Studies In Umasvati And His Tattvartha Sutra

Author(s): G C Tripathi, Ashokkumar Singh
Publisher: Bhogilal Laherchand Institute of Indology

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Studies in Umāsvāti
its own logic it maintains that just as relativity cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute, similarly an absolute cannot be logically sustained without the hypothesis of a relative truth. The non-absolutism, therefore, does not lead to a monistic idealism but to a dualistic pluralism. That the objects of the world are connected with one another is accepted by the Ācārānga when it declares that one who knows one, knows all and one who knows all knows one.13 This inter-connectedness does not mean obliteration of difference between on object and the other. It only establishes identity-cum-difference between two objects.
Pluralistic Concept of Existence Inspite of this Umāsvāti is quite conscious that he is dealing with a pluralistic system, therefore he mentions mātņkāpadāstika existence as the second type of existence. Under this type of existence we describe all the five types of eternal substances, viz., Medium of motion, medium of rest, space, matter and soul.
Five homogeneous aggregates (astikāyas) have been accepted as basic existence in Jain Philosophy. There is no existence except these five homogeneous aggregates (astikāyas). A concept of astikāya gives the specific understanding of existence. Astikāya is a technical word. It is a combination of two words asti and kāya. Generally asti means point= pradeśa and kāya means aggregate. An aggregate of homogeneous points is called astikāya. There is also a very significant expression of astikāya given by Ācārya Siddhasenagani in his commentary on Tattvārthasūtra. All existent are possessed of three characteristics viz. origination, extinction and persistence. The particle asti indicates persistent characteristic of existence whereas kāya typifies the first two characteristics viz. origination and destruction.14 So we may say that astikāya and existence are synoymous in this sense. These astikāyas are also absolute in the sense that they exist independent of each other from time immemorial. Ācārya Mahāprajña says: