Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001180
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
Publication Year: 1998
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 15 MB

Page 198

JUDGMENT
185
difference will have one locus and the identity another and thus, there will be a split in the integrity of the locus.
This kind of objection is not tenable because in conformity with the principle mentioned above, they have all been proved to be perceived in the same locus. The same cloth is mobile and immobile and the like.
3. The aspect in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits, and likewise the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicates, and this means confusion (sankara) which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum.
As regards the charge of confusion, it is easily parried by the instance of the cognition of the multiform colour and the instance of the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals.
4. The aspect which embodies difference will embody identity also and the aspect which embodies identity will embody difference too, and this, thus, gives rise to the fallacy of transfusion (the exchange of modes and attributes).
This charge is easily met by the same example of the cognition of the multiform colour and the synthesis of universal and particular.
5. A real being both identical and different will not lend itself to be determined in a definite reference, and this would create doubt.
6. The consequence will be the absence of determination.
7. This will result in the impossibility of determination of objective reality.
As regards these objections, there is no logical justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. Doubt is a kind of cognition in which the mind wavers between two conflicting alternatives. It is absolutely out of the question when the cognition is found