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JAINAS ON TESTIMONY
The necessity of testimony is felt by all the Indian philosophers because all of them, alike, believe in the objects that are amenable neither to perceptual nor to inferential cognition. All would join hands with Vātsyāyana' who observes that objects like svarga etc. could be known only through testimony. But this does not mean that testimony cannot give us knowledge of perceptible things. It does. But, then, why should we make use of testimony in objects which are perceptible ? The answer to this question is not a difficult one. Man cannot progress if he were to depend on his own experience in all matters of perceptible objects and were not to accept the results of his predecessors; he would have to start anew every generation. Again, were he dependent upon his own experiences alone for his knowledge, his stock of knowledge would be very meagre, his mental outlook would be narrow and he could neither impart the results of his experiences to others nor could he become acquainted with their achievements. Hence the necessity of testimony to know even objects which are perceptible.
Testimony is defined as a 'word' of an authority. What are the characteristic features of an authority ? Is it possible to know these features ? Is testimony a form of inference ? If it is, how is it reduced to inference ? If it is not, what are the fundamental differences obtaining between the two that render such reduction impossible ? How do we know the validity (prāmānya) of testimony ? These are some of the main topics of discussion that will engage one's attention while on an investigation, on testimony. It is intended to discuss the problem concerned under the two main heads : (A) Treatment of testimony upto the time of Jinabhadra, and (B) after the time of Jinabhadra. Under the second head, the views of the non-Jaina schools of Indian philosophy would also be taken into account.
(A) Treatment of Testimony upto the time of Jinabhadra
The Anuyogadvārasūtra recognises two types of āgamas (scriptures), viz., empirical (laukika) and transcendental (alaukika). The nonJaina sastras like the Vedas, the Mahābhārata, the seventytwo sciences and arts are included in the first category. The second type comprises
