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in course of time then that brings in the distinction between actual and possible. Does Jaina account turn out to be saitsfactory and consistent on this count ? (3) It is claimed that a thing has, as pointed out above, dispositions and properties. The question that arises is : are they the structural features of things ? What is the ground to say so ? Are such structural features too destroyed and if they are, would a certain thing be that even while its structural features arc destroyed ? Basically, questions of the kind we have mentioned here figure in the Jaina ontological investigation, no matter whether the real that is considered is Jiva or Ajiva. But they are not free from having impart on methodological inquiry as well. . Syadv da or Saptabhangi
Syadvada or Saptabhangi is a theory that raises host of methodological and/or conceptual issues, and we wish to draw attention to some of them : (1) It is often said that Syadvada is more a matter of language and expression rather than of knowledge and ontology. But it is also said that Syat' means Anekanta and Anekanta is explicitly ontological and epistemological. Hence, the justifiability of the former claim needs to be examined. (2) The notion of 'bhango' needs to be analysed properly in order to point out whether it means modility or a type of proposition of anything else as also to show whether and if yes on what ground, some of the 'bhangas' are basic and others are derivative. An examination and analysis of this kind, further, needs to be shown to be consistent with the doctrine of Syadvada. (3) It needs to be explored whether and how far possibilistic claims have a bearing on the Jaina distinction between Jiva and Ajiva, for such claims have a principal point where a contest between actually real and an hypothetically possible prevails. It needs to be brought out, through examination of the Jaina theory of reality, whether the Jaina view expects to augment the realm of what is or what does happen by what can or what might happen. Such hypothetical reach lack an objective foundation in the existential order and they cease to be independently of conceiving mind. Are some of the reals. then, considered to be mind-dependent, or at least thonght-dependent ? Is this contention an intended or an unintended consequence of the theory ? For, the claim 'x' is possible but not actual may be understood propositionally or ontologically. In the latter case it raises the question of the exis-tential status of what is asserted by propositions. Further, ontological issues regarding possibility are those posed by modality of de re type. But unactualized possibiles do not belong to the real world, though they can be conceived, entertained. Thus they exist not unqualifiedly but in a realtivised manner, as objects of certain intellectual processes. The possible, albeit unrealized, states of affairs or things obtain an ontological footing. That is, they can be said to exist appropriately in so far as they lie within generie province of minds which conceive them. The analysis of the concept demands reference to workings of mind. It, at least, demands reference to thought process. The question is : have the Jaina thinkers to say something of this kind ? Possibilities could be said to be minddependent as the essential purport of the very conception of possibility is mind
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