Aspect of Jainology Part 1 Lala Harjas Rai

Author(s): Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Shodhpith Varanasi

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Jaina Theory of parokşa-Jñana perceptual vividness. Akalarka classified parokşa-jñāna into following types : (1) Smộti, (2) Pratyabhijñā, (3) Tarka, (4) Anumāna and (5) Agama. All these being indirect knowledge. Let us discuss these five types of mediate knowledge one by one and see which of them is very important.
(1) Smộti (memory)—Memory is the knowledge of an object perceived in the past as 'that due to revival of its disposition (samskāra) which is a particular power of the self. It is revived. It is an effect of the revival of the disposition of the previous perception of an object. The object remembered must have been known in the past and it is experienced at the time of recalling it, in the form of 'that'.
There is a controversy among the philosophers, whether memory is a pramāņa or not. Some holds that memory is a pramāņa and some holds it is not a pramāņa. There are mainly two traditions on the point the Jaina and the non-Jaina.
According to the Jainas memory is a sub-class of pramāņa. This is clearly a departure from the view usually held by other-schools of Indian Philosophy on the point. On the other hand, non-Jaina tradition, vedic as well as Buddhist Philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent pramāņa on the ground that it depends on the validity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva).
On the other hand, the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of Smrti Pramāņa. Their main argument is that the Samskāras recall for any particular purpose; the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gained through senses. Therefore, memory is considered to be a pramāņa because it is true facts (samvādin) just as perception etc. are treated as pramāņas, because they are true facts.
The validity of pramāņa can't be ascertained merely by relation to its dependence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted, even pramāņa will cease to be a pramäņa, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emperical perception.
(2) Pratyabhijñán (recognition)-Recognition is the synthetic cognition, caused by experience and recollection and cognising the simi