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nally or internally (I.20). Thus like other Indian realists, the Jainas try to seek truth or falsity in terms of consistency of cognition with objects other than itself, and the truth value is not to be attributed to pramāņa as a means of cognition. Devasüri further elucidates in SVR that, these values are internally ascertained when the object is well-acquainted by repeated experience (abhyasa-daśayām).4 A similar idea is found in the Pariks amukhasūtra (PM) of Māņikyanandin and its commentary Prameyakamalamārtanda (PKM) by Prabhācandra", to which Devasūri undoubtedly owed his work. Take for instance one's own palm, one need not resort to any means other than jñānagrāhaka, it being internally known to be true. But, in the case of an unacquainted object, the first cognition arises, is followed by voli tional action to acquire the object (pravstti), and therefrom the second cognition is obtained. The truth of the first cognition which has produced action towards the object (pravartaka-jñāna) is ascertained through the second cognition, in accordance as the latter is a subsequent confirmatory cognition (samvādaka-jñāna, samvādin, avisamvādin) or a cognition of pragmatic consequences (arthakriyā-jñāna) etc. in relation to the former. In this case, the samvādakā-jñāna or arthakriya-jñāna etc. is accepted to be true by the Jainas, without resorting to further verification, and thus the infinite regress is evaded.
So far as the external determination is concerned, truth and falsity in origination and apprehension depend on excellence (guma) and deficiency (dosa) respectively; thus the Jainas postulate two distinct positive factors. But suppose a cognition is first originated and apprehended as true, as the Mimāṁsakas hold, independent of any other means, and it is changed into a false one only by subsequent deficiencies. Then only one determinant viz. dosa is to be accepted. Does it necessarily follow that the absence of doña which determines the truth might signify nothing but excellence (guna)? On the other hand, if, like the view attributed to the Buddhists by Madhaväcārya, falsity is originated and apprehended internally and is developed into truth by subsequent positive factor viz. guna, then is the absence of guna not identical with dosa? All the polemic works dealing with this topic are invariably devoted to the inquiry into the characteristics of guna and dosa with a detailed and subtle discussion. Here such controversy is passed over.
The peculiarities of the Jaina theory might be summed up as follows:
1. The determination of the truth value of a cognition has been examined hitherto from two-fold aspect viz. utpatti and jñapti, according to general treatises like SVR etc. However, Prabhācandra ( 980-1065 ) in his PKM aud Nyayakumudacandra (NKC) establishes three-fold of division viz. utpatti, jñapti and svakärya. The term svakārya ( the result of pramāņa ) is intended to conform with the aforesaid phala, as is contrasted with pramāņa, which consists of pravrtti, nivrtti and upkeşā.
Though apprehension (jñāpti ) invariably presupposes, with the exception of the case of a well-acquainted object ( abhyasita-visaya ), pravrtti by which to verify
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