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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARŠANA
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both. How can there be knowing-all without savikalpaka dhyāna ? And how can there be seeing-all without nirvikalpa dhyāna ? With the rejection of these dhyānas, there cannot be the functioning of these two labdhis at all.
These logicians wrongly ask if there remains anything unknown to vitarāga. If yes, then he is not sarvajña. If no, then what is the use of seeing-all ? In other words, knowing-all is identical with seeing-all.69 But this logic is defective. Knower of all is not necessarily seer of all. We should note that the objects that are grasped by his jñāna are the same in number (i.e. sarva= all) as those grasped by his darśana. Though the objects are the same in number there is a difference in their graspings by jñāna and darśana. The grasping of all objects by jñāna is not of the nature of sākşātkāra whereas grasping of all objects by darśana is of the nature of sākṣātkāra. So, logicians should not reject the grasping which is of the nature of sākṣātkāra. They should not even reject the grasping of all objects by jñāna because it is a necessary previous stage on the basis of which is founded the grasping which is of the nature of sākṣātkāra. On studying the arguments given by these logicians for identifying knowing-all and seeing-all we feel that they are obsessed with the idea of nitya jñāna of Isvara recognized in some non-Jain circles.
As Jainas have rejected the proviso, those who strictly follow the āgamic view of their successive occurrence have to declare that their alternative occurrence goes on perpetually, i.e. in all the old moments will occur knowing-all and in all the even moments will occur seeingall. (According to those who believe in the reverse order of their occurrence, their alternative occurrence goes on perpetually, i.e. in all odd moments will occur seeing-all and in all the even moments will occur knowing-all).10 This position is vulnerable and ludicrous. If they would have accepted the proviso, their position would have become most cogent and logicians would not have dared to attack it.
The yogi having avadhi-jñana and avadhi-darśana as labdhis does not always know and see all physical things falling within the spatial and temporal boundaries; he knows and sees only that physical object which he wants to know and see at a particular time, having entered into proper meditations ('upayoga lagākara'). This is what the Jainas believe. Even in the case of knowing-all and seeing-all they should accept the same procedure. They should say : In the case of knowingall and seeing-all there is no avadhi. That is, vītarāga can know and see
