Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

Page 96

SOUL
83
The problem of doubt and doubter is rather ontological. Just like the Sānkhya system that proves the separate existence of Puruşa on the ground of 'adhisthāna', Lord Mahāvīra proved the existence of soul on the ground of doubt. He argued that without a doubter who is beyond all kinds of doubt but still remains in all doubts, no doubt is possible. Doubt presupposes the existence of a doubter as its ground. That ground is a soul, a self, a sentient being, a conscious principle. "If the object about which one has doubt is certainly non-existent, who has a doubt as to whether I do exist or I do not exist ? Or, Gautama ! when you yourself are doubtful about yourself, what can be free from doubt ?"!
He further says : "The soul which is the substratum (guņin) of attributes is self-evident owing to its attributes (gunas) being self-evident, as is the case with a pitcher. For on realising the attributes (guņas) the substratum (guņin), too, is realised."2
Substance cannot exist without qualities and qualities have no place absolutely independent of substance. If the qualities are experienced, the experience of the substance is apparent. The qualities of soul such as perception, intuition etc. are quite evident. These qualities cannot have an absolutely independent existence. Hence, the existence of the soul to which all these qualities belong, is quite obvious. • The opponent may admit that there is a 'guņin' (substance) which is the substratum of the qualities like knowledge etc., but he may refuse to believe that this substance is something else than a body. That is to say, he looks upon the body itself as the substance in question, because the qualities are found only in the body. The argument is like this: Knowledge etc. are the qualities of a body, because they are observed there and there only like other attributes of the body, such as its whiteness, fatness, thinness etc.
1. Ibid., 1557. 2. Ibid., 1558.