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ON THE PROBLEM QF JNANA-DARŠANA
83 on the ground of their being free from vikalpa (= reasoning and thought). But if we view them from another angle we find that only svasamvedana and yogipratyakşa can truly claim to be darśana because therein ‘seeing' of the object takes place without the help of sense-organs and/or mind. This is not the case with other two pratyaksas, If we view the situation in this way the early Buddhists seem to be absolutely right in their stand that there is only one case of 'seeing' (darśana), and that is ‘seeing' in non-reflective meditation which follows the reflective one. Objects of darśana mentioned in the Pițakas betray the correctness of this view. Again, the order of jñāna and darśana, mentioned in the phrase "jānāti passati' clearly suggests the same thing, that is, that yogidarśana is the only case of darśana'. (We have kept svasamvedana out of the purview as it requires special treatment).
Now let us take up the problem of knowing-all (sarvajñatā) and seeing-all (sarvadarśana). Let us first study Buddha's two statements recorded in the MajjhimaNikāya. They are: (1) natthi so samano vā brāhmaṇo vā yo sakideva sabban ñassati sabbam dakkhiti.....n'tan thānām vijjati. (II. 127) (Tr. There is no sramana or brāhmaṇa who knows all things simultaneously and sees all things simultaneously...for such a thing is impossible.) (2) ye te......evam āhamsu : samaño Gotamo evam āha : natthi so samano vā brāhmano vā yo sabbaññā sabbadassāvi aparisesam ñanadassanam patijānissati, n'etam thānan viljati ti na me te vuttavādino abbhācikkhanti ca pana mam te asatā abhūtenā ti (loc. cit.). (Tr. Those who say, “Sramana Gotama says thus : there is no sramana or brāhmaṇa who is all-knower, all-seer and having infinite knowledge and vision, for such a thing is impossible" are not reporting me rightly and are accusing me of saying what is untrue and false.)
From these two statements it becomes quite clear that Buddha explicitly rejects knowing-all-simultaneously and seeing-all-simultaneously, but he accepts knowing-all and seeing-all in some another sense. He has not clearly stated as to in what sense he accepts them. But it is not very difficult to deduce from these two statements the exact sense in which he accepts them. If we keep before our mind's eye these two statements, we at once see that there are only two alternative senses in which he might be accepting them-(1) knowing all in succession and seeing all in succession (2) knowing and seeing whatever one wants to know and see, entering into the proper type of meditation. The first alternative is to be rejected because all objects, being infinite, 37 cannot be known or seen in succession one by one. So, it naturally follows that
