Book Title: Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

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Page 194
________________ JUDGMENT 181 under the purview of the dravyāstika. But, at the same time, all these statements, except the statement of the highest universality, become the subject-matter of the paryāyāstika as well. In other words, only one statement dealing with the highest entity without a single attribute, is covered by the dravyāstika only. Only that statement which deals with ultimate particularisation beyond which there is no possibility of further particularisation, falls under the range of the paryāyāstika only. All the intermediary statements are covered by the paryāyāstika as well as the dravyāstika, for in every such intermediary statement there is some kind of generalisation as well as some sort of particularisation. That very object which is viewed by the dravyāstika from the view-point of generalisation, is viewed by the paryāyāstika from the stand-point of particularisation. 'This being the case, it is impossible to find a dravyāstika in its pure form, that is to say, absolutely unmixed with the paryāyāstika. Similarly, it is equally impossible to find a paryāyāstika in its pure form totally unmixed with the dravyāstika. Hence, assigning a particular statement to a particular naya depends upon the volition of the speaker." The distinction between the proper provinces of these nayas is that the dravyāstika takes its stand excluding the positive assertion of the paryāyāstika as its legitimate subject, while the paryāyāstika views the same object exclusively from the stand-point of particularisation. Here, each does not consider the assertion of its rival naya as its property. Herein lies the true distinction between them and their spheres when applied to one and the same thing. The same fact is expressed in the following words : 'From the stand-point of the paryāyāstika, all things are necessarily born and perish; the dravyāstika, on the other hand, holds that all things exist eternally without birth and decay. There cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifications of birth and decay. On the other hand, modifications cannot exist without an abiding 1. Ibid., 1. 9. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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