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ON VYAPTI
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rain is necessary because they are the co-effects of atmospheric changes. In this manner all these necessary relations can be reduced to that of causality. This shows the insight of the Buddhist logicians into the nature of causality. It is their fundamental tenet that between two independent phenomena there can be no necessary relation other than that of causality. (Dharmakīrti has repeatedly stated this in his Pramāņavārtika as we have seen earlier.] This helps them to be thorough in their study of causality. Moreover, the emphasis put on causality in the Pali canon might have stimulated the Buddhist philosophers to probe deep into the phenomenon of causality.
As we shall see, this Buddhist position somewhat helps the Buddhists to answer the third and difficult question, viz. how do we acquire the knowledge that a particuar relation is necessary and universal." Those who posit innumerable necessary connections cannot say that a particular relation is necessary because it is based on either causality or essential identity. Even the Jaina logicians are here not in a better position than their Nyāya-Vaiseșika counterparts. The former have accepted two types of necessary connections in addition to those based on causality and essential identity; but the acceptance is without any (apparent) reason. A relation cannot be established as necessary merely by swearing that it is necessary. So, the Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Jaina' logicians have to find out other means of justifying the necessity of a particular connection.
Some hold. that the knowledge of necessary connection (vyāpti) is acquired by a single act of sense-perception. For example, the necessary connection between smoke and fire is grasped at the time of the very first observation of the two together.12 On the very face of it this view is untenable. The object of sense-perception is something existing at the present time and place while the necessary connection between smoke and fire expresses their relation in all times and places. So, we cannot grasp the necessary relation between two things at the time of the first observation of the two together.13 Some have modified this view. According to them, though it is not possible for a sense-organ to grasp the necessary connection at the first observation, it can do so at the time of the final observation. Why ? It is so because at the latter time the capacity of the sense-organ is much more enhanced as a result of repeated observations. Thus at the time of the final observation the relevant sense-organ, assised by the revival of the memory impressions of previous observations, grasps the necessary connection between two
