Book Title: Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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Page 138
________________ ON VYAPTI 129 So, one type of effect can never be regarded as being produced at times by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause. When we feel that there are instances of one type of effect at times being produced by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause (e.g. scorpions being generated at times by cowdung and at times by scorpion-parents) our feeling is not justified. We commit a fallacy of non-observation. The two effects produced by two different types of cause are not really of one type. We are deceived by their outward similarity. A close scrutiny and examination may reveal the traits which turn them into different types.28 But this does not solve the problem. We ask Dharmakīrti as to how he determines that there obtains a causal relation (i. e. the relation of necessary sequence) or an identity relation (i. e. the relation of necessary simultaneity) between two things. Experience cannot give us the knowledge of necessary squence or necessary simultaneity. It gives us the knowledge of mere sequence or mere simultaneity. Thus the notorious problem of induction remains unsolved. It is not easy for Dharmakīrti' to show how one acquires the knowledge of causality or identity, i. e. of necessary sequence or necessary simultaneity. But he does not take recourse to the idea of a direct transcedental perception of these two necessities as was done by other philosophers including even Prajňakaragupta. Looking to the general trend of his philosophy we may surmise that the following might be the solution at the back of his mind. Buddhist logicians hold that we directly perceive nothing but point instants; thus on their view perception is nothing but a running multiplicity of sensations without any connections or order in them. It is only the Intellect (vikalpa-buddhi) that constructs a system or order out of them through the instrumentality of the two necessities in question. Thus these two necessities are not derived from experience but in fact 'precede experience and make the world orderly and intelligible. In this sense they are apriori. This means that according to the Buddhist logicians there is no uniformity, universality and order in the universe. It is the Intellect (vikalpa-buddhi) that imparts order and uniformity to the world. They are superimposed by it on the external reality. The universe is really not a cosmos but a chaos, so to say. The pure sensations as such represent what reality is and they being chaotic what they represent should also be regarded as chaotic. Some one might urge here that the Buddhist logician too should be regarded as considering the world to be uniform and regular because

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