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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
by reason (yukti). Another statement of Siddhasena Divākara is significant. He says : Words expressing the real object and consistent with perception as well as with the whole body of the speaker's knowledge generate valid knowledge in the hearer provided he understands the import rightly. Even the words of an āpta may cause wrong knowledge if the hearer is not a proper person. Thus, to generate valid knowledge in the hearer, words should not only come from a reliable person but should also reach a person who is capable of understanding their true import. We surmise that the two ways of determining the validity of āgama are assimilated here into one by Siddhasena Divākara in his characteristic style, which renders his difinition a considerable advance on the āgamic treatment of the problem.
In Jinabhadra little that is important is to be found on the subject. It is indeed surprising that at one place he states explicitly that agama is a case of anumāna.16
(B) Treatment of Testimony after Jinabhadra In Indian philosophy, there has raged a controversy on the point whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or is merely a case of inference. The Vaiśesika and the Buddhist philosophers regard it as a case of inference, while others, including Jaina logicians, consider it to be an independent source.
For a clear understanding of thïs controversy, it is necessary to know how we derive knowledge by testimony. First, we have the auditory or visual perception of the spoken or written sentence. Then we try to understand the meaning of a sentence. For understanding the meaning of a particular sentence, the knowledge of three things is necessary, viz., that the words constituting it expect one another (ākāńksā), that they have mutual fitness (yogyatā), and that they are continuous with one another in time and place (sannidhi). And, the knowledge of the expectancy, fitness and propinquity of the words in a particular sentence requires the application of general rules for their determination. But the mere understanding of the meaning of a sentence does not lead directly to the knowledge of things. For the knowledge of things what is necessary is the knowledge that the speaker is an authority even if he may not be so actually. As soon as one understands the meaning of a sentence and knows the speaker to be an authority, there arises in him the knowledge of things. Afterwards, if he wants
