Book Title: Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

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Page 102
________________ ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARSANA 93 ly.62 Operation of the capacity to know all invariably precedes the operation of the capacity to see all. The infinity of jñāna is neither identical with the capacity to know all nor identical with actually knowing all. The same thing can be said with regard to the infinity of darśana. However infinite all the objects taken together may be, their infinity can never coincide with the vast infinity of jñāna and darśana. (Here again we are reminded of Patañjali's dictum... jñānasya ānantyāj jñeyam alpam). So, those who say that jñāna is infinite because it knows all things as also that darśana is infinite because it sees all things are committing a bluner. As a matter of fact, we should say that jñāna knows all things and darśana sees all things because jñāna and darśana have attained their infinity on the destruction of all veils. Now there arises a question as to whether or not such a person actually knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously. Jainas are of the opinion that he knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously.63 Thus they differ from the early Buddhists who maintain that such a person does never know all things simultaneously, nor does he see all things simultaneously but he knows and sees that thing which he wants to know and see at a particular time. Jainas agree with the Sānkhya-Yoga thinkers on the point that such a person can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously. But they differ from them in that they contend that this person knows always all things simultaneously and sees always all things simultaneously. The Sankhya-Yoga thinkers, as we know, maintain that he can actually know all things simultaneously and can actually see all things simultaneously provided he performs samyama (= dhāraņā-dhyāna-samādhi) on ksaņa and kşaņakarama. Jainas reject this proviso laid down by the Sānkhya-Yoga thinkers. (Even the Buddha and the Buddhists have accepted the proviso for knowing-all and seeingall though they have accepted knowing-all and seeing-all in a different sense.) For the Sānkhya-Yoga thinkers actual knowing-all and actual seeing-all do not constitute the permanent feature of viveki. But for Jainas they are the permanent features of viveki (= «vitarāga). This naturally follows from their rejection of the proviso. It is really a problem for us as to why the Jainas have rejected the proviso and as a result of it maintained that their viveki (= vītarāga) or kevali knows all things always and sees all things always. This seems to be the result of their undue emphasis on sarvajñatā-sarvadarsitā. They shifted their emphasis

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