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ON THE PROBLEM OF JNANA-DARŠANA
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If we take into account all this, in the case of vitarăga Mahāvīra jñāna seems to mean 'cognition involving thought (vikalpa) in the prthaktva-vitarkasavicāra dhyāna as also in the former stage of ekatvavitarkanirvicāra dhyāna', and darśana seems to mean 'cognition free from thought (vikalpa) at the highest point of ekatvavitarkanirvicāra dhayāna when the mind ceases to function. To use non-Jaina terminology, in the context of Mahāvīra jñāna means 'cognition that a yogi has in savikalpaka samādhi and darśana means 'cognition that a yogi has in nirvikalpaka samādhi.'53 This suggests us the defining characteristics of jñāna and darśana. Jñāna is that cognition which involves thought (vikalpa) whereas darśana is that cognition which is free from thought.54
But some Jaina thinkers hold that darśana grasps the universal (= generic attributes = sāmānya) and jñāna grasps the particular (= specific attributes = visesa).55 Upholders of this view have to reject the old traditional view that in the case of Manāvīra darśana follows jñāna whereas in the case of ordinary persons jñāna follows darśana.56 They declare that in the case of all persons without any exception jñāna follows darśana. Thus this view comes in conflict with the old traditional view that in the case of vītarāga Mahāvīra darśana follows jñāna. So, we should reject this view. It is interesting to note that this view betrays Vaiseșika influence. Other Jaina philosophers criticized this view from a different standpoint. They say: 'A particular without the universal is a figment, and so jñāna grasping a particular bereft of the universal is invalid, nay unreal. Similarly, the darśana grasping the universal without the particular is also unreal. Jñāna and darśana both being valid and real must grasp the reality which is of the nature of both particular and the universal. Each of the two, jñāna and darśana, grasps reality as it is, that is, a complex of universal-cum-particular. So, the view that darśana cognizes the universal whreras jñāna cognizes a particular is not acceptable.'7 .These Jaina thinkers maintain that darśana cognizes the ātman i.e. citta (= sva) whereas jñāna cognizes the external objects (=para). 8 This view also is not satisfactory because almost all the Jaina ācāryas are of the view that jñāna grasps both sva and para (jñānam svapara-prakāśakam). Each and every cognition, irrespective of its being jñāna or darśana, grasps both sva and para. (There are only two exceptions to this general rule. We shall have an occasion to deal with these exceptional cases.) So, we are not in a position to accept even this view that darśana grasps sva and jñāna grasps para. As a result of all
