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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY
145 It is on the authoritativeness that the validity of the knowledge derived through words depends.38
Thus, for the Buddhist logicians, this is the process by which knowledge of facts or things through words and sentences is arrived at. Versal statements are invariably connected with the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. So, they enable us to infer merely the intention of the speaker. But as soon as they are known to come from the mouth or pen of an authority, they enable us to infer not only the intention but also facts because the intention of an authority to convey a particular information always coincides with actual facts. Now, the validity of this knowledge can be ascertained only after having examined and ascertainted the authoritativeness of the speaker or writer. How the authoritativeness of a speaker or a scripture could be ascertained is an important problem which has already been discussed.
The Jaina logicians refute the Buddhist view that words do not lead directly to the knowledge of things. They observe that words are connected with things. Of course, though words and things, like Krttikā and Sakata constellations, are not related by natural and physical relation, they do have some invisible relation between them.39 Again, they observe that though words have neitlser the relation of causality nor that of essential identity with things, they do have yogyatā-sambandha with them. The Buddhist logicians might urge that in the absence of these two relations how even this relation could be possible ? The Jaina logicians observe that this relation is seen between the visual sense-organ and its object even in the absence of those two relations. Even the Buddhist logicians have recognised it. Were they to reject this, their position would come in conflict with experience and with their doctrine that the senseorgan is not in bodily contact with its object (aprāpyakāritā). It might be urged that if there is yogyatā-sambandha between a word and its object, the object can as well serve as a denoter and the word as a denoted. This objection, say the Jain logicians, is illfounded, because capacities of things are definite. Some might say : If words are inherently capable of generating knowledge of things, they would generate it even in a man innocent of language. In reply, it is said that this does not happen because words generate knowledge of things only in those who have learnt the language or the convention. Convention means the man-made rule that a particular word would denote a particular thing. Just as smoke could not enable a man, who does not know that smoke is an invariable mark of fire, to infer fire, even so a
