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JAINA CONCEPTION OF SPACE
31 independent substance besides ākāśa. For them the terms dik' and akāśa' are synonyms referring to the same substance. 2. Jaina Description of Akāša
As we have already remarked, Jainas do not regard it as a mode or an effect of mahābhūtas. For them it is an indepedent fundamental substance. It is devoid of colour, odour, taste and touch. According to Jainas sabda is a mode of mahābhūtas or matter (pudgala). Aggregates (skandhas) of atoms strike against one another and sabda is produced from them. Hence sabda is not the nature of ākāsa, nor is it its quality. If sabda were its quality, the quality of ākāśa being formless or nonphysical, it would not have been heard through the organ of hearing, say the Jainas.? Akāśa is infinite in extent, it is present everywhere, it stretches not only over the universe but also far beyond it over the non-universe. All other substances are confined to the universe only. Thus no substance is so extensive as ākāsa is. The pervasiveness of ākāśa is infinite. Akāśa is one in number. It is a onemembered class, so to say. There is no possibility of increase or decrease in its number. It is one and will remain one for ever. It is eternal in the sense that it never gives up its nature. As it is present everywhere in the universe, the possibility of movement from one place to another is rejected in its case.12 3. Function of Akāsa
· The function of ākāśa is to offer room to other substances.'' Other substances exist by their own nature. There is no doubt about it. But they require something to exist in. They do exist by themselves. But wherein do they exist ? They exist in ākāśa. Their existence is not the same as ākāsa. Nor is ākāśa an aspect of them. It is a fundamental substance different from them. Thus ākāśa is a universal container in which all other substances are contained.
Some might argue against this Jaina position as follows : if a substance requires another substance to exist in, then ākāsa itself being a substance will also require some another substance and this substance in its turn will require the third substance to exist in and so on ad infinitum. If to avoid this contingency the Jain were to say that ākāśa does not require another substance to exist in, then they should apply the same logic in the case of other substances also. Thus
