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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARŠANA
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matters. The Buddhists support their contention by the example of Buddha who knew and saw dharma as such in the form of four Noble Truths. Dharmakīrti does not deny the possibility of knowing-all and seeing-all in the sense in which they have been accepted by the Buddha. But he lays emphasis on the need for knowing and seeing the essentials. He little cares whither a person knows-sees or does not know-see the things which are not connected with the religious pursuit.39 This attitude of Dharmakirti is exactly identical with the one adopted by Vyäsa with regard to knowing-all and seeing-all. Vyāsa explicitly declares that one can become kevali even without actually becoming all-knower and allseer.
Now we take up the problem of simultaneity or succession of knowing (jñāna) and seeing (darśana). As we have already said, truly speaking jñāna means knowing by reasoning and thought in reflective meditation (savitarkasavicāra samāpatti) and darśana means seeing in non-reflective meditation (nirvitarka-nirvicāra samāpatti). Non-reflective meditation invariably follows the reflective one, if it takes place. So, it naturally follows from this that darśana (seeing) always follows jñāna (knowing). There is no possibily of their simultaneous occurrence, nor the possibility of their co-existence, nor the possibility of the reverse order, that is, darśana preceding jñāna. .
But, as we know, Buddhist logicians'consider the six thought-free (kalpanāpodha) cognitions produced by six organs to be darśanas (cases of seeing). So, it is quite natural for them to mainatin that if jñāna (thought and reasoning = knowing) arises it arises in their wake. But the logicians will not be satisfied with this general statement of the fact. They say that this is true if we have in view the origination of two series - one of seeing and another of knowing; the series of seeing arises first and the series of knowing follows it immediately. That is, in such a situation, in the first moment there takes place seeing only pertaining to that object-series and in the second moment there are both the seeing and knowing of that very object-series. Thus there is a possibility of simultaneous occurrence of both seeing and knowing from the second moment onward even with regard to one and the same object (= objectseries). Again, seeing of one thing and knowing (= thought) of another thing can occur simultaneously. Moreover, when the knowing i.e. thought with regard to one thing is going on, there can take place seeing of another thing. From this point of view, one may say that even at this level knowing can precede seeing. Taking into account all these cases
