Yatindrasuri Diksha Shatabdi Samrak Granth

Author(s): Jinprabhvijay
Publisher: Saudharmbruhat Tapagacchiya Shwetambar Shree Sangh

Page 1155

YATEENDRASURI SMARAK GRANTH In this connection, it can be noted that there 2. Padmarajiah, Y.J. Jaina Teories of Reality and cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifica- Knowledge, p. 301 tions of birth and decay. On the other hand, modi- 3. Jacob, H- Studies in Jainism, p. 17.52 fications cannot exist without an abiding or eter
Upadhye, A.N. (edd) Pravacanasara, Intronal something, a permanent, for birth decay and
duction-LXXXV stability-these three constitute the characteristic of a substance or entity. These three characteristics
Padmarajiah, Y.J. Jaina Theories of Reality must dwell together in harmony to make a real
and Knowledge, p. 304 diffinition of a thing in its integral form. In this re
6.
Ibid. P. 305 spect each naya, therefore, if taken independently 7. Pujyapada, Sarvarthasiddhi, Sutra - 6 isolated from the other, can never yield an edequate 8. Satkhandagama - p. 163. idea of an entity. Both these therefore, divorced from
Vidyananda, Tattvarthasloka Vartika 1-6., each other, are wrong in their standpoints. Therefore, Jaina logicians say that a man who holds
Suri, Vadideva : Syadvada-ratnakara vol. IV., the view of the cumulative character of truth
p. 44. (Anekantavada) never says that a particular view 11. Vidyananda : Astasahhastri, p. 209 is right or that a particular view is wrong. Again if do Tattvarthaslokavartika, 1-6 . all the nayas arrange themselves in a proper way 12. Samantabhandra : Aptamimansa, Gatha - and supplement to each other, then alone they are
108 worthy of being termed as the whole truth or the
Vidyananda : Astasahhastri, p. 290 right view in its entirety. But in this case they merge
13.. Tetia, N.: Acarya Bhiksu Commemoration vo. their individuality in the collective whole." There
Sec. III, P. 103 fore the right approach should be to accept the relating validity of knowledge. In order to give a
14. Jayadhavala, p. 283 logical shape to this view the Jainas have formuled; Sthananga - 209 a theory of relative standpoint" and they are of
There are four distinct phase of the develop opinion that there can never be an absolute claim
ment of the doctine in the exegalical and logiabout the truth of any expression."
cal literature of the Janas, Viz. At last, we can say in the words of G.H. Rao 1. Niksena as doctrine of verbal usage, that each philosophy approaching reality from a 2. Nikespa as a doctrine of aspects of reality particular and a partial standpoint, looks upon the 3 Nama-niksepa as entailing a doctrine of imone they adopt as the only true standpoint. Jainas
port of words and reject the idea of the absolute which is playing
Niksepa as a critique of absolutism. havoc in the field of philosophy by creating absolute monism, absolute pluralism, and absolute ni
Dr. Tattia, Acarya Bhiksu commenoration volhilism. By thus rejecting the absolute and one
ume, Sect. III, p. 71 sided, they claim to save philosophy from the 15. Raju, P.T. The philosophical Traditions of inchaos of conflicting opinions. Without partiality to dia, p. 97 any one they promise to give us a theory of relativ- 16. Hemachandra : Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda ity which harmonises all standpoints."
dvatrinshika, SU-5, Akalanka : Laghistraya
Tika-62 NOTES AND REFERENCES
17. There are mainly three traditions which are 1. Siddhasena Divakahr, Sanmatitarkah
based on the number of nayas occuring in Prakarana, Gatha-22-25.
the classification adopted by each of them