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JAINA PHILOSOPHY : AN INTRODUCTION
It apparently indicates that the ancient Jaina thinkers certainly believed in the separate and independent discussion of the means of valid knowledge. Their deliberations were not confined to the categories of knowledge only. They discussed the means of valid cognition as well like other systems of philosophy. Generally, such means are four in number, but in some places we find three also. As it is mentioned in the Sthānānga-sūtra : Determination is of three kinds, viz., perception, authority and inference.' Logical Conception of Knowledge : . When we look at the Tattvārtha-sūtra, we come to know that Umāsvāti made no difference between the categories of knowledge and the means of valid knowledge. In other words, he did not differentiate jñāna and pramāņa. He observes : Jñana is of five varieties, viz., mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala. All these varieties are pramāņa.” He did not inention any particular characteristic except 'rightness' regarding the concept of pramāņa. He took jñāna (right knowledge) and pramāņa as identical.
The later philosophers defined pramāņa independently and strictly. They did not conceive knowledge as the means of valid knowledge in a general form but added some specific characteristics to it. Māņikyanandin says : That jñāna is pramāņa which has the determination of itself as well as of the object not known before. It enables us to get the desirable and give up the undesirable. Hence, it can be nothing but knowledge.
Hemacandra writes in his Pramāņa-mimāṁsā : The valid judgment about an object is pramāņa. In another language, a means of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition of an object.* Vādideva says: That jñāna is pramāņa which has
1. Sthănặnga-sūtra, 185. 2. Tattvārtha-sūtra, I. 9-10. 3. Pariksā-mukha, I. 1-2. 4. Samvagarthanirnavah pramānam, I. 1.2.
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