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hill which is not different from that, different from that is lake etc. where fire dose not occur, hence there is no fault of too narrow application, this is the idea.
Similarly by which relation reason (hetu all) is desired in subject the occurrence should be known, otherewise there would be fault of avyāpti in the infernce ‘hill has fire because of smoke.' The smoke exists in it's part which is different from the substratum of sādhya, when the relation which determines the state of being reason is introduced there would not be mentioned fault because by the relation ‘samyoga smoke dose not occur in it's part.
There is very minute difference between third and fifth definitions. In third definition the mutual absence counterpositive of which is the locus of sādhya only is included, while in fifth definition the mutual absence the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the locusness of sādhya (sādhyavattva 2017). There is fault of ‘avyāpti' of third definition in the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke' taking mutual absence of fire through ‘cālaniya-nyāya.' (almiRIRI
All these five definitions are based on the original concept of non-deviation, where is no deviation there is ‘vyāpti. All these definitions are made taking in to account the agreement (anvaya 37-02) and disagreement (vyatireka aft) 'where-ever reason (hetu) there is sādhya' and 'where-ever absence of sādhya there is absence of reason (hetu).' All these are not applied in the 'pure affirmative (kevlānvayi Jadi-afil) inference such as “it is namable because of knowable' the absence of sādhya is not established, everything is namable, therefore there is no absence of namability anywhere.
In this way all these five definitions are faulty with regard pure affirmative inference. In first definition absence of sādhya is not established, and in second, third, and fifth the
