Anekantajay patakakhyam Prakaranam Part 2

Author(s): Haribhadrasuri, Munichandrasuri
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 391

260
NOTES
[P. 11, 1.7
नापि द्वितीयः, एकस्मिन्नपि काले पृथक पृथग द्वयोरप्युपलम्भार ।
नापि तृतीयः, एकस्मिन्नपि लोहभाजने रात्री शीतस्पर्टी दिवा चोग्णस्पर्शः समुपलभ्यते, न च तत्र Aja: 1
नापि तुरीयः, धूपकडुच्छकादौ द्वयोरप्युपलम्भात् ।
पञ्चमोऽपि न घटते, यत एकस्मिन्नेव तप्तलोहभाजने स्पर्शापेक्षया यत्रैवोष्णत्वं तत्रैव प्रदेशे रूपापेक्षया शीतत्वम् । यदि हि रूपापेक्षयाऽयुष्णत्वं स्यात् तर्हि जननयनदहनप्रसङ्गः 113
Amongst the available works of the S'ustāmbaras, it seems Gandhahastin Siddhasena Gani's com. (pp. 394-398) on TS (V, 31 ) is the first work to deal with the subject of virodha in details. Dharmakirti has treated this subject in Prananavinis'caya.
P. 11, 1. 8. The Jainas do not believe that being' and 'non-being' are absolutely the same. Nor do they hold that non-being' exists as inseparable from being'. What they hold is that being' and 'non-being' are predicable of the same subject. Such being the case, being and non-being' are not implicitly contained in each other and so reconcileable-as in Hegel's system-, but they are to be referred to different aspects of one and the same thing, and so there is no contradiction whatsoever. Further, according to anekantavāda the contradiction is not a fact that transcends or confounds the laws of logic, that is to say, a fact which because it is a fact, has somehow to be accepted-as is done in the anirvacanīyatīvāda in the Sankara school-; it is a fact perfectly amenable to the laws of logic, a fact which logic easily succeeds in showing to be no contradiction at all, inasmuch as all the supposed contradictory elements refer to two different aspects of the same reality.
P.11, II. 8-9. This verse, if slightly modified, serves as an answer to the allegation made here. See p. 65, 11. 4-5.
P. 11, 11. 16. gada Haya TTATI means that he elucidates this very thing by tathāhi etc. This phraseology is met with, many a time in this work.
P. 12, 11. 3–4. See p. 65. P. 12, 11. 4-5. See p. 65.
P. 12. 11. 4-5. From SM (com, on v. 4) we learn that the Jainas hold that dharmas are not absolutely other than the dharmin; otherwise, there could be no such relation between them as predicate (vis'exand) and subject (vis'esya). For, no two absolutely distinct realities (say & camel and a donkey ) can be ever related as subject and predicate. Further, if dharmas are absolutely distinct from the dharmin i. e. the substratum in which they inhere, there will be as many distinct entities in a dlarmin 29 there are dharmas, since every dharmin has infinite dharmas. For further details see “Notes" on p. 65, I. 10.
1 For the explanation of this in Guj. ses Tattvākhyāna (pt. II,
pp. 148–152), 2 See “Notes" (pp. 261-262) on SM.