the question is: How can the nature of validity be determined ? The Jaina thinkers say that 'the validity is determined either intrinsically or extrinsically.' They believe in both the types, viz., the intrinsic validity and the extrinsic validity. The determination of validity is in some cases achieved by a cognition by itself. As for instance is the habitual cognition of one's own palm induced by a repeated course of experience or the direct achievements of results such as by the acts of bathing, drinking etc., there occurs cessation of heat, thirst etc., and this alone gives final satisfaction to the subject and a person does not feel an urge for further scrutiny of his cognition. This shows that validity is self-determined, i.e., intrinsic.
On some occasions, the experience of validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point, for instance, to 1. Pramāņa-naya-tattvāloka, 1.2-3. 2. Prāmānyaniscavah svatah prato vä-Pramāna-mīmāṁsā, I. 1. 8.