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THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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Dharmakīrti the idealist. Tradition itself, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, distinguishes between Dharmakīrti's theses developed from the standpoint of Sautrāntika realism and those developed from the standpoint of Yogācāra idealism, and broadly speaking it is the former that characterises Dharmakīrti the logician, the latter Dharmakīrti the idealist. Indeed, almost all characteristic theses developed by Dharmakīrti in the field of logic have to be understood exclusively from the standpoint of realism. There is perhaps only one thesis that constitutes an exception in this connection, for in its case Dharmakirti has thought it proper to formulate an idealist version along with the realist one. This is his thesis on pramānaphalabhāva i.e. on what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes its result. It is of a highly technical character but deserves notice because of its availability in two versions. Thus, adopting the realist standpoint, Dharmakirti argues that since a piece of valid cognition manages to apprehend its object bacause it bears the form of this object, here the means of valid cognition is 'this piece of cognition bearing the same form as its object (arthasārūpya)', and the result produced is this piece of cognition apprehending its object (arthādhigati)'28. But from the idealist standpoint there exist no objects independent of cognition, while it is owing to the agency of nescience that a piece of cognition gets split into something-that-is-grasped (grāhya) and something-that-grasps (grāhaka); so that what this piece of cognition apprehends is nothing but itself. Hence, adopting this standpoint. Dharmakirti maintains that in the case of a piece of cognition the means of valid cognition is this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-grasps (grāhakabhāva)', and the result produced is 'this piece of cognition apprehending itself (svasamvadana) 29, the object of valid cognition being 'this piece of cognition assuming the form of something-that-is-grasped (grāhyabhāva).' For the rest, in the manner already hinted, Dharmakīrti the idealist simply seeks to puncture what Dharmakīrti the logician so strenuously seeks to establish. It is difficult to fathom the precise intentions that lay behind Dharmakīrti's adopting so anomalous a procedure, but that there was something essentially extralogical about them seems certain, for otherwise it remains incomprehensible why the master-logician should indulge in the wanton game of intellectual suicide. Within the Buddhist camp idealism was certainly a Mahāyāna novelty, but realism was as old as Buddha himself and its latest outstanding defence had come from the Sautrāntika school. So in defending idealism Dharmakīrti was perhaps only paying homage
